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FOREWORD
The SEACEN countries have benefited significantly from the large volume
of capital flows in the last two decades. After experiencing a financial crisis in
1997, most of the countries in the region have become increasingly concerned
about the effective management of capital flows. Despite the numerous benefits,
capital flows may also pose challenges to monetary and financial stability of an
economy. Massive capital inflows may complicate the transmission of monetary
policy while their sudden reversal may create instability in the financial markets.
In light of these issues, this study explores the implications of capital flows for
central bank policies and reviews country experiences on managing capital flows
in the SEACEN region.
This study finds that both domestic and external factors are responsible for
the increased capital inflows in the SEACEN region and that the surge in capital
inflows was one of the contributory factors for asset price bubbles and sharp
increase in bank credit. Based on the analysis of the composition of capital
flows in the SEACEN region, the study argues that due to the increasing share
of highly volatile short-term capital inflows, the SEACEN economies are facing
the risk of sudden significant capital reversal. The study also puts forth some
suggestions to optimise the benefits of capital flows while minimising potential
risks. We hope that the findings and suggestions of this study may be valuable
reference to central bankers and other policy makers.
This collaborative research was led by Dr. Min B. Shrestha and
Dr. Choon-Seng Lim, Vincent, both Senior Economists of The SEACEN Centre,
and participated by 14 country researchers from 12 member central banks and
monetary authorities. The SEACEN Centre wishes to express its sincere gratitude
to the participating member central banks and their country researchers for
actively participating in this project and preparing the country papers for their
respective countries. They are namely, Ms. Nurhuaida Damit of the Ministry of
Finance, Brunei Darussalam; Mr. Yayat Cadarajat of Bank Indonesia; Mr. Raja
Syamsul Anwar and Ms. Tan Bee Chin of Bank Negara Malaysia; Mr. Gan-
Ochir Doojav of The Bank of Mongolia; Daw Thida Myo Aung of Central Bank
of Myanmar; Mr. Bibhu Aryal of Nepal Rastra Bank; Mr. Tanu Irau of Bank
of Papua New Guinea; Ms. Sittie Hanisha M. Butocan of Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas; Mr. P. Pushparajah of Central Bank of Sri Lanka; Mr. Yu Hsiao Yuan
of Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan); Mr. Khatharit Sitthikul and
Ms. Nasha Ananchotikul of Bank of Thailand and Ms. Ngo Thi Thu Tra of
State Bank of Vietnam. The SEACEN Centre also wishes to thank Dr. Ramon
Moreno, Head of Emerging Market Issues, Bank for International Settlements,Basel, Switzerland, for his invaluable comments on the integrative paper of this
volume. The Project Leaders also would like to thank participants of the Fourth
International Conference on Business and Economic Research held in Bangkok
on 28–30 December 2008 for their constructive comments.
The views expressed in this study, however, are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect those of The SEACEN Centre or the SEACEN member
central banks/monetary authorities.
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The SEACEN economies have liberalised their external accounts and
domestic financial markets. The current account is fully convertible in all the
countries in the SEACEN region while the capital account is by and large fully
convertible in the majority of these countries. Since early 1990s, net capital flow
to the SEACEN countries increased steadily until 1996 due to the massive
increase in total capital inflows. However, after the financial crisis of 1997, total
capital outflows have outweighed total capital inflows resulting in a negative net
capital flow.
Both domestic factors such as attractive economic growth, attractive interest
rates and large current account deficits and external factors such as low world
interest rates are responsible for the increased capital inflows in the region.
However, determinants of short-term capital inflows vary from that of the total
capital inflows. Notably, short-term capital inflows are found to be inversely
associated with domestic economic growth. The effects of push and pull factors
on capital flows vary across the countries. Recent experiences of SEACEN
countries indicate that the US sub-prime mortgage crisis has led to slower capital
inflows in the region while domestic political climate, further liberalisation in
overseas investment; and, encouragement to invest abroad have accelerated
capital outflows.
The SEACEN region has benefited significantly from the increased capital
inflows mainly in terms of increased investment, higher economic growth,
favourable external accounts and developed financial markets. However, capital
flows have also led to challenges for monetary and financial stability. The recent
experience of SEACEN countries shows that capital flows can create asset
price bubbles and induce sharp increases in bank credit while outflow of capital
results in lower equity prices and depreciation of exchange rates.
Short-term capital inflows are highly volatile and prone to sudden reversals.
After 2003, the share of short-term inflow started to become increasingly dominant
in the total inflow in the SEACEN region, resembling the pattern of capital
flows before the 1997 crisis. Due to the larger share of highly volatile short-
term foreign capital, SEACEN economies are again, facing the risk of massive
capital reversals. In order to prevent a repetition of the same problems in the
future, SEACEN countries need to encourage more long-term capital inflows
rather than short-term ones. To safeguard the financial system and the economy
from speculative attacks, authorities need to implement more prudent regulationsxii
and cautiously monitor potential areas of such attacks. In order to maintain a
conducive monetary stability environment, central banks need to sterilise inflows
with appropriate intervention measures.
Freer exchange rates allow for more capital flows in and out of the country.
However, in the time of distress, the countries that have a free floating exchange
rate regime may suffer from larger capital reversals. Therefore, a managed
floating exchange regime may be more advantageous during a crisis.
The financial markets and economies of the SEACEN countries are currently
affected by the global financial crisis, due mainly to external factors. In order
to minimise further negative impacts of the crisis on various sectors of the
economy including capital flows, to speed up the recovery process, and also to
explore the possibility of inventing new economic drivers within the region,




CAPITAL FLOWS MANAGEMENT IN
THE SEACEN COUNTRIES
by
Min B. Shrestha and Choon-Seng Lim, Vincent1
1. Background
The liberalisation of capital accounts and domestic financial markets in the
emerging countries has resulted in large surges in capital flows. Various studies
have suggested that recipient countries are best placed to reap the benefits of
foreign inflows if their economic fundamentals are sound. Capital inflows can
finance a higher rate of economic growth but they can also be disruptive as
they can lead to rapid monetary and credit expansions, higher inflation, real
exchange rate appreciation and unsustainable external debt positions. On the
other hand, abrupt reversal of capital flows may bring severe economic
consequences.
The SEACEN countries attracted large volumes of capital from developed
countries during the 1980s and 1990s. After the financial crisis of 1997, the
direction and composition of capital flows have seen a significant change. Based
on the past experiences of the cycle of massive capital inflows, sudden reversal
and financial crisis, Governments these days are not just courting capital inflows
but are concerned about the proper management of such flows. The objectives
of capital flows management are to ensure that the financial system is able to
intermediate inflows in a sound and safe manner, direct the inflows into the
most productive uses, and to limit the adverse impact of capital flows, particularly
large and sudden speculative short-term capital flows.
Against the above backdrop, this study aims at examining the overall status
of capital flows management in the SEACEN region. The main objectives of
this research are to share the country experiences on managing capital flows,
in particular short-term capital flows; and to explore the implications of capital
flows for central bank policies. The study presents an overview of the recent
developments in capital movements and compares the capital flow management
policies in the SEACEN countries. Based on its findings, the study suggests
some policy measures for effective management of capital flows.
__________________
1. Senior Economists, The SEACEN Research and Training Centre2
This study in general covers all the sixteen SEACEN countries which include
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia,
Myanmar, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan,
Thailand and Vietnam. However, due to data unavailability, some countries are
omitted in various sections of data analysis and empirical investigation. The
countries covered are indicated in the respective sections of the discussion
wherever relevant. Individual country cases of 12 SEACEN countries are
discussed in detail in the accompanying 12 country papers.
This paper, which is the integrative part of this volume, is organised as
follows. Section 2 presents the literature survey on the theory and evidence on
various aspects of capital flows. Section 3 discusses the general policy
frameworks for capital flows in the SEACEN countries. Section 4 examines
recent trends in capital flows in the region. Section 5 discusses the impact of
ongoing global financial crisis on capital flows. Section 6 outlines the recent
policy measures implemented to mitigate the negative impact of global financial
crisis. Section 7 analyzes determinants of capital flows. Section 8 discusses the
monetary and financial implications of capital flows. Finally, Section 9 presents
concluding remarks.
2. Literature Survey
2.1 Determinants of Capital Flows
Economic theories suggest that capital will move from rich to poor countries
due to investment opportunities and return differentials (Lucas, 1990; Mishra et
al, 2000). Studies show that various push and pull factors work as the determinants
of capital flows. Push factors refer to those that lead to capital flows out of the
capital exporting country while pull factors refer to the internal factors which
attract the capital to the recipient country.
Calvo et al (1993) found that external factors such as declines in US interest
rates were the primary determinant of capital inflows to developing countries in
the early 1990s. While studying broader samples of emerging markets, Fernandez-
Arias (1996) found that global interest rates accounted for nearly 90% of the
increase in portfolio investment flows to the average emerging market in 1989-
1993. Kim (2000) also poses the similar view that external factors mainly in the
form of changes in the foreign interest rate and foreign output determine capital
flows.3
According to Salt (2002), both external and internal factors are important
in determining capital flows but the relative importance of external and internal
factors differ across components of the capital account. As documented by
World Bank (1997), domestic factors became more important determinants of
capital flows in 1993-1995, as rising US interest rates did not interrupt continued
flows of capital to developing countries. Kang et al (2002) found that both pull
and push factors were important determinants of capital flows in Korea during
the 1990s and current account was one of the most important determinants of
capital flows.
Bacchetta et al (2000) argue that financial liberalisation and structural reforms
which included removal of capital controls, liberalisation of the domestic financial
system, trade liberalisation, macroeconomic stabilisation, and privatisation
undertaken in recent years in emerging as well as industrialised countries are
the fundamental factors behind the increase in capital inflows to developing
countries. Mody and Srinivasan (1998) argue that new capital flows tend to go
to countries that have received large flows in the past.
2.2  Consequences of Capital Flows
Most of the studies support the view that foreign capital positively affects
domestic consumption and investment which in turn leads to higher economic
growth (North, 1956; Chenery and Strout, 1966; Calvo et al, 1996; Bosworth et
al, 1999; Mishra et al, 2000; Moreno, 2000). The additional capital coming from
outside can help increase investments in the economy. Mishra et al (2000) find
that a 1% increase in capital inflows to Africa boosts investment by more than
1%. Ito (2000) opines that capital flows to Asia increased investment, which in
turn contributed to higher growth in Asian nations and subsequent high growth
performances attracted further capital inflows creating a virtuous cycle of capital
flows and economic growth.
In addition to increasing consumption and financing rapid rates of investment,
capital flows also allow investors to diversify their risks (Calvo et al, 1996;
Moreno, 2000). Several studies also suggest that foreign finance may come
packaged with expertise and can be a vehicle for technology transfer (Borensztein
et al, 1998; Urata and Kawai, 2000; Eichengreen, 2006).
Some studies argue that the productivity and benefits of foreign capital will
depend on the pre-existing conditions in the economy. Lucas (1990) finds that
new investment is more productive in countries with a skilled workforce and
well-developed physical infrastructure. Foreign direct investment helped boost4
productivity in Malaysia, Taiwan and southern China but similar impact was not
evident in Morocco, Tunisia, and Uruguay (Mishra et al, 2000). Borensztein et
al (1998) suggest that FDI can contribute to economic growth only when a
sufficient absorptive capability of the advanced technologies is available in the
host country. Bailliu (2000) analysed panel data of 40 developing countries over
the period 1975-1995 and found that capital inflows can accelerate growth only
if the banking sector has reached a certain level of development.
Studies also point out to the differing impact of the foreign capital on the
economy depending on the composition. Bosworth et al (1999) document stronger
impact of foreign direct investment and weaker impact of portfolio flows and
international bank lending on domestic investment. According to World Bank
(1996), foreign direct investment is more likely than portfolio investment to go
into new projects, increasing demand in capital goods markets and for capital
imports. Mishra et al (2000) find that private capital flows in the form of portfolio
flows are associated with the development of domestic capital markets, which
in turn bolster growth.
Capital inflows may bring various benefits to the economy but it is not
immune from negative impact and risks. Several studies have analysed the
potential negative impact of capital inflows. Volatility in capital flows may have
negative influence as sudden reversal of the capital can be devastating for
recipient countries. Moreover, capital flows may also be associated with financial
instability and macroeconomic risks.
Lensik et al. (2003) examine the impact of uncertain capital flows on the
growth of 60 developing countries during the 1990s. They find that uncertain
capital flows have a negative effect on financial market and growth in developing
countries.
Various factors may be behind the sudden capital reversal. Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (1998) studied sudden reversals in capital inflows in 86 countries
from 1971-1992 and found that both external and domestic factors may cause
sudden reversals. External factors that increased the likelihood of capital flow
reversals included worsening terms of trade, high US interest rates, and low
official transfers to the developing country while domestic factors likely to be
associated with a capital reversal included larger current account deficits or
foreign borrowing, a smaller ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, lower foreign
reserves, and a smaller proportion of concessional debt. A study by Berg and
Pattillo (1998) suggests that domestic factors may have played a larger role in
the East Asian currency crises of 1997.5
Capital flows can increase the vulnerability of a country with weak financial
markets to banking and exchange rate crises (Mishra et al, 2000). Kawai and
Lamberte (2008) argue that capital inflows could create maturity and currency
mismatches in the balance sheets of private sector debtors (particularly banks
and corporations), push up equity and other asset prices, and potentially reduce
the quality of assets, thereby contributing to greater financial fragility. According
to Eichengreen (2006), financial sector weaknesses played a larger role than
macroeconomic imbalances in setting the stage for the crisis. Among these
weaknesses were poorly regulated banking systems, pervasive connected lending,
unreliable bankruptcy and insolvency procedures, and weak creditor rights.
Schadler (2008) find that about 15% of the large capital inflow episodes over
the past 20 years ended in crisis.
The macroeconomic risks associated with larger capital flows include rapid
monetary expansion, inflationary pressures, real exchange rate appreciation and
widening current account deficits (Calvo et al, 1996; World Bank, 1996; Bacchetta
et al, 2000). The capital inflows can lead to inflationary pressures, especially
when they are monetised. Since an inflow of capital also implies a higher demand
for a nation’s currency, it often means an appreciating exchange rate which
may widen the trade deficit to uncomfortable levels (Calvo et al, 1996). Kawai
and Lamberte (2008) opine that capital inflows could affect macroeconomic
performance in a way not consistent or compatible with domestic policy objectives
such as sustainable economic growth with price stability. Bacchetta et al (2000)
argue that the capital inflows and outflows themselves generate significant
turbulence in emerging market economies and this turbulence in turn affects
capital flows.
2.3 Policy Issues and Challenges
Capital flows can boost investment and spur productivity growth when
harnessed effectively. Therefore, domestic policy priorities that foster more
efficient investment will also attract productive foreign capital (Mishra et al,
2000). World Bank (1996) argues that freer capital flows improve the allocation
of capital globally, allowing resources to move to areas with high rates of return
while attempts to restrict capital flows lead to distortions that are generally costly
to the economy imposing the controls.
Understanding of the relative importance of external or domestic factors in
driving capital flows has important implications for policy. If capital flows are
driven largely by domestic factors, developing countries can attract a steady
and predictable flow of foreign capital and minimise cycles by adopting sound6
macroeconomic and financial policies. However, if capital flows are driven largely
by external factors, developing countries are vulnerable to unexpected external
shocks even if they maintain prudent policies, and they must take measures to
insulate themselves (Moreno, 2000).
When the volume of capital flows, especially short-term flows becomes too
large, monetary policy becomes difficult (Khan and Reinhart, 1995; IMF, 1995).
Therefore, capital importing countries face the challenge of designing appropriate
policies that secure the most benefits from capital inflows while maintaining
monetary stability.
3. Existing Policy Frameworks
A country’s policy framework related to capital flows and the exchange
rate regime is crucial in encouraging or discouraging capital flows to and from
the country. Current account and capital account liberalisation is taking place at
a faster pace and countries are increasingly floating their exchange rates in the
SEACEN region. At present, 4 countries have a free floating exchange rate
regime and 9 countries have a managed floating regime while 3 countries are
maintaining fixed exchange rate regime (See Box No. 1).
Current account is fully convertible in all the countries covered in this study.
On the capital account side, it is fully or almost fully convertible in Brunei
Darussalam, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and
Taiwan while there are some restrictions imposed in Cambodia, Fiji, Mongolia,
Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam.
Countries where both inflow and outflow of FDI, portfolio and other
investment are fully or almost fully allowed are categorised as the countries
with fully convertible capital accounts. In the countries where capital account
is partially convertible, FDI inflow is allowed while portfolio inflow is allowed
in only some of them. Brunei, Cambodia and Myanmar do not have formal
capital markets to attract portfolio inflows while in Nepal, the capital market is
not opened to foreign investors. Investment abroad by residents is either by and
large prohibited or limited in the countries with partial capital convertibility.7
Box No. 1: Capital Flow Management Frameworks








- Currency board system
- Singapore currency is
the anchor currency
- Brunei Dollar is at par
with Singapore Dollar.
- Managed floating system
- Exchange rate is set
freely by the market but
official exchange rate is
used for official
transactions
- Fixed exchange rate
system
- Value of the Fiji dollar
determined vis-à-vis a
basket of currencies
- Free floating system




- Managed floating system
- Exchange rate of the
ringgit determined based
on a basket of
currencies.
- Both current and capital accounts are fully
convertible.
-  Foreign investors can lease land but are not
allowed to own.
- Current account is fully convertible while
capital account is partially convertible.
- There is no limit for the foreign direct
investment and capital flow from oversees
- Investment abroad by Cambodian residents
exceeding USD 50,000 must be declared to
NBC
- Current account is fully convertible while
capital account is partially convertible.
- Exchange controls are used to meet the
objectives of low inflation and a comfortable
level of foreign reserves.
- Both current and capital accounts are fully
convertible.
- Bank Indonesia employs prudential measures
governing foreign transactions, including
foreign borrowing, derivative transactions and
net open position.
- Both current and capital accounts are fully
convertible.
- Negative list system adopted under which
the authorities control capital transactions in
certain areas.
- Both current and capital accounts are fully
convertible.
- Foreign currency borrowings by residents
above a specified limit require prior
permission
- Both residents and non-residents are free to
remit abroad own funds. Non-residents are
free to repatriate any amount of capital,






- Managed floating System
- Official exchange rate of
togrog against the USD
is set daily by the Bank
of Mongolia
- Managed floating system
- Kyat officially pegged to
SDR  and  exchange
rates of all major
currencies determined
based on their value
against SDR
- Flexible exchange rate for
convertible currencies
and fixed exchange rate
for Indian currency
- Managed floating system
- Current account is fully convertible while
capital account is partially convertible.
- Investment by private corporations in
export promotion, use of advanced
technology, and the exploration of natural
resources are encouraged
- Sales or issue of capital market securities,
money market securities, derivatives and
other instruments locally by nonresidents
are prohibited
- Nonresidents can purchase local bonds and
other debt securities and  commercial
credits to and from nonresidents are
allowed
- Current account is almost fully convertible
while capital account is partially
convertible.
- Foreign Investors can setup their business
either in the form of wholly foreign-owned
or a joint venture and repatriation of
capital and profits is allowed through
banks after payment of taxes and other
prescribed funds.
- Current account is fully convertible while
capital account is partially convertible.
- Foreign direct investments except in certain
areas are allowed but require prior
approval.
- Nonresidents may invest in equity shares
up to 25% of the capital of the Nepalese
companies; residents are not allowed to
make investments abroad; repatriation of
profit earned from investment does not
need approval.
- Both current and capital accounts are fully
convertible.






- Free floating system
- Exchange rate determined
by market forces




- Free floating system
- Managed floating system
- Exchange rate determined
by supply and demand
in the foreign exchange
market
- All private capital account contracts to
acquire or deal with an asset within or
outside PNG and to open foreign currency
accounts outside PNG require approval
- Current account is fully convertible while
capital account is partially convertible.
- Policies and measures aimed at
strengthening country’s external position
and reducing country’s vulnerability to
sudden reversals of capital flows are
adopted.
- Both current and capital accounts are fully
convertible.
- No restrictions on inflow and outflow of
funds including repatriation of profits,
dividends and capital abroad.
- No exchange control formalities or
approvals required for any forms of
payments or capital transfer.
- Current account is fully convertible while
capital account is partially convertible.
- Investment abroad by residents permitted
on a case by case basis and foreign
investment in government Treasury Bond
is permitted up to 5% of the outstanding
Treasury Bond amount.
- Both current and capital accounts are fully
convertible.
- Only limited restrictions remain on short-
term financial transactions involving the
conversion of the NTD.
- Domestic company can freely conduct
inward and outward remittance up to USD
50 million and such limit for residents is
USD 100 thousand and nonresidents can




- Managed floating system
- Value of Baht largely
determined by the
market force
-  Managed floating
system
-  Forward exchange rate is
determined on the
differential between the
prime interest rate of
VND and that of the
FED
- Current account is fully convertible while
capital account is partially convertible.
- Residents are encouraged to invest abroad
in order to promote more balanced capital
movements.
- Current account is fully convertible while
capital account is partially convertible.
- Foreign investors can invest in Vietnam
through capital contribution and purchase
of shares of the domestic enterprises
- Enterprises and economic agencies are
allowed to borrow from foreign borrowing
sources.
Source: “Exchange Rates and Capital Flows in the SEACEN Countries”, SEACEN Occasional
Papers No. 46, 2008, and “Monetary and Financial Stability in the SEACEN Region”, SEACEN
Occasional Papers No 49, Forthcoming, 2009.
In general, the objective of capital flow management frameworks have been
to attract high volumes of foreign capital and discouraging the capital outflows.
There has been a surge in capital inflows in most of the SEACEN countries
during 1980s and 1990s. However, the financial crisis of 1997 has taught a
valuable lesson in that countries should encourage more long-term capital inflows
since short-term capital are prone to sudden reversals. Lately, SEACEN countries
are increasingly allowing and encouraging their residents to invest abroad.
4. Trends in Capital Flows until 2007
Data on capital flows show that net capital flow has become negative post
1997 in SEACEN region due to the increase in capital outflow. As a result of
the distress created by financial crisis of 1997, there was massive decline in
both the total inflow and total outflow of capital. Capital inflow as well as capital
outflow picked up after 2002 but the rate of increase in total outflow exceeded
that of the total inflow resulting in a negative net capital flow.11
Out of the total capital inflow of USD 278 billion received in 2007 by 11
SEACEN countries2 included in the study, USD 69 billion came as direct
investment, USD 73 billion as portfolio investment and USD 136 billion as other
investments. On the outflow side, portfolio investment held the largest share.
Out of the total outflow of USD 321 billion, total portfolio investment outflow
was USD 139 billion, other investment outflow was USD 122 billion while FDI
outflow was USD 60 billion. Net FDI has been comparatively stable and positive
while net portfolio flow and net other investment flow have remained mostly
negative and highly volatile during the study period.
________________
2. These countries include Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore,
Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam.12
Composition-wise, the breakdown shows that both FDI inflow and outflow
have increased after 2002 (Figure 5). Portfolio investment inflow remained stable
while outflow increased significantly in the recent years (Figure 6). Other
investment inflow fluctuated highly after the Asian financial crisis until 2005 and
has since recorded a significant increase in 2006 and 2007. Other investment
outflow started to see a persistent increase since 2003 (Figure 7).
In terms of maturity, FDI is long-term capital while portfolio investment and
other investment are short-term capital. The term-wise breakdown shows that
net long-term capital, which is identical to net FDI flow, has remained positive
and comparatively stable while net short-term capital flow has fluctuated highly
and continued to remain negative after the financial crisis of 1997 (Figure 8).
Both short-term capital inflow and outflow have increased by a higher rate
than long-term capital inflow and outflow in the recent years (Figures 9 -12).
Short-term capital inflow amounted to USD 208 billion in 2007 compared to a13
long-term inflow of USD 69 billion. Similarly, short-term capital outflow was
USD 261 billion compared to the long-term outflow of USD 60 billion in the
same year.
Thus, it can be seen from the data that the SEACEN region is becoming
net capital exporter in terms of aggregate flows after the 1997 financial crisis.
However, this amount also includes the capital movement that had taken place
within the region. The composition of capital flow has also gone through a
significant change. In the recent years, short-term capital has taken a larger
share in both capital inflow and outflow resembling the pattern of capital flows
before 1997.14
5. Global Financial Crisis and Capital Flows
The global financial crisis that originated from the US subprime mortgage
crisis in August 2007 has started to affect the capital flows in the SEACEN
region. Countries having financial markets that are highly integrated with the
global market appear to be facing deeper impacts. Due to the deleveraging by
foreign investors, capital inflows have slowed down and instead capital reversal
is taking place.
The latest figures of 2008 reveal that net FDI flow as a ratio of GDP has
slowed down in Indonesia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Thailand and Vietnam
in the first nine months of 2008 while it has become negative in Singapore in
the second quarter of 2008 (Figure 13 and Box No. 2). However, net FDI
continued to increase in Cambodia and Malaysia in the second quarter of 2008.
Korea and Taiwan, which are among the net capital exporters in this region and
had a net negative FDI flow, also show a slowdown in 2008.
Figure 13: Net Capital Flows to GDP Ratio in
Selected SEACEN Countries*
(in percent)15
* Countries selected based on data availability; data for 2006 and 2007 are in annual frequency
and for 2008 in quarterly frequency; 2008Q3 data not available for Cambodia, Malaysia and
Singapore.
Data Source: SEACEN Occasional Papers No. 49, Forthcoming.16
Box No. 2: Recent Trends in Capital Flows
Country Trends
The surge in capital inflows which began in 2005, continued in 2008. The
share of FDI flows in total inflows has risen sharply in recent years.
There is no portfolio flow in Cambodia due to the absence of a capital
market.
After the Asian financial crisis, foreign capital flows to Indonesia mainly
consist of portfolio flows. During the first six months of 2008 also,
capital flows was dominated by net portfolio investment. Net other
investment flow continued to record a net outflow in 2008. As an impact
of ongoing global financial markets turmoil, Indonesia has experienced
increased capital outflows, which has led to a significant fall in the Jakarta
composite index. The yield of government bond saw a sharp rise in
September-October 2008 but dropped significantly afterwards. Moreover,
portfolio readjustment of rupiah instruments by foreign investors resulted
into a depreciation of rupiah by 10 percent.
The current account turned negative in Q1 and Q2 2008, resulting from
the sharp reduction in trade surplus due to high oil prices. The financial
account balance deteriorated as foreign investors sold off equity in the
stock market and banks began to repay their foreign-currency borrowings.
In the first half of 2008, the financial account recorded a net inflow of
RM13.4 billion. Direct investment outflow reached RM20.8 while direct
investment inflow stood at RM20.7 billion resulting into a marginal net
outflow. Portfolio investment recorded a net outflow of RM3 billion due
to the liquidation of both debt and equity securities by foreign investors.
However, other investment recorded a net inflow of RM16.4 billion
reflecting mainly net placement of deposits by foreign banks in the domestic
banking system.
The capital and financial account recorded a sizeable increase in net inflows,
aggregating US$1.2 billion in the first semester of 2008, from US$144
million in the same period in 2007. The direct investment flow in the first
half of the year reverted to a net inflow of US$742 million net inflow
from a net outflow of US$1.4 billion a year ago. The other investment
account recorded a net inflow of US$643 million in the first semester of
2008, a turnaround from the net outflow of US$632 million a year ago.
The portfolio investment account posted a net outflow of US$191 million
during the first half of 2008, a turnaround from the US$2.3 billion net
inflow recorded in the comparable quarter in 2007.
While Singapore continued to record net outflows from the financial
account, the magnitude of such flows moderated in the first half of 2008
to S$2.4 billion, compared with S$17 billion over the same period last







investment registered a net outflow of S$13 billion, while direct investment
and other investment showed a net inflow of S$4.6 billion and S$5.6
billion respectively.
During the first half of 2008, the current account registered a surplus of
US$8,495 million and US$6,493 million in the first and second quarter
of 2008, respectively. In the same period, direct investment registered a
net outflow of US$2,568 million and US$1,516 million, respectively. With
respect to portfolio investment, residents’ portfolio investment registered
a net outflow of US$6,377 million and US$7,141 million in the first and
second quarter of 2008, respectively. Non-residents portfolio investment,
on the other hand, stood at a net inflow of US$9,313 million in the first
quarter of 2008 but it turned into a net outflow of US$3,609 million in
the second quarter of 2008. As for the financial derivatives, a net inflow
of US$821 million was recorded in the first quarter of 2008 compared to
a net outflow of US$35 million in the second quarter of 2008. Meanwhile,
other investment recorded a net outflow of US$242 million in the first
quarter of 2008 compared to a net inflow of US$13,142 million in the
second quarter of 2008. Overall, the financial account registered net inflows
of US$947 million and US$841 million in the first and second quarter of
2008, respectively.
Net capital inflows to Thailand continued to be positive until 2007 and
the first half of 2008. However, in the third quarter of 2008, net capital
inflows registered a deficit mostly due to a reversal of capital inflows
from portfolio and other investments, while FDI inflows remained relatively
stable. The portfolio outflow declined markedly in 2008 due to the global
financial turmoil, while FDI outflow remained quite resilient to the external
shocks and continued to register relatively large net outflow in 2008. As
for other investments, two items that have been major components in this
category are changes in bank swap positions and hedging by residents.
During 2006-2008Q2, the net outflow under this category largely reflected
bank outflow associated with the increase in foreign holdings by the banking
sector to square their foreign asset positions as a result of being a
counterparty to the BOT’s swap agreements. This amount more than
offset bank intflow due to an increase in the FX hedging ratio by exporters
against currency appreciation. The opposite was happening in the third
quarter of 2008 when the Baht started to depreciate due to a capital
reversal by non-residents.
In the first nine months of 2008, foreign capital flows continued to increase
in Vietnam, the majority of which was medium and long-term capital. FDI
in the first nine months registered at US$ 57 billion, which was five-fold
compared to that in the same period of 2007. The reimbursed FDI increased
by 13.2% and was recorded at US$8.1 billion, of which foreign
reimbursement accounted for US$ 5.67 billion. The downturn of the
Vietnam Stock market led to the decrease of portfolio investment inflow.
The net portfolio investment inflow decreased by 65% to US$ 1.6 billion
compared to that in 2007. In general, the structure of foreign capital flows
in Vietnam still remains highly stable given the medium and long-term
capital including FDI, ODA as well as medium and long-term commercial





Source: SEACEN Questionnaire Survey, December 200818
Among the three components of capital flows, the portfolio investment flow
has been affected the most by the global financial crisis. Decreased inflow and
increased outflow in portfolio flow has resulted into a decreased net portfolio
inflow in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea while it has became negative in
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam in 2008. In Singapore and Taiwan, the net
portfolio outflow has slowed down while it has fluctuated in Korea in the same
period (Figure 13).
Net other investment flows in Cambodia, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea
remained stable but fluctuated highly in Korea, Mongolia, Singapore, Taiwan,
Thailand and Vietnam in the first nine months of 2008.
6. Recent Policy Measures to Manage Capital Flows
The negative impact of the global financial crisis has been felt in 2008 by
the majority of the SEACEN countries. Capital inflows are slowing down and
capital reversal is increasing due to the liquidation of assets by foreign investors
to deleverage their parent companies. This has put downward pressures on the
domestic currencies of the SEACEN countries and has also been associated
with declining foreign exchange reserves due in part to central bank intervention
to increase foreign currency liquidity.
With a view to minimise the negative impacts of the ongoing global financial
crisis, central banks and the governments of the SEACEN countries have
implemented various policy measures. Key policy measures include lowering
interest rates to ease the effect of the financial market turmoil and avoid a
severe contraction of economic activity; banning short-selling and implementing
a circuit-breaker to contain the mounting pressure on equity markets; enhancing
existing repurchase agreement facilities through relaxed valuation and a broader
list of acceptable collateral; intervention of the foreign exchange market; policy
coordination between government and the central bank to mitigate financial
market panic; shoring up market confidence through timely communication on
developments and policy changes; implementing deposit insurance to fully
guarantee deposits in the banking system; and, coordinating at regional level to
share information, discuss emerging developments, and pool resources, particularly
foreign exchange reserves (See Box No. 3 for detail).19
Box No. 3: Policy Measures Implemented Recently
Country Trends
New measures introduced by the National Bank of Cambodia included
increasing the reserve requirements and imposing a cap on bank lending.
These measures are aimed to reduce excess liquidity in the banking system
and to limit banks’ exposure to the real estate sector. Since the measures
have been effective only in July, it is still premature to give a good
assessment of their impact. However, there are some indications that the
level of bank excess   liquidity has been reduced.
Indonesia has implemented several policies in 2008 to manage capital
flows. One of them is the intensified policy coordination between the
government and Bank Indonesia which includes setting an auto rejection
of transactions when prices fall below 10% to mitigate the fall in the
stock market. Meanwhile, the Indonesian government has committed to
buy back government bond (SUN) to improve liquidity. Furthermore, to
reduce potential losses, Bank Indonesia and the Indonesian Institute of
Accountants gave freedom to holders of securities to establish a fair value
for securities, including SUN-owned by banks. Also, in an attempt to
ensure sufficient liquidity in the economy, the Indonesian government has
placed its fund in state owned banks, while Bank Indonesia lowered the
reserve requirement ratio for both domestic currency and foreign currency
deposits.
The Korean government, that is the Ministry of Strategy and Finance,
held the South Korean currency down on behalf of exporters. The results
were not as the government has anticipated as depreciation of the won
did not improve the current account but instead raised consumer prices.
The Ministry of Finance and Bank Negara Malaysia jointly announced
pre-emptive and precautionary measures to maintain the stability of the
Malaysian financial system in October 2008. These measures include full
guaranteed of all ringgit and foreign currency deposits with banks and
financial institutions until December 2010; extension of access to Bank
Negara Malaysia’s liquidity facility to insurance companies and takaful
operators; reduction in corporate income tax rate; fine-tuning of customised
tax and non-tax incentives to promote specific industries; generous tax
incentives and flexibilities to invest and operate in the 5 economic corridors;
and reduction or improvement in processes, procedures, legislation and
human resources in the public sector to reduce costs of doing business.
The BSP has been implementing various measures to ensure the soundness
and stability of the banking sector, strengthen the public’s trust and
confidence in the financial system, and guard against systemic risks that
could arise from a sudden stop or reversal of capital flows. The measures
implemented include ensuring adequate peso and dollar liquidity by
enhancing existing peso repo facilities, establishing the US$ repo facility,






reducing reserve requirement and providing directed relief to banks. These
measures along with the concerted efforts in the regional and international
fronts by central banks and financial agencies have helped stabilised the
financial markets. The peso recovered from a 22-month low of P49.58/
US$1 on 28 October 2008 to P48.08/US$1 on 6 November 2008. The
benchmark Philippine Stock Exchange Index reached a four-year low of
1,704.4 index points on 28 October 2008, but recovered subsequently.
The Government has opened the Rupee denominated Treasury bill market
for foreign investors since May 2008 and are permitted to invest up to
10% of the value of Treasury bills outstanding at any given point of time
through the primary market. Domestic Banks are allowed to accept time
deposits from nonresidents in foreign currencies. Similarly, migrants’
transfers have been relaxed by allowing a transfer of foreign exchange
equivalent to US$150,000. These new series of initiatives are designed to
promote international investor confidence, secure comparative advantages
by moving to global financial markets and to further mobilise foreign
savings to address the country’s domestic savings-investment gap.
In March 2008, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) allowed
insurance companies to issue policies denominated in US dollar; the
Executive Yuan relaxed the calculation base of domestic firms’ direct
investment ceiling in Mainland China; and the FSC raised insurance
company’s foreign investment ratio of its insurance funds from 35% to
45%, and allowed them to invest in foreign private equity funds and
overseas real estates. In July 2008, the government allowed Mainland
Chinese to invest in domestic industries and securities market. And in
October 2008, the government announced the full deposits insurance
scheme that covers foreign exchange deposits. This will attract residents
not only to maintain but also to attract foreign deposits back into Taiwan.
The key policies in 2008 included the removal of the unremunerated reserve
requirement (URR) measure which was implemented in December 2006
to discourage short term speculative inflows. In March 2008, when the
Baht movement became much more stable and the economic growth
momentum became more stable, the BOT decided to remove the capital
flow regulation measure. Additionally, further capital liberalisation aimed
at promoting private portfolio investment abroad to reap more international
diversification benefits was carried out by increasing the limit on overall
outflow by qualified institutional investors from US$10 Billion to US$30
Billion in March 2008. Initially, the actual outflows increased in response
to the increased limit but it slowed down sharply in Q3 of 2008 due to
the unfavorable conditions in the global financial markets and higher risk
aversion of Thai investors.
Key measures implemented by Vietnam in 2008 in order to manage capital
flows include expansion of daily trading exchange rate band to realise a
flexible exchange rate regime in line with the demand and supply for
foreign currencies in the market as well as to prevent speculations; and
adjustment of prime interest rate, discount rate and refinancing rate to






Source: SEACEN Questionnaire Survey, December 200821
7. Determinants of Capital Flows: Empirical Test
As discussed earlier, capital flows are determined by various internal and
external factors. In order to examine the determinants of capital flows (CF) in
the SEACEN region, empirical tests are conducted employing the following model.
CF = a + biXi + diZi + u (1)
where,
Xi – set of internal variables (pull factors), and
Zi – external variables (push factors)
The internal factors that may work as the pull factors for capital flows
include economic growth rate, interest rate, inflation level, current account balance,
stock price index, exchange rate volatility, credit rating, trade openness, investment
environment, and so on. Similarly, potential external factors that work as pull
factors for capital flows include economic growth rate of developed countries
and interest rates prevailing in those countries. Understanding the relative
importance of internal and external determinants of capital flows is critical in
the implementation of appropriate policies to maintain a favourable level of capital
flows. If capital flows are driven largely by domestic factors, developing countries
can attract a steady and predictable flow of foreign capital and minimise cycles
by adopting sound macroeconomic and financial policies. However, if capital
flows are driven largely by external factors, developing countries are vulnerable
to unexpected external shocks even if they maintain prudent policies, for which
they must take measures to insulate themselves (Moreno, 2000).
Since data on all these variables are not available for the study period and
also since the inclusion of too many variables is not appropriate, selected key




CAPIN – capital inflow composed of FDI inflow, portfolio investment
inflow and other investment inflow to GDP ratio22
RGDPR – real GDP growth rate
RIR – real interest rate proxied by one year time deposit rate minus
inflation rate
CAGDP – current account to GDP ratio
WGDPR – world real GDP growth rate proxied by the average real GDP
growth rate of US and Japan
WRIR – world real interest rate proxied by average deposit rate minus
average inflation rate of US and Japan
In the above equation, α is the intercept, β1, β2 and β3 are the coefficients
of internal variables (pull factors) and δ1 and δ2 are the coefficients of external
variables (push factors). Coefficients β1 and β2 are expected to have positive
signs while signs of the coefficients β3, δ1 and δ2 are expected to be negative.
Capital flows are composed of both long-term and short-term investments.
The determining factors of short-term capital flow may be different than those
of long-term flow. In order to analyse specifically the determinants of short-
term capital inflows, following model is employed.
SCAPINt = α1+β4RGDPRt+β5RIRt+β6CAGDPt+δ3WGDPRt+
 δ4WRIRt+et          (3)
where,
SCAPIN – short term private capital inflow (composed of portfolio inflow
and other investment inflow received by banks and others) to
GDP ratio
The independent variables (pull factors and push factors) are same as in
equation (2). In the above equation, α1 is the intercept, β3, β4 and β5 are the
coefficients of pull factor variables and δ1 and δ2 are the coefficients of push
factor variables. Regarding the sign of coefficients, β4 and β5 are expected to
be positive while β6, δ3 and δ4 are expected to be negative.
In this study, annual data of 1977 to 2007 period has been employed. The
data are compiled by taking the average of 10 SEACEN countries which include
Fiji, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan,23
and Thailand. The data for all the countries except Taiwan are taken from
International Financial Statistics database, December 2008. The Taiwanese data
have been taken from various issues of the Monthly Financial Statistics published
by the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan).
A widely used procedure for analysing the time series data is the cointegration
test. Prior to conducting the cointegration test, it is essential to check each time
series for stationarity. If a time series is non-stationary, the regression analysis
done in a traditional way will produce spurious results. Therefore, the unit root
test is required to be conducted first.
Perron (1989) showed that in the presence of a structural break in time
series, many perceived non-stationary series were in fact stationary. Perron
(1989) re-examined Nelson and Plosser (1982) data and found that 11 of the
14 important US macroeconomic variables were stationary when known
exogenous structural break is included. Perron (1989) allows for a one time
structural change occurring at a time TB (1 < TB < T), where T is the number
of observations. Traditional tests for unit roots such as Dickey-Fuller, Augmented
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron are viewed to have low power in the presence
of structural break. Perron (1989) models cannot be applied where such breaks
are unknown. To solve this problem, Zivot and Andrews (1992), Perron and
Vogelsang (1992), and Perron (1997) among others, have developed unit root
test methods which include one endogenously determined structural break.
The unit root tests conducted following Perron 1997 models and Augmented
Dickey-Fuller models are presented in Table 1. SCAPIN and RGDPR are shown
to be stationary by both Perron 1997 and ADF models but there is no agreement
in the results for CAPIN, RIR, CAGDP, WGDPR and WRIR. Both of these
models indicate that the variables included in equation (2) and (3) are of mixed
order of integration.24
While plotting the data in graph, CAPIN is seen to have gone through a
structural break in 1998 (Figure 14). However, there is no distinct structural
break in SCAPIN (Figure 15).
Note: Results have been determined at 5 percent significance level.
In order to capture the known structural break in CAPIN, a dummy that
takes value of 0 until 1998 and 1 after 1999 will be included in equation (2)
following Perron (1989). However, there will be no dummy variable in equation
(3) as there is no distinct structural break in SCAPIN.25
Since the variables in the equation are of mixed order of integration, the
standard cointegration tests such as Johansen (1991; 1995) cannot be employed
as these tests require all the variables to be of equal order of integration, which
is I(1). Therefore, the OLS based autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) method
is employed to analyse the cointegration among the variables in the model. This
method can be applied irrespective of whether the regressing variables are I(0)
or I(1) (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). From the ARDL model, a dynamic error
correction model (ECM) also can be derived which integrates the short-run
dynamics with the long-run equilibrium without losing long-run information.
The ARDL method estimates (p+1)k number of regressions in order to
obtain optimal lag length for each variable, where p is the maximum number of
lag to be used and k is the number of variables in the equation. As the data used
in this study are in annual frequency, 3 is selected as the maximum lag (p) to
be used3. The model can be selected using the model selection criteria like
Schwartz-Bayesian Criteria (SBC) and Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC). In
this study, models are selected based on SBC as it is known to be parsimonious.
The ARDL model for equation (2) is as follows:
(4)
________________
3. Foreign investors’ decision to invest in a developing country is generally based on the analysis
of macroeconomic performance and other environment factors of the past few years and even
after making the decision, some time may elapse before the foreign investment actually flows
to the country. Therefore, a longer lag is preferred in the model. However, because of the limited
observations available, regression with more than 3 lag is not feasible in this study.
In the above model, DCAPIN is the dummy variable that captures the structural
break in capin. The null hypothesis is 0 6 5 4 3 2 1 = = = = = = λ λ λ λ λ λ , which
means the non-existence of the long run relationship. The key statistics of the
ARDL based cointegration test are presented in Table 2 and 3.26
Table 2: ARDL (2,3,3,2,3,3) Model Long Run Results
Dependent Variable: CAPIN
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio
β0 -2.8463 1.8620 -1.5286
RGDPR  1.0313 0.2375       4.3419 ***
RIR  1.2129 0.2670       4.5426 ***
CAGDP -0.6897 0.1336     -5.1612 ***
WGDPR  1.5510 0.2920       5.3123 ***
WRIR -3.1858 0.5245     -6.0742 ***
DCAPIN  4.6537 1.2180      3.8207 **
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
Table 3: ARDL (2,3,3,2,3,3) Model ECM Results
Dependent Variable: DCAPIN
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio
Db   -5.0438 3.2129 -1.5698
DCAPIN(-1) 0.7495 0.2802     2.6753 **
DRGDPR 0.7683 0.1334      5.7581 ***
DRGDPR(-1)   -0.3802 0.2558  -1.4863
DRGDPR(-2) 0.1768 0.1534   1.1530
DRIR 1.2894 0.3002       4.2954 ***
DRIR(-1) 0.1818 0.2322   0.7830
DRIR(-2) 0.3194 0.1294       2.4691 ***
DCAGDP 0.6262 0.1853       3.3796 ***
DCAGDP(-1) 1.1610 0.2888       4.0197 ***
DWGDPR 1.0621 0.3423      3.1032 **
DWGDPR(-1) 0.6720 0.2320      2.8970 **
DWGDPR(-2) 0.3714 0.2063      1.8002 **
DWRIR 0.1084 0.5969   0.1816
DWRIR(-1) 3.7457 0.9477       3.9526 ***
DWRIR(-2) 1.7387 0.3920       4.4355 ***
DDCAPIN(-1)     8.2465 2.4727        3.3350 ***
ECM     1.7720 0.3485        5.0846 ***
***  Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level27
The long-run statistics of the ARDL model tests show that real GDP growth
rate, real interest rate, world real GDP growth rate are positively associated
with capital inflows while current account to GDP ratio and world real interest
rate are inversely associated with capital inflows in the SEACEN region (Table
2). All these results are statistically significant at 1% level. The coefficient of
ECM (Table 3) indicates to a short-run dynamics that the shock or the deviation
from the long-run equilibrium is adjusted back in less than one year time (about
7 months).
Equation (3) is aimed at analyzing the determinants of short-term capital
inflows. The ARDL model for equation (3) is as follows:
In the above model, the null hypothesis is  0 5 4 3 2 1 = = = = = σ σ σ σ σ ,
which means that there is no long run relationship between SCAPIN and a set
of independent variables. The ARDL test statistics of this model are presented
in Table 4 and 5.
(5)
Table 4: ARDL (3,1,2,1,3,3) Model Long Run Results
Dependent Variable: SCAPIN
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error  T-Ratio
µ0  6.5303 0.5293      12.3383 ***
RGDPR -0.4470 0.1087      -4.1127 ***
RIR  1.0268 0.1637       6.2739 ***
CAGDP -0.1717 0.4938      -3.4775 ***
WGDPR  0.8957 0.1712       5.2305 ***
WRIR -3.2984 0.3352      -9.8414 ***
*** Significant at 1% level28
Table 5: ARDL (3,1,2,1,3,3) Model ECM Results
Dependent Variable: DSCAPIN
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error    T-Ratio
Dm 21.1638 2.9725     7.1200 ***
DSCAPIN (-1) 1.5025 0.2722     5.5210 **
DSCAPIN (-2) 0.7644 0.1535     4.9811 **
DRGDPR 0.2191 0.2828   0.7747
DRIR 2.0892 0.3873       5.3950 ***
DRIR(-1)   -0.5259 0.3203  -1.6419
DCAGDP 1.4282 0.2685       5.3191 ***
DWGDPR 2.1474 0.5235       4.1022 ***
DWGDPR(-1) 1.5421 0.3572       4.3174 ***
DWGDPR(-2) 1.0456 0.3252       3.2153 ***
DWRIR -1.4041 0.7034  -1.9961
DWRIR(-1) 8.0390 1.3802       5.8246 ***
DWRIR(-2) 3.7469 0.7906       4.7396 ***
ECM     -3.2409 0.3553        -9.1210 ***
*** Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
The long run test statistics show that there is a highly significant relationship
between short-term capital inflow (SCAPIN) and all the independent variables
included in the model (Table 4). However, in contrast to the results of CAPIN
(total capital inflow) presented in Table 2, the domestic real GDP growth rate
is negatively associated with the short-term capital inflow. This result suggests
that when economic growth rate is high, more capital will flow into the country
as long-term investment such as FDI while there will be more short-term capital
inflows when domestic economic growth is declining. This is in line with the
fact that portfolio inflows may come to the country even in low growth situation
mainly with speculative motive and on the other hand, when FDI inflow is low,
banks and other sectors need to borrow more short-term capital from abroad.
According to test results, the effects of domestic real interest rate and world
real interest rate appear to be of almost similar magnitude for both total capital
inflow and short-term capital inflow. However, current account balance and world
economic growth have higher impact on total capital inflow compared to short-
term inflow.29
ECM statistics presented in Table 5 suggest that the short-run change in all
the independent variables except real GDP growth rate (RGDPR) is associated
significantly with the change in SCAPIN. The ECM of -3.2409 suggests that
the speed of adjustment is very fast and it takes only about 3.6 months to adjust
back the deviation from the long-run equilibrium.
The above results are based on the aggregate data compiled by taking the
average of 10 SEACEN countries as mentioned earlier. The impact of each
individual variable on capital inflows vary across the countries but the above
test results do not help in analyzing the determinants of capital inflows in the
individual countries. The empirical test results reported in the accompanying
country papers, which are summarized in Table 6 below, suggest that domestic
real GDP growth rate has a positive impact on capital inflows in all the 7 countries
included in the table. Among other factors, country risk and world interest rate
are inversely related to capital flows while stock market return affects capital
inflows positively. However, the impact of domestic real interest rate, current
account balance, exchange rate volatility and world economic growth appear to
vary across countries.30
The individual country analysis based on a survey indicates that the US
sub-prime mortgage crisis, heightened risk aversion of global investors, global
liquidity squeeze and uncertainty in financial markets; and, slower global economic
growth are the external factors that have slowed down the capital inflows while
the political climate of the country, further liberalisation on overseas investment;
and, encouragement of sovereign funds to invest abroad are the internal factors
that have accelerated capital outflow in the SEACEN region.
Note:‘+’ indicates a statistically significant positive relationship while ‘–’ indicates a statistically
significant inverse relationship.
*  Country paper of Malaysia reports separate regression results for FDI Inflow and Portfolio
Inflow. In the table, F indicates the regression result for FDI Inflow while P indicates the result
for Portfolio Inflow.31






External factors influencing capital inflows to Cambodia include Asian
economic strength and stability while internal factors: political and
economic stability, high and sustainable growth rate over than a decade
and improved investment opportunity.
The increased risk of slowing global economy, worsening global
financial sector crisis and also the negative outlook on the Indonesia’s
balance of payments affected the development of capital flows. Slowing
global economy and strengthening of the US dollar led to the decrease
in international commodity prices, including export commodities of
Indonesia. These adverse conditions are perceived to negatively affect
Indonesia’s balance of payments, especially the current account.
Meanwhile, the US subprime crisis triggered capital flight from the
developing countries. This resulted in the depreciation of the domestic
currencies. Although the rupiah depreciation is quite large, the rupiah
exchange rate is relatively more stable when compared to other regional
currencies. Conducive domestic economy in addition to tighter monetary
policy stance and foreign exchange stabilisation implemented by Bank
Indonesia helped to alleviate the pressure on the rupiah.
The factors which influence recent capital flows in Korea are oil prices
and the global credit crunch. Korea’s current account is also affected
by the fluctuations in the oil prices. Under the global liquidity squeeze,
foreign investors have the tendency to withdraw capital from Korea
because assets can be redeemed easily in Korea’s well-developed
financial markets.
The increase in investment abroad by Malaysians in 1st half 2008
reflected diversification of operations and the growing competitiveness
of Malaysian companies to become regional and global players. The
larger inflows of FDI reflected the sustained attractiveness of Malaysia
as an investment destination, supported by the strong economic
fundamentals, favorable investment environment. The liquidation of
portfolio funds from Malaysia, which continued into the 3Q 2008,
was due mainly to the uncertainty on the future direction of financial
markets following the heightened global financial turmoil. Global de-
leveraging led to tight liquidity in US dollar money markets and forced
some global investors to liquidate their profitable investments in the
region, including Malaysia, both to obtain US dollar liquidity as well
as to offset their losses in the home markets.  Global risk aversion
has also caused investors to re-allocate their investments into perceived
safe and liquid assets, which contributed to the liquidation of their






Taking out the effect of the substantial rise in capital outflow in 2007
(resulting from the purchase of shares of a foreign power company
by a resident), the net capital inflow in the first semester of 2008
comes out lower compared to that in the same period in 2007.  The
lower inflow is likely a result of the slowdown in the global economy,
specifically the country’s major trading partners.  The decline in risk
appetite of foreign investors stoked by the US subprime mortgage
problems also contributed to weaker capital inflows.  Higher risk
aversion affected most emerging market economies, including the
Philippines and this was most evident in the trends in portfolio and
equity capital flows.
The large flow of capital in and out of Singapore reflects the fact that
it is a small and open economy, as well as an international financial
centre.  Singapore’s liberal trade and capital regimes, as well as its
strong macroeconomic fundamentals, have attracted significant
investment flows into the country.  At the same time, the government
has been investing public sector surpluses abroad, and has also
encouraged private entities to develop an “external wing” overseas.
The major internal factor that influenced the recent trends in capital
flows is the gradual liberalisation of the capital account transactions.
Higher growth prospects in some industries in the services sector,
especially telecommunication, attracted higher amount of portfolio and
FDI inflows. Private sector firms were prompted to borrow externally
and foreign investment in government treasury bills and bonds was
encouraged due to the recent surge in the domestic interest rates and
the stable exchange rate. However, the global international liquidity
crisis has influenced some capital outflows specially the foreign
investments in Treasury bills and bonds and portfolio investments.
However, lower international interest rates influenced the domestic
private firms to borrow abroad.
In terms of current account, the surplus mainly came from the goods
trade surplus, especially exports to neighbouring Asian countries. With
regard to financial account, the net outflow of direct investment is
mainly due to large investment in Mainland China where the economy
is booming and production cost is lower than that of Taiwan. As for
the net outflow of residents’ portfolio investment, this is primarily
owing to the increased securities investment abroad by nationals,
especially life insurance companies. The factors driving the investment
are the low interest rate in Taiwan and the 10jþincrease in the ceiling
of foreign investment as a percentage of its insurance funds for insurance
companies. Non-residents’ portfolio investment turned into a net
outflow and this was induced by reduced foreign investment in local
stock market where share prices have fallen sharply. Other investment
turned into a net inflow, this is attributable to the introduction of
foreign funds and decrease of deposits in affiliated overseas branches
by the banking sector.33
8. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Implications of Capital Flows
Capital flows are known to affect monetary and financial stability through
various channels in the economy. Capital inflows increase the supply of money
in the economy and may result into a soaring inflation if they are monetized.
Central banks can use sterilization interventions in order to check the rapid
monetary expansion but such sterilization also may induce some costs to the
economy. Similarly, capital inflows increase the supply of foreign exchange in
the financial system. During the episode of capital inflows, domestic currency
continues to strengthen. However, the massive outflow of capital results in volatile
foreign exchange market weakening the domestic currency. Swings in capital
flows may lead to exchange rate fluctuation whereby exchange rate management
becomes difficult. On the other hand, increase in real effective exchange rate
may damage the competitiveness of the export sector.
Thailand
Vietnam
From 2006 through the first half of 2008, internal factors that attracted
large capital inflow to Thailand were mainly stable economic
fundamentals and strong long term growth prospects. Additionally,
external factors that contributed to the growth of capital inflow before
2008 included lower yields on assets in major economies, increases in
global liquidity, and investors’ risks appetite. Plagued by political
instability at home, after the first quarter of 2008, capital inflow
started to decelerate.  Entering the second half of 2008 amidst the
global financial turmoil, the reversal of capital inflows could be due
to tightening liquidity conditions as well as a higher risk aversion
among international investors. Internal factors such as recent relaxation
of capital outflow restrictions and external factors such as arbitrage
opportunities abroad are the main determinants of capital outflows
from Thailand over recent years.  A significant portion of portfolio
outflows was targeted to invest in Korean sovereign bonds with full
FX hedging for yield pickups.
In early 2008, FDI including registered and reimbursed capital increased
dramatically. The key reasons were that Vietnam scored high economic
growth as compared to regional countries. In addition, the country’s
investment environment saw considerable improvement. Foreign
investors’ confidence in the long-term economic prospect was another
factor contributing to high increase in FDI in Vietnam in the context
of global financial crisis. Medium and long-term external debts of
domestic enterprises and FII fell sharply compared to 2007 while
short-term external debt was on the increase. This development was
due to credit crunch in the US that led to the shrinkage in international
financial markets and decrease of liquidity.
Source: SEACEN Questionnaire Survey, December 200834
Increased capital inflows reduce cost of capital and also help investors in
risk diversification. Short-term capital flows specifically may contribute in financial
market development leading to stock market boom and real estate boom. But
such flows are known to be highly speculative in nature and vulnerable to sudden
reversal. Increased inflows generally push asset prices upward while increased
outflows result in lower prices. Surge in capital inflows also may reduce the
quality of assets, thereby contributing to greater financial fragility.
Increased capital flows into the Asian economy in 1990s helped spur
economic growth but it also became a major cause of the financial crisis in
1997. The recent experience of SEACEN countries shows that capital flows
created asset price bubbles, pushed inflation up and brought sharp increases in
bank credit while outflow of capital resulted in lower equity prices and depreciation
of exchange rates. Increased foreign capital flows make the financial system
and the economy, as a whole, vulnerable to external shocks. The possibility of
sudden and massive capital reversal creates increased risk and uncertainty in
the financial system (See Box No. 5 for detail).




The implications include booming real estate sector, rising inflation,
sharp increase in bank credit. Therefore, the challenges are to maintain
low inflation and a sound banking system. The Cambodian banking
system has no exposure to the US sub-prime crisis. This is because
the sector operates mainly locally and has limited involvement in the
international financial markets. However, the country is not totally
immune from the recent global crisis from the macro aspect, including
FDI, tourism sector, and external trade.
The capital flows to Indonesia are currently dominated by portfolio
inflows. Contrary to FDI flows which are more sustainable, portfolio
investment is categorised as “liquid flows” and vulnerable to sudden
capital reversal. Nevertheless, the portfolio inflows have contributed
to increasing the foreign exchange supply to the economy. Historically,
data on foreign exchange transactions between domestic banks and
others show that excess foreign exchange demand from domestic
players is covered by the portfolio inflows. The movement in rupiah
exchange rate is also closely related to the daily net flows between
the non-resident and domestic bank (cross-border concept), hence




Although the global economic slowdown may have an impact, in
October 2008, the current account is expected to turn positive owing
to the recent plunge in oil prices. Recently, the financial account is
in deficit and this is related to the global credit crunch. Global
cooperation and bold actions by the Bank of Korea and the Korean
government to stabilise the financial markets will alleviate capital
outflows. The global credit crunch is a matter of concern. This is the
cause of the international financial market unrest and global economic
slowdown which has impacted capital flows in 2008. Global
cooperation, like the currency swap between the Federal Reserve and
the Bank of Korea is expected to stabilise the local financial market
and alleviate outflow of foreign capital.
Malaysia has benefited from the continued inflows of FDI, in terms
of generating employment, increasing domestic productivity,
encouraging the transfer of technology and skills, as well as potential
for higher export growth. While there have been large amounts of
profits and dividends accruing to foreign investors arising from MNCs’
successful operations in Malaysia, the bulk of these earnings was
retained for reinvestment in Malaysia. However, the recent outflows
of foreign portfolio funds, in tandem with the trend in the regional
markets, have resulted in lower equity prices in the domestic capital
market. Despite the outflow of portfolio funds, liquidity remained
ample in the Malaysian economy, supported mainly by sustained
large current account surplus and net inflows of other investment.
During the episode of capital inflows, the Malaysian ringgit continued
to strengthen, reaching an all-time high since the day it was unpegged.
Volatility in the local foreign exchange market rose somewhat but with
resulting increased in U.S. dollar liquidity. Subsequently, the reversal
of capital inflows has steadily resulted in increased volatility in the
foreign exchange market and weakening of the Malaysian ringgit against
the U.S. dollar. More importantly, the collapse of Lehman Brothers
has exerted an unprecedented escalation of credit and liquidity risks
and worsened global de-leveraging activities that later turned into a
vicious circle, effectively drying up liquidity of the U.S. dollar.
The weaker capital flows, specifically, the reversal in net portfolio
flows, have put a dampening effect on the peso and resulted in sharp
declines in equity prices in 2008. Nonetheless, the sustained flow of
remittances of overseas Filipinos as well as higher export services
receipts continue to provide a balancing effect on the domestic currency.
Moreover, weaker capital flows in 2008 have so far, been reflected
mainly in the large net outflow of portfolio capital. Direct and other
foreign investments remain in surplus. The macroeconomic effects of
weaker capital flows have also been muted due to the continued
resilience of domestic demand, sustained health of the corporate sector,
and the dominant domestic financing of investments.  However, the
threat of a sudden and massive capital flow reversal cannot be
discounted, especially in light of the heightened uncertainties in the36
global financial markets. A sustained and massive reversal of capital
flows can have substantial effects on the domestic economy similar
to those seen during the Asian financial crisis in 1997.
The financial outflows are a counterpart to the current account
surpluses in the Singapore economy, reflecting the outcome optimising
saving and investment decisions by economic agents. Singapore has
thus far been successful in intermediating large capital flows. This is
supported by its strong economic fundamentals, unique monetary
policy framework that is able to cope with both short-term volatility
and avoid longer-term misalignments in the exchange rate, and resilience
of the financial sector underpinned by a sound regulatory and
supervisory framework. The ongoing financial crisis has brought about
significant volatility in capital markets worldwide, including in
Singapore.  In addition, there has been a global squeeze on liquidity
and credit.  The turmoil would in turn cause volatility in capital flows,
especially short-term portfolio flows as well as banking flows.
The capital inflows helped the Sri Lanka rupee to appreciate reversing
its depreciating trend, particularly after the international bond issue.
However, to prevent sharp appreciation of the rupee, the Central
Bank has to intervene in the foreign exchange market by absorbing
foreign exchange. This process helped the Central Bank to build-up
its foreign reserves during the first half of 2008. However, the current
global financial crisis is posing a major challenge in attracting new
capital flows and Sri Lanka experienced some capital outflows as a
result of the crisis. Increased reserves helped cushion sudden capital
outflows with respect to foreign investments in Treasury bills and
bonds. Emerging vulnerabilities are the potential downside risk to the
expected inflow of FDI, portfolio investments and the government
and private sector borrowings. The unexpected outflow of capital in
forms of Treasury bills and bonds by foreign investors is also a concern.
Free capital flows indicate that the government has embraced financial
liberalisation in line with the international trend. The net outflow of
direct investment showed a concentration risk of investment in Mainland
China and lack of an incentive and friendly domestic investment
environment to attract more foreign direct investment and encourage
domestic firms to invest in Taiwan. Hence, this will affect employment
and economic growth in the future. The volatility of portfolio
investment and other investment means the surge of capital inflow
may quickly reverse. Thus, to avoid the adverse effect of huge capital
flows, in addition to the sterilisation by the Central Bank in its open
market operations, financial supervisory institutions must impose
stricter regulations on financial institutions and enforce stronger financial
market discipline. The US sub-prime crisis has directly or indirectly
influenced Taiwan’s financial stability and economic growth since it
erupted in the third quarter of 2007. Financial institutions, securities






and domestic investors have suffered huge losses from overseas
investments in mutual funds and financial derivatives, such as CDO
or structured notes. Furthermore, for compliance with regulations on
capital adequacy and risk management, financial institutions have to
sell their assets and to decrease lending, leading to severe credit crunch.
The Central Bank has taken various measures, such as injecting liquidity
in the money market and foreign exchange call loan and swap market,
decreasing the discount rate and required reserve ratio, curbing capital
outflows and depreciation of the NT dollar. However, due to
consumers’ loss in confidence, there were occurrences of bank runs in
some banks.  The government has since announced a full deposits
insurance scheme including interbank lending.  A ban on short selling
in equity market was also imposed.
While inflows are expected to bring benefits in terms of lower cost
of capital as well as market development, large inflows into Thailand
over the past few years have presented a number of key challenges,
particularly with its implications on the exchange rate.  During the
past few years up until the second quarter of 2008, large inflows,
together with current account surplus, have put sustained upward
pressure on the Baht. This rapid rate of Baht appreciation, when
resulting in an increase in real effective exchange rate, could damage
the competitiveness of the Thai export sector which would in turn
adversely affect the overall economic stability since the exports make
up a large portion of Thai GDP. The BOT thus attempted to alleviate
this upward pressure on the Baht by intervening in the FX market.
This has led to a large accumulation of international reserves. Though
increasing economic resiliency to external shocks, an increase in
international reserves could also mean an increase in domestic liquidity
which translates to an increase of inflationary pressures. Under an
inflation-targeting regime, the BOT normally sterilises the monetary
impact of intervention in order to avoid inflationary effects as well
as to maintain the policy rate at the level set by the monetary policy
committee.
Increased capital inflows to Vietnam contributed to increased
investment which promoted economic growth, financed current account
deficits and narrowed the difference between savings and investment.
In addition, inflows also aided financial market development, especially
stock market development while reducing the double mismatch of the
banking sector. It also improved market liquidity and encouraged a
more effective monetary transmission mechanism. The surplus of
capital account remained higher than the deficit of the current account,
which caused volatility in foreign currency demand and supply. The
macroeconomic and monetary developments became increasingly
complicated as a result of immediate changes in investment and deposit
behaviours. The swings of capital flows, notably FII caused some
turbulence in the USD/VND exchange rate. VND appreciated in the38
first quarter of 2008 but depreciated considerably in the second quarter
and only became stable lately owing to SBV’s interventions. Exchange
rate fluctuations posed negative impacts on imports and exports as
well as economic competitiveness. Other than monetary policy and
exchange rate management, the selection of monetary policy
management targets was also challenged.
Source: SEACEN Questionnaire Survey, December 2008
9. Concluding Remarks
The SEACEN economies have relaxed the barriers to capital movement
and liberalised their domestic financial markets. The current account is fully
convertible in all the countries in the SEACEN region while the capital account
is by and large fully convertible in the majority of these countries. However, a
few countries in the region still exercise some restrictions on capital movement
across the border. Starting from early 1990s, net capital flow to the SEACEN
countries increased steadily until 1996 due to the massive increase in total capital
inflows. After the financial crisis of 1997, total capital outflows have outweighed
total capital inflows resulting to a negative net capital flow. Among three
components of capital flow, namely, FDI, portfolio investment and other
investment, portfolio investment flow has become dominant in both capital inflow
and outflow in the recent years.
Empirical results show that both domestic factors such as high economic
growth, attractive interest rates and large current account deficits and external
factors such as low world interest rates are responsible for the increased capital
inflows in the region. However, the effects of these factors on capital flows
vary across the countries. The contagion effects of global financial crisis that
originated from US subprime mortgage crisis in August 2007, has brought a
significant change in the direction and volume of capital flows in the SEACEN
region. Recent experience of SEACEN countries indicates that the US sub-
prime mortgage crisis which heightened risk aversion of global investors, global
liquidity squeeze and uncertainty in financial markets; and, slower global economic
growth are the external factors that have slowed capital inflows while the political
climate of the country, further liberalisation on overseas investment; and,
encouragement of sovereign funds to invest abroad are the internal factors that
have accelerated capital outflow.
Capital flows affect monetary and financial stability through various channels
in the economy. Increased capital flow may lead to monetary expansion which39
in turn may result into soaring inflation. However, sterilisation intervention by
central banks can mitigate such risks. Capital flows also affect asset prices
including financial assets and real estate. Increased capital flows into the Asian
economy in 1990s in general, helped spur economic growth in the region but
they also became a cause of the financial crisis in 1997. The recent experience
of SEACEN countries shows that capital flows create asset price bubbles, push
inflation up and induce sharp increases in bank credit while outflow of capital
results in lower equity prices and depreciation of exchange rates. Increased
foreign capital flows, as a whole, make the financial system and the economy
more vulnerable to external shocks. The possibility of sudden and massive capital
reversal creates increased risk and uncertainty in the financial system.
9.1 Policy Implications
The SEACEN region has benefited significantly from the increased capital
inflows mainly in terms of increased investment, higher economic growth,
favourable external accounts and developed financial markets. However, the
financial crisis of 1997 and also the current global financial crisis have clearly
demonstrated the vulnerabilities associated with the capital flows. The 1997
financial crisis erupted mainly due to internal factors while the current financial
crisis is due mainly to external factors. In both cases, the slowing down of
capital inflows and massive capital reversals were the common factors that
generally led to greater financial and economic turbulence. These episodes have
clearly indicated the need for the proper management of capital flows.
A lesson learned from the 1997 financial crisis was that countries should
encourage more long-term capital inflows as short-term capital inflows are highly
volatile and prone to sudden reversals. After the 1997 crisis, the share of FDI
inflow started to outweigh the share of portfolio inflow in the SEACEN region
which continued until 2003. However, after 2003, the share of portfolio inflow
started to become increasingly dominant, resembling the pattern of capital flows
before the 1997 crisis. Due to the larger share of highly volatile short-term
foreign capital, SEACEN economies are again, facing the problem of massive
capital reversals. In order to prevent a repetition of the same problems in the
future, SEACEN countries need to encourage more long-term capital inflows
rather than short-term ones.
Short-term capital inflows may also lead to speculative attacks. To safeguard
the financial system and the economy from such attacks, authorities need to
implement more prudent regulations and to cautiously monitor potential areas of40
such attacks. Similarly, increased capital flows in general may lead to monetary
expansion and inflation. In order to maintain a stable monetary policy environment,
central banks need to sterilise inflows with appropriate intervention measures.
Exchange rate regimes to a larger extent, determine the volume and direction
of capital flows in an economy. Freer exchange rates allow for more capital
flows in and out of the country. However, in the time of distress, the countries
that have a free floating exchange rate regime may suffer from larger capital
reversals. The experiences of some SEACEN countries have shown that a free
floating exchange rate regime is not always the best regime and that during a
crisis, a managed floating exchange rate regime may be in more advantageous
position.
The financial markets and economies of the SEACEN countries are currently
being affected by the global financial crisis. As such, positive developments are
less likely in the region until the global market recovers. However, to minimise
the further negative impacts of the crisis on various sectors of the economy
including capital flows, to speed up the recovery process and also to explore the
possibility of inventing new economic drivers within the region, coordinated policy
measures need to be implemented at national as well as regional levels. In this
regard, SEACEN economies may benefit by establishing a strong regional
mechanism for effective policy coordination.41
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Chapter 2
CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL
BANK POLICIES IN BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
by
Hjh Nurhuaida Fakhriah Hj Damit1
1. Introduction
Brunei Darussalam is a small country located on the island of Borneo, with
a total land area of 5,767 sq km and over 160 kilometres of coastline along the
South China Sea. Recent statistics showed that Brunei’s population is
approximately 390,000 with the majority being Malay, followed by Chinese
(DEPD, 2009). Brunei is governed under a constitution, in which His Majesty
the Sultan has executive authority and is assisted and advised by 5 constitutional
bodies:- the Council of Succession, the Council of Cabinet Ministers, the Privy
Council, the Legislative Council and the Religious Council (Brunei Government,
2009).
Brunei Darussalam’s economy is dominated by the oil and gas industry and
accounts for more than 90% of its exports and more than 50% of its Gross
Domestic Product. Nevertheless, the government sees the need to diversify away
from oil and gas and to widen the economic base, including by strengthening the
financial and tourism sectors.
Brunei does not have a central bank. However, the functions of a central
bank are shared between the departments under the Ministry of Finance. Brunei
operates under a currency board system, in which the Brunei Dollar is pegged
at parity (one-to-one) with the Singapore Dollar under the Currency
Interchangeability Agreement which was signed in 1967.
2. General Framework and Major Capital Flow Management Policies
One of the acts drafted after Brunei Darussalam’s independence in 1984
was the Exchange Control Act, in which laws regarding gold, foreign currency,
________________
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travellers’ cheques, and payments to and from Brunei Darussalam were
promulgated.  The Act also prescribed the laws with regard to securities’ issues
as well as restrictions on imports and exports of notes and securities.
However, the Exchange Control Act was later repealed by the Exchange
Control Order of 2000, with effect on 1st July 2000. Since then there have been
no formal exchange controls, but the Ministry of Finance retains responsibility
for exchange control matters. However, there are also other relevant legislations
which are related to capital flows, particularly in encouraging foreign direct
investment flow.
For businesses in the private sector, the Brunei Company Act requires that
companies incorporated in Brunei to have at least two directors, in which at
least one Director should be a Brunei national. A majority of the shareholders
in Brunei registered companies must be locals if they are going to bid for
government projects or apply for government licenses. However, this should not
deter foreign partners from bringing in foreign capital to invest domestically.
Besides that, companies in Brunei are also permitted to obtain loans from
non-resident lenders with a 20% withholding tax on the interest paid. However,
the government may provide exemption if the approved foreign loan is for the
purpose of purchasing production equipment, which is more than B$200,000.
This is just one example of the incentives provided to investors following the
enactment of the Investment Incentive Act of 1975 that may influence the flow
of borrowings from overseas.
Foreign companies are welcomed to set up branches in Brunei. However,
businesses which affect the public directly, such as banks, finance companies,
insurance companies, travel agencies and money lender, are required to obtain
special licenses from the government and  must observe a more stringent set
of rules before approval, which includes the amount of capital they need to
bring in. These foreign companies, like local companies, are subject to 27.5%
corporate tax for the first year and 25.5% for the subsequent years. However,
under the Investment Incentive Act, pioneer companies are exempted up to
eight years, with an option to extend up to 11 years.
In April 2007, His Majesty the Sultan of Brunei consented to pass the Sungai
Liang Authority (SLA) Order for the Brunei Economic and Development Board
(BEDB) to handle the needs of the industries at Sungai Liang. With this Act,
it provides the SLA to be the single point in granting licenses, approvals and
consent in developing the Sungai Liang Industrial Park (SPARK). This will47
facilitate faster access and less red-tape for foreign investors to invest in Brunei.
Besides SPARK, the BEDB is also planning to develop Muara Island into a
deep sea port. It is also studying the possibility of developing it into a
manufacturing complex of major industries and an export processing zone for
Halal food. All these projects are aimed at attracting more foreign direct
investment into the country.
3. Key Macroeconomic Indicators
3.1 GDP Growth Rate
Source: Department of Economic Planning and Development, Brunei
After experiencing negative growth in 1997 and 1998, due to the sluggish
performance of the construction industry, Brunei’s GDP increased in 1999 by
3.1% with an increase in the mining industry by 10%, compared to a reduction
of production by 1.8% in 1998. Since then, Brunei’s GDP continued to experience
a positive growth albeit in at a decreasing rate from 2003 to 2005 before increasing
sharply to 4.4% in 2006. The 0.5% growth in 2004, compared to 2.9% growth
in 2003, was due to a slowdown in economic activity in the industrial sector,
which comprises 62.5% of the total economic activity (DEPD, 2007).
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The positive growth of the industrial sector in 2006 contributed to the 4.4%
GDP growth in 2006, which also marked a 7.4% increase in the services sector
in the same year, compared to 4.1% increase in the previous year. However,
despite an increase of 10.4% in the services sector, the economic growth tapered
to 0.60% in 2007when the industrial sector weakened as the result of an economic
slowdown in both the mining and manufacturing sectors, which jointly contributed
up to 67.6% of Brunei’s economy.
3.2  Exchange Rate
Under the Currency Interchangeability Agreement 1967, the Brunei dollar
is pegged at  par with the Singapore dollar. The Brunei dollar has remained
relatively stable against the US dollar due to the strong underlying economic
fundamentals of the Singapore dollar. Nevertheless, after the Asian Financial
Crisis in 1997, the Brunei dollar depreciated to B$1.7917 in 2001 before
appreciating and reaching its peak in June 2008 at B$1.3616 in  the current
financial crisis. However, in January 2009, the US dollar strengthened, which if
the trend continues, may affect Brunei’s income from oil and gas.
Source: Department of Economic Planning and Development, Brunei;  Monetary
Authority of Singapore49
3.3 Inflation
Supported by the Currency Board Arrangement, Brunei’s inflation generally
moves in tandem with the trend price developments in Singapore. This was also
reflected when Brunei experienced a deflation of 2.3% in 2002, when Singapore
experienced a deflation of 0.39% in the same year. The decreasing trend of
inflation was due to the recession encountered in the late 1990s. Nevertheless,
inflation picked up again in 2003 and remained subdued in the 0-1.5% region but
increased to 2.9% year-on-year in November 2008. This was a result of relatively
higher prices of food and entertainment, increasing at 5% compared to November
2007.
Source: Department of  Economic Planning and Development, Brunei50
3.4 Current Account Balance
The current account has been showing an increasing trend since 2002
dominated by the trade balance followed by balance on services. Despite an
increase in imports for both goods and services, the current account remains in
the surplus. Whilst the balance on services continues to be negative, the surplus
in the trade balance offsets it. This is mainly due to a relatively higher marginal
increase in exports, particularly with the high energy prices contributing to more
than 90% of total exports.
Source: International Financial Statistics51
3.5  Overall Balance of Payments
The overall balance of payments is on a rising trend. It is apparent that
current account, net errors and omissions dominate. The net capital account
recorded is relatively small and is in deficit. It is noted, however, that no data
has been collected for capital transfers and acquisition or disposal of non-produced
and non-financial assets overseas and, thus, the statistics may not reflect the
true nature of Brunei’s capital account. Nevertheless, the financial account is
further explored in the next section.
4. Capital Flows
Although capital flows do not dominate the overall balance of payments like
the current account, they continue to be an important composition of it and will
continue to be as Brunei diversifies its economic base away from the oil and
gas industry. In this section, the components of the financial account will be
discussed and looked at.
Source: International Financial Statistics
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4.1 Net Foreign Direct Investment
Brunei yearly records a positive foreign direct investment inflow. The major
portion of this investment goes to the primary sector, where the oil and gas
industry still plays a dominant role in the development of Brunei’s economy. The
United Kingdom and Netherlands have predominantly been the two largest
investors in Brunei as the oil and gas industry in Brunei is mostly managed by
Shell. However, in 2006, the United Kingdom and France were the main investors
that accounted for 14.5% of total FDI inflows.  In 2002, there was an increase
in foreign direct investment. This was largely contributed by an increase in
investment into the tertiary sector.
With regard to foreign direct investment outflow, the data for 2004 and
2006 are only available in the International Financial Statistics. This may not
reflect Brunei’s actual foreign direct investment overseas as there have been
reports of record-high investment by Brunei in China, as reported by the People’s
Republic of China’s Embassy in Brunei. According to this report, Brunei had
invested in 121 projects in China, with an actual investment of US$34.92 million
as at the end of April 2003, compared to 82 projects with an actual utilisation
of US$21.34 million in 2002.
Source: International Financial Statistics53
4.2 Net Portfolio Investment
Bank Islam Brunei Darussalam offers equities to the local Public. However,
these equities are not offered to non-residents of Brunei. Similarly, the Government
of Brunei Darussalam, through the Ministry of Finance, issues short-term Sukuk
Al-Ijarah, currently to the local financial institutions only. There is no data available
on portfolio inflow.
There is no apparent trend in the portfolio investment made overseas by
Brunei residents. However, it was noted that in 2001, the repatriation of equities
invested overseas was relatively higher than new investment, with net portfolio
investment outflow recorded at US$180 million. In 2003, on the other hand, new
investments were higher than repatriation with net portfolio investment outflow
recording US$60 million.  New equities invested overseas were the majority
component. Thus, equity investments continue to dominate the portfolio investment
flow relative to debt securities.
Source: International Financial Statistics54
4.3 Net Other Investment
The Government’s Investment overseas, which is managed by the Brunei
Investment Agency and Brunei’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, is guarded under the
Brunei Investment Agency Act, where its operations and statistics are not publicly
disclosed.
For banks, between 2003 and 2005, relatively high net repatriation of funds
back to Brunei was recorded after positive net other investment outflows in
2001 and 2002. However, in 2006, net deposits and investments placed overseas
by the local banks was US$637 million, the highest compared to 2001 and 2002.
Repatriation of borrowings and investments from foreign banks to Brunei,
however, were relatively lower with net banks investment liabilities the highest
in 2003 at US$73 million. In 2005 and 2006, borrowings and investments from
foreign banks were relatively higher at US$210 million.
The private sector had also recorded high inward repatriation of deposits
and investments made overseas of US$568 million in 2004, compared to only
US$75 million repatriation in 2003. In 2006, repatriation was also higher despite
a positive amount invested abroad by the private sector in 2005.
Source International Financial Statistics55
For borrowings from overseas and investments made by foreign private
sectors in Brunei Darussalam, it peaked in 2004 with US$413 million, where
subsequently, borrowings continued to be more than repayments and repatriations
despite at a relatively lower amount.
4.4 Net Errors and Omissions
The overall Balance of Payments has shown that whilst the Current Account
is dominant, the Financial Account continues to play a role in the transfers of
international commercial transactions in Brunei. Between 2005 and 2006, there
was an increase by 41% in the Current Account Balance and 92% increase in
the Net Capital Flow in the Financial Account. However, it is observed that net
error and omissions were high, particularly in 2005 and 2006, dominating other
flows. This reduces the predictive power of the data and information gathered.
5. Capital Flows on Monetary Policy
Brunei’s exchange rate has remained stable with the Currency
Interchangeability Agreement and strong underlying fundamentals of the Singapore
dollar. Also, with the repeal of the Exchange Control Act in 2000, access to the
market is relatively free. As such, in reference to the Impossible Trinity Theorem,
Brunei is not in a position to undertake an independent monetary policy. Although,
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund56
in theory, this may lead to volatile domestic output and inflation, statistics have
shown that both have remained relatively stable as highlighted in Graphs 1, 2
and 3.
6. Capital Flows on Financial Stability
Looking at the financial stability of Brunei’s financial sector, the aggregate
bank lending and non-performing loans are analysed against net banks investment
outflows. The first observation derived from the graph is that aggregate bank
lending decreased while net bank investment outflow by banks increased. Also,
it is observed that, prior to 2005, as deposits into the bank increased, aggregate
lending increased.  Subsequently, aggregate lending decreased despite the rising
trend of deposits in the banking system. This may have resulted in the increase
in overseas deposits or investments when domestic banks placed their excess
liquidity abroad, which they were unable to lend out as much as they could
when the Ministry of Finance, through the Financial Institution Division, introduced
a loan capping directive in May 2005.
Whilst the loan capping directive was introduced to reduce the level of
personal debt and promote the savings culture, the increasing outflow of liquidity
overseas as the result of excess liquidity could have been used for investment
Source: Financial Institution Division, Ministry of Finance, International Financial
Statistic57
domestically. However, relatively less financial investment opportunities are
available in Brunei, due to the absence of a vibrant financial market, as compared
to Singapore where similar activities can be undertaken with no currency risk.
In 2006, the Ministry of Finance revised the Banking Order, under which
directives were issued to assist counteract excessive liquidity being transferred
overseas as well as providing ways of ensuring that there is enough short-term
liquidity available domestically in times of crisis. Among them are the minimum
reserve requirements put in place. The measures include minimum liquid asset
requirement, where the authority may require each bank to hold a certain amount
of liquid asset as a percentage of their total liabilities and investments; minimum
cash balances, where there is a provision to place up to 30% of the bank’s
deposits and other liabilities with the Authority; and minimum asset requirements,
where the Authority may require each bank to hold a minimum amount of specified
assets domestically (Banking Order, 2006).
In 2006, Brunei also offered its first short-term Sukuk Al-Ijarah in its bid
to further develop the domestic financial system. Since then, there have been
25 issuances over BND1.4 billion, where the Primary Dealers consists of the
local banks and local branches of international banks. There is no secondary
market for the Sukuk as yet, but the certificates are tradable amongst the Primary
Dealers.
Recently, the Ministry of Finance issued a directive by which each local
branch of the international banks is required to hold at least BND10 million
worth of Sukuk-Al-Ijarah to fulfill the minimum asset requirement (FID, 2009).
This is one way to ensure that some of the excess liquidity is maintained locally.
7. Conclusion
Brunei is practicing free capital flow with the repeal of the Exchange Control
Act 1984 by the Exchange Control Order in 2000. With this, there are no
restrictions on the flow of capital and no formal exchange control issue.
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Finance still retains the responsibility pertaining to
this area.
Based on the data published, the current account and net errors and omission
dominate the Balance of Payments. The current account balance has been on
an increasing trend since 2002 and has remained in surplus due to the contribution
of total exports. The Financial Account, on the other hand, has been on a
decreasing trend since 2002, before increasing again in 2004. The flows are58
dominated by the changes in the banking sector. Whilst these changes may
reflect that the Financial Account is heavily impacted by the changes in flows
in the banking sector, it needs to take into consideration that net errors and
omissions are also relatively high.
In light of this, in assumption that there is an impact, financial stability will
be of utmost importance. It is noted that there was an increase in outflow from
the banking sector when the loan capping directive was introduced in May 2005.
The measure was implemented to improve financial stability and increase public
confidence in banks in Brunei and indirectly ensure that there are sufficient
funds remaining in the country to reduce the risk of any sudden and irregular
flows.
There is scope for changes in capital flows, particularly in the financial
sector as Brunei diversifies away from the oil and gas industry. Nevertheless,
the oil and gas industry will continue to play an important role in the movement
of capital flows.59
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Chapter 3
CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL




Indonesia has achieved outstanding economic growth since 1968 which was
partly attributed to capital inflows. While capital inflows contribute extensively
to economic development as an alternative and/or as a complement to other
sources of financing, they carry risk exposure and are full of inherent risks. The
1997 Asian financial crisis is one of the clear examples that failure to manage
capital inflows may lead to vast economic damage.  This study aims to examine
the macroeconomic variables that determine capital inflows to the country and
elaborate their implications for monetary policy and financial stability.
Following this introduction, an overview of the capital account liberalisation
and the major capital-inflow management policies is outlined in Section 2. The
evolution of capital inflows in Indonesia is described in Section 3. Sections 4 and
5 discuss the recent developments of short-term capital flows and monetary
policy as well as financial stability. The capital inflow determinants are analysed
in Section 6. Finally, the conclusions are drawn and presented in Section 7.
2. Overview of Indonesia’s Capital Account Liberalisation
Indonesia has long been known as one of the most open economies in the
region and among the developing countries. In April 1970, Indonesia lifted its
control on capital account.  The sequence of Indonesia’s external account
liberalisation is somewhat unconventional in the sense that the capital account
openness preceded the opening up of the financial sector. In line with the spirit
of free foreign-exchange system and broadened financial reforms, Indonesia
liberalised its current account in May 1988, as it accepted Article VIII of the
IMF, whereas the obligation to repatriate export proceeds was revoked since
1982.
________________
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Prior to the period of economic unrest that began in late 1997, there were
four clearly-discernible efforts to attract capital inflows. The first attempt is the
deregulation of foreign exchange management in 1970 that resulted in significant
changes in the volume of capital inflows.  The second and the third attempts
took place in 1980s, with the liberalisation of interest rates in 1983 and the
removal of entry barriers to the domestic banking sector in 1988. Finally, the
foreign investment liberalisation in 1994 led to huge capital inflows preceding
the financial crisis of 1997. In the post-crisis, capital flow management policies
are mainly marked by financial restructuring and strengthening of prudent capital
account management  which partly can be regarded as foreign exchange and
capital control. All the measures are primarily aimed at improving the business
environment and enhancing the development of the domestic financial market
as well as the attainment of financial system stability.
2.1 Gradual Liberalisation of Foreign Exchange: 1970 – 1982
This period was marked by the beginning of foreign exchange as well as
capital account liberalisation. Indonesia relaxed its tight control on foreign
exchange transactions which was imposed by the Foreign Exchange Act, No.
32/1964. Residents were required, among other things, to surrender foreign
exchange receipts and are not allowed to hold foreign exchange without the
expressed permission of the authorities. The deregulation programmes, aimed
largely at accelerating economic recovery and promoting foreign investment,
were implemented through the enacting of the Banking Act, 1967 and the Foreign
Investment Law, 1967. The programmes covered, inter alia, the liberalisation  of
foreign-exchange transactions mechanisms by permitting residents to keep a
certain fraction of their export proceeds to finance their imports, allowing foreign
banks to establish branches or joint-venture banks to increase participation in
the foreign exchange market, providing  fiscal incentives in terms of tax holidays
and free import tariffs to enhance foreign investment, and allowing non-residents
to invest up to 30 year-duration.
The Government Regulation No. 16/1970 lifted Indonesia’s control on capital
account and relaxed the foreign exchange trading system. These foreign exchange
reforms included, among other things, freeing the selling and purchasing of foreign
exchange, compensation of export proceeds surrendered concurrently by the
endorsement to buy foreign exchange in any amount and freeing the holding of
foreign exchange receipts from exports of services. Thus, Indonesia nullified its
foreign exchange control at a very early stage in the development of its financial
system.63
2.2 First Financial Reform: 1982 – 1987
The drive in the liberalisation of foreign exchange continued in 1982 through
the passing of the Government Regulation No.1/1982 where restrictions on foreign
exchange transactions were entirely removed. The regulation invalidated the
obligation to surrender export proceeds. Furthermore, banks were no longer
required to sell their acquired foreign exchange to the central bank. This can
be regarded as an aggressive stage since neither a monitoring system nor reporting
obligation of foreign exchange transactions has been established.
This period is also considered to be the starting point of reforms in the
financial sector and of a more market-based monetary policy framework. The
comprehensive financial reforms of June 1983 have altered drastically the previous
financial infrastructures which can be described as a repressed financial system.
Moreover, the Central Bank Certificate (Sertifikat Bank Indonesia) and the
Discount Facility were introduced in February 1984. This series of reforms
incorporated liberalising interest rates, streamlining the central bank’s liquidity
credit, abolishing credit ceilings and introducing open market operation.
Furthermore, in order to promote non-oil exports and economic diversification,
gradual liberalisation of foreign direct investment was conducted in 1985 through
the simplification of investment procedures and possibility of opening certain
closed fields of investment if the entire production is exported.
2.3 Second Financial Reform and Foreign Investment Deregulation: 1988
– 1996
In order to increase financial deepening, the second round of financial reforms
was conducted in the late 1980s. The effects of the acceptance of Article VIII
were that the branches of foreign banks, which were previously prohibited from
managing foreign exchange, could now do so by simply informing Bank Indonesia
and the swap premium shifted to market-based determination and the maximum
maturity extended from six months to three years. The announcement of the
banking-sector reform-policy package in October 1988 (Paket Oktober 1988)
was mainly expected to promote the mobilisation of fund and raise the efficiency
of the financial institutions. One of the important points was the abolishment of
the restriction on the establishment of new private banks. The deregulation and
liberalisation of entry to the domestic banking sector shifted Indonesia’s fund
allocation principles.  This was considered the turning point with regard to the
domination of the state-owned banks over the private banks in the banking sector
and the ascendance of competitive principles in the banking system. These
reforms have also increased the efficiency of monetary management and64
promoted a more conducive environment for the development of the financial
market.
In line with the banking sector liberalisation, financial market reforms were
introduced in December 1988 aiming at mobilising more long-term capital flows
by encouraging further development of capital market and improving investor
confidence. Since then, foreign investors were allowed to own domestic
companies by purchasing stocks in the capital market. Further foreign investment
liberalisation in 1994 permitted foreign ownership of domestic companies up to
100% for certain categories of investment, and permitted foreign investment in
joint ventures in vital sectors such as power generation, ports and
telecommunication. All the deregulation and liberalisation packages, combined
with the new capital market law in 1995 aimed at strengthening the legal
fundamentals of the capital market, including the removal of equity ownership
limitation2, boosted capital inflows into Indonesia in the first part of 1990s until
preceding 1997, when the capital flow reversal began to materialise.
2.4 Recent Major Capital Flow and Exchange Rate Management Policies
Learning from the 1997 financial crisis, the country realised the pressing
need for more prudent management of capital flows, especially of the short-
term types. Policies, such as improved prudential measures on foreign exchange
transactions, better prudential banking supervision, and other policies to further
develop financial infrastructures, are mainly designated to maintain financial and
monetary stability, which are extremely important to support a more conducive
investment climate and attain most advantageous benefits from capital inflows.
The central bank has initiated several policies to cushion capital flows and
exchange rate volatility, such as foreign exchange intervention and domestic
currency sterilisations (open market operation), anti-speculation on foreign
exchange measures, and policies related to resident and non-resident transactions.
2.4.1 Intervention and Sterilisation
In order to curb foreign exchange volatility, the central bank introduced
Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No. 30/2005 on the third amendment of PBI
No.9/2002 on Open Market Operation. This regulation was instituted to enhance
the effectiveness of open market operation as an instrument to stabilise the
rupiah. With the purpose in smoothing out exchange rate volatility, direct
________________
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intervention in the foreign exchange money market is carried out in the spot,
forward and swap market, where the tenor of the forward and swap transactions
is not exceeding seven days. Furthermore, sterilisation in the rupiah money market
is conducted to absorb excess liquidity. Thus, generally speaking, the regulation
is intended to intensify open market operation in the inter-bank money market
due to the high correlation of foreign exchange money market and the rupiah
money market.
2.4.2 Anti-Speculation Policies
Regarding the capital flows and foreign exchange stabilisation, Bank Indonesia
enacted, among other things, PBI No. 31/2005 on Derivative Transactions, PBI
No. 36/2005 on Swap Hedging, and PBI No. 37/2005 on the second amendment
of PBI No. 13/2003 on Bank’s Net Open Position (NOP) to reduce speculative
transactions on foreign exchange. PBI No. 31/2005 prohibits banks from: i) doing
foreign exchange or interest rate related derivative transactions without underlying
transaction; ii) holding position on derivative transactions of affiliated parties
unless the transactions are channelled instantly to other parties, where affiliated
parties refer to the regulation of Legal Lending Limit of banks; iii) conducting
margin trading of the rupiah against foreign exchange for the benefit either banks
or their customers except for credit provision and/or overdraft facilities from
bank relatives to the derivative transactions of their customers.
In order to encourage investment in the real sector, PBI No. 36/2005
introduced a swap hedging facility where banks are allowed to enter into swap
transactions with Bank Indonesia to hedge investment risks in the real sectors
which are partly or entirely financed by external debts.  The regulation (PBI
No. 13/2003) on NOP is intended to improve banks’ management of foreign
exchange risks and limit banks from foreign exchange transactions that can
potentially trigger foreign exchange instability.  Regarding this, the regulation
sorts NOP into on-balance sheet and overall NOP, where both are reported in
the rupiah presentation at the end of the day or any other specified time with
the limit of 20% of bank’s capital.
2.4.3 Restrictions and Limitation on Certain Transactions
The other policy to reduce the rupiah exchange rate volatility was released
as Bank Indonesia issued PBI No. 14/2005 (improvement on PBI No. 3/2001)
on the Restriction of Rupiah Transactions and Provision of Foreign Exchange
Loan by Banks.  The coverage of the regulation is as follows:66
a. Prohibits banks from doing certain transactions with non-residents including
providing rupiah and foreign exchange credits to non-residents, placement
of rupiah in the form of deposits or other means in offshore banks, purchasing
rupiah-denominated assets issued by non-residents, inter-office accounts in
rupiah (domestic branch lending to offshore branches), inter-office accounts
in foreign exchange for provision of credits in offshore, equity participation
in rupiah, rupiah transfer to an account held by non-residents and/or a joint
account in onshore or offshore and rupiah transfer to residents in outside
Indonesia.
b. Limits banks from doing transactions with non-residents including purchasing
and/or selling foreign exchange derivative transactions against rupiah without
its underlying transaction not exceeding the threshold of US$1 million
(lowered from US$3 million in PBI No. 3/2001) for each individual transaction
or outstanding position for each bank.
In regard to external debts, Bank Indonesia issued regulations concerning
bank and non-bank corporate foreign borrowings. PBI No. 1/2005 on Bank
Foreign Borrowings requires banks to hold daily outstanding short-term foreign
loan position not exceed 30% of their capital. Banks are also required to obtain
the approval of Bank Indonesia before entering the market for long-term foreign
borrowings and to give reports not exceeding seven working days. Furthermore,
PBI No. 7/2008 on Non-Bank Corporate Foreign Borrowings gives conditions
to corporate sectors to use long-term foreign borrowing as their source of finance,
such as having good    financial health profiles as well as international rating,
reporting its financial statement and corporate risk management analysis. The
regulation also requires corporations to report their outstanding foreign loan
positions each semester.
2.4.4 Monitoring of Exchange Rate Transactions
In order to support those capital flow related policies and obtain more accurate
data and information concerning capital flows, Bank Indonesia prompted to further
improve the foreign exchange monitoring system3. The Online Monitoring System
of Foreign Exchange (LLD) was applied in 2000 involving banks, non-bank
financial institutions, companies and individuals. Additional to the online monitoring
system, Banks Daily Report (LHBU), which was released in 2005, covers all
market players’ transactions including that of offshore players4. This system
________________
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monitors foreign exchange transactions in the money market with only one day
time lag and can trace the data up to the individual transactions due partially
to the utilisation of the Online Analytical Data Processing (OLAP). The
information generated from this system thus can be used as ‘leading information’
towards foreign exchange flows.
3. Trend in Capital Flows in Indonesia
As shown in Figure 1, prior to the financial crisis, Indonesia recorded current
account deficit for most periods except in the period of oil price boom attributed
to oil and gas exports. Opposite to the current account, in line with the economic
performance, this country maintained capital account surplus mounting to 10.7%
of GDP, as the highest, in 1975. The Asian financial crisis has reversed the path
of Indonesia’s external accounts. In the post-crisis, while the economy achieved
current account surplus, it experienced capital account deficit until 2003 and
turned the deficit to surplus in 2004, the first time for Indonesia to record surpluses
all together in both current and capital account.
The capital account surplus in the pre-crisis period was contributed variously
by its components which were in sync with  macroeconomic fundamentals and
policies. Figure 1 also shows that, before the 1990s, other investment was dominant
over other components of capital flows in contribution to the capital account. In
the 1990s up to the financial crisis, capital flows were dominated by FDI and
portfolio investment, whereas portfolio investment is the main contributor to the
recent capital account surplus.
________________
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Figure 1
Evolution of Capital Flows and its Components
 Source: Bank Indonesia
3.1 Foreign Direct Investment
Indonesia has experienced two phases of high FDI inflows since 1980. The
first period of high FDI inflows occurred after the first-1985 deregulation of
foreign investment which happened to coincide with the flow of Japanese and
NIE’s FDI to the developing countries. The second period of high FDI inflows
took place following the second foreign investment liberalisation in 1994 where
the FDI raised up to more than 100% in 1995 from US$ 2.2 billion in 1994 and
reaching its highest point of US$ 6.25 billion in 1996. The high FDI inflow was
attributed to the high economic growth and stability of macroeconomic
fundamentals. The development of FDI inflows seems to be in line with GDP
growth and the openness of the economy, except in the period of deep financial
crisis, which reflects the higher portion of trade in terms of total GDP (Figure
2).69
The 1997 financial crisis which resulted in a large depreciation of local
currency against US dollar and other currencies led to the difficulty of private
sector to repay their external debts. Accelerated debt repayments and limited
loan disbursements from affiliated companies as well as low equity investment
in relation to FDI inflows caused the deficit to rise from 1998 through 2004,
except in 2002. While the economy recorded US$ 1.9 billion inwards FDI, it still
experienced a net FDI deficit in 2004 due to residents’ outwards FDI of US$
3.4 billion. Furthermore, Indonesia has attained net FDI surpluses in the last
three consecutive years which was partly attributed to investments in oil and
gas sector and acquisition of domestic companies by non-residents. Moreover,
direct investment recently has reached a more preferable level with high capital
inflows on one side and growing domestic overseas assets on the other. While
Indonesia recorded high inwards FDI, since 2004, the FDI is also characterised
by increasing residents’ assets overseas. The high outwards FDI of US$ 4.8





Since 1992, the performance of portfolio investment, as shown in Figure 3,
is marked by domination of the private sector over the public sector in net portfolio
investment up until 2003.  Prior to 1997, portfolio investment displayed an
impressive performance as it recorded high annual average growth of 54% during
the time period spanning 1993 through 1996, which was mainly attributed to
investment in corporate debt securities. As the financial crisis broke out in Thailand
in July 1997, the capital flow reversal, as high as nearly US$5.4 billion, struck
the country in the last quarter of 1997. The portfolio investment, since then,
experienced negative net inflows until 2004. Recently, portfolio investment has
arrived at a more favorable level where high capital inflows tend to be stable
and increasing in amount which indicates that the economy’s fundamentals have
improved and are sounder.
Figure 3
Portfolio Investment; Public vs Private
Source: Bank Indonesia71
Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, Indonesia received huge portfolio inflows
which peaked at 2.2% of GDP (more than US$ 5.0 billion) in 1996. This massive
portfolio investment inflows were supposed to be attributed to high and sustainable
economic growth, less volatile foreign exchange rate, large interest rate differential
and very rapid growth of capital market (See Figure 8 for exchange rate
development). Those sound macroeconomic fundamentals lowered the country
risks and led to greater foreign investor confidence. Part of the portfolio investment
is in terms of foreign purchase in the stock market. Figure 4 shows that the
development of stock market index went alongside with the composite country
risks index, published by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).5   The capital
inflow reversal occurred as the financial crisis hit the country in 1997 and
recorded net portfolio investment deficit of US$2.63 billion or nearly 1.2% of
GDP. The negative picture of portfolio investment continued up to 2001.
Figure 4
Jakarta Composite and Country Risks Indices
Source: ICRG, CEIC
________________
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Following the improved macroeconomic indicators, for example, better fiscal
sustainability, less volatile exchange rate and expectation of appreciation, higher
economic growth as well as lower country risks, portfolio investment surplus
was re-attained in 2002. In additional to these fundamental factors, ample global
liquidity and low international interest rate in comparison to that of the emerging
markets are considered as the other compelling factors. Furthermore, the
privatisation programmes of state-owned companies through the capital market
were believed to be one of the additional factors in attracting higher foreign
investments.  The favorable performance of portfolio investment continued to
mount up portfolio liabilities to US$9.8 billion as of 2007.  The last, but not the
least, important factor in influencing portfolio investment is the extraordinary
growth of Indonesia’s capital market, which is recently regarded as one of the
best in performance in the region.  As the result, the net portfolio investment
surplus rose to US$5.5 billion in 2007 from US$1.2 billion in 2002.
3.3 Other Investment
The profile of Indonesia’s other investment has changed from net inflows
in the preceding 1994 to recent net outflows.  In the decade of the 1980s, other
investment was dominated by external government debts. While the role of the
government was extremely pivotal in the economic development, as the oil price
boom ended and the government could no longer rely on the oil and gas incomes,
external debts in terms of project-aid began its role as one of main source of
development financing. The increasing private commercial external debts incurred
in the first part of 1990s is judged to be one of the major contributors to the
prolonged 1997 financial crisis. In the post-crisis era, continuing its unfavorable
picture preceding the crisis, other investment recorded net deficit until the recent
years.73
Figure 5
Other Investment; Public vs Private
Other investment in the 1980s was characterised by long term government
external debts with low interest rate and relatively long grace periods. Most of
the government foreign debts were mainly in terms of project loan and programme
loan which focused on infrastructures and other development agendas. After
the ceilings on foreign borrowing by foreign exchange bank and non-bank financial
institutions were removed in 1989, the rising amount of private external debts
in the early 1990s was mainly in the form of commercial bank borrowing
converted to local currency through central bank’s swap facility. Concerned
that the commercial loans might be excessive, showed up by the domestic
economy that started to overheat in 1990 – 1991, indicated by the accelerated
inflation and significant increase in interest rate, the government formed a Foreign
Commercial Borrowing Management Coordinating Team (PKLN) in 1991.
Furthermore, the prolonged 1997 financial crisis is regarded as partly due to the
weaknesses of external debt management by the private sector (banking and
corporate sectors) which failed to cope with, among other things, currency and
maturity mismatches.
The 1997 financial crisis was further aggravated by foreign investors’ loss
of confidence that led to pressures on the domestic private sector to accelerate
their debt repayment with no additional disbursements.  Regarding this, private
Source: Bank Indonesia74
other investment deficit peaked at nearly  US$12 billion in 1998, when at the
same time the government (central bank) took the IMF standing loan (Figure
5). All in all, other investment recently is still in the negative figure due to large
private debt repayments and the government debt management strategy which
stipulates foreign loan disbursements in particular fiscal year should be less than
its repayments, including the speeding up of debt repayment to the IMF.
4. Short-term Capital Flows and Monetary Policy in Indonesia
As implied in the impossible trinity, allowing the exchange rate to float and
maintaining cross-border capital convertibility complicates the conduct of monetary
policy and exchange rate management under the objective of maintaining price
stability.  Realising that the 1997 financial crisis is an evidence of improper
monetary policy in dealing with the impossible trinity, and the surge in capital
inflows is one of main source of the problems, policymakers need to be
concerned and take some necessary preemptive measures to reduce the possibility
of sudden capital reversal, this section analyses the short-term capital flows in
the recent years with its embedded risks.  The monetary policy reactions are
discussed in the last part of this section.
4.1 Short-term Capital Flows in the Recent Years
Figure 6 displays the short-term capital flows which consist of portfolio
investment and short-term loan over the past five years. While portfolio
investment recorded high net inflow due to the remarkable high performance of
the capital market, other investment in the post-crisis era is characterised by
persistent negative net inflows, which are attributed to negative net disbursements
and growing foreign assets in terms of currency and deposits. Thus, in general,
it exhibits a quite volatile net balance of short-term capital flows.75
The noticeable performance of portfolio investment in the recent years
suggests that Indonesia is one of the emerging markets in the region that has
recently received massive short-term capital inflows. The increasing portion of
debt securities from the total value of portfolio investment is closely related to
the higher interest rate differential in the country in comparison with that of
other emerging markets (Figure 6, right panel). Government bonds and Bank
Indonesia certificates are the most interesting rupiah outlets (debt securities)
that foreign  investors are willing to hold as they carry fairly lower risks than
those issued by the corporate sector. The high inflows of “hot money” have not
only vast monetary implications to the economy, they also suggest the increasing
risks of sudden capital reversal.
Expanding capital inflows will directly be reflected in the appreciated nominal
exchange rates since it has direct effects on the supply of and demand for
foreign exchange in the domestic foreign exchange market. Figure 7 shows the
appreciation in real exchange rates (RER) and real effective exchange rate
(REER) at the time of relatively stable nominal exchange rate. Figure 8 (lower
left panel) exhibits the movement of the rupiah against the US dollar exchange
rate that links strongly to the capital inflows associated with the major rupiah-
denominated outlets. Figure 8 (upper left panel) also shows how the foreign
exchange reserve picks up when the exchange rate moves in narrow bands,
Figure 6
Recent Development of Short-term Capital Flows
Source: Bank Indonesia76
while it drops when the foreign exchange largely depreciates, as occurred, for
instance, in the 1997 financial crisis.  All in all, it can be seen that the foreign
exchange reserves change depending on the direction of capital inflows.
The surging in of capital inflows can also be reflected in the increasing
money supply, for foreign exchanges are converted into the domestic currency
as soon as the foreign investors purchase local-currency-denominated assets.
Furthermore, rising capital inflows when it is connected to the banking sector
is usually followed by increasing credit growth. However, the recent high credit
growth seems to be isolated from the huge inflows of “hot money.”  High
domestic credit growth in the last part of 1980s and in the first part of 1990s
up to the 1997 financial crisis were attributed to the large inflows of other
investment (loan) into the banking sector, while the expanding credit growth in
the recent year is associated with negative net inflows of other investments
(lower right panel of Figure 8).  Moreover, the high growth of money supply
theoretically leads to increasing inflationary pressures. In the case of Indonesia,
the accelerating money supply growth is not necessary connected to the scaling
up of the price level (upper right panel). The empirical study of Bank Indonesia
found that there is no clear evidence of strong relationship between monetary
aggregates and inflation in the post crisis.   Thus, even though capital inflows
accelerate the growth of money, it is not always followed by rising domestic
credit growth and increasing inflationary pressures.
Figure 7
Nominal Exchange Rate (NER), Real Exchange Rate (RER) and
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
Source: Bank Indonesia77
Capital inflows, as it implies an increasing demand for domestic assets, will
significantly affect domestic asset prices.  Positive non-resident net purchase of
stocks listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) is associated with the mounting
stock price index (Figure 8, upper right panel). This is confirmed by equity
securities inflows (portfolio investment) which exhibit an increasing scale that
is in line with allied returns in the stock market (lower left panel). Additional to
the equity securities market, changes of yield on debt securities show a relatively
close connection to portfolio inflows in debt securities. Yield growth reveals a
reduction as there is a surge in capital inflows (upper left panel). Capital inflows,
thus, could have resulted in creating a domestic asset price bubble. According
to the empirical study of Hardiyanto and Kurniati (2006), persistent asset price




4.2 Monetary Policy Reactions
Regarding the surge in capital inflows, how much capital inflows are enough
for the economy?  Large capital inflows, while they benefit the host country, if
not managed appropriately can have a detrimental impact on the economy,
including greater exchange rate appreciation, excessive money supply growth,
which in turn increases inflationary pressure and heightened risks of domestic
asset price bubbles and sudden capital reversal.  Concerning on the possibility
of those undesirable pressures, therefore, the central bank is required to manage
“the impossible trinity” under the monetary policy framework to achieve all the
monetary and economic objectives. There are some available tools that can be
used in managing capital inflows, such as open market operation (market
intervention and sterilisation), interest rates adjustment, and “limited” capital
control.
Figure 9
Capital Inflows and Asset Prices
Source: Bank Indonesia, CEIC79
In the post 1997 financial crisis, Indonesia adopted a floating exchange rate
regime. Bank Indonesia has allowed the rupiah to adjust to the market mechanism
and associated macroeconomic fundamentals. Short-term capital inflows in the
recent years have grown significantly and contribute to exchange rate instability.
In addition, short-term capital inflows for the purpose of currency speculation
have largely contributed to more rapid rupiah appreciation than those economic
fundamentals could bear.   In order to curb the exchange rate from unexpected
sharp appreciation associated with growing capital inflows and the possibility of
sudden reversal, the central bank carries out foreign exchange market interventions
which result in the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and increasing
domestic liquidity.  Additional to market intervention, the monetary authority has
constituted regulations on anti-speculation and regulation that could be considered
as capital control as well as developed foreign exchange transaction monitoring
systems (as explained in the previous sections).
Reserve accumulation associated with capital inflows has monetary
implications, for instance, increasing domestic liquidity. When the central bank
conducts market interventions, it must choose whether to finance it by raising
the reserve money base, which could potentially cause inflationary pressures, or
by reducing its net domestic assets, which sterilises the impact on the domestic
liquidity. Regarding excessive domestic liquidity resulting from large capital inflows,
Bank Indonesia carries out open market operation to sterilise the foreign exchange
intervention.  Despite the pressures caused by portfolio inflows, positive net
foreign purchase of domestic assets has enhanced the size and liquidity of the
domestic asset market as well as contributed in supplying foreign exchange to
the domestic foreign exchange market. A greater and more liquid domestic asset
market would provide greater support for effective open market operation. In
order to increase the effectiveness of open market operation in the money market,
Bank Indonesia regulation No. 30/2005 on Open Market Operation has given
a legal basis known as the Fine-tune Operation (FTO) where Bank Indonesia
can control the daily domestic liquidity through overnight interest rate which can
direct the movement of the interbank interest rates around BI’s rate bands.  BI
rate adjustment is usually taken to maintain price stability with consideration to
other fundamental macroeconomics indicators. Domestic liquidity management
operations are also carried out by the central bank through credit policy, such
as adjustment in reserve requirement, productive asset write-off reserve, etc.
Figure 10 shows the extent of sterilisation that the central bank conducted
up to the recent years. A positive net international reserves (NIR) change is
related to foreign reserves inflows, whereas a negative net domestic asset (NDA)80
change is associated with reduction in domestic assets held by the central bank.
The figure also shows the nominal exchange rate movement which is associated
with the conduct of foreign exchange market interventions and domestic money
market sterilisations.
Figure 10
The Extent of Sterilisation
Figure 11
Rolling Regression of β β β β β Coefficient
Source: Bank Indonesia81
Figure 11 displays the rolling regression of sterilisation coefficient over 40-
quarter samples, where the value ranges from -0.96 to -1.08, suggesting the
degree of sterilisation is around full sterilisation6. Assuming that the demand for
money is stable, this implies that (under the monetary approach to the balance
of payment) the expansion of domestic credit at the growth rate of GDP would
increase the demand for money.  Full sterilisation suggests that the central bank
allowed domestic credit to fully accommodate greater demand for money
attributed to GDP growth, but avoided any credit acceleration caused by stashing
foreign reserves.
Reserve accumulation to a level deemed sufficient and the capital inflows
management from the perspective of monetary and/or financial stability became
a critical issue for emerging economies like Indonesia. Several indicators are
considered to be useful in analysing the fragility of monetary and financial stability.
M2/reserves ratio measures the gap between liquid domestic assets (that can
be converted into foreign currency-denominated assets) and the stock of foreign
reserves available to meet demand for domestic assets. Debt to reserve ratio
is another indicator that is important in connection to reserve adequacy to cover
external debts. The indicators in Table 1 imply that the current ratio of foreign
reserve is much better than before the onset of the 1997 financial crisis (for
discussion on such indicators see, for example, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart,
1998).
________________
6. Following Aizenman and Glick (2008), we estimate the degree of sterilisation by a simple OLS
regression of the central bank’s change in NDA on the change in its NIR, where change is
measured over four-quarter, and scaled by four-quarter lag of reserve money stock. To control
for other explanatory variables, Z, that might induce the demand for money, we incorporate
nominal four-quarter GDP growth rate in the right side of the equation: ∆NDA = λ + β∆NIR
+ Z.
The coefficient of sterilisation β= 0, corresponds to no sterilisation. A unitary coefficient, i.e.,
β= -1, implies full monetary sterilisation of the foreign reserve assets, whereas the coefficient
in between these level, -1 < β < 0, represents partial sterilisation, and β < -1 corresponds to
tighter monetary policy.82
5. Capital Flows and Financial Stability in Indonesia
Capital flows can create a risk to financial stability through currency and
maturity mismatch of assets and liabilities in the financial sector.  In the case
of Indonesia, assessment on financial system stability implies an evaluation on
banking sector soundness and capital market resilience due to their domination
over other component of financial system, such as multifinance, insurance, etc.,
in term of size and contribution to the development of the country. This section
reviews the recent developments of the banking sector and capital market with
consideration to capital flows and their implication for financial stability. The
general framework for achieving and maintaining financial stability would be
discussed in the last part of this section.
5.1 Capital Flows in the Banking Sector
The recent development of capital flows in the banking sector represents
a fairly volatile net inflow.  Regarding the liability of the banking sector, this
recent period is characterised by positive inflows, except for 2003 and 2005,
where debt repayments were recorded higher than its disbursements. On the
assets side, the capital outflows mostly correspond to currency and deposits of
domestic banking sector that are held by foreign bank to support cross-border
transactions either for the banks or for their customers. The overall net inflow
Table 1
Selected Reserve Indicators
 Source: Bank Indonesia83
variation shown in Figure 12 represents mostly the behavior of domestic banks’
liquidity management of foreign assets. The figure also displays the reduction
in debt stock in 2004 and 2006  is associated with debt repayment in 2003 and
2005. Positive capital inflows in 2007 are also clearly reflected in the figure of
the external debt stock.
The impact of capital inflows in the banking sector can directly be seen in
the domestic credit expansions. As shown in the previous section (Figure 8), the
acceleration of domestic credit in the recent years is not so high as that of
credit after bank business liberalisation (October 1988) and before the onset of
the crisis when the credit growth of private national banks and foreign-joint
venture banks are extremely high.  In general, the lower value of capital inflows
into banking sector in the recent years in comparison with that in the last 1980s
up to the financial crisis contribute mainly to the lower domestic credit expansion.
Higher recent credit growth, thus, are primarily supported by domestic saving.
Figure 12
Short-term Capital Flows in the Banking Sector and their
Debt Position
Source: Bank Indonesia84
5.1.1 Banking System Soundness
Considering the two aforementioned channels that transmit the impact of
capital inflows to financial sector stability, banks with high capital adequacy
ratio (CAR) and good assets qualities (indicated by low rate of non-performing
loan  (NPL)) are believed to be fundamental for banking system soundness.
Banks with high capital ratio (higher than that of required ratio) are assumed
to be able to absorb all reasonable amount of loss, whereas banks with good
assets qualities imply that they are exposed to lower pressures of financial loss
either related to risks associated with capital inflows or other risks. Table 2
exhibits both ratios in the recent years and of that before the 1997 financial
crisis. Despite the high credit growth this recent year (around 30%), the average
CAR of the banking sector is far higher than required (8%) with lower NPL
of 3.4% at the end of August 2008. This implies that banking sector is now
relatively strong to handle credit risks, interest rate risk, and currency and maturity
mismatch risks.
Table 2
Capital Adequacy Ratio and Non-Performing Loan (in percent)
5.2 Capital Market Development
Figure 13 shows the recent development of the capital market in Indonesia.
The remarkable performance of the stock price index since 2004 is associated
with the relatively high growth of market capitalisation. However, this noticeable
performance of the capital market was coupled with high volatility of the stock
price index which has been increasing significantly since the subprime scandal
burst in the second part of 2007.  While the volatility was intensified, the earning
yield of the stock market has been lower than the BI rate since July 2005,




Selected Stock Market Indicators
The development of the capital market is relatively close to that of the
global financial market due to the relatively significant role of foreign investors
in shaping Indonesia’s capital market performance. This implies that the capital
market, besides benefiting from ample global liquidity, is exposed and quite prone
to external shocks and more sensitive to global financial instability than that of
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and The Philippines. This is viewed to be connected
with the foreign ownership limitation of listed companies which is higher than
in those countries (Indonesia allows foreigners to own listed companies up to
100% (non-banking sector) as in the previous section, while in Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand foreign investors are allowed to own only up to 49%,
whereas in the Philippines up to 51%). Figure 14 shows the average foreign
ownership in Indonesia’s stock market, which exhibits a significant decline from
74.1% in 2006 to 59.6% in 2008 (up to September 2008) due to the global
liquidity problem following the subprime scandal.
Source: Bank Indonesia, CEIC86
Figure 14
Average Foreign Ownership in the Stock Market
Source: Indonesian Central Securities Depository (KSEI)
6. Determinants of Capital Flows
As the above analysis has shown, foreign direct investment flows are less
volatile than that of portfolio investment and other investment which are highly
unstable. This section investigates the factors that determine capital inflows into
the economy and verifies the things that influence short-term capital inflows and
FDI inflows decisions.  The analysis conducted in this paper is estimated based
on the Pesaran at al (2001) autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) regression
model.
6.1 Data, Estimation Model and Methodology
The data of the analysis are quarterly data that span from 1985Q1 to 2007Q4.
Some of the data are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
that is published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), such as exchange
rate, interest rate, inflation and US GDP. The US GDP growth and US T-Bill
are used as proxies to world economic growth and world interest rate, respectively.
The nominal interest rate data are converted into real term by simply subtracting
the current inflation rate from it.  Real GDP, capital inflows and current account
per GDP ratio are obtained from Bank Indonesia and Statistic Indonesia (Badan
Pusat Statistik – BPS), whereas the country risk data employed is the composite
country risk index published by ICRG.87
The empirical model of capital inflows used in this analysis is constructed
in the form:
where Cap is capital inflows which consist of foreign direct investment, portfolio
investment and other investment. The estimation will be conducted to the equation
of total capital inflows (Cap), short-term capital inflows (Caps) and foreign direct
investment inflows (FDI). Short-term capital inflows consist of portfolio investment
and other investment inflows. CA means current account to GDP ratio which
hypothetically has a negative sign. While Y and r represent real domestic GDP
and real interest rates, Y* and r* correspond to real world GDP growth and real
world interest rate. Both real GDP are estimated in the form of natural logarithm.
The explanatory variable of CA, Y and r were regarded as the pull factors to
international capital inflows, whereas Y* and r* were considered to be the push
factors. JCI is changes of natural logarithm of stock (Jakarta Composite Index)
prices which represents return on investment in the stock market. This implies
that higher return in the domestic stock market leads theoretically to increasing
capital inflows. CR stands for country risk index which is estimated in the form
of 1/index. Thus, lower country risk is expected to attract higher capital inflows.
Several econometric procedures have been developed to investigate
cointegration among the questioned variables. With regards to univariate
cointegration approach, the most popular method is that of Engle and Granger
(1987) and the modified OLS process of Phillip and Hansen (1990). The
Johansen’s (1996) full information maximum likelihood technique is one of the
most popular methods in testing multivariate cointegration. Recently, a single
cointegration approach, well-known as ARDL initiated by Pesaran at al.(2001)
has impressed increasing number of researchers. It is necessary to note that the
ARDL approach to cointegration has convinced econometric advantages in
comparison to other single cointegration procedures as follows: i) The ARDL
approach can cope with the endogeneity problems and inability to test hypotheses
on the estimated coefficients in the long run as can be found in the Engle Granger
method (Pesaran and Shin, 1999); ii) it is able to estimate both the long-run and
short-run parameters of the model simultaneously. The short-run parameters are
T -consistent with the asymptotically singular covariance matrix and the ARDL-
based long run estimators of  the long run coefficients are super-consistent
(Pesaran and Shin, 1998); iii)  it can test for the existence of long-run relationship
between variables in level regardless of whether the regressors’ state of
stationarity are purely I(0), purely I(1), or partly integrated (Pesaran and Shin,
1999);  iv) the ARDL approach has far superior properties for the small sample
(1)88
in comparison to that of multivariate cointegration. (See e.g. Narayan (2005) for
discussion on the econometric advantages of the ARDL method.)
The ARDL approach consists of two steps for estimating
cointegration (Pesaran et al. 2001). The first step is to test for the
existence of the long-run relationship among variables, whereas the second
step is to estimate the long-run and short-run coefficients in the same
equation.  The test investigates the null hypothesis of having no coinegration
or long-run relationship among variables in the equation, Ho:
0 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 = = = = = = = = a a a a a a a a , it is tested against the
alternative hypothesis H1:  0 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ a a a a a a a a  by
comparing the computed F-statistics to the F-statistics provided in Pesaran and
Pesaran (1997). If the computed F-statistics exceeds the upper critical value
then the Ho is rejected. If the F-statistics is below the lower critical value then
it entails no cointegration. However, if the F-statistics is in between the lower
and the upper bounds then it suggests that the test happens to be inconclusive.
The equation (1) is represented in the ARDL model as follows:
The ARDL approach estimates (p+1)k  number of regressions to find the
optimal lag for each variable, where p is the maximum number of lag and k is
the number of variables in the equation.  Following Pesaran and Pesaran (1997),
we use 4 lags as the maximum lag since the quarterly data is employed.  The
optimal model is selected using Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC) due to the
finding of Pesaran and Smith (1998), based on Monte Carlo empirical evidence,
that SBC is preferable to Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)   as it minimises
the lag length to maximise the observation’s degree of freedom. Hence, this
analysis uses SBC in selecting the optimal lag for each variable in the model.
The conditional ARDL-related error correction model (ECM) can be obtained
as the long-run relationship has been established. The general form of the ECM
estimation is constructed as in the equation (3).
(2)89
6.2 Estimation Results
As noted above that the ARDL model is applicable irrespective of whether
the variables are I(0) or I(1). Table 3 shows that while some variables such as
CA, Y, Y*, r* and CR are I(1),  the rest are I(0). The results of the ADF test
for null hypothesis of unit root in the variables in question presented in that table
indicate that the ARDL approach to long-run relationship is more appropriate
than other procedures for testing cointegration.
(3)
Table 3
Results of the ADF Tests90
The ARDL method estimates (4+1)8 =390,625 number of regressions for
each model to get the best model selected by SBC. The long-run cointegration
and the ARDL-based error correction model of total capital inflows, short-term
capital inflows and FDI selected by SBC are respectively shown in Figure 18.
In the long run, total capital inflows are influenced by country risk, current account,
real interest rates, domestic real economic growth and stock market return.
Higher country risk leads to lower capital inflows, whereas greater current
account surplus (per GDP) would need more capital inflows to finance it. While
domestic economic growth and stock market return have, as theoretically
expected, positive impact on total capital inflows, real interest rate has significant
negative influence on total capital inflows. This might suggest that foreign investors
consider other macroeconomic indicators such as domestic inflation which is
relatively higher than other countries in the region as additional factor influencing
investment decision into this country.
In the short run, all the long run explanatory variables have significant effects
on capital inflows with lower coefficient value. Moreover, the error correction
model suggests that 57% of deviation of total capital inflows in the short term
from its long-run equilibrium will be corrected so that it will be maintained in
its long-run pattern. The significance of the error correction term coefficient
also implies that all variables involved in the regression are cointegrated is
confirmed.
In the estimation of short-term capital inflows, the cointegration model found
that only country risk, current account, stock market return and a dummy for
the 1997 financial crisis are statistically significant in influencing short-term capital
inflows. Opposite to current account and stock market return coefficients which
have less power in affecting short-term capital inflows, country risk becomes
more powerful in shaping long run short-term capital inflows. However, domestic
economic growth is statistically insignificant in determining short-term capital
inflows. This suggests that non-residents who invest in the short-term instruments
give more weight on country risk than they who invest for longer period.
Furthermore, in the ARDL-based error correction model, the coefficient of
adjustment for short-term capital inflows is higher (0.85) than that of total capital
inflows.
The long-run model estimation exhibits that FDI inflows to domestic economy
is determined by country risk, current account, real interest rate and stock market
return.  However, in the short run, stock market return is statistically insignificant
in affecting FDI inflows. This suggests that part of FDI inflows is in term of
acquisition of listed companies through the capital market and in the long term91
foreign investors also consider the performance of the existing listed companies.
On the contrary, FDI investors would not notice stock market return in the short
run due to their long term horizon in investment. However, real interest rate is
found to have negative impact on FDI as well as on total capital inflows. In
addition, FDI inflows estimation also found lower rate of adjustment (0.37) of
short-term deviation from equilibrium compared to both estimation of total capital
inflows and short-term capital inflows.
All in all, the composite country risk index is extremely dominant in influencing
capital inflows into the Indonesian economy. Investment opportunities created
by high economic growth are less powerful than country risk which corresponds
to foreign investor views on comparative business risks in each country. This
also implies that improvement in all components of country risk, such as political,
economic and financial risk, is similarly important in attracting capital inflows.9
2
Table 4
Estimation Results of the ARDL Model93
7. Conclusion
Indonesia has experienced high inflows of international capital since the
early 1980s to the first part of 1990s, attributed to the liberalisation measures.
The recent pick-up of the capital inflows, particularly in terms of portfolio
investment and foreign direct investment, are supported by significant
improvement of the macroeconomic fundamentals. Strong capital inflows created
external pressures through excessive exchange rate appreciation. To achieve its
monetary objectives, in conducting capital flows, exchange rate and domestic
liquidity management, Bank Indonesia carried out foreign exchange market
intervention and domestic money market sterilisation. The degree of sterilisation
is found to be persistently around full sterilisation.
Foreign exchange market intervention and domestic money market
sterilisation have resulted in foreign reserve accumulation. Recent outstanding
reserve ratios to external liabilities are found to have improved compared to that
on the onset of the 1997 financial crisis.
Capital flows have greater implications for a small open economy, like
Indonesia. Capital inflows can have significant impact on the financial stability
through currency and maturity mismatch of assets and liabilities in the financial
sector.  The recent high credit growth seems to be less supported by capital
inflows due to lower amount of capital inflows into the banking sector compared
to the domestic credit boom in the previous periods. Opposite to the banking
sector, recent noticeable performance of capital market is regarded to be closely
related to the recently strong capital inflows. The rise of stock price index and
market capitalisation are coupled with increasing stock price volatility. This is
considered to be attributed to the significant role of foreign investors, which are
more interested in capital gain than stock earning yield, in shaping capital market
development.
We found that country risk and current account are steadily significant factors
that determine capital inflows. Although the stock market return has significant
effect on capital inflows, its coefficients are fairly small and insignificant especially
in influencing FDI in the short run.  Moreover, domestic economic growth which
can create investment opportunities is only significant in affecting total capital
inflows. This implies, it is is especially important that both fiscal and monetary
authorities pay more attention to macroeconomic fundamentals and institutional
development that can reduce business potential risks in the economy, which, in94
turn, can attract more capital inflows when investors are confident about the
risks of investing in countries about which they know little. Finally, favorable
economic environment can be exceptionally supportive in optimising the benefits
of capital-inflow in the seeking of economic prosperity.95
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Chapter 4
CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL
BANK POLICIES IN MALAYSIA
by
Raja Syamsul Anwar and Tan Bee Chin1
1. Introduction
The Malaysian economy has grown significantly since achieving independence
in 1957. Between 1970 and 2007, the economy expanded at an annual rate of
6.78%, which is higher than the global average of 4.34% for the developing
countries2. Much of the economic success is associated with its outward-oriented
strategy, which is manifested in its open policies towards both current and capital
accounts. There is no denying that Malaysia’s developmental progress has
benefited greatly from investment flows in terms of greater diversification, lower
financing costs, increased technological transfers, as well as higher levels of
investment and increased growth potential. However, at the same time, the small
size of the economy meant that the openness to financial flows exposed Malaysia
to the risks inherent with such flows, including their influence in accentuating
economic cycles, their destabilising impact on financial prices, and the challenges
they pose in the conduct of monetary policy and the maintenance of financial
stability.
________________
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This paper aims to develop a deeper understanding of Malaysia’s experience
in coping with volatile movements of capital over the period 1991 to 2007, which
includes key episodes of capital account liberalisation and capital flows
management. It progresses as follows: Section 2 presents a historical account
of Malaysia’s capital account regime and the direct measures introduced to
manage capital flows. Section 3 discusses the trend of capital flows in Malaysia
for the period 1991 to 2007, followed by a discussion on their determinants in
Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the implications and challenges for monetary
policy and financial stability arising from large capital flows in the more recent
period. The conclusions are presented in Section 7.
2. Capital Account Liberalisation and Major Capital Flow Management
Policies
Malaysia moved to current account convertibility with the acceptance of
International Monetary Fund Article VIII in November 1968. With the dismantling
of the sterling area arrangement in June 1972, Malaysia substantially liberalised
regulations on foreign exchange transactions with all foreign countries on 8 May
1973.3,4
Malaysia liberalised the capital account further in 1987. The liberalisation
of 1987 aimed at reducing the cost of doing business and was part of measures
to pull the country out of the economic recession of the mid-1980s.5 Specifically,
a number of exchange controls measures were eased on 1 January 1987. This
includes reducing the formalities businesses had to comply with when exporting
goods (e.g., raising the threshold for exchange control export declaration) and
allowing foreign investors greater access to domestic financing facilities to expand
local productive capacity (e.g., raising the limit for offshore loans).
________________
3. Exchange control in Malaysia was previously linked to the sterling area arrangement. According
to the Exchange Control Act, 1953, both current and capital transactions between Malaysia and
the Scheduled Territories (defined as former sterling area countries) were not subject to exchange
control. Exchange control regulations apply only to countries outside the Scheduled Territories.
Capital transactions with non-Scheduled Territories were subject to exchange control. However,
regulations were administered liberally with approval normally given for most bona fide transaction.
4. The dismantling of the sterling currency arrangement also led to the adoption of the US dollar
as the intervention currency in place of sterling on 24 June 1972, and ultimately the floating
of the ringgit on 21 June 1973.
5. The Malaysian economy contracted in 1984 and 1985 against the backdrop of balance of
payments difficulties due to the decline in global commodity prices, as well as sizeable external
borrowings and debt service payments by the government.99
In the period 1991-93, strong inflows of foreign direct investments (FDI)
were accompanied by significant inflows of short-term capital.6 The additional
liquidity caused by the capital inflows exerted pressure on domestic prices, led
to resource misallocation, as well as complicated monetary management. Hence,
in January and February 1994, Bank Negara Malaysia introduced administrative
measures to discourage short-term investment inflows and reinforce monetary
policy autonomy.7 These measures were subsequently lifted in August 1994 after
the objectives to contain short-term inflows, limit monetary expansion and stabilise
the foreign exchange markets had been achieved.
Box I: Summary of 1994 Measures1
§ The 1994 measures were directed entirely at containing speculative activity by
discouraging short-term capital inflows.
§ The measures included the following:
- The revision of the eligible liabilities base of the banking institutions for the
calculation of the SRR and the liquidity requirement to include all inflow of
funds from abroad.
- The imposition of limits on non-trade related outstanding net external liabilities
of banking institutions.
- Restricting sales of short-term monetary instruments to non-residents.
- The requirement for commercial banks to place with Bank Negara Malaysia the
ringgit funds of foreign banking institutions held in non-interest bearing accounts.2
- Prohibiting commercial banks from undertaking non-trade related swap and
outright forward transactions on the bid side with foreign customers.
__________
1 Appendix I provides a detailed listing.
2 As observed by Tamirisa (2004), this was analogous to the unremunerated reserve
requirements on foreign borrowing used by Chile during the 1990’s.
________________
6. Appendix provides a listing of capital account measures introduced between 1990 and 2007.
7. As a result of the administrative measures in early 1994, the ringgit depreciated and short-term
capital recorded a net outflow of RM8.5 billion in 1994, compared with an average annual net
inflow of RM10.3 billion three years before. Nevertheless, the measures achieved the intended
objectives to contain short-term inflows, limit monetary expansion and stabilise the foreign
exchange market. Despite the outflow of short-term capital, long-term investment flows were
unaffected and recorded a net inflow of RM12.9 billion, slightly higher than the RM12.4 billion
average in the last three years. Money supply was also effectively contained. M3 fell sharply
from 23.5% growth in 1993 to 13.1% in 1994.100
In addition to the easing of the measures introduced in early 1994 to manage
capital inflows, the liberalisation during 1994-1996 reflected broader efforts to
create a freer foreign exchange environment in line with the sustained growth
in resident foreign exchange transactions. Measures were undertaken to reduce
the cost of compliance, allow small- and medium-scale industries greater access
to credit facilities, increase the efficiency of cross-border transactions and
encourage the relocation of the operational headquarters of multinational
corporations (MNC’s) to Malaysia. There was also greater transparency in the
prudential rules on foreign borrowings and on the use of domestic resources to
fund overseas investment. The objectives of prudential guidelines were aimed
at containing the size of the external debt, ensuring companies meet their external
obligations and maintaining Malaysia’s investment grade in international markets.
Measures undertaken during this episode of liberalisation included raising the
threshold for foreign borrowings requiring approval, allowing residents to maintain
foreign currency accounts with licensed onshore banks and to invest abroad
(conditional upon them not having domestic borrowings).
The onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 disrupted the liberalisation
process and introduced a new set of challenges for the management of financial
flows.8 Despite having relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals in the period
preceding the Crisis, the ensuing panic and uncertainty in regional financial markets
manifested in significant withdrawals of portfolio investment from Malaysia.9
Between end-June 1997 and end-August 1998, capital outflows had led to more
than a one quarter decline of international reserves (about US$7.2 billion), a
40% ringgit depreciation and a 72% fall of the stock market. To limit speculative
pressure on exchange rates, Bank Negara Malaysia imposed limits on ringgit
swap transactions with non-residents that were not related to underlying
commercial transactions in August 1997.10 A ban on short-selling of securities
listed on the KLSE was also introduced.
________________
8. We do not attempt to discuss the causes of the Asian Financial Crisis as this subject has been
discussed extensively elsewhere in the literature. See for example Krugman (1998), Corsetti,
Pesenti and Roubini (1998) and Radelet and Sachs (1998), among others.
9. As noted in Bank Negara Malaysia (2000), real GDP continued to grow at about 8% in the first
two quarters of 1997, while the Government continued to record fiscal surpluses. The level of
external debt was low at 43.2% of GNP, while the current account deficit was reduced to 5%
of GNP in 1996 from 10% in 1995 and was expected to improve further. Measures to address
the supply constraints in the economy had been taken earlier since 1995 and were beginning
to show positive results, with inflation moderating to its lowest level of 2.1% in July 1997.
10.Prior to 1997, the rapid growth of international trade and investment in the 1990s and the
availability of ringgit outside Malaysia had led to the development of an offshore market for
the ringgit that was based mainly in Singapore. To meet greater demand for hedging instruments,
local banks provided forward cover against ringgit to non-residents. This facilitated the arbitrage
between domestic and offshore markets, resulting in greater currency volatility.101
Box II: Summary of 1998 Measures
§ The September 1998 exchange control measures were aimed at stabilising short-term
capital flows and containing speculation by eliminating access to ringgit by speculators
by reducing the offshore market in ringgit.2
§ The measures included the following:
- The imposition of a one-year holding period for non-resident portfolio
investment.
- The introduction of approval requirements for selected ringgit-denominated
transactions among non-residents, as well as for resident investment abroad
exceeding a certain limit.
- The disabling of fund transfers among non-residents by prohibiting the crediting
of an External Account by another External Account holder.
- The prohibition on the granting of credit lines to non-resident banks and
stockbrokers by banks in Malaysia
- The requirement for export and import transactions to be denominated in foreign
currency and for all export proceeds to be repatriated back to Malaysia within
six months.
- Restrictions on the import and export of ringgit currency notes
§ There were no controls on foreign direct investment flows while the current account
remained fully convertible.
__________
1 Appendix I provide a detailed listing.
2These measures supplemented the limits placed on swap transactions that were not
related to underlying commercial transactions effective 4 August 1997.
As the Crisis deepened, a more comprehensive package of selective
exchange control measures was introduced on 1 September 1998 with the aim
of curtailing ringgit speculation and regaining monetary independence. 11,12 The
ringgit was also pegged to the US dollar at an exchange rate of RM3.80 for
one US dollar the following day.
________________
11.Accompanying these measures, the Companies Act was amended to limit dividend payments.
The Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) – the offshore market for Malaysian equities – was also
closed. Financial and corporate sector reforms were introduced to improve the weak financial
institutions and enhance the stability and resilience of the financial system. Prudential regulations
and risk-based supervision were also strengthened.
12.Following the imposition of the controls, nominal interest rates were reduced from 10.1% in
August 1998 to 3.2% in August 1999. This reduced pressure on non-performing loans which
could have increased if interest rates had not fallen as they did. A year into the implementation
of the exchange controls, the Malaysian economy recovered from a 7.4% contraction in 1998
to a 6.1% growth in 1999. Inflation fell from 5.7% to 2.7% during the same period. With the
more orderly foreign exchange market conditions, the current account surplus rose from RM37.4
billion in 1998 to RM47.9 billion.102
In fact, following the 1997 - 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, the capital account
liberalisation efforts resumed. Three phases of ensuing exchange control
liberalisation can be discerned. The liberalisations in 1999-2002 dismantled the
selective exchange controls measures imposed during the crisis. The liberalisations
of 2003-2005 and 2007-2008 were intended to both improve the business
environment and enhance the development of the domestic financial markets.
The selective exchange controls imposed in 1998 were subsequently relaxed
in stages between 1999 and 2001, with market stability remaining a key
consideration. This reflected the intention that such controls would not be a
permanent feature.
In line with the objective to continuously improve the business environment,
liberalisation measures were announced between 2003 and 2005. The measures
were specifically designed to provide greater flexibility for residents to manage
foreign exchange risks with licensed onshore banks in Malaysia and boost the
development of domestic financial markets. Residents were allowed to maintain
foreign currency accounts and invest in foreign currency financial products
offered by onshore banks while non-residents were allowed to maintain ringgit
and foreign currency account and hedge their foreign currency exposure with
onshore banks. The bond market was also opened up to MNCs, multilateral
development banks and international financial institutions for issuance of ringgit-
denominated bonds.
Due to increased integration with the rest of the world and consistent with
the positioning of Malaysia as a leading international Islamic financial centre,
further liberalisations were undertaken in 2007 and 2008 to build on the success
of  the earlier liberalisation efforts. The objectives remain to expand the scope
of foreign currency business of onshore banks and expanding the investment
horizon and hedging mechanism of residents and non-residents. However, in this
round, the banks were accorded a greater degree of independence to undertake
foreign currency business and more flexibility to obtain foreign currency and
ringgit funds for productive uses.
The Capital Control Index in Chart 1 gives an overview of the evolution of
capital account policies in Malaysia between 1990 and 2007. Given the difficulties
with taking stock of all the existing capital account restrictions, this paper utilises
data on changes to regulations pertaining to capital transactions as outlined in
the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions (1990 –
2007) and Tamirisa (2004). The index was constructed by assigning weights to103
the changes in regulations using the scheme applied by Tamirisa (2004). Outright
prohibition is given a weight of 1.0. Quantitative limits, approval requirements,
and a tax greater than ten percent is given a weight of 0.5, while notification
requirements, a tax less than ten percent, and other similar measures are given
a weight of 0.2. In addition, we assign a weight of 0.2 for an easing of quantitative
limits.13 The changes are added or subtracted cumulatively relative to the base
period of January 1990. The index captures the tightening of capital controls in
1994 and 1998, as well as the sustained liberalisation between 1999 and 2007.
3. Trends of Capital Flows in Malaysia
3.1 Overview
Malaysia was generally a net recipient of capital in the period from 1991
until the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 (Chart 2). The marked
increase in inflows was a common feature across the region. For most of the
________________
13.The main difficulty in constructing such an index is the conversion of information that is
subjective into an objective measure. While the weighting scheme alleviates this problem, it does
not eliminate the considerable scope for interpretation.104
period, Malaysia registered net inflows in all three investment categories, i.e.,
direct investment, portfolio investment and other investment, which collectively
exceeded 10% of GDP a year. Of significance, direct investment had been
consistently a stable source of net inflows, followed closely by other investment
(consists predominantly of bank lending and private sector borrowings).
Meanwhile, portfolio investment flows were rather volatile. The sharp rise in
capital flows from 1991 to 1996 reflected the declining trend of interest rates
in advanced countries against the backdrop of slowing growth in their economies14.
During this period, sharp net capital inflows had resulted in sizeable current
account deficits. With the already high domestic savings rate, the capital inflows
provided additional impetus to domestic investment and economic activity. The
strong economic growth performance in turn supported the property and equity
markets and perpetuated the capital inflows.
The situation, however, changed in 1997 in the wake of the yen depreciation
and slowing regional export growth in 1996, and the devaluation of Thai Baht
in July 1997. Fear of broader currency devaluation and sizeable current account
deficits in some countries resulted in capital outflows from East Asian countries.
In the case of Malaysia, most of the outflows took the form of portfolio
investment and other investment. FDI remained resilient even up to the eve of
the crisis in 1997. This reflected investor confidence in the long-run prospects
of the Malaysian economy.
________________
14.Between 1990 and 1992, the US federal funds rate was reduced from 8% to 3%. The decline
of interest rates prompted institutional investors to search for high-yield opportunities in emerging
markets (Ito (2000)).105
In 1998, Bank Negara Malaysia introduced capital account measures which
restricted portfolio investment outflows and moved to a fixed exchange rate
regime. From 1998, the general trend has reversed to net capital outflows. This
corresponded with the trend shift in the current account. The current account
turned from a deficit to a surplus of 12.4% of GDP in the period 1998-2007
following an adjustment in domestic investment to a more sustainable level, which
coincided with a more stable exchange rate environment as well as a rapid
expansion in global trade. Exports grew strongly, underpinned by electronics and
electrical and commodity exports, while domestic investment and imports grew
at a slower pace. The surplus allowed the replenishment of reserves and reduced
Malaysia’s reliance on external capital. A large portion of net outflows was in
the form of other investment (which consists predominantly of bank lending and
non-bank private sector’s trade credits and loans). FDI continued to broadly
record net inflows even as overseas investment by Malaysian companies grew
larger over the years. Portfolio investment generally recorded marginal net
outflows until 2003, subsequently turning into net inflows and increasing in response
to global push and domestic pull factors. The following sub-sections elaborate
on the developments across different types of investment flows.
3.2 Long-term Investment Flows
Prior to the Asian Crisis, strong FDI into Malaysia contributed largely to the
net inflows in the financial account. The inflows coincided with the relocation
of Japanese and New Industrialised Economies (NIEs’) export-oriented industries
to Southeast Asia (particularly to Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand) to mitigate
the impact of rising labour cost at home and the appreciation of the yen (associated
with the Plaza Accord15 of 1985). In the case of Japan, the outflow of FDI was
also stimulated by large current account surpluses and the “bubble economy”
in the domestic market, during which the relative abundance of domestic credit
combined with the appreciating yen encouraged Japanese firms to invest abroad.16
For the NIEs, additional impetus was given by the withdrawal of the Generalised
System of Preferences17 (GSP) for their exports in 1988. In addition, on the
________________
15. On 22 September 1985, the finance ministers from the world’s five biggest economies - the
United States, Japan, West Germany, France and the UK - announced the Plaza Accord. The
big-five had agreed to intervene in currency markets as necessary to engineer a depreciation
of the US dollar. By the end of 1987, the dollar had fallen by 54% against both the Deutsch
mark and the yen from its peak in February 1985.
16. Bayoumi et al. (1996)
17. The Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) allows the importers, the developed economies,
to provide duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated developing
countries in order to promote economic growth in developing countries by stimulating their
exports.106
domestic front, the enactment of the Promotion of Investments Act18 (PIA) in
1986 further attracted FDI inflows from the US. These inflows moderated after
1997, reaching a low point in 2001 following the collapse of the technology
bubble in the United States. Nevertheless, the uptrend in FDI resumed in the
following years, underpinned by Malaysia’s large and long-standing presence of
MNCs in the manufacturing sector. It also reflected the continued favourable
domestic investment climate and economic growth prospects. More recently,
overseas investment increased significantly, outpacing the growth in FDI. The
sustained increase in overseas investment by Malaysian companies reflected
their increased capacity and rising interest to venture abroad in search of new
and fast-growing markets which offer good returns.19
________________
18. The PIA (1986) offered generous incentives for export-oriented industries with a greater
degree of liberalisation and deregulation of trade and investment than previous policies.
19. Between 2003 and 2007, net profits and dividends accruing to Malaysian companies investing
abroad rose from 0.5% of GDP to 2.3% of GDP.
3.3 Debt flows
External borrowings recorded small net inflows in the early 1990s mainly
due to public sector repayment of foreign debt (Chart 4). This was in line with
measures to rationalise the government’s external debt position, following the
fiscal expansion in the 1980s.107
External debt flow recorded sustained net borrowings between 1993 and
1997. This episode can be explained by large borrowings to finance private
sector capacity expansion and government projects. It was a feature of the
physical capital-induced growth of the early 1990s. It could be argued that some
of the external borrowings were counterproductive as there are views that the
rise in investment during this period was excessive.20
The period of large borrowings ended in 1998 with the onset of the Asian
Financial Crisis. Private sector net borrowing reversed to net lending, largely as
a result of trade credit extension to importers abroad which is still very much
prevalent until today. The public sector, however, continued to record net loan
draw-downs until 2002, due to the expansionary fiscal measures to support
economic growth and recovery after the Asian Crisis. These borrowings were
largely repaid in 2003. In recent years, the trend in public sector debt mostly
reflected borrowing or repayment activities by the non-financial public enterprises.
In particular, the net outflows of debt (or net repayment) in the period 2005-
2007 coincided with the rising profitability of these enterprises.
________________
20. Bustelo (2000) finds evidence of a decline in investment efficiency and capital profitability
in Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand. The incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) displayed
an upward tendency in the early 1990s in Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand, indicating a
process of declining investment efficiency and falling capital profitability. An increased share
of bank lending was directed to speculative investment in real estate, equities, and other
financial assets. For instance, real estate exposure of domestic banks was very high (30-40%
of total bank lending) in Malaysia and Thailand.108
3.4 Short-term Investment Flows
For Malaysia, short-term inflows surged in the early 1990s against an
environment of slowing economic activity in the industrial countries, the associated
fall in interest rates worldwide, expectations for ringgit appreciation and a period
of rapid domestic economic growth in excess of 8% per annum between 1988-
92 (Chart 6).21 The surge in short-term inflows was also evident in other
developing countries – Chile, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mexico, and Korea - which
received large international capital flows from the industrialised countries.22
Inflows of short-term capital were mainly directed at equity purchases.
Estimates indicated that net inflows of purchases of stocks and shares increased
from RM6.9 billion in 1992 to RM20 billion between January and October 1993.23
By 1994, Malaysia’s stock market capitalisation in relation to GDP was
comparable to that of the United States and United Kingdom.24 Capital inflows
were also driven by external borrowing by banks, especially in 1991 to 1993.
A considerable portion of these external liabilities were raised to cover the
commercial banks’ forward purchases of foreign exchange from domestic
exporters.
________________
21. This is in line with the findings of Calvo et al. (1994) and Frankel and Okongwu (1995), which
affirms the role of low world interest rates in driving capital flows into emerging economies
in the early 1990’s.
22. According to Ishii and Dunaway (1995), there also appears to have been some reassessment
of riskiness, particularly of APEC developing countries, owing in part to the solid macroeconomic
track records they have established and their generally strong economic performance over the
period.
23. Bank Negara Malaysia (1994)
24. Bank for International Settlements (1995)109
The pattern of capital flows was a reflection of Malaysia’s relatively liberal
exchange control regime, which enabled the country to benefit from the global
increase in trade and investment in the 1990s. The ease of entry and exit for
the Malaysian stock market was confirmed by the 1994 survey by the
International Finance Corporation on emerging stock markets that identified
Malaysia as one of the markets with the most liberal exchange control system.25
The development of the ringgit offshore markets was also not possible without
broad access to ringgit.
Nevertheless, the influx of capital led to a rapid expansion of money supply,
causing strains to domestic productive capacity and exerting upward pressure
on prices. More importantly, the inflows caused misallocation of resources, which
diverted from productive sectors to unproductive sectors, such as the real estate
and stock markets. In early 1994, exchange control measures were introduced
to discourage short-term inflows and reinforce monetary policy autonomy.
Together with the correction in the domestic equity market and the narrowing
of interest rate differentials, the measures facilitated the outflow of bank lending
during the course of 1994. As a result, the short-term net inflows decelerated
significantly from US$14.2 billion (28% of GDP) in 1993 to US$0.3 billion (2.8%
of GDP) in 1994. The exchange control measures were never meant to be
permanent, and were gradually lifted during the second half of 1994 as the
objective of discouraging speculative short-term capital inflows was met.26
The respite was brief as short-term capital inflows resumed in 1995 and
1996 against the background of strong economic growth, a reinvigorated stock
market and the shift in interest rate differentials back in Malaysia’s favour. As
a result, between 1995 and 1997, the ringgit was subject to intense upward
pressure despite the country running current account deficits during that period.
Nevertheless, the conditions changed dramatically in 1997 as the earlier build-
up of capital inflows reversed sharply. Short-term capital flows stabilised in the
fourth quarter of 1998 following the introduction of the comprehensive package
________________
25. Bank Negara Malaysia (1994)
26. It is noteworthy that by January 1995, when the Mexican crisis occurred, a sizeable proportion
of these funds had flowed out, thus limiting the contagion effect of the peso crisis on domestic
financial markets.110
of selective exchange controls and the fixing of the ringgit to the US dollar in
September 1998.27
As conditions normalised after the Crisis, there appears to be a shift in the
behaviour of short-term investment flows with other investment forming the bulk
of the net outflows. This in large part can be attributed to trade credits extended
by Malaysian exporters and increased bank lending abroad, which, in turn,
reflected the shift from the prolonged trade deficit prior to the Crisis to the
continuous trade surplus since 1998.
During the fixed exchange rate period, portfolio investment generally recorded
a net outflow until 2003. The key drivers for the net outflows were geopolitical
developments and concerns by market participants over the sustainability of the
ringgit peg following the weakening of the Japanese yen. The weakness of the
US dollar and expectations for a revaluation or unpegging of the ringgit resulted
in sizeable inflows of portfolio investment into Malaysia in 2004 and the first
half of 2005, and to a lesser extent, increased foreign deposits in the banking
system in 2003 and 2004. However, the sizeable portfolio inflows reversed in
the second half of 2005 following the unpegging of the ringgit. This culminated
in a net outflow for 2005 as a whole.28
Short-term capital movements recorded net outflows in 2006 and 2007. The
net outflows also reflected the sizeable increases in banking system external
assets in 2006 and 2007 arising from increased diversification of portfolios and
greater access to foreign currency from domestic sources. To a lesser extent,
this trend reflects the more liberal exchange control environment prevailing after
2005, which afforded greater flexibility for residents to invest abroad. However,
________________
27. Although there are mixed views over the effectiveness of the controls on short-term capital
outflows, there is some evidence in the literature to suggest that the controls imposed by
Malaysia did achieve, in varying degrees, their intended purpose. For example, Kaplan and
Rodrik (2001) suggest that Malaysia’s recovery was faster and less painful compared to Korea
and Thailand. Edison and Reinhart (2001) concludes that the controls in Malaysia achieved
their objectives of greater interest rate and exchange rate stability and Tamirisa (2004) found
that controls on portfolio outflows and on bank and foreign exchange operations facilitate
reductions in the domestic interest rate. What cannot be disputed is that the controls were
effective in containing the internationalisation of the ringgit, thus depriving speculators of
their main source of financing for their speculative activities. For a cross-country perspective
on the use of capital controls, refer to Ariyoshi et al. (2000).
28. The ringgit link to the US dollar was severed on 21 July 2005. Subsequently, the ringgit would
be managed against a basket of currencies. There is no predetermined path for the exchange
rate, with intervention operations mainly to minimise volatility.111
more recently, the trend has changed to net inflows due to net placement of
deposits by foreign banks in the domestic banking system.
4. Determinants of Capital Flows
In this section, we provide the results of our empirical investigation into the
determinants of investment inflows to supplement the observations made in the
preceding sections. We approach the issue by distinguishing between two sets
of factors affecting capital movements. The first are country specific or pull
factors. The second are global or push factors.29
The pull factors are attractors which reflect domestic opportunity and risk.
This paper considers eight types of pull factors. These are economic activity,
the rate of return, the balance of payments, the exchange rate, institutional quality,
capital market imperfections, trade openness and economic vulnerabilities.
Strong domestic economic activity and growth performance tend to lead to
higher investment rates as expected profitability increases. Domestic output is
also a proxy for market size and hence economic opportunities and potential
sales. In this regard, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient on the economic
activity variable. We use real GDP to represent economic activity.
If country risk and liquidity considerations are the same across countries,
capital flows will be attracted to countries with the higher rate of return. In this
paper, we consider the role of real interest rates and stock market returns in
attracting portfolio investment inflows. In the case of FDI, the rate of return is
proxied by real interest rates, the relative marginal productivity of capital (MPK),
differentials in sovereign bond yields and the incremental capital-output ratio
(ICOR). 30,31 High domestic interest rates, MPK and sovereign bond yield
differentials are expected to lead to more FDI inflows. In contrast, a higher
ICOR will lead to less investment because it implies less efficiency in the
________________
29. An alternative is the dichotomy between the supply and demand for capital. See, for example,
Felices and Orskaug (2008).
30. In this paper, we considered the MPK relative to the United States, Japan, and the average
of the two. A high MPK relative to other countries should lead to more investment inflows.
We follow Lipschitz et al (2002) and derive the relative MPK from a common Cobb-Douglas
production function Yt = AKia Li1-a. With a given output per worker relative to the capital
exporting country, and assuming that a=1/3, we can derive the relative capital per worker and
ultimately the MPK.
31. The ICOR is calculated by taking the ratio of gross fixed capital formation relative to the
change in GDP.112
________________
32 This stems from the identity that CA = -KA, where CA is the current account balance and KA
is the capital account balance.
33 This is a common way of estimating the volatility parameter for the purpose of pricing options
contracts (Zhang, 1997).
utilisation of capital. The difference in expected signs on the coefficients is due
to the different definition of the variables. Generally, however, higher returns
results in more inflows.
The balance on the current account has implications on the direction of
capital flows. A current account deficit requires a capital account surplus to
offset the deficit.32 Specifically, it requires a capital inflow (net new borrowing)
from the rest of the world to finance the deficit. In this case, the current account
balance is expected to be negatively related to investment inflows. Alternatively,
a current account deficit that is seen to be rising towards unsustainable levels
can also be an indicator of economic vulnerability. Unsustainable current account
deficits accompanied by macroeconomic instability and structural weaknesses
can degenerate into an external crisis. In this case, the relationship is positive
whereby a current account surplus increases investment while a deficit reduces
capital inflows. We control for this effect by including the ratio of the current
account balance relative to GDP in our empirical exercise.
Real exchange rate appreciation means a less a competitive economy. Hence
a stronger exchange rate would lead to less investment inflows, implying a negative
sign on the exchange rate coefficient. Recent experience, however, suggests
that the relationship may be positive if an exchange rate appreciation fuels
expectations for further appreciation. In this paper, we use an economy-wide
exchange rate, which is the real effective exchange rate as provided by the
International Monetary Fund.
Another dimension is exchange rate volatility. The common belief is that
greater exchange rate volatility would deter investment inflows. This is consistent
with the interpretation that investors are averse to currency risk. Another
interpretation is that greater exchange rate volatility is also an indicator of financial
instability. In both cases, the expected sign on the exchange rate volatility
coefficient is negative. Conversely, greater volatility in itself may be an inducer
for capital inflows if investors are not averse to currency risk, and if the expected
payoff from exchange rate movements is large. In this scenario, the sign could
be positive. In this paper, exchange rate volatility is defined as the standard
deviation of the daily returns for the trade-weighted nominal effective exchange
rate, which is multiplied by the square root of 253 to annualise it (since there
are 253 trading days in a year).33113
Institutional quality encompasses aspects such as the legal structure, security
of property rights, government tax and incentives structure, the degree of
corruption, whether a country is member of a free trade area or currency area,
whether a country shares a common language, and the level of capital and
financial market development, among others. Malaysian time series data for
most of these variables are limited.34 As a second best, we approximate
institutional quality with financial market size and liquidity, as defined by the
ratio of stock market turnover relative to market capitalisation. A well developed
and liquid financial market allows investors easy access to domestic investment
opportunities and allows them to liquidate their investments quickly. As such, it
can be expected to have a positive effect on investment inflows.
Restrictions on capital flows are generally expected to have a dampening
effect on capital inflows.  Restrictions on capital movements prevent capital
flows from exploiting differentials in rates of return. For example, taxes on capital
inflows or outflows reduce the incentive to invest by reducing the rate of return.
Imposing new restrictions on capital flows would raise investor concern that
they cannot repatriate their money and also give rise to future policy uncertainty.
In this paper, the restrictions on capital flows are proxied by a capital controls
index.35
Openness to trade or external exposure makes inputs more efficient. Greater
openness to trade facilitates the economy’s adoption of more efficient production
techniques. Foreign investors are also attracted by countries with lower trade
barriers because they are not faced with extra production and distribution costs.
This suggests a positive relationship between openness and capital inflows.
However, it may also be the case that high tariffs could lead to more direct
investment in an attempt to establish presence and market share. Trade openness
is defined as the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP.
The final pull factor we consider here is country risk. The risk of investing
in an economy increases with the intensification of macroeconomic vulnerabilities
and political instability. These, in turn, raise investor expectations on the prospect
for economic and financial crisis or political unrest. Investment inflows are thus
expected to react negatively to higher investor perceptions of country risk. We
________________
34. For example, data coverage for Malaysia in the World Bank and the International Finance
Corporation co-publication Doing Business starts from 2004. In any case, such information
is usually gathered from survey data and hence is seldom available at quarterly frequencies.
35. Refer to the earlier discussion on page 7.114
proxy economic vulnerabilities and country risk with the Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) country risk index and the ratio of international reserves relative to
short-term external debt.36
Push factors comprise external events that drive capital flows to a country
or divert them away. This paper considers four types of push factors. These are
global economic activity, the global rate of return on capital and financial
investments, the role of contagion and global risk aversion.
Strong global economic activity increases the expected profitability in other
economies. This diverts capital flows away from the domestic economy because
of better investment opportunities abroad and implies a negative relationship
between global economic activity and capital inflows. However, strong global
economic activity could also mean that there are more funds available for
investment abroad. In this case, the sign on the global economic activity coefficient
may be positive. In this paper, global economic activity is proxied by U.S. real
GDP.
Investment flows will be attracted to high global rates of return on capital
and financial assets. The global rate of return is also a measure of global liquidity.
In both instances the global rate of return is expected to be negatively related
with investment flows into Malaysia. For our empirical exercise, the global rate
of return is proxied by U.S. interest rates and stock market returns.
As noted by Hernandez et al (2001), the clustering of flows during the
episodes of large private capital flows toward developing countries suggest that
some form of contagion could have occurred. Contagion implies that capital
inflows to a country should coincide with capital inflows in other countries which
are perceived as being similar or as having real economic linkages. However,
________________
36. The EIU country risk index is a simple average of indices representing sovereign risk, currency
risk and banking sector risk. This makes the EIU index our preferred measure of economic
vulnerability and country risk. However, we also ran the portfolio investment and foreign
direct investment regressions with the ratio of reserves to short-term term external debt in
its place for robustness (see the discussion on the estimation results below). It should be noted
that the EIU index series for Malaysia started from the first quarter of 1996. We extended
the series back to 1991 using the Standard and Poors sovereign foreign currency ratings based
on the scheme used by EIU to compare bond ratings with the index.115
the relationship can be negative if countries are instead treated as close substitutes.
We construct a proxy for contagion that is conceptually similar to Hernandez
et al (2001).37
Global appetite for risk can be expected to influence movements of short-
term capital flows. A common proxy for global market risk aversion is the Chicago
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) index.38 The VIX index is a
measure of expectations of near-term volatility, which is, in turn, assumed to be
inversely related to risk appetite (i.e., greater volatility lowers global appetite for
risk). Over the past decade, there were several episodes of heightened global
volatility, as indicated by sharp spikes in the VIX index. As noted by Cairns et
al (2007), these episodes occurred in August 1998, September 2001, June-July
2002 and May 2006. In emerging Asia, the May 2006 episode saw heavier net
sales of equities by non-residents than in earlier episodes. As such, we can
expect a negative relationship between higher global financial market volatility
and short-term capital inflows.
Formally, the importance of push and pull factors in explaining capital inflows
are investigated by estimating the following equation:
u Z X CF i i i i + + + = d b a
Whereby;
CF denotes capital inflows
a is a constant
Xi is a vector of domestic or ‘pull’ factors
Zi is a vector of external or ‘push’ factors
bi is a vector of coefficients to be estimated
________________
37. Specifically, we use a weighted average of capital inflows to Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and
Thailand. The weights are apportioned based on the degree of similarity of a particular country
with Malaysia across six macroeconomic indicators, namely, the annual inflation rate, the
current account balance, the stock of international reserves, the stock of foreign debt, the
rate of economic growth and total exports. The variables are measured either in percentage
points or as a share of another relevant economic variable (GDP, exports or imports). The
degree of similarity is measured as the inverse of the numerical difference between a regional
country and Malaysia for an economic indicator.
38. The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) is a measure of expectations of
near-term volatility, as conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices.116
di is a vector of coefficients to be estimated
u is a residual
The dependent variables considered are gross inflows of foreign direct
investment and portfolio investment. The data for these variables were sourced
from the Cash Balance of Payments Reporting System (CBOP) of Bank Negara
Malaysia.39 Other data were sourced primarily from the International Financial
Statistics, and where necessary, supplemented by national sources, Bloomberg,
the United Nations Population Information Network, the World Trade Atlas and
the Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-WB External Debt Hub, as well as the authors’ own
estimates.40 Estimation was constrained to the period between the first quarter
of 1991 and fourth quarter of 2007 because of the limited availability of data
on gross flows.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests indicate that the two dependent
variables are integrated of order one or I(1).41 The explanatory variables
considered are at most I(1). The Trace and Maximum-Eigenvalue test statistics
from Johansen Cointegration tests, however, indicate the presence of cointegration
between the dependent and explanatory variables at the 5% significance level.42
We adopt the conventional general-to-specific procedure to estimate a
parsimonious model. For portfolio inflows, the dependent variable is initially
specified as being a function of the contemporaneous and one-period lagged
observation of the explanatory variables. This is to reduce the likelihood of omitted
variables. At the same time, the one-period lag is assumed to be adequate given
that portfolio flows appear to respond to short-term developments. In the case
of FDI inflows, the dependent variable is initially specified as being a function
of the contemporaneous and four-period lagged observations of the explanatory
variables. The four-period lag specification is adopted given the strategic nature
of FDI decisions. Dummy variables were also included in the FDI equation to
account for sizeable inflows arising from merger and acquisition activities in the
latter part of the sample.
________________
39. The Department of Statistics, Malaysia, only publishes data on a net basis.
40. This applies particularly to the construction of the Capital Controls Index, the alternative
measures for the relative marginal productivity of capital, the incremental capital output ratio,
and the measures of exchange rate volatility.
41. As noted by Sarno and Taylor (1997), given that the dependent variable is I(1), there must
be at least one I(1) variable among the explanatory variables. If not, the estimated equation
will be mis-specified.
42. Results for the unit root and cointegration tests are not reported.117
The final specification for both the portfolio investment and FDI equations
includes a lagged dependent variable.43 The inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable suggests some persistence in capital inflows. For example, in the case
of portfolio inflows, every US$1 billion received in the previous quarter will, on
average, see an inflow of US$0.65 billion in the current quarter.44 The lagged
dependent variable also allows us to interpret the estimated equations as a partial
adjustment model.45 For convenience and space considerations, here we report
the long-run representation of the final portfolio investment and FDI equations.46
The results in Table 1 indicate that in the long term (i.e., when the partial
adjustment dynamics have completed) portfolio investment inflows are affected
by both pull and push factors. In terms of pull factors, portfolio investment inflows
are affected positively by domestic economic growth, REER appreciation and
NEER volatility, domestic stock market performance and liquidity, as well as the
ratio of reserves to short-term external debt47. Conversely, portfolio inflows are
negatively affected by capital controls and contagion. With regard to global push
factors, portfolio investment inflows are affected negatively by strong global
economic activity and stock market performance, as well as increases in global
financial market volatility. It is noteworthy that the signs on the REER appreciation
and NEER volatility coefficients are positive. The positive relationship between
portfolio inflows and exchange rate changes and volatility could reflect that in
the past, investors expect an initial currency appreciation will be followed by
further appreciation. The negative sign on the coefficient for the contagion
variable indicates that in the past, an increase in portfolio investment into countries
________________
43. In the case of the portfolio investment equation, omission of the lagged dependent variable
noticeably reduces the explanatory power of the model and results in problems with serial
correlation.
44. This is based on the coefficient of 0.65 on the lagged dependent variable in the estimated
portfolio inflows equation.
45. In the case of a partial adjustment model, the lagged dependent variable reflects the speed of
adjustment of capital inflows toward its desired level. The long-run coefficients for the
explanatory variables are derived by assuming that recorded capital inflows are equal to their
desired levels (i.e. CFt = CFt-1). If we denote the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable
as gt-1, we can calculate long-run coefficients for the explanatory pull and push variables as
bi / (1- gt-1) and di / (1- gt-1).
46. The more detailed estimation results are reported in Appendix III and IV.
47. Estimation was initially conducted with the EIU Index as the measure of country risk and
vulnerability. This specification yielded a positive sign for the EIU Index coefficient, suggesting
that portfolio inflows increased with higher country risk. The exchange rate variables also
became insignificant. Ultimately, we chose the specification with the ratio of reserves to short-
term external debt as our final equation because of its slightly better explanatory power.118
that are similar to Malaysia was associated with less portfolio inflows. This
suggests that investors could well be discerning in allocating funds across similar
countries. However, this does not imply that investors are discerning when it
comes to portfolio outflows.48
In contrast, the result in Table 1 indicates that FDI inflows are largely driven
by pull factors. FDI inflows increase with the ratio of the current account to
GDP, FDI inflows to similar countries, and stock market liquidity. FDI inflows
decrease when the domestic rate of return rises, when the REER appreciates,
when capital controls are tightened and when county risk increases. All the
coefficients have the expected signs except for the rate of return. Using other
measures to proxy for the rate of return, such as Malaysia’s marginal productivity
of capital relative to the US and Japan (both individually and as a simple average
of the two), the incremental capital-output ratio for Malaysia and yield differentials
for long-term bonds also returned a ‘wrong’ sign.49 However, we suggest caution
in interpreting the results for the FDI equation. We could not obtain well-behaved
residuals for the various FDI equation specifications. Even the final FDI equation
specification chosen suffers from non-normality in the residuals.
________________
48. It would be interesting to test this conjecture. The experience during the Asian Financial Crisis
and in recent years certainly suggests that investors are less discerning when it comes to taking
their investments out (i.e., herding).
49. In the case of the ICOR and the long-term bonds yield differentials, the variables were found
to be insignificant and dropped from the respective equations.119
5. Capital Flows and Monetary Policy
The period 2004-2007 saw the return of large scale portfolio flows into
Malaysia. Malaysia was not unique in this sense as the trend was prevalent
across the region, and emerging markets more generally. The weakening of the
US dollar amid low US interest rates precipitated the search for higher investment
returns elsewhere. On the domestic front, the positive prospects for economic
growth and the strong performance of the corporate sector, as well as the
deepening of the domestic bond market, enhanced the attractiveness of Malaysian
assets. Inflows were also driven by expectations for a possible realignment of
regional currencies.
Unlike the sustained net inflow of portfolio investment in the early 1990’s,
recent inflows have shown to be prone to sharp and sudden reversals. Although
portfolio investment for 2005 as a whole recorded a small net inflow, higher
frequency data indicates that net inflows were sizeable in the first half of the
year. However, following the move to a managed float exchange rate regime
on 21 July 2005, portfolio investment recorded a substantial net outflow as
expectations for ringgit appreciation subsided.
In the first half of 2006, foreign portfolio inflows returned in view of the
strong fundamentals and attractiveness of Malaysian financial assets. These
inflows reversed following the global financial market correction in May 2006,
but resumed in the second half of 2006 and into the first quarter of 2007, reflecting
increased foreign interest in the domestic stock market. Again, however, the
portfolio inflows was interrupted by several external market developments,
including the Shanghai market correction in February 2007 and heightened global
market uncertainty following the US sub-prime mortgage problem in July and
August.
The sizeable movement of financial flows complicated monetary policy, as
well as monetary and exchange rate management. The objective of monetary
policy in Malaysia has always been the attainment of sustainable level of economic
growth with price stability. Operationally, this entails the simultaneous attainment
of internal (output is at potential such that there are no price pressures) and
external balance (exchange rate is in line with underlying fundamentals) in order
to provide an environment conducive for sustainable economic growth.
At the first instance, the sizeable build-up of capital inflows in 2004 and the
first half of 2005 in anticipation of currency revaluation exerted tremendous
upward pressure on the exchange rate. In view of the fixed exchange rate120
system prevailing at the time, Bank Negara Malaysia intervened in the foreign
exchange market to maintain the ringgit’s parity with the US dollar. Between
September 2004 and September 2005, reserves increased by US$24 billion.
However, portfolio investment recorded a substantial net outflow as expectations
for ringgit appreciation diminished after the move to a managed float exchange
rate regime in July 2005. In the last quarter of that year, international reserves
fell by about US$10 billion as Bank Negara Malaysia intervened to mitigate the
downward pressure on the ringgit.
As foreign exchange market conditions normalised in early 2006, the
resumption of portfolio inflows renewed upward pressure on the ringgit. While
Bank Negara Malaysia is not averse to a stronger exchange rate, there is concern
over the potential impact of the rapid pace of appreciation, as well as the possibility
of sharp and sudden reversals, on domestic financial markets and the economy
more generally. To address this concern, the central bank intervenes in the foreign
exchange market to smooth the extremities while preserving the underlying trend.
Intervention has been two-way. The build-up of reserves since the move to the
managed float merely reflects the dominance of periods of inflows relative to
outflows.
An important element in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of central
bank intervention operations is the ability to segregate stable long-term flows
from the flows that are easily reversible. In view of the important role of capital
flows in the Malaysian economy, Bank Negara Malaysia has developed several
internal reporting systems to enhance its surveillance and monitoring of capital
account transactions. The monitoring systems on capital flows include the Ringgit
Operations Monitoring System (ROMS), the Cash Balance of Payments Reporting
System (CBOP) and the Quarterly External Asset and Liability (EAL) Survey.
The ROMS provides information (near real-time basis) on cross-border flows
which affect the international reserves of the Bank. The CBOP provides detailed
data on all cross-border flow of funds between residents and non-residents
transacted through the banking system, inter-company accounts and overseas
accounts. The Quarterly External Asset and Liability (EAL) Survey provides
detailed information on overall flow and stock of external assets and liabilities
of the economy, including the potential claims or servicing obligations. Together,
these systems provide the Bank with in-depth knowledge on the composition,
size, source and currency exposure of capital inflows and outflows, and facilitate
timely assessment of risks.
To prevent the expansionary impact of external operations from driving
interest rates below the targeted level, the central bank sterilises the foreign121
exchange intervention through money market operations.50,51 It should be noted
that monetary policy has always been focused on domestic considerations.
Despite the strong portfolio investment inflows, Bank Negara Malaysia raised
the benchmark Overnight Policy Rate (OPR) three times between 2005 and
2006 by a total of 75 basis points. This reflected the need to normalise monetary
conditions after a prolonged period of low interest rates and restrain nascent
inflation pressures. Given these considerations, sterilising the inflows was an
effective means to limit the impact of large and rapid capital movements on
domestic monetary conditions and the economy more generally.
In view of the increasing size and erratic nature of portfolio investment, a
larger and more liquid domestic asset market would facilitate monetary operations
and minimise disruptions associated with large movements of investment flows.52
To this end, considerable efforts have been made to further enhance financial
market development. The introduction of new money market instruments, including
the Bank Negara Monetary Notes (BNMN) and Islamic money market
instruments have improved liquidity management, deepened and broadened the
conventional and Islamic money markets and enhanced the capacity of the
financial system in absorbing capital inflows. Significantly, the size of the domestic
bond market has increased by more than 4 times since 1998, while the proportion
of private debt securities in the bond market is approaching the 50% level.  As
a result, Malaysia has managed to ride out the recent periods of turbulence in
international capital markets without any serious disruptions.
________________
50. In April 2004, Bank Negara Malaysia moved to a new interest rate framework which operationally
targeted the overnight interest rate.
51. Although there are views that the combination of intervention and sterilisation could involve
significant fiscal costs (especially when the interest rate differential is in favour of the domestic
currency), the point is moot. Central banks surveyed by Neely (2001) unanimously reject the
notion that profitability is a consideration in intervention, suggesting that cost considerations
are superseded by other motives,
52. Despite the challenges posed by portfolio investment flows, the increase in non-resident activity
has also had a positive impact on Malaysian financial markets as capital inflows have contributed
to the increase in the size and liquidity of the Malaysian asset markets.122
The improved ability to absorb the sizeable investment inflows has enabled
Bank Negara Malaysia to effectively contain the growth of money supply and
limit the impact on overall economic activity. This is in contrast to the situation
in the early 1990’s when inflows became the main source of M3 expansion
(Chart 8).53
________________
53. In the early 1990s, Bank Negara Malaysia faced the dilemma of conflicting policy objectives
arising from the contractionary monetary stance to control inflation and the need to maintain
low interest rates to discourage the inflow of speculative funds. In 1993, this dilemma became
more acute in the face of massive capital inflows making it increasingly difficult to contain
the growth in money supply to control inflation.123
It is noteworthy that large capital flows have not diminished Bank Negara
Malaysia’s influence over interest rates. As noted earlier, Malaysia’s interest
rate policy has always been based on the central bank’s assessment of the
prospects for inflation and economic growth.  Being a small and highly open
economy, close attention is focused on external factors and their potential
implications on domestic stability.   While large capital inflows have played a
role in influencing the level of short-term and long-term rates in the bond market,
Bank Negara Malaysia’s efforts in promoting the depth and breadth of the
financial markets, especially the bond market, have enhanced Malaysia’s resilience
and capacity to better manage and absorb external shocks and volatility.
Nonetheless, shocks driven by short-term volatility in the global financial markets
may still result in fluctuations in the short-term bond yields. This, however, does
not imply any reduction in Bank Negara Malaysia’s ability to influence domestic
interest rates. Market fundamentals, as determined by the level of the Bank’s
policy rate, would still exert a significant influence on the eventual shape and
level of the yield curve.
For example, in May 2007, expectations of an appreciation of the ringgit
resulted in significantly higher short-term capital inflows into the shorter end of
the bond market, not only pushing yields (across the maturity spectrum) below
the level of the OPR but also causing the yield curve to flatten (Chart 9).
However, with the Bank Negara Malaysia policy rate unchanged, the
fundamentals of the money market remained the major determinants of short
and long-term rates.  The yield curve has since returned to an upward sloping
yield curve with yields settling above the OPR level.124
6. Capital Flows and Financial Stability
Financial system vulnerabilities are built up over time while the ability of the
financial system to cope with significant stress and external shocks is dependent
on its initial conditions. In this regard, Bank Negara Malaysia’s policies towards
maintaining financial stability has aimed at enhancing the strength and resilience
of the financial system through enhancements to risk management, financial
infrastructure development, as well as strengthened governance and
comprehensive oversight at both the financial system and individual institution
levels. At the same time, Bank Negara Malaysia has balanced the focus on
financial stability with the need to provide an environment which is conducive
for financial innovation and growth.
In recent years, the supervisory and regulatory approach has evolved to be
more holistic with the adoption of a more principle-based regulatory approach,
while preserving an appropriate balance between principle-based and rule-based
regulations. The adoption of a more holistic supervisory and regulatory approach
is in line with changing market circumstances and business practices, and
safeguards proper risk-taking behaviour among the financial institutions. It also
reduces the regulatory burden and creates an environment conducive for
innovation and development.54
On the regulatory front, continuous efforts have been channeled towards
strengthening and streamlining the existing prudential and regulatory framework
with international best practices, while at the same time providing flexibility to
financial institutions that have demonstrated strong risk management capability.55
The intensified competition in lending activities which raises banks’ engagement
in higher risk taking activities amidst the current environment of rapid product
innovation pose a great challenge to the regulator. Nevertheless, Bank Negara
Malaysia continues to strike a balance between promoting competition and
efficiency in the banking system, and putting in place the necessary prudential
safeguards to preserve stability and orderly market conditions.
________________
54. A majority of prescriptive limits and regulatory requirements or restrictions have been replaced
with broad principles that emphasise on corporate governance over the recent few years,
beginning with substantive revisions to the prudential standards on corporate governance. Since
2001, more than 50 prudential standards have been developed or reviewed under this initiative.
55. For example, in April 2007, the limit on net open position was abolished to provide greater
flexibility to licensed onshore banks to undertake foreign currency business. Since January
2007, banking institutions that meets the Bank Negara Malaysia supervisory standards are also
no longer subject to the prevailing limit of 5% participation in equity-related activities.125
Meanwhile, the supervisory framework is now premised on a rigorous risk-
based assessment56, focusing on banking institutions’ risk profiles and the
effectiveness of internal risk management systems. The framework assesses
five main areas. This includes group structures, corporate governance, risk
management, intra-group exposures and reporting requirements. The framework
would enable a structured and pre-emptive approach in assessing financial
institutions’ stability. Initiatives are also being undertaken to prepare the banking
institutions for Basel II which is expected to result in more efficient capital
management through a more risk sensitive mechanism to compute capital
adequacy.57
Significant attention is also directed at ensuring the effective integration of
the regulatory and supervisory processes to achieve a coherent framework that
contributes to financial stability. Specifically, prudential policy priorities are
assessed against key risks to financial stability which has been highlighted through
supervisory observations and assessments, including micro stress testing adopted
at the institutional level. Policies are developed jointly between the regulatory
and supervisory functions in Bank Negara Malaysia, and staff involved in policy
development is also included in the supervisory review panels and deliberations.
In addition, greater emphasis has been placed on enhancing the effectiveness
of macro prudential surveillance that provides a more holistic view of structural
imbalances, linkages and vulnerability within the financial system.
________________
56. For instance, in 2004, an enhanced risk-based supervisory framework (RBSF) was implemented
for insurers and Takaful operators, followed progressively thereafter by the adoption of the
framework for banking institutions and development finance institutions. The RBSF is a dynamic
supervisory toll that identifies and assesses the emerging risks in financial institutions based
on an in-depth understanding of the institution, the industry and environment in which it
operates, and factors that could adversely alter the risk profile. In implementing the RBSF,
regular discussions with the board and senior management as well as those principally responsible
for internal audit, risk management, compliance and management information support within
institutions are conducted to raise risk issues concerning the institution.
57. Starting 1 January 2008,  a total of 27 banking institutions have adopted the Standardised
Approach for credit risk and either the Basic Indicator, Standardised or Alternative Standardised
Approaches for operational risk. The remaining seven banking institutions will move to the
more advanced Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approaches for credit risk under Basel II from
1 January 2010. With respect to Islamic banks, 10 out of 12 Islamic banks have adopted the
revised framework for Islamic banks (Capital Adequacy Framework for Islamic Banks or CAFIB).
The Risk-Based Capital (RBC) framework was issued to the insurance industry in 2007. The
framework provides for regulatory capital requirements that are more sensitive to the underlying
risk exposure of insurers and is expected to be implemented in January 2009.126
The magnitude and speed of international capital mobility in international
capital and the increasing risks of contagion arising from integration with the
global financial markets have necessitated the identification and assessment of
the link and sources of risks from the external sector. At the national level,
contagion risk is monitored between various economic sectors with the financial
sector. Both the assessment against the external developments and against various
sectors in the economy captures the dynamic interaction of different risks and
their impact on overall financial system stability, thereby facilitating immediate
remedial response.
To complement the enhanced supervisory and regulatory measures, efforts
were also undertaken to deepen and broaden domestic financial markets under
the strategic master plans for the financial sector58, improve financial safety
nets through the establishment of institutions such as the Malaysian Deposits
Insurance Corporation59 and centers for financial education60 and align risk
management with the best international practices.
The cumulative effect of all these efforts has been the strengthening of the
country’s capacity to absorb the volatile movements of financial flows and to
implement policies to manage and minimise the risks arising from capital flows.
The restructuring and development of the banking and financial sector since the
Asian Financial Crisis has placed the financial system in  better position to manage
the return of large-scale and volatile financial flows to Malaysia in recent years.
The continuous enhancements to risk management, financial infrastructure
development as well as strengthened governance and oversight at the institutional
level have greatly improved the financial performance and fundamentals of banks
since the recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis (see Table 2). The liquidity
of the banking system has steadily increased since the crisis as banks received
________________
58. The central bank and the Securities Commission launched the Financial Sector Master Plan
(FSMP) and the Capital Market Master Plan (CMP), respectively, in 2001 to develop an
efficient, dynamic and innovative financial system which ultimately forms the foundation for
a robust and strong Malaysian economy.
59. The Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation was established in September 2005 and is an
independent statutory body established under the Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation Act
2005 (PIDM Act).
60. The Credit Counselling and Debt Management Agency was established by Bank Negara Malaysia
in April 2006 to provide financial counselling and debt management to individuals as well as
financial education to help individuals take control of their financial situation and gain peace
of mind that comes from the wise use of credit.127
more cash deposits from both corporates and households. The capitalisation of
the banking system remained high, at levels above 12.5%, providing a sizeable
buffer against unexpected losses and shocks.  Profitability in the banking sector
has been improving steadily from 2003 onwards, underpinned by strong
macroeconomic and financial conditions with very low levels of financial market
volatility. While the interest income of most institutions remained broadly stable,
banks enjoyed further improvements in fee, commission and trading income in
2006 and 2007. The rate of NPLs had fallen markedly from 7.5% at end-
December 2004 to the historically very low level at 2.4% at end-June 2008.61
The strengthened fundamentals enhance the ability of the banking system to
withstand shocks.
Table 2: Selected Financial Soundness Indicators of Malaysian Banks
2004 2005 2006 2007
Risk Weighted Capital Ratio (RWCR) 14.4 13.7 13.5 13.2
Return on Assets (ROA) 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.5
Net NPL ratio 7.5 5.8 4.8 3.2
The deepening of the domestic financial market and the introduction of new
instruments for monetary management have also improved Bank Negara
Malaysia’s ability to manage the build-up or withdrawal of liquidity from capital
flows to ensure orderly functioning and stability of the domestic financial system.
This has been illustrated by the episode of large capital inflows in anticipation
of exchange rate revaluation in 2004 and 2005, the subsequent sharp withdrawal
of capital in the last quarter of 2005, and the return of capital inflows in 2006
and 2007. Despite the sizeable and sharp movements of financial flows in these
episodes, there were no disruptions to financial market functioning and the broader
financial system.
________________
61. The significant reduction in NPL was due to higher recoveries and the reclassification of NPLs
to performing status as well as intensified efforts to strengthen balance sheets through write-
offs and the disposal of loans via securitisation and outright sales.128
The resilience of the banking sector and the financial system generally went
through a  testing phase in 2007 when the benign macroeconomic environment
of the previous four years started to show considerable signs of strain62,
emanating largely from the external sector. Nevertheless, the ensuing growing
risk aversion and the continuous re-pricing of risks which led to tightening of
global liquidity and credit conditions in the global markets had little impact on
domestic financial system stability. The volatility was well-absorbed given the
insignificant exposures of financial institutions to subprime related instruments
and the increased depth of the domestic markets.
However, the risks remain going forward. While there had been no direct
impact of external developments on the performance and stability of the banking
sector and the broader financial system, the intensification of the global financial
turmoil which emanated from the developed economies is likely to transmit
through less direct channels. In particular, the general operating environment
has changed. The weakening external environment has begun to affect the
outlook for the Malaysian economy. This, in turn, is likely to increase the exposure
of banks to credit and other risk as the potential downturn in general
macroeconomic conditions affect the corporate and household sectors. It is too
early to portend the impact on overall financial stability. Nonetheless, the significant
improvements and capacity built-up since the Asian Financial Crisis will enable
the domestic financial sector to better cope with challenges as they unfold.
7. Conclusion
This paper has looked at Malaysia’s experience in coping with the volatile
movements of capital over the period 1991 to 2007. While Malaysia’s
developmental progress has greatly benefited from investment flows, the historical
experience suggests that the openness to financial flows exposed a small economy
like Malaysia to the risks inherent with such flows. This includes their role in
accentuating economic cycles, their destabilising impact on prices, as well as
the challenges they pose in the conduct of monetary policy and the maintenance
of financial stability. In terms of the determinants, an empirical investigation
suggests that the portfolio investment inflows are affected by both pull and push
factors, while FDI inflows are largely driven by pull factors.
________________
62. The global financial and business environment deteriorated sharply due to the emergence of
the US subprime crisis in mid-2007, the boom-bust cycle in commodities prices in 2007 and
first half of 2008, and the impending slowdown in global economic growth.129
The sizeable movement of financial flows has certainly complicated monetary
policy, as well as monetary and exchange rate management. However, the
development of surveillance capabilities, the deepening of domestic financial
markets and the introduction of new instruments for monetary management has,
thus far, enabled Bank Negara Malaysia to effectively manage the risks arising
from large capital flows in the recent period and ensure the potency of monetary
policy. Large capital flows also pose challenges for the maintenance of financial
stability. Vulnerabilities are built up over time while the ability of the financial
system to cope with significant stress and external shocks is dependent on its
initial conditions. In this regard, Bank Negara Malaysia’s policies have been
pre-emptive and aimed at enhancing the strength and resilience of the financial
system. The continuous enhancements to risk management, financial infrastructure
development as well as strengthened governance and oversight at the institutional
level have certainly placed the financial system in a better position to manage
the return of large-scale and volatile financial flows to Malaysia in recent years.130
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APPENDIX I
Capital Account Measures (1990 – 2007)
9 November 1990: Applications from non-residents and non-resident-controlled
companies to obtain any domestic financing solely for property acquisition and
development purposes would not be approved by the Controller of Foreign
Exchange.
20 April 1992:  Total borrowing by residents in foreign currency from domestic
commercial and merchant banks to finance imports of goods and services was
restricted to the equivalent of RM1 million (previously there were no limits).
9 July 1992:  Borrowing under the Export Credit Refinance Facilities (both pre-
and post-shipment financing) by non-resident controlled companies would be
considered as domestic borrowing.
24 October 1992:  Offshore guarantees obtained by residents to secure domestic
borrowing, except offshore guarantees (whether denominated in ringgit or foreign
currency) without recourse to Malaysian residents and obtained from the licensed
offshore banks in Labuan to secure domestic borrowing were deemed as foreign
borrowing. In cases where an offshore guarantee is denominated in ringgit, it
were subject to the condition that, in the event the guarantee is called on, the
licensed offshore banks in Labuan must make payments in foreign currency
(with some exceptions), not in ringgit.
1 November 1992: The guidelines on foreign equity capital ownership were
liberalised. Companies exporting at least 80% of their production were no longer
subject to any equity requirement, whereas companies exporting between 50%
and 79% of their production were permitted to hold 100% equity, provided that
they have invested $50 million or more in fixed assets or completed projects
with at least 50% local value added and that the company’s products do not
compete with those produced by domestic firms. These guidelines would not
apply to sectors in which limits on foreign equity participation have been
established.
14 December 1992:  Residents and the offshore companies in Labuan were
prohibited from transacting with the residents of dealing in the currency of the
FYR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) without specific prior approval from
the Controller of Foreign Exchange.137
22 December 1993:  Non-resident controlled companies involved in manufacturing
and tourism-related activities were freely allowed to obtain domestic credit
facilities to finance the acquisition and/or the development of immovable property
required for their own business activities.
17 January 1994:  A ceiling was placed on the net external liability position of
domestic banks (excluding trade-related and direct investment inflows) (removed
on January 20, 1995).
24 January 1994:  Residents were prohibited to sell the following Malaysian
securities to non-residents: banker’s acceptances; negotiable instruments of
deposit; Bank Negara bills; treasury bills; government securities (including Islamic
securities) with a remaining maturity of one year or less.
7 February 1994:  Residents were prohibited to sell to non-residents all forms
of private debt securities (including commercial papers, but excluding securities
convertible into ordinary shares) with a remaining maturity of one year or less.
7 February 1994:  The restriction on the sale of Malaysian securities to non-
residents was extended to both the initial issue of the relevant security and the
subsequent secondary market trade.
23 February 1994:  Prohibition of forward transactions (on bid side) and nontrade-
related swaps by commercial banks with foreign customers to curtail the
speculative activities of offshore agents seeking long positions in ringgit (lifted
on August 16, 1994).
12 August 1994: Residents were permitted to sell to non-residents any Malaysian
securities.
1 December 1994:  Residents may borrow in foreign currency up to a total of
the equivalent of RM5 billion from non-residents and from commercial and
merchant banks in Malaysia.
1 December 1994:  Non-resident-controlled companies were allowed to obtain
credit facilities, including immovable property loans, up to RM10 million without
specific approval, provided that at least 60% of their total credit facilities from
banking institutions were obtained from Malaysian-owned financial institutions.138
1 December 1994:  Non-residents with valid work permits may obtain domestic
borrowing to finance up to 60% of the purchase price of residential property for
their own accommodation.
20 January 1995: Ceilings on the net external liability positions of banks, imposed
since January 24, 1994, were removed.
27 June 1995:  Corporate residents with a domestic credit facility were allowed
to remit funds up to the equivalent of RM10 million for overseas investment
purposes each calendar year.
1 February 1996:  The threshold for the completion of the statistical forms for
each remittance to or receipt of funds from, non-residents was raised from
amounts exceeding RM50,000  to RM100,000, or its equivalent in foreign
currency.
4 August 1997:  Controls were imposed on banks to limit outstanding non-
commercial-related ringgit offer-side swap transactions (i.e. forward order/spot
purchases of ringgit by foreign customers) to $2 million per foreign customer or
its equivalent.  Hedging requirements of foreigners for trade-related and genuine
portfolio and foreign direct investment were excluded.
4 August1997:  Residents are allowed to enter into non-commercial-related swap
transactions up to a limit (no limits previously).
30 October 1997: The quota on sales to foreigners of high-end condominiums
was raised to 50% from 30%. Also, foreigners were allowed to acquire two
units of condominiums (up from one previously).
22 April 1998: The limitation on the purchase of residential or shop or office
space by non-residents was lifted.
1 September 1998:  A requirement introduced to repatriate all ringgit held offshore
(including ringgit deposits in overseas banks) by October 1, 1998 (BNM approval
thereafter).
1 September 1998:  Approval requirement was imposed to transfer funds between
external accounts (freely allowed previously) and for the use of funds other
than permitted purposes (i.e., purchase of RM assets).139
1 September 1998:  Licensed offshore banks were prohibited to trade in ringgit
assets (allowed up to permitted limits previously).
1 September 1998:  A limit was introduced on exports and imports of ringgit by
residents and non-residents travellers, effective September 1, 1998 (no limits
existed previously).
1 September 1998:  Residents were prohibited from obtaining ringgit credit facilities
from non-residents (subject to a limit previously).
1 September 1998:  All imports and exports were required to be settled in foreign
currency.
1 September 1998:  All purchases and sales of ringgit facilities can only be
transacted through authorised depository institutions.
1 September 1998:  Approval requirement for non-residents to convert RM in
external accounts into foreign currency, except for purchases of RM assets,
conversion of profits, dividends, interest, and other permitted purposes (no such
restrictions previously).
1 September 1998:  No restriction on conversion of ringgit funds in external
accounts of non-residents with work permits, embassies, high commissions, central
banks, international organisations, and missions of foreign countries in Malaysia.
1 September1998:  A 12-month waiting period for non-residents to convert RM
proceeds from the sale of Malaysian securities held in external accounts
(excluding FDI, repatriation of interest, dividends, fees, commissions, and rental
income from portfolio investment). No such restrictions previously.
1 September 1998:  A prior approval requirement beyond a certain limit for all
residents to invest abroad in any form (previously applied only to corporate
residents with domestic borrowing).
1 September 1998:  Trading in Malaysian shares on Singapore’s CLOB OTC
market became de facto prohibited as a result of strict enforcement of the existing
law requiring Malaysian shares to be registered in KLSE prior to trade.
1 September 1998:  A specific limit on exports of foreign currency by residents
and up to the amount brought into Malaysia for non-residents (previously, no
restriction on export of foreign currency on person or in baggage of a traveller;
export by other means required approval, regardless of amount).140
12 December 1998:  Residents are allowed to grant loans to non-residents for
purchases of immovable properties from December 12, 1998 to January 12,
1999.
13 January 1999:  Capital flows for the purpose of trading derivatives on the
commodity and monetary exchange of Malaysia and the Kuala Lumpur options
and financial futures exchange were permitted for non-residents, without being
subject to the rules governing external accounts, when transactions were
conducted through “designated external accounts” that could be created with
tier-1 commercial banks in Malaysia. (From September 1999, the classification
of tier-1 and tier-2 banks became no longer applicable: All commercial banks
were allowed to open designated accounts for non-residents)
15 February 1999:  The 12-month waiting period replaced with a graduated
system of exit levy on the repatriation of the principal of capital investments (in
shares, bonds, and other financial instruments, except for property investments)
made prior to February 15, 1999. The levy decreased over the duration of the
investment, and thus penalised earlier repatriations; the levy was 30% if repatriated
less than 7 months after entry, 20% if repatriated in 7-9 months; and 10% if 9-
12 months. No levy on principal if repatriated after 12 months.
18 February 1999:  Repatriation of funds relating to investments in immovable
property is exempted from the exit levy regulations.
1 March 1999:  The ceiling on the import and export of ringgit for border trade
with Thailand was raised.
5 April 1999:  Investors in MESDAQ were exempted from the exit levy
introduced on February 15, 1999.
8 July 1999:  Residents were allowed to grant overdraft facility in aggregate not
exceeding RM200 million for intra-day and not exceeding RM5 million for
overnight to a foreign stock broking company subject to certain conditions.
21 September 1999:  Commercial banks were allowed to enter into short-term
swap arrangement with non-resident stockbrokers to cover for payment for
purchase of shares on the KLSE and in outright ringgit forward sale contract
with non-residents who have firm commitment to purchase shares on the KLSE,
for maturity period not exceeding five working days and with no rollover option.141
4 October 1999:  Residents are allowed to grant RM loans to non-residents for
purchases of immovable properties from October 29, 1999 to December 7, 1999.
14 March 2000:  Funds arising from sale of securities purchased by non-residents
on the CLOB can be repatriated without payment of exit levy.
24 April 2000:  Non-resident controlled companies raising domestic credit through
private debt securities were exempted from the RM 19 million limit and the
50:50 requirement for issuance of private debt securities on tender basis through
the fully automated system for tendering, to develop domestic bond market.
29 June 2000:  Administrative procedures issued to facilitate classification of
proceeds from the sale of CLOB securities as being free from levy.
27 July 2000:  Residents and non-residents were no longer required to make a
declaration in the traveller’s declaration form as long as they carry currency
notes and/or travellers’ cheques within the permissible limits.  For non-residents,
the declaration was incorporated into the embarkation card issued by the
Immigration Department.
30 September 2000:  Licensed offshore banks in the Labuan international offshore
financial centre were allowed to invest in RM assets and instruments in Malaysia
for their own accounts only and not on behalf of clients.  The investments could
not be financed by ringgit borrowing.
1 December 2000:  Foreign-owned banks in Malaysia were allowed to extend
up to 50%  (previously 40%) of the total domestic credit facilities to non-resident
controlled companies, in case of credit facilities extended by resident banks.
This is to fulfil Malaysia’s commitment under the GATS.
20 December 2000:  Licensed commercial banks were allowed to extend intraday
overdraft facilities not exceeding RM 10 million (previously RM 5 million) to
foreign stock broking companies and foreign global custodian banks.
1 February 2001:  The exit levy on profits repatriated after one year from the
month the profits are realised was abolished.  Portfolio profits repatriated within
one year remained subject to the 10% levy.
25 April 2001: Limitations and conditions imposed on purchases of residential,
shop lot, commercial, and office space by foreigners were liberalised, provided
that the purchase price is more than RM250,000.142
1 May 2001:  The 10% exit levy imposed on profits arising from portfolio
investments repatriated within one year of realisation was abolished.
1 June 2001:  All controls on the trading of futures and options by non-residents
on the MDEX were eliminated.  The Commodity and Monetary Exchange of
Malaysia and the KLSE were merged to form the MDEX.
13 June 2001:  Resident insurance companies were allowed to extend ringgit
policy loans to non-resident policy holders with the terms and conditions of the
policies.  The amount of RM loans extended may not exceed the policy’s attained
cash surrender value and may be for the duration of the policies.
10 July 2001:  Resident financial institutions were allowed to extend ringgit loans
to non-residents to finance the purchase or construction of any immovable
property in Malaysia (excluding financing for purchases of land only) up to a
maximum of three property loans in aggregate.
21 November 2002:  Banks are allowed to extend additional RM credit facilities
to non-residents up to an aggregate of RM5 million per non-resident to finance
projects undertaken in Malaysia.  Prior to this, credit facilities in RM to non-
residents for purposes other than purchases of three immovable properties or
a vehicle were limited to RM200,000.
3 December 2002:  In addition to obtaining property loans to finance new
purchases or construction of any property in Malaysia, non-residents may also
refinance their RM domestic property loans.  The above is subject to a maximum
of three property loans.
3 December 2002:  The limit of RM 10,000 equivalent in foreign currency for
investment abroad by residents under the Employee Share Option/Purchase
Scheme has been removed.  Effective this date, general permission is granted
for overseas investment for this purpose.
3 December 2002:  Payments between residents and non-residents as well as
between non-residents for RM assets are liberalised to allow payments to be
made either in RM or foreign currency (previously, only in RM).143
7 March 2003: Banking institutions, as a group, were permitted to extend ringgit
overdraft facilities not exceeding RM500,000 in aggregate to a non-resident,
provided that the credit facilities are fully covered at all times by fixed deposits
placed by the non-resident customer with the banking institutions extending the
credit facilities.
21 May 2003: The threshold level for acquisition by foreign and Malaysian
interests exempted from FIC approval was raised to RM10 million from RM5
million; acquisition proposals by licensed manufacturing companies were
centralised at MITI, while corporate proposals were centralised at the SC, and
these proposals no longer required FIC consideration.
31 May 2003: The guidelines on unit trust funds (issued by the SC in 1997)
were revised to include investments in foreign securities traded in or under the
rules of a foreign market with approval from the BNM, the SC, and other relevant
authorities.
17 June 2003: Foreign equity holding in manufacturing projects was allowed up
to 100% for all types of investments.
1 April 2004: COFE approval was required for the issuance of ringgit bonds in
Malaysia by multinational development institutions and foreign multinational
corporations.
1 April 2004: Resident banks and nonbanks were permitted to extend ringgit
loans to finance or refinance the purchase or construction of any immovable
property in Malaysia (excluding financing for purchases of land only) up to a
maximum of three property loans in aggregate.
1 April 2004: The limit on banking institutions for loans to non-residents (excluding
stock broking companies, custodian banks, and correspondent banks) was raised
to RM10 million from RM200,000.
1 April 2004: Licensed insurers and Takaful (Islamic insurance) operators were
allowed to invest abroad up to 5% of their margins of solvency and total assets,
respectively, these entities were also allowed to invest up to 10% of net asset
value in their own investment-linked funds.144
1 April 2004: Unit trust management companies were allowed to invest abroad
the full amount of net asset value attributed to non-resident. In addition, fund/
asset managers were allowed to invest abroad up to the full amount of
investments of non-resident clients.
1 April 2004: Unit trust management companies were allowed to invest abroad
up to 10% of net asset value attributed to residents without prior COFE approval.
In addition, fund/asset managers were allowed to invest abroad up to 10% of
investments of their resident clients.
1 April 2005: Residents (individuals or companies on a corporate group basis)
without domestic ringgit credit facilities were allowed to invest abroad amounts
of own foreign currency held onshore or offshore, up to RM10 million from a
foreign currency facility, and any amount of ringgit converted into foreign
currency.
1 April 2005: Residents (individuals or companies on a corporate group basis)
with domestic ringgit credit facilities were allowed to invest abroad amounts of
own foreign currency held onshore or offshore, up to RM10 million from a
foreign credit facility, or ringgit converted to foreign currency, subject to limits
of RM10 million a calendar year on a corporate group basis for companies, and
RM100,000 a calendar year for individuals.
1 April 2005: Resident individuals and companies were permitted to prepay foreign
currency credits.
1 April 2005: The limits on foreign currency credits were raised to RM50 million
for resident companies in aggregate on a corporate group basis, and RM10
million for individuals, from RM5 million for both. No limit applied to trade
financing.
1 April 2005: Resident credit institutions other than ADs and approved merchant
banks no longer required prior approval to open and maintain FCAs with onshore
banks, offshore banks in Labuan, overseas banks, and approved merchant banks.
1 April 2005: Resident insurers and Takaful operators were allowed to invest
abroad up to 5% of their margins of solvency or total assets, and up to 30%
of the NAV of investment-linked funds marketed by them.145
1 April 2005: Resident fund/asset management companies were allowed to invest
abroad up to 100% of funds managed on behalf of non-residents and resident
clients with no domestic ringgit credit facilities.
1 April 2005: Resident fund/asset management companies were allowed to invest
abroad up to 30% of total funds managed on behalf of resident clients with
domestic ringgit credit facilities.
1 April 2005: The limit on investments abroad for investment-linked funds offered
by resident insurers was increased to 30% from 10% of total NAV of the funds.
1 April 2006: CIS funds of limited distribution to sophisticated investors (restricted
investment schemes) were required to be managed and administered by a fund
management company licensed by the SC.
7 April 2006: Restricted investment schemes were allowed to invest in foreign
securities subject to prior approval by the BNM and the SC.
29 May 2006: Investments in securities listed on exchanges recognised by Bursa
Malaysia Securities Berhad, SC require only prior notification of the BNM and
other relevant authorities.
1 January 2007: The FIC Guidelines on Property on the acquisition of residential
properties valued at not less than RM250,000 for personal use by foreign investors
were relaxed.
1 January 2007: The restriction on Labuan offshore banks to transact in ringgit
assets on behalf of non-resident clients was removed to enhance the role of and
scope of business of Labuan offshore banks.
18 January 2007: The sub limit for investments in any one foreign jurisdiction
of 2% of an insurer’s solvency margin was removed.
1 April 2007: Resident corporations were allowed to utilise proceeds arising from
the listing of shares through initial public offering on the main board of the Bursa
Malaysia for offshore investment purposes.
1 April 2007: The limit for resident corporations with domestic ringgit borrowing
to invest in foreign currency assets through conversion of ringgit into foreign
currency was increased to RM50 million a calendar year from the previous limit
of RM10 million.146
1 April 2007: The limit for residents with domestic ringgit borrowing to invest
in foreign currency assets through conversion of ringgit currency is increased
to RM1 million a calendar year from the previous limit of RM100,000.
1 April 2007: Non-resident corporations were allowed to utilise abroad proceeds
arising from the listing of shares through an initial public offering on the main
board of the Bursa Malaysia.
1 April 2007: Residents were allowed to issue foreign currency bonds in Malaysia.
1 April 2007: Lending by non-bank residents to non-residents in foreign exchange
is allowed. Residents without ringgit credit facilities may lend any amount.
1 April 2007: Lending by non-bank residents to non-residents in foreign exchange
is allowed up to the following limits: resident corporations and individuals with
ringgit credit facilities may lend up to RM5 million and RM1 million a year,
respectively.
1 April 2007: Licensed onshore banks were allowed to extend to non-resident
stock broking companies and custodian banks ringgit overdraft credit facilities
without limit for the financing of funding gaps arising from unforeseen or
inadvertent technical delays in relation to (1) settlement of trades on the Bursa
Malaysia and (2) ringgit instruments settled through the Real Time Electronic
Transfer of Funds and Securities System and Bursa Malaysia. The licensed
onshore banks, in granting the overdraft facility, are required to observe the
following conditions: (1) the facility is not for funding purposes and is granted
strictly for settlement due to inadvertent or technical delays as well as time zone
differences and (2) the facility must not exceed two working days with no rollover
option.
1 April 2007: The limit in foreign currency borrowing that can be obtained by
resident corporations from licensed onshore banks and non-residents as well as
through issuance of onshore foreign currency bonds was increased to RM100
million equivalents in aggregate and on a corporate group basis from the previous
RM50 million equivalents. The proceeds may be used for domestic purposes or
offshore investment. Residents are allowed to obtain foreign currency credit
from non-residents up to RM10 million.
1 April 2007: Residents are required to seek prior permission from the COFE
to issue financial guarantees to or on behalf of a non-resident or to obtain financial
guarantees from non-residents.147
1 April 2007: The limit on the number of residential or commercial property
loans obtained by non-residents was abolished. Under the previous policy, non-
residents were allowed to obtain a maximum of three property loans from
residents to finance the purchase or construction of residential or commercial
properties in Malaysia.
1 April 2007: Investment banks in Malaysia were allowed to undertake foreign
currency business, subject to a comprehensive supervisory review of their capacity
and capability.
1 April 2007: The limit on borrowing abroad by financial institutions other than
banks was increased to RM100 million from RM50 million.
1 April 2007: The limit imposed on licensed onshore banks, previously capped
at 20% of the banks’ capital base was abolished.
1 April 2007: The limits for resident institutional investors to invest in foreign
currency assets were increased as follows: (1) unit trust companies may invest
up to 50% of NAV attributable to residents (previously, 30% of NAV); (2) fund
management companies may invest up to 50% of funds of resident clients with
domestic credit facilities (previously, up to 30%) and (3) insurance companies
and Takaful operators may invest up to 50% of NAV of investment-linked funds
marketed (previously, 30% of NAV).
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions (1990
– 2007) and Tamirisa (2004)148
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Chapter 5
CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL
BANK POLICIES IN MONGOLIA
by
Gan-Ochir Doojav1
1. General Framework and Major Capital Flows Management Policies
1.1 General Framework
At the beginning of its transition to a market economy, Mongolia had a
relatively closed capital account. Economic liberalisation, such as reduction of
price controls, floating exchange rates, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises,
and trade and capital liberalisation processes, was implemented in the 1990s.
Most of the changes had occurred between 1990 and 1993. The Government
of Mongolia accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the
IMF Articles of Agreement, with effect from February 1, 19962. The
implementation of current and capital account liberalisation has both negative
and positive impact on the economy.
Mongolia was the first country in transition to join the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) in January 1997. The opening up of Mongolian markets
(foreign trade liberalisation) as well as their integration into the multilateral trading
system under the WTO have created not only new opportunities and prospects
for economic development of Mongolia, but also brought about limitations and
restrictions for its domestic policies.
Like in other SEACEN countries, the liberalisation of the financial market
and capital account has resulted in large capital inflows to Mongolia. On the
other hand, the inflows were motivated by good macroeconomic performance
________________
1. Author is Economist attached to the Monetary Policy and Research Department of the Bank
of Mongolia. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Bank of Mongolia.
2. IMF members accepting the obligations of Article VIII undertake to refrain from imposing
restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions or
from engaging in discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices without
IMF approval.152
and by strong demand of foreign investors in the mining and financial sectors.
The large capital inflows have financed a higher economic growth, although it
created pressures that led to inflation, real appreciation of the exchange rate,
and a reduction in the domestic interest rate in recent years. Furthermore, due
to this negative impact, an analysis of the determinants of capital flows and their
macroeconomic impact and their implications for the policy management of capital
flows is required.
Capital inflows are expected to increase massively due to the fact that
large mining  projects  (Oyu tolgoi and Tavan tolgoi) are in the pipeline to be
implemented in the coming years and with financial investment in the commercial
banking sector increasing. Thus, the importance of the topic, while not considered
as significant previously, is engaging the close attention of policy makers today.
This paper examines the evidence on the recent developments in capital
flows empirically,  the determinants of capital flows, impact of capital flows on
monetary and financial variables, and review of policy management of capital
flows in Mongolia.  There is no preceding work done in this area in Mongolia.
Thus, it is not possible to make a review of literature in the Mongolian case and
compare some results with other papers’ results.
1.2 Policies Implemented to Manage Capital Flows
Capital inflows may lead to inflationary pressures, to real exchange rate
appreciation, which can reduce international competitiveness, and to rapid growth
of monetary aggregates and credit, and banking sector problems, if the inflows
are not properly intermediated. So capital inflows worry policy makers. The
impact depends on the volume of flows, the macroeconomic policy framework,
the microstructure of the flows, and incentives in the financial sector. In the
Mongolian case, current and capital account were almost fully liberalised in earlier
1990s. The present capital flow management framework is as follows:
l Non-residents can purchase local bond and other debt securities;
l Commercial credits to and from non-residents are allowed;
l Investment by private corporations in export promotion, use of advanced
technology, and the exploration of natural resources are encouraged;
l Sales or issue of capital market securities, money market securities,
derivatives and other instruments by non-residents are prohibited; and
l Gold mining companies are not required to register their exports at the
Bank of Mongolia (BOM) or a commercial bank.153
Nowadays the Mongolian authorities do not use any direct controls to react
to capital flows. However, they implement policies to reduce the negative effects
of capital flows.
1.2.1 Exchange Rate Policy
A country with high inflows is to let the nominal exchange rate appreciate
in response to the capital inflows. Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1998) noted
that a disadvantage of a pure float is that massive capital flows may induce
rapid nominal and real appreciation which may damage strategic sectors of the
economy, like non-traditional exports, and it could rise to have adverse effects
on the trade balance.
The BOM shifted to a floating-exchange rate regime in May 1993 and then
moved to a managed floating regime in 2001. For the BOM, its interventions are
officially limited to smoothening severe volatility in the foreign exchange market,
using the US dollar as the principal intervention currency. In reality, the BOM
has been a net seller of foreign exchange in the interbank market.
The IMF staffs’ report (January 2007) documented that the impact of the
BOM’s intervention on the market rate is limited. The BOM’s interventions are
atypical of central banks’ interventions, whereby the central banks buy or sell
foreign exchange in order to affect the exchange rate level. Nevertheless, the
impact could still be significant, given that these interventions are relatively large.
Also the report concludes that the interventions may have reduced the magnitude
of the appreciation/depreciation (in other words, the volatility), but have not
fundamentally changed the trend of exchange rate movements.
1.2.2 Monetary Policy
Sterilisation is a popular policy used in several countries. This policy aims
to mitigate inflationary pressures, real exchange rate appreciation and avoid the
loss of control over the domestic money stock.
Before 2007, without sterilisation, capital inflows led to reserve money and
money supply injection into the economy, which could have contributed to
inflation. Furthermore, in recent years the real exchange rate appreciation is
effected through higher inflation in Mongolia. In fact, the increase in the reserve
money in Mongolia has been largely driven by an increase in the net international
reserves (NIR) before 2007. IMF staff (January 2007) calculated the sterilisation
coefficient as the ratio of the change in Central bank bills (CBBs)3 to the change154
in NIR. The short-term elasticity is estimated around 60-70% and even the
long-run elasticity is less than 80%. Also they conclude that sterilisation through
CBBs issuance was not sufficient and the effectiveness of monetary policy may
be dampened.
Since July 2007, the excess liquidity in the inter-bank market, reserve money
and growth of monetary aggregates have decreased and the sterilisation coefficient
has risen due to the revision of the regulation on CBBs auction. In the economy,
decreases in the growth of monetary aggregates reduce inflationary pressure
with lags of 3-5 quarters.  Section 4.3 considers the issue of sterilisation policy
from the BOM in more detail.
1.2.3 Fiscal Policy
The government of Mongolia has revised the profit tax and income tax
rates to encourage the FDI by private corporations in January 2007. The
government has not imposed any taxes and restrictions on capital flows. Calvo,
Leiderman and Reinhart (1996) noted that a policy reaction to the surge in capital
inflows is to tighten fiscal policy (cut in public expenditures) and this policy may
be effective in limiting the appreciation of the real exchange rate. In the case
of Mongolia, fiscal policy expansion has continuously increased due to government
transfer for social purpose, increased pensions and wages of state employees
since 2005. For example, the fiscal expenditure increased from 27.5% of GDP
in 2005 to 38.4% in 2007. The funds for public expenditure are derived from
windfall tax income of gold and copper. This expansion has led to high monetary
growth, accelerating inflation and appreciation of REER.
2. Trends of Capital Flows in Mongolia
2.1 Key Macroeconomic Indicators
Economic growth in Mongolia has been strong in recent years. Capital inflows,
of which foreign direct investment – especially in mining and construction activities
and Mongolian workers’ remittances have increased significantly in recent years
pushing up GDP growth. Annual real GDP growth has averaged to 8.4% since
2003 due to the high world prices of gold and copper.  As illustrated in Figure
1, there is a strong empirical positive correlation between GDP growth and net
capital flows, especially during the last three years.
________________
3. BOM issue CBBs to observe (absorb?) excess liquidity from the banking sector.155
Figure 1
Capital Flows and GDP Growth Rates
The Mongolian economy grew nearly 5% per year between 1995 and 2007,
while receiving net capital flows of nearly 5.8% of GDP.
As the economy began to be exposed to external shocks, inflation acquired
significance, though it was at a low level (1.6-11.0%) between 1998 and 2006.
Strong supply shocks, such as increases in petroleum and food prices have mainly
been responsible for inflation volatility. The inflation rate jumped from 6% in
2006 to 15.1% in 2007, due to supply side shocks (rapid increase of oil and food
price in the world market), fiscal expansion, rapid monetary growth and structural
bottleneck (Figure 2).
Figure 2
Inflation and Interest Rates4
Source: The Bank of Mongolia and National Statistical Committee
 Source: The Bank of Mongolia
________________
4. Real interest rate is calculated using Fisher’s identity.156
Figure 2 shows that high lending interest rates have also been decreasing
in recent years. Especially during the last five years, the lending interest rate
dropped twice to 20%. This decrease reflected in the reduction in the interest
rate spread due to extension of banking operation, decrease of NPL ratio, and
financial intermediation deepness of banking system, high economic growth and
relatively low inflation. At the same time deposit rates have not decreased and
it seems to be mainly the result of strong competition among banks.
Figure 3
Developments of NEER and REER
The NEER has slightly appreciated in 2006 due to strong trade balance
surplus, and the REER has been moderately appreciating since 2004 (Figure 3).
Recent years’ exchange rate movements have related to capital inflows,
improvement in term of trade and rapid increases in domestic price level.
Figure 4
Growth of Money Supply and Credit
 Source: The Bank of Mongolia
Source: The Bank of Mongolia157
The money supply and credit growth have been high, that is between 20%
and 90% per year in the last six years (Figure 4). The growth in money supply
was reflected in the strong foreign exchange inflows. Especially in 2007, the
high growth of money supply and credit has mainly been driven by increases
of financial inflows and fiscal expansion. The improvement in fiscal position has
been attributed to strong economic growth, increase in mining sector revenues
(related with rapid growth of copper prices).
The average annual credit growth was over 40% in 2001-2007, and it is a
relatively high indicator comparing to other transition economies. The growth in
credit has been supported by decreases of lending interest rate, expansion of
economic scale and rapid growth of banks’ deposits.
2.2 Trends in Capital Flows
Figure 5 reveals that capital inflows are trending upwards since 1996. During
this period, the composition of capital inflows changed, with public debt inflows
replaced by foreign direct investment (FDI) and private debt inflows.  FDI and
private debt inflows in last four years took up on average 40% and 38% of
capital inflows, respectively. While public debt inflows declined from 77% of
capital inflows in 1996 to about 10% in 2007. FDI inflows peaked at US$327.8
million in 2007.
Figure 5
Composition of Capital Inflows (US$ million)
Source: The Bank of Mongolia, Balance of Payment Statistics158
Increases in the world copper and gold price and domestic real estate prices,
the high growth of the private sector and the high differential interest rate have
attracted a large amount of FDI and private debt inflows in recent years.
Figure 6 shows that capital outflows have been rapidly increasing from
2003. Capital outflows have largely been accounted by private debt outflows
since 2003. Private debt outflows rose from 48.2% of total capital outflows in
1996 to 95.7% in 2007. The macroeconomic determinants of capital flows are
closely examined in Section 3 of this paper.
Figure 6
Composition of Capital Outflows (US$ million)
Source: The Bank of Mongolia, Balance of Payment Statistics
Figure 7
Composition of Net Capital Flows (US$ million)
 Source: The Bank of Mongolia, Balance of Payment Statistics159
Figure 7 plots the trend of net capital flows (capital inflows minus capital
outflows) and its composition in Mongolia. The plot shows that net capital flows
were positive and continuously increasing between 2004 and 2007. The
composition of net capital flows has not changed during this time. The net capital
flows in the recent years are mainly accounted by net direct investment, because
of strong demand from foreign investors for Mongolian mining and exploration
sector.  FDI into the mining and exploration sector has been growing rapidly
since 2001 and is the fastest growing component of total FDI. The FDI inflows
increased 38.1% as compared to the previous year. In 2007, net capital flows
increased by 51.3% and showed a surplus of US$176.0 million.
Figure 8
Composition of Balance of Payment (% of GDP)
Source: The Bank of Mongolia, Balance of Payment Statistics
Since 2004, the current account of the balance of payments is in surplus,
since gold and copper prices in the world market have continuously increased
and stayed at relatively high levels. In other words, the improved terms of trade
have shifted the current account into surplus. The capital and financial account
(net capital flows) recorded a surplus since 2003, given the net capital flows of
about 4.1% of GDP in the last two years. The surplus of current and capital
accounts led to an overall balance of payments surplus – with the ratio of overall
balance of payments surplus to GDP increasing from 2.1% to 7.4% in last four
years, reaching its peak at 12.4% of GDP in 2006 (Figure 8).160
3. Determinants of Capital Flows
3.1 Methodology
Lipschitz, Lane, and Mourmouras (2002) noted that there are two ways to
think about the motivation for capital flows to transition economies. One way
is in portfolio terms, about interest rate differentials and arbitrage condition. The
other way is in terms of fundamentally, different supply conditions, mainly, capital-
labor ratios and rates of return on capital.
Some researchers divided the factors by their influence on capital flows
into external and internal factors. Calvo, Leideman and Reinhart (1993),
Fernandez-Arias (1996), Frankel and Okongwu (1996) noted that for small open
economies, external factors (world interest rates and world growth) are major
drivers of capital flows. Other external factors include terms of trade, the
international business cycle and its impact on profit opportunities, and some
regulatory changes that affect the international diversification of investment
portfolios at the main financial centers. Whereas Chuchan, Claessens and
Mamingi (1995), Henandez and Rudolph (1995), Kang and others (2002) noted
that internal factors are also as important as external factors. The internal factors
are related to domestic monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policies5 and market-
oriented reforms, such as trade and capital market liberalisation. In most of the
empirical studies, the internal and external factors are chosen as follows:
Internal (Pull) Factors: External (Push) Factors:
• Real GDP growth rate • World or industrial countries’s
• Real interest rate   real GDP growth rate
• Current account balance • World real interest rate
• Stock price index




• Expectation of exchange rate
________________
5. Capital can also flow to a country as a result of lack of credibility in current policies, or renewed
confidence about a country’s economic prospects. For example, inflation stabilisation programmes
can reduce macroeconomic risk.161
Like other studies, the determinants of capital flows in Mongolia are examined
using a simple regression model. Based on the above theoretical and empirical
concepts, the empirical model for the determinants of capital flows is chosen as
follows:
[1]  CF X Z D e α β γ λ = + + + +
Where CF is real capital inflows or real capital outflows (in logarithms), X is
a group internal variables (pull factors) including real GDP growth rate, domestic
real interest rate (proxied by real 12-month time deposit rate), current account
to GDP ratio, Z is a group of external variables (push factors), including world
real GDP growth rate (proxied by US GDP growth rate), world real interest
rate (proxied by US real interest rate), D is dummy for structural break and 
e
is
residual of the regression.
3.2 Data Description, Unit Root Tests and Cointegration Tests
The empirical results are based on quarterly data for the period 1998Q1-
2008Q2 (42 observations) to exclude impact of structural changes of the economy
and banking crisis. Also the official quarterly data of real GDP and capital flows
are available from the first quarter of 1998 for Mongolia. Table 1 summarises
the variables used in the estimation and their sources.162
________________
6. All the variables are in percent except capital inflows and capital outflows. The series of capital
inflows, capital outflows, GDP and current account are seasonally adjusted by using the X-12-
ARIMA method.
7. Real capital flows= nominal capital flows (in US$)/CPI of USA.
8. The IO2 model allows for gradual changes in the intercept and the slope of the trend function
such that:
Where   denotes the time break (1<<T) which is unknown,  if  and zero otherwise, if  and
zero elsewhere,  if t= and zero otherwise,  is any general ARMA process and  white noise. The
null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if the absolute value of the t statistic for testing a=1
is greater than the corresponding critical value tabulated by Perron (1997).
9. In the paper, order of integration was chosen at the 5% level.
The order of integration of the series is tested by employing the ADF and
Perron (1997) (IO2 model)8 test. The result of AFD test is reported in Appendix
1.
The ADF test represents that the variables CA_GDP, W_GDP_G, R and
R_W appear to be integrated to order I(1) and their underlying processes are
without deterministic trend. The variables CIN_R_L, COUNT_R_L and GDP_G,
on the other hand, appear to be stationary, i.e., integrated to order I(0)9. As163
these variables appear to be mixed (stationary and non-stationary), the appropriate
estimation method (ARDL approach) for mixed time series is applied.
But a problem with the AFD test is, it does not allow for testing the possibility
of a structural break. Perron (1997) proposed unit root test with existence of
structural break. In this paper, the IO2 model of Perron (1997) is also used for
testing unit roots of the series. The time of break (Tb) of the series is chosen
based on the historical experience and the principle, which is to minimise the t-
statistic of α = 1 . The timing of any Tb  for each series is shown in Table 2.
Also the optimal lag (k*) is selected such that the last coefficient in an
autoregression of order greater than  is insignificant, up to a maximum order k.
Figure 10 provides unit root tests using IO2 model. The results obtained indicate
that all variables are non-stationary under structural change at 5% significance
level.
Note: Critical values for the IO2 models at 1%, 5% and 10% are -6.32, -5.59 and -5.29, respectively.
          (Source: Perron (1997), page # 36, Table 2.A).
As all variables appear to be non-stationary under structural change (IO2
model, Perron 1997), the appropriate estimation methods for non-stationary time
series are applied. The co-integration analysis is carried out using the main two
methods so as to ensure that the acquired estimates have some robustness.
These methods are: the auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach due
to Pesaran and Shin (1995, 1999), and the full-information maximum likelihood
(FIML) method due to Johansen (1995).
________________
10. Real interest rate has decreased from the first quarter of 2006, due to rapidly decreasing
nominal interest rate between the first quarter of 2006 and second quarter of 2007. This trend
has continued because of the rapid increase in the inflation rate since July of 2007.
11. Due to increase in gold and copper prices in the World market, the current account had a
surplus between third and fourth quarters of 2006.
12. Nominal interest rate of USA started to decrease from the  third quarter of 2006. Then, the
Federal Reserve Bank has decreased FED target rate since September of 2007, due to the sub-
prime crisis.164
Due to the small sample available, a maximum of three lags in the lag-
length selection process is considered. It appears that both the LR test statistic
and AIC (Akaike information criterion) suggest that this maximum of three lags
is employed. Both criteria are weakly consistent in the case where the lag-
length determination is carried out for non-stationary variables. Thus, VAR(3)
for the Johansen procedure13 and a maximum of three lags for the ARDL method
are used. The Trace and Maximum-Eigen statistics for the VAR(3) system of
the variables considered are reported in Table 3.
The Maximum-Eigenvalue statistic indicates the presence of two co-
integration vectors at the 5% significance level within the system of part 2 and
the presence of only one co-integration vectors within the system of part 1.
Also, the Trace statistic indicates the presence of only one co-integrating vector
within the system of part 1 and the presence of two co-integrating vector within
the system of part 2. It continues with more conservative choice of one co-
integrating vector, which is easily identified in our case by normalising the real
capital inflows or real capital outflows (in log).
________________
13. The Johansen co-integration technique is used to determine the number of co-integrating
vectors in a vector autoregression (VAR) framework.
Note: * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level.165
An advantage of the ARDL model is that while other cointegration techniques
require all of the regressors to be integrated of the same order, the ARDL
model can be applied irrespective of their order of integration. It thus avoids the
pre-testing problems associated with the standard cointegration tests (Pesaran
et al., 2000).
In the ARDL approach, the null hypothesis ( all long-run coefficients of
the underlying ARDL are equal to zero, implying no cointegration) is tested
by computing the general F-statistic to determine that a long-run relationship
does exist between the dependent and independent variables. At this stage the
F-statistic is compared with the critical value tabulated by Pesaran et al. (2001).
We choose 3 as the maximum lag length in the ARDL model and the calculated
F-statistics of real capital inflows and real capital outflows equation is equal to
14.7 and 21.4, respectively. These estimated F-statistics is greater than upper
bound critical value14, respectively. Thus, the null hypothesis of no cointegration
is rejected, implying long-run relationship exists between the real capital inflows/
capital outflows and its independent variables. However, based on the theory,
real capital inflows/capital outflows are used as the dependent variables in the
paper.
3.3 Estimation Results: Determinants of Capital Flows
The estimates of long-run coefficients of the model in equation [1] using
two (ARDL and Johansen methods) estimations are reported in Figure 12. The
general to specific approach is applied to arrive at the parsimonious versions of
the estimates provided in Table 4.
________________
14. Source: Pesaran et al. (2001), Critical Value Bounds for the F-Statistic, Table C1.iii: Case III
with unrestricted intercept and no trend for k=4, k=5. For k=4, Lower bound I(0)=3.74 and
Upper bound I(1)=5.06 at the 1% significance level. For k=5, Lower bound I(0)=3.41 and
Upper bound I(1)=4.68 at the 1% significance level.166
Note: *, **, *** denotes 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. t-statistics are in
parentheses. The probability level of the diagnostic tests is in square brackets. The long-run
coefficient standard errors of ARDL model are obtained using familiar delta method.
________________
15. The order of the optimal ARDL model (distributed lag function) is selected based on the AIC.
16. Standard error of the coefficient is not defined from the Eviews 6.0 software.167
The two model estimates satisfy the summary statistics and common
diagnostic tests, based on the results reported in the last three rows of Figure
12. The residual tests show that there is no significant serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity in the residuals. Also from the accompanying summary statistics
of the R2, R2  and the F-statistics, the selected models have a good fit. These
are especially appropriate in a case like ours, where the sample size is very
small. Recursive estimation of the ARDL models also suggests that the regression
coefficients are generally stable over the sample period. The cumulative sum
(CUSUM test) and cumulative sum of squares (CUSUM of Squares test) plots
based on the recursive residuals are given in Figure 9 and do not show evidence
of statistically significant breaks. This implies that the estimated models are
stable.
Figure 9
CUSUM Test and CUSUM of Squares Test
A) ADRL (1,2,2,3,0,1) Model of Real Capital Inflows
B) ADRL (1,2,2,2,2) Model of Real Capital Outflows168
According to the estimates from the two methods employed an increase in
domestic real GDP growth results in a rise of the real capital inflows and real
capital outflows. Namely, the ARDL and Johansen estimates suggest that the
1 percentage point increase of domestic GDP growth causes the real capital
inflows to increase by 3-5%. This result confirms that real capital inflows are
partly explained by high domestic real GDP growth in recent years.
An increase in domestic real interest rate causes a growth of real capital
inflows, in accordance with the underlying theory. Namely, the estimates indicate
that a 1 percentage point increase of domestic real interest rate causes the real
capital inflows to increase by 1.3-1.5%. However, the effect of domestic real
interest rate on real capital outflows is significantly negative, as predicted. In
the other words, a 1 percentage point increase in domestic real interest rate
leads to 3-4% decrease in real capital outflows.
There is a positive relationship between the current account as a proportion
of GDP and real capital inflows and real capital outflows. That is, a 1 percentage
point increase in the ratio causes the real capital inflows to raise 4-5%. The
effects of World real GDP on the real capital inflows and capital outflows are
significant and consistent across two methods, with slight variability in the
estimates’ magnitude. Similarly, increasing World real GDP growth appears to
induce a rise of real capital inflows and capital outflows. As predicted in the
earlier parts of this paper, the effect of the World real interest rate on the real
capital inflows is negative and significant. In the other words, decreasing World
real interest rate results in a rise of the real capital inflows. But the World real
interest rate does not help to explain real capital outflows.
The results of the estimations indicate that the recent year’s high real capital
inflows are determined by push and pull factors, including high domestic economic
growth, high domestic real interest rate, positive current account performance,
strong World real GDP growth and low world real interest rate. Whereas the
real capital outflows are determined by internal factors, including domestic
economic growth, domestic real interest rate and current account to GDP ratio.
Furthermore, the high real capital inflows are associated with FDI promotion
policies after 2001, increasing interest of foreign investors for investment in
mining sector, decline in the corporate income tax rate since January 2007,
growing international confidence in the economy, macroeconomic stability and
rapid growth of banking sector credit by bank borrowing from abroad. These
do mean that the capital flows are affected by the domestic policy environment
and external shocks will necessarily require macroeconomic policy response.169
Figure 10
Short-term Capital Flows (US$ million)
Source: Bank of Mongolia, Balance of Payment Statistics
The coefficients of the error correction term (ECTt-1) have the right sign
(negative) and are statistically significant at 1% level.  The estimated values of
ECTt-1  of real capital inflows and real capital outflows indicate that 90-95%
and 69-86% of the disequilibria of the previous quarter’s shock adjust back to
the long-run equilibrium in the current quarter, respectively.
4. Capital Flows and Monetary Policy
4.1  Short-term Capital Flows
Figure 10 shows that short-term net capital recorded a deficit from 2003,
due to a rapid increase in capital outflows from 2003. In the Mongolian case,
the short-term capital flows are dominated by short-term private debt. Before
2003, the volume of short-term capital flows was small and the deficit of short-
term net capital flows increased by 7.5 times between 2003 and 2007. Also, the
short-term capital flows have been highly volatile: short-term capital outflows
decreased by 3.9 times between 2005 and 2006, and the short-term capital inflows
increased 4.4 times between 2006 and 2007.170
With regard to capital controls on short-term capital flows, Mongolia has a
very liberal capital account regime with free flows into and out of the economy.
Short-term capital inflows to the economy are expected to increase massively.
Thus, the policy makers need to study carefully the effect of short-term capital
flows on the economy in light of the experience of other countries in managing
short-term capital flows.
4.2 Impact of Capital Flows on Monetary and Financial Variables
This section will examine the effects of capital flows on the important
macroeconomic variables, namely, the GDP growth rate, real effective exchange
rate, foreign exchange reserves and monetary expansion. Capital flows have
different effects on an economy depending on its economic structure, exchange
rate regime, etc., and this Section draws on the works of Kohli (2001), Edward
(1999) and others in analysing Mongolia’s experience. Large capital inflows can
create a higher rate of economic growth, rapid monetary and credit expansions,
and can generally lead to pressures of inflation, real exchange rate appreciation,
lower domestic saving, and a reduction in the domestic interest rate or the cost
of capital.
4.2.1 Impact of Capital Flows on Economic Growth
Theoretically, FDI has a direct positive impact on economic growth through
an economy’s productive capacity. It also has an indirect impact on development
via competition, improvement in technology and machinery, better education and
knowledge, higher employment (higher household income), improved infrastructure
and environment, and enhanced tax collection, etc. On the other hand, foreign
investors will be increasingly interested in investing when the host country is
experiencing economic growth, as they are confident that industry promises high
stable return and financial market.
The simple correlation coefficient between FDI and GDP level is 0.76 and
the long-run elasticity of GDP in relation to FDI is 0.27 between 2000 Q1 and
2008 Q1 in the Mongolian economy. Production elasticity of the agricultural
sector in relation to the FDI to the sector is 0.25. For the sectors of mining and
manufacturing, the calculated elasticity is 0.29; and, for hotels, restaurants and
wholesale & retail trade, the value is also 0.29. These results imply that any
expansion in foreign investment in those sectors cause their production level to
rise. The response of GDP to FDI is obtained from vector error correction171
(VEC) with 4 quarters lags estimation between the two series17. The response
function shows that a 10% increase shock to FDI in the first period causes the
GDP to rise by 0.4% in the second quarter. This is then accompanied by a
cumulative growth of 1.0% after 12 quarters, i.e., three years.
4.2.2 Impact of Capital Flows on Exchange Rate
Capital inflows are linked with the real appreciations of exchange rate. On
the one side, capital inflows may be motivated by the anticipation of real
appreciations and, on the other side, inflows support the real appreciation18. The
simple correlation coefficient between net capital flows and the real effective
exchange rate is 0.54. This result indicates that the relationship between these
variables is positive and capital inflows may lead to appreciations of REER.
The Granger causality test19 with one lag shows that the hypothesis that net
capital flows do not cause an appreciation in the REER can be rejected at the
significance level of 10%. The test result indicates a permanent effect of capital
account shock upon the REER.
4.2.3 Impact of Capital Flows on Foreign Exchange Reserves and
    Money Supply
Depending on the exchange rate regime, capital inflows can be either
international reserves’ accumulation or a current account deficit20. The current
account balance had surplus from third quarter of 2004 to second quarter of
2007. The sharp increase in foreign exchange reserves is parallel with the current
account surplus, suggesting absorption of foreign currency inflows by the BOM.
In addition, the increase in gold prices in the world market strongly affected the
foreign exchange reserves. The stock of net international reserves was US$1.04
billion in March 2007, represents an increase 154% over January 2006. But the
trade balance deficit has started increasing since April 2007, reaching a deficit
________________
17. Both GDP and FDI to be I(1) process and both series are also co-integrated at significance
level of 5%.
18. Lipschitz. L, Lane. T, Mourmouras. A (2002).
19. The test is used in the Kohli, R. (2001), “Capital Flows and Their Macroeconomic Effects
in India”, IMF.
20. If the exchange rate regime is fixed and the central bank intervenes to counter appreciation
pressures, then capital inflows would be visible in increase in foreign exchange reserves. If there
is no intervention by central bank, then the net increase in capital assets via capital inflows
would be associated with a similar increase in imports and therefore a widening current account
deficit.172
of US$706.1 million in July 2008. Due to the increase of this deficit, foreign
exchange reserves have declined.
Net capital flows affect domestic money supply through accumulation of
net foreign currency assets (NFA)21. The correlation coefficient (0.45) shows
that a positive relationship between money supply and net capital flows exists
in the economy.
The Granger causality test with three lags shows that the hypothesis that
net capital flows do not cause money supply can be rejected at the significance
level of 10%. This result may be consistent with reality. The high growth of
money supply in the last three years is fueled by the growth of net foreign
currency assets. During this time, the average annual growth of NFA increased
by 69.7% and it pushed the average annual growth of money supply to 41.9%.
These results confirm that money and credit growth are rapidly growing, owing
to the substantial capital inflows in the recent years. In other words, increases
in capital inflows intermediated through the banking system have been supporting
a strong growth of banking sector credit, leading to economic overheating,
jeopardising stability and creating inflationary pressures.
4.2.4 Response of Monetary and Financial Variables to Capital Inflows
Figure 11 presents the impulse response functions (IRFs) for monetary and
financial variables to one standard deviation innovation in the capital inflows.
These IRFs are calculated from the SVAR model22 used in analysis of
determinants of capital inflows.
The positive reaction of GDP to one standard deviation impulse of capital
inflows start from same period, reaches its peak after three quarters. The response
of GDP to capital inflows is significantly different from zero at the significance
level of 5% for first five quarters. With respect to inflation, it takes a major
positive effect for first three quarters and reaches its peak level after two
quarters.
________________
21. If the central bank intervenes to maintain a fixed exchange rate, then an accumulation of
international reserves represent an increase in the net foreign exchange assets of the central
bank and directly affects the monetary base.
22. The SVAR model was identified by orthogonalising the variance-covariance matrix of the
residuals of the equations using the Cholesky decomposition. In performing the decomposition,
the causal ordering , , , , , , was used. Where is a logarithm of terms of trade, is nominal
international interest rate (LINOR3M rate), is nominal domestic interest rate (monetary policy
rate), is logarithm of real effective exchange rate, is logarithm of real GDP, is annual inflation
rate, is logarithm of capital inflows.173
The positive reaction of GDP to one standard deviation impulse of capital
inflows start from same period, reaches its peak after three quarters. The response
of GDP to capital inflows is significantly different from zero at the significance
level of 5% for first five quarters. With respect to inflation, it takes a major
positive effect for first three quarters and reaches its peak level after two
quarters. The impact of capital inflows leads to appreciation in the REER. This
effect start after one quarter, reaches its peak after two quarters. The response
is different from zero at the significance level of 5% for first three quarters.
These impulse responses confirm that the key macroeconomic indicators have
strongly affected by large capital inflows in the recent years.
Figure 11




23. The point estimates of responses are shown as solid lines; dashed lines display a two standard
deviation confidence interval.
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4.3 Monetary Policy Reactions to Deal with Capital Flows
It has been observed that large capital inflows often give rise to increases
in money supply and domestic liquidity, appreciation of both nominal and real
exchange rates, and acceleration in asset prices. Hence, a country experiencing
excessive capital inflows usually has to face the challenges of inflationary
pressures, loss of a competitive exchange rate and misallocation of capital into
unproductive projects24.
In the Mongolian economy, it is clear from Figure 4, the monetary aggregates
have been growing since 1999. Indeed, over the last eight years, the year-on-
year (y-o-y) monetary growth rates have exceeded the y-o-y nominal GDP
growth, which has averaged 21.5% only over the same period. Turning to the
exchange rates, we see that the Mongolian REER exhibited an upward trend
since 2003 (Figure 3). However, depreciation in the NEER is discernible in the
recent period, reflecting a return of the Mongolian Tögrög (domestic currency)
to a depreciation path against its major trading partners. By comparison, the
REER continued its appreciation path, reflecting relatively high inflation until the
most recent period. Correspondingly, Figure 2 shows that the consumer price
inflation stayed at a relatively high level.
In recent years, the sharp increases in monetary aggregates associated with
the current account surplus, fiscal expansion and rise in capital inflows. The
BOM is concerned to see the credits and monetary aggregates rising rapidly.
The issue of concern is that the rise in money supply will fuel inflation25. This
fear led the BOM to engage in sterilisation policies through the open market
sale of central bank bill and increases in monetary policy rate.  Increases in the
reserve requirements were also used to reduce liquidity during the monetary
aggregates surge26. This sterilisation effort was particularly intensive since 2007.
In 2007, the BOM updated its regulations on CBB auction and statutory
reserve requirement and announced one-week CBB rate as its policy rate. The
policy rate shall apply to one-week CBB rate. The BOM has been conducting
the one-week CBB auctions as fixed rate tender with preannounced full
allotments, and for longer maturity CBB auctions as variable rate tender with
________________
24. Calvo, G.A, Leiderman. L, Reinhart. M.C., (1996).
25. Fear of inflation often leads central banks to try to sterilise the increase in money supply
through open market operations.
26. Theoretical model of sterilisation of capital inflows through the banking sectors (increase in
reserve requirement) is postulated in Mark M. Spiegel (1995).175
preannounced allotment volume. By making all those changes, the BOM is able
to realise all the advantages in announcing the real and true interest rate to
market and use its monetary policy instruments efficiently.
Due to the high growth of credits and monetary aggregates and the tendency
of inflation to increase continuously, the BOM increased its monetary policy
rate to 10.25% in September 2008, bringing the cumulative increase since July
2007 to 3.85 percentage points. Furthermore, the BOM raised its reserve
requirements by 0.5 percentage points to 5.5% from January 2008. As a result,
by August of 2008, the amounts of reserve requirements of commercial banks
increased by 7.8–8.6 billion Tögrög. Excess reserve of interbank market stood
at 81.1 billion Tögrög in June 2006. As a result of raising the monetary policy
rate and the increases in reserve requirement, the excess reserve of the interbank
market has decreased and reached its lowest level of 9.3 billion tugrug in August
2008. Also owing to these policy changes, the weighted average of central bank
bill rate and interbank market rate has continuously increased to 14.41% in August
200827. As a result, the domestic currency loan rate increased to 21.8% and the
foreign currency loan rate to 15.2% in August 2008.
As a result of the sterilisation policy, the growth of credits and money
aggregates has started to decelarate since first quarter of 2008. The BOM
expects this deceleration of credits and monetary aggregates to drive down
inflation in the mid-term. But there were no signs of fiscal tightening as a reaction
to the high credit growth (related with large capital inflows) and high inflation
in past two years. Thus, the BOM aims to improve the conduct of monetary
and fiscal policy (credible and consistent macroeconomic policy mix).
5. Capital Flows and Financial Stability
5.1 Capital Flows in Banking Sector
Capital flows in the economy and banking sector are shown in the Table
5. The total capital inflows, excluding currency and deposits in the banking sector,
rose 6.65 times from US$30 million in 2006 to US$199.6 million in 2007. The
increase was provided by the joint growth of short-term (less than one year)
and long-term capital inflows. Namely, the short-term capital inflows in banking
sector was increased three fold, as the Trade Development Bank (a large
commercial bank in Mongolia) issued US$ 75 million senior unsecured bond in
________________
27. In most cases, the domestic short-term interest rates rose when sterilisation began, suggesting
that this policy had an impact, at least in the short run.176
the international capital market. Furthermore, the long-term capital inflows in
the banking sector rose by US$109.3 million, owing to the high differential interest
rate and high demand for long-term foreign funds of commercial bank. Figure
16 also provides some information about the changing maturity of capital flows.
The maturity profile of capital inflows in the banking sector has changed where
45.2% of the capital inflows are now short-term.
The rise of the capital outflows is similar with the increase in capital inflows
in the banking sector. But the increase in the capital outflows in the banking
sector has been fully accounted by the short-term capital outflows. In other
words, the short-term capital outflows in the banking sector generally exceeded
the long-term capital outflows where over 96% of the total capital outflows in
December 2007 were in one year.
Source: The Bank of Mongolia Balance of Payment. * denotes capital flows excluding currency
and deposits in the banking sector28.
________________
28. In the Mongolian case, items of currency and deposit in balance of payment statistics are not
classified.177
Figure 16 also indicates that the capital flows of the economy are
concentrated in the monetary authority and general government rather than the
banking sector and non-bank private sector. But capital inflows to the banking
sector constituted 23% of the total capital inflows in 2007.
The capital inflows in the banking sector are expected to rise in the immediate
future, since commercial banks are starting to issue their own bond in the
international capital market and financial investment is increasing enormously in
the commercial banks.
5.2 Impact of Capital Flows on Financial Stability
Although large increases in financial flows can be handled by the financial
system,  flows of significant magnitude may risk the safety of the banking system.
In addition, the real exchange rate appreciation that often accompany these
capital inflows can lead to undesirable resource reallocation, particularly if the
reallocation of resources motivated by the capital inflow surge is likely to be
temporary. Financial development is important for financial intermediation and
the efficient allocation of capital. It is clearly a crucial element to the overall
economic development of emerging capital markets.
The Mongolian financial system is developing and performing well, in line
with the economy as a whole, but faces a number of challenges. There are
signs that the economy is overheating and the country’s dependence on a
relatively narrow range of commodity exports and the rapid credit growth are
sources of risk. The y-o-y credit growth has been high, annual average growth
is 58.6% in the last six years (Figure 4). The rapid credit growth fueled by the
capital inflows29 has also given rise to potential risks to financial sector stability.
Some deterioration in the lending standards has been observed as banks compete
for market shares30. The Granger causality test indicates that the faster credit
growth leads to higher non-performing loans31 after six to nine months.
Furthermore, the negative real interest rates due to relatively high inflation, which,
in turn, contribute to the real estate boom and rapid growth, have caused the
risks to financial stability.
________________
29. Also the rapid credit growth thus seems to reflect to a large extent financial sector deepening.
30. Large inflows can lead to unsound credit allocation.
31. An increase in loan growth is likely to lead to higher loan losses only if the source of the
faster credit growth is a shift in the supply of bank credit.178
The price of securities has risen rapidly since the first quarter of 2007 in
tandem with the increase in market capitalisation of the local securities market.
The price of securities and the market capitalisation increased by 3.7 times and
4.4 times, respectively, between the first quarter of 2007 and second quarter of
2008.  A similar surge in housing prices saw a 2.8-fold increase between the
fourth quarter of 2005 and second quarter of 2008, due to the growth of mortgage
loan and prices of raw construction material. In other words, the increases in
securities and housing prices have been fueled by capital inflows and rapid credit
creation.
The stress tests undertaken by the FSAP team of the IMF and the World
Bank (September 2008) indicate that the surge in capital inflows32 would decrease
the aggregate capital adequacy ratio (CAR) by 2.7 percentage points from the
baseline CAR (15.2%). Also, the hypothesised substantial increase in the NPL
ratio by 10 percentage points would take the aggregate capital adequacy ratio
to 9.8%. This indicator is lower than the baseline CAR by 5.4 percentage points.
Table 6
Selected Financial Soundness Indicators
(in percent)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 20.4 20.0 18.2 18.1 14.0
Return on Assets 3.1 2.5 2.2 2.7 2.5
Non-Performing Loan Ratio 4.8 6.4 5.8 4.9 3.3
Source: The Bank of Mongolia
As shown in Table 6, the Mongolian banking sector remained resilient in the
recent years, with positive developments recorded in all key financial soundness
indicators. Due to increased investments and activity in the banking sector and
instruments, the non-performing loans are continuing to trend downwards and
profitability is improving.
________________
32. Under this scenario, it was assumed that substantial trade and capital inflows result in an
appreciation of the Tögrög by 20%, and intensified inflationary pressures, leading to a moderate
slowdown in the performance of all tradable and non-tradable sectors. Interest rates were
assumed to remain at the current levels.179
5.3 Central Bank Policy Reactions Related to Capital Flows and Financial
Stability
The financial sector in Mongolia consists mainly of banks, which hold about
95% of assets in the financial sector. The BOM supervises banks to ensure the
stability of the financial sector, which is one of its main goals stated in the
Central Banking Law, within the framework of the related laws and regulations33.
As the role of the banking sector in the economy increases, it is vital to make
the supervisory framework more prudent and banks need to manage their risks
efficiently to improve corporate governance, and to adequately define their
strategic aims.
In recent years, the BOM subscribes to such strategic aims as improving
the quality and scope of financial intermediation, ensuring the stability of the
financial sector, preventing financial crises, enhancing the confidence of investors
and depositors in the banking sector, creating a favorable environment for banks,
protecting the interests of depositors and restraining illegal activities through
banks or other financial institutions.  All these aims are stated in the “Short-term
Strategy of Reform and Development of the Banking Sector”. As a result of
this policy implemented by the BOM to enhance stability and support the growth
of financial sector, the confidence of customers and depositors in the banking
sector has improved. The result of which led to an expansion of the scope of
banks’ operations and improvement in the profitability of banks.
The BOM has been refining its supervision policy and methods, such as
conducting assessments of the financial sector, improving corporate governance
and enhancing prudential regulation, as well as defining future direction and
preventing financial crises.
The current system of supervision of banks is carried out in accordance
with the common and accepted structure of international banking and financial
organisations, and the BOM has made adjustments in the sophistication of the
system. As the activities of the banking and financial organisations widen to
embrace the latest methods and technologies, as has happened in recent years,
banks face more risks. Therefore, to conduct supervision efficiently, the direction
of supervision based on regulations and rules was shifted to a risk-based analysis.
Thus, the supervision operations are focused on evaluating and measuring risk,
and encouraging customers’ oversight of banks. As of now, the BOM has been
harmonising its rules and regulations with international standards, especially those
________________
33. Improvements in prudential supervision and regulation have helped enhance the capacity to
absorb the inflows.180
of the Basel Committee.  Amendments to the “Prudential Ratios Regulation of
Banks” was approved on October 2007, because of the Basel Committee’s new
capital framework and mortgage market, which has been adopted in Mongolia.
Changes to the regulation include making market risk requirements more
compliant with international standards, making calculation of capital adequacy
more adequate, and lowering risk-weights of mortgage-backed securities issued
by the Mongolian Mortgage Corporation to support the development of a
secondary mortgage market.
At the request of the BOM, the IMF and the World Bank performed a
“Financial Sector Assessment Programme” in Mongolia. This programme
evaluates the current situation of the financial sector and the regulation framework,
and delivers recommendations for future work based on the “Core Principles
for Effective Banking Supervision” issued by the Basel Committee. According
to the report of the “Financial Sector Assessment Programme,” the performance
of the Mongolian financial sector is relatively good compared to those countries
which have the closest rate of social and economic development to Mongolia.
A “Financial Stability Council” was established consisting of the Governor
of the BOM, the Minister of Finance, and the Chairman of the Financial
Regulatory Commission. The council shall monitor the soundness and stability
of the financial system, informing the public of a potential financial crisis and,
in pertinent cases, work with the management of the financial institutions, provide
financial aid and oversee effective cooperation between them. In addition, the
“Financial Stability Report” had been constantly published since the third quarter
of 2008.
6. Conclusion
Capital inflows and outflows have increased significantly over the past five
years, starting from 2003. Much of the capital inflows have taken the form of
FDI – especially in mining and construction activities, which has created GDP
growth in the recent years. A common feature of changes in the composition
of the capital inflows has been an increased share of FDI and private debt, and
a decrease in the public debt.
The results of empirical analysis indicate that push and pull factors, including
improved macroeconomic performance with high economic growth, high interest
rate differentials, current account surplus, World real GDP growth, have led to
increases of capital inflows in the recent years. Whereas the high capital outflows
in the recent years have mostly been determined by internal factors, which are181
high domestic economic growth, domestic real interest rate and current account
to GDP ratio.
The large capital inflows in the recent years have contributed in promoting
economic growth and improving productivity and export performance, but the
inflows are starting to create some adverse consequences, including rapid
monetary expansion, accelerating inflation, appreciation of REER and a loss of
competitiveness and faster growth in securities and housing prices. The results
are shown by the some technical analysis. The rapid inflows also posed risks
to financial stability in terms of rapid growth of credit (credit risk), negative real
interest rates related with high inflation (market and liquidity risks), and
appreciation of domestic currency (currency risk). The results show that if the
large capital inflows continue, they may create potential risk of economic
overheating and financial instability. In the near future, capital inflows are expected
to increase massively due in light of the large mining projects and the
government’s intention to issue sovereign bond in the international financial
market. Thus, the policy makers are concerned how to sterilise the expected
impact of the surge in capital inflows. Unfortunately, the management of capital
flows is not an easy exercise and the policy maker’s efforts should focus on
reducing the risks and adverse consequences associated with the inflows, as
opposed to affecting the flows and their composition.
The following policies are recommended to avoid the adverse impact of
surge in capital inflows:
l Fiscal austerity, tightened monetary policy, enhanced bank supervision and
institutional improvements are the best responses to a capital-inflow episode.
l The BOM should continue tightening monetary policy (sterilisation policy)
because tightened monetary policy reduces economic overheating, excess
money and inflationary pressure. Also to avoid excess money and inflationary
pressure related to large capital inflows, the BOM need to engage in
sterilisation policies through the open market sale of CBB, monetary policy
rate, reserve requirement and capital requirement, and foreign exchange
intervention. But the policy makers should consider that while sterilisation
may provide some relief, it may also be quite costly to the central bank.
l The BOM may need to determine and formulate its foreign exchange rate
intervention strategies. Although increases in capital inflows will require a
careful mix of interest rate and intervention policies to avoid disorderly
exchange rate adjustments, while preserving the credible monetary policy.182
Furthermore, the exchange rates of Tögrög need to be protected from a
speculative attack depleting foreign exchange reserves.
l The Ministry of Finance should implement a tighter fiscal policy. Tightening
the fiscal stance helps to reduce the risk of economic overheating and inflation
pressure.  Fiscal policy and elimination of excessive fiscal incentives may
be the options for aggregate demand management.
l Deepening the financial markets and strengthening the financial system
supervision and regulation, where needed, would be the most effective ways
to deal with the risks associated with capital inflows. The rapid credit
growth34 and the rollover of loans could make it difficult for the BOM to
spot emerging problems in the banking sector. Thus, the authorities should
continue to upgrade the supervisory framework by improving the supervision
of liquidity and operational risks of banks, and continue to implement
structural policies for a sound financial sector, including prudential regulation
and supervision and improved risk management.
l Institutional improvements have helped strengthen the policy responses to
capital inflows. Other countries’ experiences show that instead of capital
controls, countries have been able to combine macroeconomic policy tools,
with efforts to develop the financial markets, closer monitoring of capital
flows, and adoption of various debt management measures and some indirect
intervention schemes. Thus, the authorities should aim to improve the conduct
of macroeconomic policies and policy tools.
l Promoting the development of the stock market, improving the financial
structure to cater for safe accommodation of capital flows and managing
risk related to them. A well developed and deeper stock market could promote
financial stability and help reduce the economy’s susceptibility to volatile
capital flows.
l The policy makers should consider capital controls on short-term capital
inflows, if the capital inflows are mostly of the “hot money” type. While
capital controls may work, at least in the very short run, it needs to be
considered that the introduction of restrictions to capital mobility may have
undesirable long-run effects.
________________
34. Beware of rapid credit growth during the inflow phase of the cycle. When capital flows out,
these loans may have to be repaid at short notice, leading to bankruptcies in the private non-
financial sector and, possibly, bank failures.183
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CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL




Capital flows have become increasingly important to the developing nations
for their economic growth. Governments of the developing nations are striving
to promote capital flows, especially foreign direct investment (FDI) from the
rest of the world. This is because not only does FDI involve transfers of tangible
and intangible assets, but it also confers many spill-over benefits to the host
countries, such as employment, development of human resources, transfer of
superior technology, and so forth. FDI, therefore, is invaluable for its contribution
to economic development and enhancement of the standard of living of the host
country.
Recognising capital flows as an importance source of external financing for
a long-term economic growth, the governments of many developing nations have
been taking measures to put in place an institutional framework as well as provide
a stable economic and financial environment that is conducive for investment to
attract FDI inflows. The measures include were privatisation schemes, trade
openness, attractive investment incentives, and so forth. Myanmar has been
strategising to promote FDI by structuring incentives to attract foreign investors
and entrepreneurs.
2. General Framework and Major Capital Flows Management Policies
2.1 Current Account and Capital Account Liberalisation
It is recognised that liberalisation of the various sectors, such as trade,
investment, and so forth, can facilitate the implementation of a country’s
development objectives. Following the adoption of a market-oriented economic
system in late 1988, Myanmar has been carrying out various institutional and
policy reforms, including financial liberalisation.  The Myanmar government
________________
1. Assistant Director, Foreign Exchange Department, Central Bank of Myanmar188
permitted the liberalisation of both current and capital accounts to ease the inflow
of financial resources.
The export and import of goods and services, investments, debt-service
payments, and private or public net remittances and transfers are classified under
the current account. Whereas private foreign direct investment (mostly by
multinational corporations), foreign loans by private international banks, and loans
and grants from foreign governments (as in the form of foreign aid) and
multilateral agencies, such as the IMF and the World Bank, are classified under
the capital account (Todaro & Smith, 2009, p.668, 669).
2.2 Policies Implemented to Manage Capital Flow
In late 1988, Myanmar converted its economic system from a centrally
planned economy to a market-oriented economy. The government subsequently
promulgated the Union of Myanmar Foreign Investment Law (FIL) on 30th
November, 1988. The policy objectives of this law are as follows:
(1) Promotion and expansion of exports;
(2) Exploitation of natural resources requiring heavy investment;
(3) Acquisition of high technology;
(4) Supporting and assisting capital-intensive production and services;
(5) Creation of  employment opportunities;
(6) Development of energy conserving activities; and
(7) Promotion of regional development.
To achieve the above objectives, the FIL provides for the following incentives:
(1) Exemption from income tax for up to three years;
(2) A reduction of up to 50% on income tax due on the investor’s produce
exported from Myanmar;
(3) Exemption from customs duty on capital goods imported as part of the
investment operations;
(4) Guarantee against nationalisation;
(5) Right to repatriate profits and investment capital; and
(6) Exemption from customs duty on capital goods imported as part of the
investment operations.189
A foreign investor is allowed to invest in Myanmar with 100% foreign capital
or a joint with any Myanmar partner from private sector or cooperative sector
or state sector. He has the right to enjoy appropriate economic benefits as well
as tax incentives. A foreign investor is, however, required to contribute a minimum
foreign equity of 35% of the total. The minimum amount of foreign capital is
US$ 500,000 for investment in manufacturing and US$ 300,000 in the services
sector. Land lease is also granted to the investors up to 30 years, and the lease
can be renewable after 30 years. Through the reduction of red-tape and
simplification of procedures in the registration of companies, production, trade,
finance, etc., the business environment has been significantly improved. The
Foreign Direct Investment Law offers a slew of incentives to the foreign investor
and it has managed to attract much foreign investment to Myanmar.
On the tax front, reforms have been implemented. Some of the major tax
reform measures include broadening of the tax base, adjustment or relaxation
of tax rates, granting of reasonable tax exemptions and relief, and simplification
of tax procedures. A flat corporate tax of 30% per annum is imposed on the
income of companies set up in Myanmar. Myanmar has signed bilateral tax
treaties with ASEAN countries and the U.K. Such tax reforms give important
support to the current account liberalisation drive. Myanmar’s commitment to
the AFTA also helps promote liberalisation of the current account. Tariff barriers
and non-tariff barriers have been eliminated as scheduled in accordance with
the ASEAN agenda of Capital Account Liberalisation.
3. Trends in Macroeconomic Indicators and Capital Flows
The growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) shrank from -1.1%
in 1986/87 to -11.4% in 1988/89. The deterioration of the economy affected
political stability, which led to a change of government and a change of economic
system.  Myanmar switched from a socialist, centrally planned economic system
to a market-oriented one in late 1988. The SLORC (State Law and Order
Restoration Council) initiated economic reforms, the main objectives of which
are to:
• Adopt a market-oriented system for the allocation of resources and the
distribution of goods and services;
• Encourage private investment and entrepreneurial activity at home; and
• Open up the economy to foreign direct investment and to promote export.190
The four economic objectives of the SLORC/SPDC, which were boldly
proclaimed on the front page of The New Light of Myanmar in 1996, are as
follows:
• Development of agriculture as the base as well as all-round development
of other sectors of the economy;
• Proper evolution of the market-oriented economic systems;
• Development of the economy inviting participation in terms of technical
know-how and investments from sources inside the country and abroad;
and
• Initiative to shape the national economy must be kept under the control of
the state and the national peoples.
The major economic reforms directly affecting the macroeconomy and the
external sector may be summarised as follows:
• Introduction of Foreign Investment Law: to enhance technical know-how
and investments in all sectors, except those reserved for the state;
• Fiscal reforms: taxation reforms to restructure the tax and tariff systems
and to streamline tax collection and customs procedures to be in line with
the market-oriented system and to tackle the problem of deficits; and stringent
scrutiny of government expenditures;
• Financial sector reforms: building of legal framework; restructuring the
financial sector; and allowing private sector participation in banking and
insurance;
• Legal system reforms: The combination of Common Law and Civil Law
Legal Systems, which Myanmar already had and kept intact during the past
twenty-five years before 1988, were reactivated with some new legal
injection and revocation of the Law of Establishment of Socialist  Economic
System;
• Tourism sector reforms: allowing private sector participation in hotels and
tourism business;
• Trade sector reforms: liberalisation of domestic and foreign trade, allowing
private sector participation in the business previously under the monopoly
of SEEs; resumption of Myanmar’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
regularisation of border trade; and
• Reforms of frontier areas administration: pacification and promotion of
development of minority races in frontier areas. (Myat Thein, 2004, pp.124
and 125.)
Basically, the purchase of the stocks (equity), bonds, certificates of deposits,
and commercial paper are related to portfolio investment. Capital flow as portfolio191
investment relies on the rate of return on those investments. (Todaro & Smith,
2009, p.725.) When domestic bonds or foreign bonds are invested, they depend
on the difference between the domestic interest rate and the foreign interest
rate. (Blanchard, 2003, p.389.)
Scholars have conducted a number of empirical studies regarding the variables
which determine the influx of capital into recipient countries from abroad. The
GDP growth rate, inflation, saving and lending interest rates, exchange rates,
stock price index, current account balance, foreign reserves and overall BOP
are considered the key macroeconomic indicators in determining the capital flows
into nations.
3.1 Gross Domestic Product
As a result of the above-mentioned reform measures, Myanmar’s GDP
improved between 1989 and 2007, except negative growth in 1991/92. The
government emphasised on stabilisation and national consolidation and
implemented stabilisation programmes to revitalise the economy during the three-
year period from 1989/90 to 1991/92.  The economy began to turn around and
accounted for a growth rate of 5.9% during the three-year period.
Figure 1
Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product
With stability restored, the Short Term Four-Year Plan (1992/93 to 1995/96)
was launched with a target growth rate of 5.1% annually. The government
successfully carried out the Short Term Four-Year Plan achieving an average
annual GDP growth rate of 7.5%.  Per capita income also increased to K 13,515
from K 4,496.
Source: Statistical Yearbook, Central Statistical Organisation,
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development192
The above Plan was followed by the Second Short Term Five-Year Plan
(1996/97 to 2000/2001). It was launched with a target GDP growth rate of 6%
annually and achieved GDP growth on average of 8.5% annually. In addition,
per capita income rose sharply from K 13,515 in 1995/96 to K 50,927 in 2000/
01. It can be said that the economy could expand 1.5 times. During that period,
the average annual growth rate of agriculture sector, industry sector and service
sector was 7.3%, 11.4% and 8.5%, respectively.
After accomplishing the Second Short Term Five-Year Plan, the Third Short
Term Five-Year Plan (2001/02 to 2005/06) was implemented with the target
average annual growth rate of 11.3%.  Because of the favourable performance
of the economy  during the plan period, the average annual growth rate of GDP
was 12.8%. The economy increased 1.83 times, and per capita income also
reached to K 221,217 in 2005/06. Similarly, agriculture sector increased to 9.8%
while industry sector rose to 23.5%.
Overall, the economic performance of Myanmar can be said to have improved
to some extent during the period of 1989 and 2006/07.
3.2 Inflation
According to the official statistics, the inflation rate continuously fluctuated
during the period from 1985/86 to 2006/07, generally hovering between 20% to
30%  per annum during this period. In 2002/03, the inflation rate exceeded 50%.
It gradually fell after 2002/03, and declined to 3.76% in 2004/05. Inflation reared
up again, and increased to 26.07% in 2006/07.
Figure 2
Inflation Rate
Source: Statistical Yearbook, Central Statistical Organisation,
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development193
Myanmar faced budgetary deficits and increases in money supply. In addition,
the over-bidding of agricultural export product, over-building of certain
infrastructural facilities, and depreciation of the kyat in the parallel foreign
exchange market  were also contributory factors to the inflationary process.
The depreciation of the kyat caused the prices of imported intermediate
goods used as inputs in the production process to increase. On the one hand,
the large budget deficits financed by money creation contributed to “demand-
pull” inflation, which in turn fuelled rising prices. On the other hand, the “cost-
push” factors, such as the price hike of electricity, the rising cost of transportation
and the decline in the production of some essential commodities, have raised the
cost of doing business, and this was reflected in price increases.
Innumerable forms of local taxes, municipal taxes, wheel taxes, toll charges,
and so forth, escalated transportation cost all over the country. The rising cost
of transportation and the electricity price increase from 2.50 kyat/kwh to 25
kyat/ kwh in March 1999 caused the prices of essential goods to rise.
Apart from this, the prices of some food items increased due to excess
demand as their production lag far behind the population growth in recent years.
For instance, the production of beef between 1995/96 and 1998/99 was lower
the level needed to sustain the population growth rate, which is 2%.
Inflation reduces the purchasing power of fixed-income earners, which in
turn, lead to cost-push inflation. This is because the wage earners who are
affected, generally, are striving to earn income from other sources in order to
spend more.
3.3 Exchange Rate
Myanmar is a country using a fixed exchange rate system.  Under this
foreign exchange regime, Myanmar’s currency unit the “kyat” is pegged to
special drawing rights (SDRs) at 8.5087 kyat = SDR 1. After changing a market-
oriented policy, Myanmar has experienced many transformations. In actuality, it
can be described that Myanmar has a two-tiered or even a multi-layered exchange
rate system.
In February 1993, the government of Myanmar introduced foreign exchange
certificates (FECs) to facilitate the convenience of foreigners visiting Myanmar.
Under this scheme, both local and foreign entrepreneurs were conducting their194
businesses based on the parallel exchange rates, which reflect the true market
value of the kyat. Thirty foreign-exchange dealers and ten semi-government
and private banks were permitted to engage in foreign exchange transactions,
thus making the FECs popular.
Myat Thein (2004, pp.141and142) states that the government intends to
gradually re-align the kyat value in line with the free market equilibrium rates
as businesses conduct their transactions with FECs more and more. However,
due to the depreciation of the kyat, the government revoked the licenses of
seven foreign exchange dealers and nine banks. On the other hand, the lack of
confidence in the local currency also affected people’s willingness to save or
deposit money in the banks. The large difference in the two-tier exchange rate,
i.e., the official versus unofficial rates, is a major obstacle to national saving.
Figure 3
Official Exchange Rate
Source: Statistical Yearbook, Central Statistical Organisation,
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development
According to the available statistics, the exchange rate between the foreign
exchange certificate and the Myanmar currency unit “kyat” during the period
of 1998/99 and 2006/07 is shown in Figure 4. Looking at the exchange rate
between the FEC and the kyat, the equivalent of 1 FEC was around 500 kyat
during the period of 1998/99 and 2000/01. In the following years, the exchange
rate was between 800 kyat/FEC and nearly 1400 kyat/FEC. It can be seen that
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Figure 4
Changes in the Rate of Foreign Exchange Certificate (FEC)196
3.4 Foreign Direct Investment
Figure 5 shows the pattern FDI inflows into the Myanmar for the period
from its conversion to a market-oriented economy to 2006/07.
There was significant fluctuation in the inflows of direct foreign investment
into Myanmar, as can be seen in Figure 5. The volume of FDI inflow into the
country had dropped almost continuously after 1997 up to 2004/05. However,
the volume of direct foreign investment inflows, increased sharply in 2005/06,
totalling $ 6065.675 million, because of an increase in investment in the power
generation sector. In 2006/07, the inflow of foreign direct investment into country
fell again, and accounted for $752.7 million.
Source: Central Bank of Myanmar197
Figure 5
Pattern of the Inflow of FDI
Source: Statistical Yearbook, Central Statistical Organisation,
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development
Source: Statistical Yearbook, Central Statistical Organsation, Ministry of National   Planning
and Economic Development
Note:  Agri – Agriculture, O & G – Oil and Gas, Manu – Manufacturing, Trans – Transport,
H & T – Hotel and Tourism, R E D – Real Estate Development, I E – Industrial Estate, Const
– Construction198
The distribution of FDI inflows by sector during the period of 1989/90 and
2006/07 is presented in Table 1. The power sector received the biggest share
of FDI, and the oil and gas sector was the second largest recipient of FDI. The
manufacturing sector was the third largest recipient of FDI.  The hotel and
tourism sector became important as it received the fourth largest amount of
direct investment from abroad. The influx of foreign direct investment into the
agricultural sector was very low compared to the other sectors. It can be seen
from the statistics that the FDI did not flow into the sectors regularly and
consistently. For instance, although the power sector is the largest recipient of
FDI till now, the inflow of foreign direct investment into that sector started only
in 2005/06.
As have been stated, the government has taken the necessary measures to
attract foreign and local investors to do business in Myanmar. Nevertheless,
some risks and issues remain in regard to the investment environment, notably,
the economic sanctions imposed by some advanced countries; government budget
deficit due to implementation of infrastructure development and reforms financed
mainly from our resources; absence of international assistance for more than
two decades; inflation and low investor confidence; the overvalued exchange
rate; lack of access to credit and foreign exchange; restrictions affecting business
in specific sectors; and incomplete infrastructure.
With regard to the macroeconomic environment, although Myanmar has
achieved GDP growth, there is still room for improvement. The widening rate
gap between the official and unofficial exchange rates and the existing exchange
controls are impediments in creation of a sound and adequate payment system
in attracting massive foreign capital flows. The situation calls for the unification
of exchange rates and further liberalisation of the foreign exchange market.
Delay in exchange rate reform is an obstacle in inducing FDI inflows.  The
development of a well-functioning financial and capital market is a key to
liberalisation and growth of the economy.
4. Capital Flows, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability
Portfolio flows are potentially beneficial in raising capital for the local firms.
In attracting portfolio flows into the host countries, the local stock and bond
markets need to be developed. Additionally, the recipient countries need to step
up the liberalisation of the domestic financial markets and open up these markets
to foreign investors.199
Following the conversion  of Myanmar  to a market-oriented economy in
the late  1988,  the government of Myanmar promulgated the following laws to
liberalise the financial system:
(1) The Foreign Investment Law, 1988;
(2) The Central Bank of Myanmar Law, 1990;
(3) The Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law, 1990;
(4) The Myanmar Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Law, 1990;
(5) The New Savings Bank Law, 1993; and
(6) The Myanmar Insurance Law, 1993.
The financial sector consists of the banking sector and non-bank sector.
The banking sector includes the following:
• The Central Bank of Myanmar
• State-owned Banks, namely:
(a)  Myanma Foreign Trade Bank
(b)  Myanma Agricultural and Development Bank
(c)  Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank
(d)  Myanma Economic Bank (with 350 branches)
• 20 Domestic private banks (with 219 branches)
• 28 Representative offices of foreign banks
• Myanmar Securities Exchange Centre Co., Ltd.
The non-bank sector includes:
• Myanma Insurance Corporation
• Myanma Small Loans Enterprise
• Japanese Insurance Representative Offices
• Myanmar Oriental Leasing
Under the Central Bank of Myanmar Law, 1990, the Central Bank of
Myanmar is empowered to carry out these functions:
• Advising the government on economic development policies and plans
and the State Budget;
• Formulating and implementing monetary policy;
• Regulating the financial system;
• Implementing exchange rate policy and controlling foreign exchange
transactions; and
• Managing the international reserves.200
While Myanmar receives FDI from abroad, it does not receive any portfolio
investment inflow. This is because the capital market is underdeveloped in
Myanmar, but its development is in progress. Portfolio flows, theoretically, depends
on the development of local stock and bond markets.
The function of a capital market is for transacting of purchase and sale of
long-term loanable funds in the form of bonds, stock, long-term securities,
mortgages, treasury notes, obligations of state and local governments, corporate
bonds and corporate stock. The development of the capital market, therefore,
is essential for portfolio inflows.
After adopting a market oriented economic system in late 1988, the
government of Myanmar undertook various fiscal and monetary reform measures.
In addition, the Central Bank of Myanmar and the Sung Hung Kai Fund
Management Ltd., Hong Kong, jointly conducted a symposium in Yangon in
1990 on the development of a capital market, and mooted these justifications for
the establishment of a stock market:
(1) The increasing numbers of limited companies, the establishment of joint-
ventures between the government and the private sector, and the
growing amount of tradable shares favored the creation of an efficient
stock market.
(2) Myanmar has a potential source of investment funds for the functioning
of a stock market because it was estimated that a large part of savings
was in the hands of individuals.
(3) The Myanmar Company Act, which was enacted on 1st April 1914,
provides an adequate legal framework for the establishment and
operation of business entities in a free enterprise economy. The Act
includes the definition of the meaning and nature of shares, provision
for shares which are negotiable and tradable, and recognition of the
rights of shareholders.
Under the Myanmar Companies Act, the establishment of two types of
companies is provided for, namely, public and private companies.
Based on these justifications, the symposium recommended the formation
of a high-level steering committee to draft the Securities and Exchange Law,
and rules and regulations for the establishment of a stock market.201
To facilitate the development of a capital market, the Daiwa Institute of
Research Ltd., Japan, and the Myanmar Economic Bank, a state-owned bank
with the largest national banking network, established the Myanmar Securities
Exchange Centre Co., Ltd. (MSEC) in June, 1996. The MSEC was set up as
a joint-venture on 50-50 basis, with an authorised capital of US$ 17 million, and
a paid-up capital of US$ 3.4 million.
In Myanmar, the MSEC is the first and only securities company, which is
authorised by the government, to create a securities market and establish a
stock exchange in Yangon. The aim of the MSEC is to help promote the national
economy by mobilising long-term funds for the expansion and modernisation of
businesses, launching of new business start-ups, support of the privatisation of
state-owned enterprises, and provision of new methods of savings to the general
public in developing the economy.
The following are the functions of the MSEC:
(1) Assisting companies going public;
(2) Brokering, dealing, and underwriting securities;
(3) Making research on the national economy and companies;
(4) Publishing investment information;
(5) Providing investment consultancy services;
(6) Managing venture capital funds and acting as an agent for joint ventures;
and
(7) Selling to investors Myanmar Treasury Bonds as an agent of the Central
Bank of Myanmar, and shares of Myanmar companies as an agent of
those companies. (Yin Yin Mya, 2000, p.62.)
A sound regulatory framework with the appropriate laws, rules and regulations
should be set up in order to create the securities market in Myanmar and protect
market participants in the securities market. The MSEC was mainly responsible
for drafting the proposed laws regulating the securities and exchange market
because it was the first and only securities company in Myanmar.  In early
1995, the Daiwa Institute of Research, Ltd. (DIR) presented a draft of the laws
to the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, and extensive
discussions were held between with the senior officers of the Ministry of National
Planning and Economic Development, the Ministry of Finance and Revenue and
the DIR. After three and half years of discussions with senior officers of the
Central Bank, the MEB, the MESC and the Attorney General’s office, the final
completed draft was submitted to the Cabinet.202
Myanmar encountered many major problems in the establishment of a capital
market. Yin Yin Mya (2000, p.65) highlighted some of them:
Ø Lack of public knowledge concerning the securities and stock market.
Ø Reluctance of business owners to widen their ownership.
Ø Inadequate infrastructure, including electricity supply,
telecommunications system, electronic data processing system, and so
forth.
Ø Insufficient regulatory and incentive aspects of the stock exchange.
Ø Lack of skilful intermediaries, such as brokers and fund managers.
Ø Shortage of technical and professional skills, such as qualified accounting
professionals, auditing firms and financial analysts.
Ø Insufficient supply of stocks and low market capitalisation.
Ø Inflation.
Ø Interest rates which do not provide adequately for the risk in lending
Ø Exchange control and unrealistic official exchange rate.
Ø Imposition high tax and levy of stamp duty on shares trading.
The financial sector is in need of more reforms. To tackle the said issues,
the government should take measures to combat inflation and maintain
macroeconomic stability. Appropriate policies to promote productivity and
production should be implemented to reduce inflation. The measures that can be
adopted include the employment of better technology in industries, promotion of
investment in the economy, reduction of tax rates, provision of easier access to
markets, transparent business procedures, and availability of market information
to the economic players without discrimination. Moreover, a contractionary
monetary policy will help in slowing down inflation.
As overvalued exchange rate makes domestic products less competitive
and reduces exports, it would cause balance of payment problems, and this will
not help the economy. The exchange rate policy, therefore, should be flexible
according to the domestic and international conditions.
5. Conclusion
This paper focuses on the capital flows and the implications for Central
Bank policies. According to this study, it is found that Myanmar receives inflows
of foreign direct investment from abroad following its transformation into a
market-oriented economy in late 1988. However, it does not receive any inflows
of portfolio investment.203
Regarding the policy implications, the foreign exchange control measures of
the Central Bank of Myanmar have been used as the major instrument for
capital inflow management policies. Import controls were also used, especially
in the real estate sector. There is not much to say about the policies regarding
the management of capital outflows, since Myanmar does not have an organised
capital market in the country. However, those who keep foreign currency accounts
with Myanmar banks must get prior approval from the Central Bank of Myanmar
when the deposit money is to be taken out.
Myanmar has not yet developed its financial system that is strong enough
to withstand the instability that would result from the liberalisation of the capital
account. It is necessary for the country to gradually build up and strengthen its
financial system with sound macroeconomic policies in order for Myanmar to
withstand external shocks. We have so far not experienced any large capital
outflows or inflows because of our strict exchange controls. If we should dismantle
our exchange controls, short-term capital flows are bound to create instability
in the economy. We will need to deploy the appropriate monetary, fiscal and
exchange-rate policies to achieve macroeconomic stability, if Myanmar is to
benefit from the liberalisation of its capital account.
The fact remains, Myanmar welcomes foreign investment for its economic
development and has been continuing its sincere cooperation with the regional
and international community in pursuit of this end.204
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Chapter 7
CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL




Nepal started its development process only after the new political regime
of 1950. The country initiated measures to develop its economy with the
introduction of its first five-year plan in 1956. This was followed by a number
of planned development efforts. The country today is in its eleventh plan (The
Three-Year Interim Development Plan of 2007/08-2009/10).
Nepal has been experiencing a relatively low GDP growth of about 3% per
annum during the period of 1960-2000. While the GDP growth averaged about
2.5% per annum during 1960s and 1970s, it increased to about 5 % per annum
during the 1980s and 1990s. From the macroeconomic perspective, one can
presume that Nepalese economy has neither experienced a recession nor a boom
during the last four decades. The GDP growth in the year 2000 and onwards
has exhibited an upward slopping trend.
The Nepalese economic growth was expected to rebound in the fiscal year
2007/08. A growth of 5.6% at basic price is estimated for this fiscal year. This
has mainly come from the agricultural sector that accounts for 32% of the GDP.
________________
1. Assistant Director, Nepal Rastra Bank, Research Department.206
1.1 Macroeconomic Situation
The highest GDP growth of 7.6 % was experienced in 1994 whereas the
rate stood at 0.2 % in FY 2001/02. In FY 2007/08, the GDP growth rate was
at 4.7 % in producer price and 5.6% in basic price. A highest level of growth
of the agricultural sector contributed to this level of economic growth.
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal.
Figure 1
GDP Growth Rate in Producer Price
Nepal experienced a galloping rate of inflation at 21.1% in FY 1991/92. The
lowest inflation of 2.4% was experienced in FY 2000/01. In the FY 2007/08, the
annual average Consumer Price Index (CPI) was 7.5% whereas the annual
________________
2. FISIM stands for Financial Intermediaries Service Indirectly Measured.207
growth rate of the CPI was recorded at 12.1%. The price increase in crude oil
and other raw materials in the international market contributed to such higher
growth rate of the CPI.
Figure 2
Annual Average Inflation
Because of the higher inflation rate, the gap between the nominal and real
interest rate widened especially in year FY 1986/87, and in FY 1992/93. Because
of the lower nominal interest rate and higher inflation rate, the real interest rate
remained negative in various years.
Figure 3
Nominal and Real Interest Rate208
In the following figure, the exchange rate of US$ to Nepalese Rupee is
presented. The highest rate of 77.8 (1 US$ = Rs. 77.8, annual average) was
experienced in FY 2002/03. After FY 2002/03 the rate is moderately low by the
end of FY 2007/08. Such fluctuations of exchange rate of Nepalese currency
with the US dollar could have occurred because of the revaluation or devaluation
of Indian currency because the Nepalese currency is pegged to Indian Rupee.
Figure 4
Exchange Rate with USD
Figure 5
Stock Price Index
Nepal lacked a secondary market for capital-market instruments in the past.
In February 1994, the Nepal Stock Exchange was established to facilitate the
secondary market for long-term financial market instruments.  In the following
figure, the trend of the stock price index is presented from 1994 onward. The
Nepalese Stock Price Index (NEPSE) reached to 930.7 in July 2008 from 683.9
in July 2007.209
1.2 Foreign Exchange Policy
As the central bank of Nepal, the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) is responsible
for the formulation of the foreign exchange policy of the country. Since its
establishment in 1956, the bank has been adopting a significantly different
methodology in case of exchange rates of convertible currencies. The NRB
started to buy and sell the convertible currencies from 1960, four years after
its establishment (Adhikary). The bank subsequently decided to adopt the policy
of current account convertibility.
There were two different phases in the process of current account
convertibility in the country. The First Phase was the partial convertibility of
current account and the Second Phase was the full convertibility of such account.
In order to facilitate trade and promote export, “partial convertibility” policy of
current account was adopted in 1992 allowing the exchange rate of convertible
currencies to be determined by the market forces. In this system, the market
rate was applicable to 65% of export earnings in the beginning and subsequently
it was increased to 75%.
Nepalese Rupee was made fully convertible for the current account
transactions in 1993. Under this policy, all the foreign currency proceeds were
permitted to be converted at market rates. Exporters were permitted to retain
100% of their earnings in their foreign currency accounts and foreign exchange
facility for a large number of items was easily made available.
Even though the current account is made fully convertible, the country has
not yet adopted the capital account convertible policy. It is obvious that the
nature of such convertible policies affect the capital inflow of the country. The
official record of FDI flow to Nepal is from 1951. Foreign investors are protected
by law in repatriating their profits to their home foreign countries in foreign
currencies according to their need. These activities can be marked as a partial
convertibility of capital account. Moreover, the government is currently planning
to issue a new policy for Nepali citizens which will facilitate the people in making
investment in the foreign capital market. If such a step is taken, it will be a
significant achievement towards the full capital account convertibility.
2. Major Capital Flow Management Policy
Policies and institutional frameworks are necessary for making the economy
more competitive. Basically, the laws and policies that govern capital flows in
Nepal are as follows:210
2.1 Foreign Direct Investment Policy, 1992
Even though Nepal was receiving FDI since 1951, there was an absence
of FDI-related laws and policies in the past. In 1992, the Foreign Direct
Investment Policy was promulgated with the sole objective of providing a sound
environment for FDIs. This policy also aimed at streamlining the investment
procedures and encouraging foreign investment.
2.2 Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act, 1992
The country’s investment mechanism is laid out in the Foreign Investment
and Technology Transfer Act, 1992. This legislation was enacted to attract
technology transfer and foreign investment. According to the Act, foreign
investment implies the investment made by a foreign investor in any industry as
investment in share (equity), reinvestment of the earnings derived from the
investment in share (equity) and investment made in the form of loan facilities.
The Act stipulates that the industries set up with foreign investment are also
entitled to enjoy all facilities and incentives. Permission is given to the foreign
investors to repatriate the following income outside the country:
a) amount procured from the sale of share of foreign investment as a whole
or any part thereof;
b) amount procured as profit or dividend in place of such investment;
c) amount procured as payment of principal and interest on any foreign
loan; and
d) amount procured under the agreement for the transfer of technology in
such currency as agreed upon in the contract accepted by the DOI.
The Act, amended in 1996, has made 100% foreign equity participation
possible by foreign investors in all industrial enterprises, except for cottage and
some specific types of industries especially reserved for domestic investment.
Moreover, the transfer of technology is possible even in the case of cottage
industries. The Government requires that a business enterprise set up with foreign
investment or technology should require the prior approval of the DOI.
In July 2000, the Government constituted a seven-member Fast Track
Committee (FTC), under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, with a view
to take a quick decision on projects linked to foreign investment. As a result,
a foreign investor could directly send a proposal to the FTC, and a decision is
made within two weeks.211
2.3 One Window Committee and Industrial Promotion Board
In Nepal, there is a provision to establish the One Window Service (OWS)
under the Industrial Enterprises Act, 1992. The aim of the OWS is to provide
all the necessary services needed by foreign investors under one roof. The OWS
purposes to provide hassle free services to the concerned persons or companies.
The OWS provides all the required services from a single workstation, so that
investors do not need to deal with the various government offices in order to
start up an industry in the country.
2.4 Board of Investment
Nepal formed a Board of Investment under the chairmanship of the Prime
Minister in December 2001. The Board was set up in order to promote investment
and to make the investment process more transparent and reliable. The other
objectives of the Board include formulation of new policies by reviewing the
existing investment policy, maintaining coordination between the various
government and non-government organisations for the promotion of investment,
pinpointing the areas of priority sector for investment promotion, monitoring the
activities associated with investment promotion and providing directives to the
concerned department to boost investment.
3. Trends in Capital Flows
The amount of capital flows can have a significant impact in an economy.
A country should analyse the trend of capital flows alongside other major
macroeconomic indicators of the economy, like GDP, price level, level of
consumption, saving, and investment, etc., before formulating the relevant policy.
With regard to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the first official record of
FDI flow to Nepal was in FY 1951/52 when the Nepal Commercial Corporation
was set up as a joint venture with 67% equity participation from Indian investors.
There was a provision of foreign investment in medium-scale industries with the
investment of Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 500,000 and large-scale industries with the
investment of more than Rs. 500,000.
In reality it is very difficult to capture the actual FDI data in Nepal. The
Department of Industry (DOI) compiles the data on FDI commitment but the
mechanism to monitor the realisation of such commitment is still not properly in
place. The BOP statistics also does not fully capture the movement of the FDI
in Nepal.212
After the political regime change of 1990, the move towards liberalisation
was further accelerated. As a result, the commitment to promote FDI in early
nineties was sustained at a higher level.
Figure 6
FDI Commitments
Analysing FDI on a sectoral basis, manufacturing sector takes up the largest
share. It is followed by the manufacturing sector, services, hotel/restaurant and
electricity which take up 36.4%, 27.1%, 14.8%, and 10.9%, respectively.
Figure 7
Sectoral FDI on FY 2007/08213
With respect to country-wise portfolio analysis of FDI, India has the largest
share of 43.7%. Next to India, USA and China have the share of 14.3% and
10.3%, respectively.
Portfolio investment is one of the components of capital flows. Therefore,
this type of investment can have a significant influence in any economy depending
upon its volume and flow. However, in the Nepalese context, no portfolio
investment is recorded till today. Thus, there is no portfolio investment data is
presented in this paper.
As the ‘other investment’ is another component of capital flows, it is also
meaningful to discuss about this type of investment. In the Nepalese context,
the data of ‘other investment’ can be obtained from BOP statistics from FY
2000/2001 onward. After the implementation of the fifth BOP manual, other
investment data is being recorded in BOP statistics. In this paper, other investment
data is not presented mainly because of two different reasons. Firstly, such data
can be obtained only from FY 2000/2001 and, secondly, the amount of other
investment is negligible.
Another factor which could have an important role in capital flows is the
government debt. So it is meaningful to discuss a little bit about public debt. The
public debt comprises external as well as domestic debt. In the Nepalese context,
the outstanding domestic debt is increasing steadily every year. Similarly the
outstanding external debt is also increasing since the beginning, except in FY
2004/05. Nepal was suffering from internal political instability over the last few
Figure 8
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years which causes external loan to decrease in FY 2004/05. In July 2008, the
total outstanding domestic debt and total outstanding external debt were recorded
as Rs.111,239.1 million and Rs.242,060.6 million, respectively.
Figure 9
Total Outstanding Debt of the Government
Composition of total outstanding debt in 2008 is presented in following pie
chart. Out of total debt outstanding of Rs.353299.7 million, the ratio of domestic
debt and external debt stood at 31.5% and 68.5%, respectively.
Figure 10
Composition of Public Debt Outstanding215
As mentioned earlier, the capital account is not fully convertible in Nepal.
Except for the repatriation of income, no capital outflows data is recorded in the
Nepalese BOP. Presently the government is taking steps to provide facility to
the Nepali people in making investment in the foreign capital market. If the
government pursues such policy, it will be a major milestone towards the capital
outflow.
3.1 Challenges
The following factors can be considered as the challenges facing capital
flows in the context of Nepal.
3.1.1 Political Situation
The political situation is one of the major determinants of capital flow in
Nepal. Nepal has been facing political instability since 1996. The period of political
turbulence and conflict among the major political parties was brought to an end
last year.  Peace is restored in the land. It is believed, this will have a positive
impact on capital flows. Political stability is a ‘must’ to increase capital flows
in any country.
3.1.2 Government Policy
Capital flows increase with the sound and safe government policy. On one
hand, the Nepal government has promulgated the necessary policies to protect
foreign investors in Nepal (like Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer
Act, 1992), which provide a conducive environment for facilitation of capital
flows to the country. On the other hand, the government has not been able to
adopt the capital account convertibility policy in its full extent, which has
prevented capital outflows from the country. However, the Nepalese capital
account policy can be called a partial capital account convertibility policy. It is,
therefore, necessary for any government to adopt the appropriate policy to attract
the capital inflows in the country.
3.1.3 Macroeconomic Performance
Closely related to sustained and high growth rates of capital flows, Nepal
needs to pay attention to the maintenance of a stable macroeconomic
environment. Macroeconomic stability should be maintained as a prerequisite216
for sustained and high level of FDI and other investments. Until and unless the
macroeconomic indicators are stable in any country, it will be difficult for that
particular country to attract FDI and other foreign investments.
3.1.4 Foreign Exchange Reserves
The higher the country’s foreign reserves, the more likely are foreign
investors to invest in the country. Nepal has maintained a level of foreign currency
reserve equivalent to Rs. 212,624 million as of July 2008, which is sufficient to
cover its imports for eleven months.
3.1.5 Human Capital
Even though human capital is an important determinant of capital flows,
Nepal lacks skilled manpower. With both low levels of education and health in
terms of literacy ratio, school enrollment ratio, poverty, and underfed population,
a large portion of the labor force is unskilled in Nepal. Therefore, it is necessary
for the country to produce skilled manpower in order to acquire a significant
level of capital inflows.
4. Capital Flows and Monetary Policy
As ‘other investment’ is one of the components of capital flows, the Nepalese
BOP data captures such investment only after 2001. If we take net other
investment data from the year 2001 up to the current period, the amount will
only show a negligible figure. That’s why net other investment data is not
presented in this paper. Since Nepal does not have portfolio investment and
financial derivatives data in its record and, as mentioned above, the data figure
of net other investment is negligible, it is FDI that has been a dominant factor
in the capital flows.
To analyse the impact of capital flows on monetary policy, an example of
FDI can be given. For example, whenever capital inflow increases in the country.
it will increase Net Foreign Assets (NFA). As NFA is a part of the monetary
base, such increased NFA affects the monetary base pressuring the money supply
to increase. The central bank, the monetary authority, of the country has to
sterilise such money supply pressure using its monetary tools. In the Nepalese
context, the FDI commitment has gone up by 300% in July 2008 compared to
that in the preceding year. In July 2007, the FDI commitment was recorded at
Rs. 2,453.1 million whereas in July 2008 the commitment figure stood at Rs.
9,810 million. Such increment of FDI has helped Nepal to maintain the foreign
exchange reserves of US$ 3,104 million in July 2008.217
On one hand, capital inflow has helped the country to maintain the foreign
exchange reserve holding at a significant level. On the other hand, this capital
flow has helped, directly or indirectly, to enhance the overall business activities
of the nation. Even after such a growth of capital inflow and foreign exchange
reserve, Nepal has been able to maintain its money supply at a desired level.
5. Capital Flows and Financial Stability
Needless to say, capital flows play a major role in the financial stability of
any country. Sound and safe financial systems are a ‘must’ for financial stability.
In the Nepalese context, capital flows have not played a major role in the financial
sector, especially in banking sector. In the last five years no capital inflow is
experienced in the establishment of banking sector. However, Nepal has become
a member of World Trade Organisation (WTO) and is a signatory in the WTO
agreement permitting foreign banks to open their branches in the country
beginning from 2010. Once foreign bank branches start operating in the country,
it is very possible that capital inflow will increase heavily.
To control the sudden increment of capital inflow which is going to happen
after 2010, the country should formulate the necessary policies at the early stage.
If sound and effective rules and regulations are implemented in order to manage
the impact of such capital flows on the financial market, the sudden and heavy
flow of capital will not adversely affect financial stability.
Proper inspection and supervision of the financial institutions are also required
to maintain the soundness and efficiency of the financial system. To maintain
the health of the banking sector, Nepal has just implemented Basel II. In order
to comply with the directives published by the NRB, all the financial institutions
are required to observe all the rules and regulations. The financial institutions
should pay attention to various factors like capital adequacy, liquidity, maturity
mismatch, investment decision, managerial decision-making, etc. If the regulatory
authority is capable enough to supervise the banking sector of the country,
financial stability can be maintained.
6. Conclusion
To attract and facilitate capital flows to the country, Nepal has adopted
various policies and acts. In 1992, the Foreign Direct Investment Policy was
initiated with the sole objective of providing a sound environment for FDI. In
the same year, the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act, 1992
was enacted to attract technology transfer and foreign investment. The Act has218
defined the meaning of FDI and also provided the permission of repatriation to
the foreign investor. Similarly, the OWS was set up under the Industrial
Enterprises Act, 1992 to provide all the facility to foreign investors under a
single roof. Finally, to promote investment, a Board of Investment was established
under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister in December 2001. Capital flow
comprises FDI, portfolio investment and other investments. In this study, only
FDI is taken as the indicator of capital inflow. The first official FDI to Nepal
was recorded in FY 1951/52 when Nepal Commercial Corporation was set up
as a joint venture with 67% equity participation from the Indian investors. The
FDI commitment increased in Nepal after the new political regime of 1990. On
a sectoral basis, the highest share the FDI is taken up by the manufacturing,
followed by service, hotel and restaurant, and the electricity of sectors.
Capital flow in any country increases if the pull and push factors play a
significant positive role. Factors like the real GDP, interest rate, capital account
GDP ratio, Indian real GDP and Indian interest rate are considered as the
determinants of capital flow in this study. The first three factors are considered
as the determinants of capital flow because GDP growth has a direct and positive
effect on capital flows. Besides, capital flow increases or decreases depending
upon the performance of GDP, interest rate and capital account GDP ratio. The
last two factors are considered as the determinants of capital flow because
India is a big international trade partner of Nepal. Also the share of India in FDI
is highest compared to that of the other countries.
As mentioned above, capital inflow in the form of FDI was started in 1951.
Since then, Nepal has taken many steps to promote capital inflows in line with
the situation and context. Some achievements have been attained and, as the
data show, Nepal received FDIs from various countries on various dates.
However, due to the political situation and economic performance of the country,
the amount of capital inflows did not increase according to the expectation of
the country. Therefore, it can be said that the policies adopted up until today
are not sufficient to boost capital inflows to Nepal.
Capital inflow confers another benefit to the countries, like Nepal, where
capital account is not fully convertible. Such inflow helps maintain foreign
exchange reserves to a desired level. But at the same time the inflow increases,
the Net Foreign Assets (NFA) affecting the monetary base, pressure the money
supply to increase. In such a situation, the monetary authority of the country has
to sterilise the money supply pressure using its monetary tools.219
In the Nepalese context, FDI commitment has gone up by 236% in July
2008 compared to that recorded in the preceding year. In 2007 July, the FDI
commitment was recorded as Rs. 2,920 million, whereas in July 2008 the
commitment figure stood at Rs. 9,807 million. Such increment of FDI has helped
Nepal to maintain the foreign exchange reserves of US$ 3,104 million in July
2008. Even after such a growth of capital inflow and foreign exchange reserve,
Nepal has been able to maintain its money supply at a desired level.
In the Nepalese context, capital flows have not played a major role in the
financial sector, especially in banking sector. However, Nepal has become the
member of World Trade Organization (WTO) and is a signatory in the WTO
agreement allowing foreign banks to open their branches in the country beginning
from 2010. It is obvious that proper inspection and supervision of the financial
institutions are required to maintain the soundness and efficiency of the financial
system. To maintain the health of the banking sector, Nepal has implemented
Basel II. Similarly, the NRB has published the necessary directives for compliance
by the financial institutions and implemented the appropriate monetary policy in
order to maintain the desired level of liquidity.
Nepal has been trying to attract capital inflow right from the very beginning.
Some policies and acts have existed to achieve the objective. But at the same
time the country is beset with problems hindering the country from reaching the
desired objective of achieving a higher level of capital inflow. Unstable political
situation, lower growth rate of macroeconomic indicators, and a serious shortage
of unskilled manpower are the major challenges confronting the country today.
On one hand, the Granger causality result suggests that IIR is causing FDI.
On the other hand, the country is facing different kinds of challenges in receiving
capital inflows. As the government of the country concentrates mainly in
economic development projects and in fiscal policy, the central bank of the country
has to pay attention in managing monetary and financial policy. To attract capital
flow to the country, the government should address the above-mentioned
challenges and frame the appropriate policies for the future.220
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Chapter 8
CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL




This paper examines the nature of capital flows into and out of the Papua
New Guinea (PNG) economy and discusses how these flows may influence
monetary policy. The management of capital flows varies from country to country.
PNG’s major policy tool relating to capital flow management has been the
Exchange Controls and Gold Regulation2 which has been enforced by the Bank
of PNG (BPNG) since 1976. The exchange controls are aimed primarily at
controlling the amounts of foreign exchange transactions between PNG and the
rest of the world to preserve the level of foreign exchange reserves and to
protect the domestic banking and financial sector. There have been several
episodes of reform to the exchange control system. The first of these was in
1987. These reforms represent an ongoing need to adapt to changes in economic
policy and environment as well as international and domestic institutional and
structural changes. Reducing controls on foreign exchange transactions over
the years has been part of the overall process of liberalisation in line with the
government’s market-orientated approach to economic development. Other
government agencies, such as the Investment Promotion Authority (IPA), Internal
Revenue Commission (IRC) and the Department of Trade and Industry, also
have policies relating to different aspects of capital flows. An integral component
of the government’s development strategy is the promotion of investment in
PNG. The IPA was established by an Act of Parliament in 1992. Its focus is
________________
1. The author is a Senior Research Analyst, Research Department, Bank of Papua New Guinea
(BPNG). The author expresses his gratitude to the project leaders Min B. Shrestha and Vincent
Lim of The SEACEN Centre for their leadership and guidance on the project and to Gae Kauzi,
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2. Exchange control refers to the enforcement of limits on amounts in foreign exchange transactions
carried out by individuals or entities into and out of Papua New Guinea with the rest of the
world. The main objective of exchange control is to conserve the country’s foreign exchange
reserves. The controls are administered by the BPNG and commercial banks who may grant
approvals within the limits of their delegated authority.224
centred on attracting new investors to the country as well as encouraging existing
investors, both foreign and domestic, to expand their investment.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the major policies relating
to capital flows are discussed. This is followed, in Section 3, by a review of the
trends in the major macroeconomic indicators and capital flows since 1985. Section
4 provides the empirical analysis of the determinants of capital inflows into PNG.
Capital inflows and their relation to the BPNG’s monetary policy are covered
in Section 5, while Section 6 discusses capital flows and financial stability. Section
7 concludes the paper by identifying policy issues, prospects and
recommendations.
2. General Framework and Major Capital Flow Management Policies
in Papua New Guinea
2.1 Policies Implemented by the Bank of Papua New Guinea
A uniform set of exchange controls under the Exchange Controls and Gold
Regulation came into effect with monetary independence in 1976. The fixed
exchange rate regime adopted in 1975 obviated the need for extensive exchange
controls and, with the exception of restrictions on some capital transactions, a
reasonably liberal exchange control regime was put in place. Approval was readily
given for imports and most types of current account payments.
The main focus of exchange controls was on investment from overseas for
which approval was dependent on the compatibility of the investment with the
government’s objectives. Limits were also imposed on annual remittances
overseas for portfolio investments made by PNG residents and all export proceeds
were to be repatriated to PNG.
In November 1982, the BPNG made amendments to the controls relating
to borrowing. Offshore borrowing by private sector companies in PNG required
the specific approval of the BPNG if the borrowing resulted in a debt to equity
ratio exceeding 3:1. A three-year moratorium on principal interest payments was
also imposed.
Several liberalisation measures were taken in 1987. These included a 50%
increase in the amounts that authorised dealers could approve under delegated
authority; a 50% increase in the allowable levels of overseas portfolio investments
for individuals and a reduction to one year of the moratorium on principal
repayments. In 1992, foreign exchange controls were liberalised further by225
increasing the delegated authority of the authorised dealers and relaxing controls
on capital transactions. For overseas debt, the authorised dealers could approve
borrowing in foreign currency up to K5 million at a debt to equity ratio of 5:1.
By 1992, the exchange controls related primarily to the outflows and not the
inflow of capital. Inflows were welcome, providing that they were consistent
with government policy. Repatriation and loan repayments were still monitored
to ensure that the terms were fair and reasonable.
In October 1994, the kina was floated. This prompted minor changes to the
exchange controls. The remaining capital controls were designed to limit short-
term speculative capital flows, assist tax surveillance and prevent transfer pricing3
(BPNG, 2007: 170).
The creation of the Port Moresby Stock Exchange (POMSoX) in 1999,
financial sector reforms, the need to remove impediments to investment and
good economic fundamentals provided the motive for major foreign exchange
control liberalisation in 2005. Liberalisation from this stage forward was
implemented through exemptions, so that exchange controls could be re-
implemented if a balance of payments crisis required them to be invoked.
In 2005, all current account contracts and flows, all capital account contracts
and flows to the government and all private capital account flows whose contracts
had been approved by the BPNG were liberalised. The need for foreign exchange
approval was retained for all private capital account contracts to acquire or deal
with an asset within or outside Papua New Guinea; the opening of foreign
currency accounts outside PNG; licensing of gold exporters; and licensing of
foreign exchange dealers. The conditions imposed included (a) approval required
to take K20, 000 (about US$7,600) out of the country; and (b) only authorisation
for dealers to conduct foreign exchange transactions.
In September 2007, private capital account contracts between residents and
non-residents; securities and guarantees in favour of non-residents; listed and
un-listed securities and other investments with underlying written contracts; and
________________
3. Refers to the pricing of contributions (assets, tangible and intangible, services, and funds) transferred
within an organisation. For example, goods from the production division may be sold to the
marketing division, or goods from a parent company may be sold to a foreign subsidiary. Since
the prices are set within an organisation (i.e., controlled), the typical market mechanisms that
establish prices for such transactions between third parties may not apply. The choice of the
transfer price will affect the allocation of the total profit among the parts of the company.
This is a major concern for fiscal authorities who worry that multi-national entities may set
transfer prices on cross-border transactions to reduce taxable profits in their jurisdiction. This
has led to the rise of transfer pricing regulations and enforcement, making transfer pricing a
major tax compliance issue for multi-national companies.226
foreign currency accounts of individuals opened prior to 1st June 2005 were
liberalised.
The Bank retained controls on the opening of offshore foreign currency
accounts, including kina accounts outside PNG; licensing of gold exporters;
licensing of foreign exchange dealers; and the removal of physical cash in excess
of K20, 000 or equivalent in foreign currency.
2.2 PNG Policies to Manage Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows
The National Investment Development Authority (NIDA) was established
by the government in 1989 to channel foreign investment into areas of business
that would make the best use of resources consistent with national development
and investment policies. It was also aimed at encouraging citizen participation
in business activities or projects facilitated by foreign investment. Government
regulated monopolies were restricted from receiving any foreign investment. No
new foreign firms were allowed into the retail sector and established foreign
firms in the retail sector had to sell 50% of their equity to local enterprises. In
1990, NIDA, which was considered as being overly regulatory and an impediment
to investment growth, was replaced with the Investment Promotion Authority
(IPA) which was given clear goals to encourage foreign investment in the
economy.
The Government, through the IPA and the Department of Trade and Industry,
launched the five-year National Investment Policy in 1998 to achieve the
following objectives (National Investment Policy, Vol. I, 1998:4):
• The creation of a social and economic environment conducive to private
investment;
• The development and maintenance of infrastructure;
• The development of human resources;
• Greater clarity and transparency in investment incentives;
• The elimination of regulatory and procedural obstacles to investment;
• The promotion of small and medium enterprises;
• The encouragement of backward and forward linkages and support for
domestic value added;
• The provision of greater consistency in policy measures; and
• The creation of the necessary institutional framework, in order to ensure
strong implementation of its investment policy.227
Furthermore, other  government development aspirations and plans, such as
the Medium Term Development (MTDS) 2005-2007, call for export promotion;
employment growth; aiding the development of new industries; influencing the
spatial distribution of economic activity in favour of less developed areas;
increasing training; aiding investment; promoting fuel efficiency; environmental
conservation; and aiding primary production. Some of the initiatives covered
under these areas can be initially exempted from company income tax to
encourage investment flows.
3. Trends in Macroeconomic Indicators and Capital Flows in Papua
New Guinea
3.1 Gross Domestic Product
Economic growth in PNG averaged 3.0% for the period, 1985-2007. In the
sub-period, 1985-1990, real GDP growth averaged 1.7%. The prices of PNG’s
export commodities were generally low during this period. The commencement
of production at Ok Tedi mine in 1984 contributed positively to GDP growth
during the period. However, the closure of the Bouganville mine and a significant
decline in mineral prices resulted in the decline in real GDP in 1989 and 1990.
The decline would have been higher had it not been for the increase in the
number of other mineral projects.
The period 1991 – 1995 saw real GDP growth rates averaging around 8.8%
per annum with a high of 18.2% in 1993. The high growth during the period was
mainly due to the boom in the mineral sector which had positive spin-offs to the
other sectors of the economy. It was during this period that production commenced
at Hides gas and Kutubu oil projects, whilst Wapolu gold/silver project was under
construction.228
From 1996 – 2002 economic activity was influenced by unfavourable internal
and external developments. These lead to an average growth rate of 0.4% for
the period. Internally, these included the El Nino drought, the Sandline4 crisis
and unproductive overspending by the government. Meanwhile, the prices of
PNG’s export commodities were low. These factors had the effect of reducing
economic activity for most of the years during this period. However, in 1998
and 1999 real GDP grew by 4.7% and 1.9%, respectively, largely due to the
commencement of production at the Lihir gold mine.
GDP growth for the period 2003 - 2007 averaged around 3.6% per annum
and was broad-based, with all sectors contributing strongly to the growth. The
growth was largely driven by high international commodity prices due to higher
global demand which was supported by prudent fiscal and monetary policy.
3.2 Inflation
Changes in the domestic prices of goods and services are closely associated
with movements in the kina exchange rate. Under the fixed exchange rate regime
the kina’s foreign currency value was high and stable, and therefore headline
inflation during the period 1985-1994 was relatively stable and low. Most of the
inflationary pressure came from foreign inflation and domestic factors. Other
factors that contributed to these inflation outcomes were: disciplined government
spending, a favourable balance of payments position, low international oil prices
Figure 1
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4. A period when foreign mercenaries were brought into the country by the government to help
halt the Bouganville crisis. Some factions of the Defence Force were not happy with this
arrangement and therefore had to remove the mercenaries by force.229
and low inflation in PNG’s major trading-partner economies. Annual inflation
averaged around 5.0% during the period, with a low of 2.9% in 1994 and a high
of 7.0% in 1991.
Under the floating exchange rate regime, which was adopted in 1994, the
kina exchange rate trended downwards and inflation was volatile and high. Internal
research by the Bank shows that pass-through to inflation was 50-60% of a one
percent depreciation in the effective exchange rate.5 This depreciation in the
exchange rate fed through to the Consumer Price Index over 4-6 quarters during
the period 1989-2004 (Sampson, Yabom, Nindim & Marambini, 2006: 25). Annual
inflation between 1995 and 2002 averaged around 12.0%. When the kina
depreciated by 11.6% against the Australian dollar and 13.1% against the US
dollar in 1995, inflation peaked at 17.3%. The high inflation rate in 1998 and
1999 were due to irresponsible government spending, the effects of El Nino and
the Asian financial crisis. The impact of the Asian financial crisis had manifested
itself in balance of payments pressure and rapid depreciation of the currency.
Prices of PNG’s export commodities, particularly oil, copper and logs, fell
dramatically. Log volumes declined due to a contraction in the demand in the
main export markets of Korea and Japan. Between 2000 and 2003, the kina
depreciated by 30.9% and 22.3% against the Australian and the US dollars,
respectively, resulting in an inflation outcome of 14.7% in 2003.
The exchange rate stabilised between 2004 and 2007 as a result of high
commodity prices and favourable international conditions. This lead to annual
inflation falling within a range of 0.9 – 2.4%, with an average of 1.8%. Prudent
fiscal and monetary management also contributed to the stable rate of inflation.
________________
5. The exchange rate is the weighted average of the exchange rates of the kina with the US,
Australian, New Zealand and Singapore dollars and the Japanese yen. Two alternative weightings
are used to calculate the effective exchange rate. One based on the average share of PNG’s
imports purchased from each country during 1989–2004 and the other based on the average
share of imports purchased in each currency during 1996–2004. The effective exchange rates
calculated using these weightings is labeled the country-based exchange rate and the currency-
based exchange rate, respectively.230
3.3 Interest Rates
During the fixed exchange rate period from independence to 1994, real
interest rates in PNG were generally stable and positive reflecting low inflation
over most of the years. The margin between the lending and deposit rate was
around 4.0% on average during the period. Following the float of the kina, real
interest rates fluctuated widely as inflation was volatile, and, for some years,
negative real interest rates were realised, particularly for term deposits. In an
attempt to realign interest rates and signal its monetary policy stance, the BPNG
introduced a price-based signalling mechanism, the Kina Facility Rate (KFR),
with the aim of enhancing the transmission of monetary policy. Any change in
the KFR signals the monetary policy stance of the Bank of PNG and sets the
rate at which the BPNG deals with the commercial banks for over-night and
term6 repurchase agreements. Following the introduction of the KFR, the
commercial bank’s lending rate and the 6-12 month deposit rate moved in line
with the KFR. However, the margin between the lending and deposit rate remains
wide.
Figure 2
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6. Apart from the overnight repos, 7- and 14-day term repos are also offered by the BPNG to
commercial banks.231
From 2003 to 2007, inflation stabilised and averaged around 4.0%. This was
driven by high international commodity prices and stable kina exchange rates.
The BPNG, in response, reduced its KFR progressively down to 6.0% and
maintained it up until June 2008 when it raised the KFR to 6.25% due to a high
inflation outcome in the March quarter of 2008 and expectations of continued
inflationary pressures for the rest of the year.
3.4 Exchange Rate
The exchange rate regime adopted by the Bank of PNG provides the basic
framework within which rates are determined and it influences the way in which
the Bank conducts its monetary, exchange rate and foreign currency management.
The transition to a floating regime therefore introduced some fundamental changes
to the nature of monetary management. Under the fixed exchange rate regime,
foreign exchange reserves acted as a shock absorber, allowing injections of
liquidity to be diffused without an adverse effect on inflation. Under the floating
regime, imbalances between demand and supply are brought into equilibrium
through changes in exchange rates (BPNG, 2007: 110).
Figure 3
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During the fixed exchange rate period7, the kina value in terms of foreign
currencies of the major trading partners was relatively high and stable. Following
the adoption of the floating exchange rate system in 1994, the kina fluctuated
considerably, mostly depreciating against the key currencies. By 2002, the kina
stabilised and has since remained fairly stable. The stability in the kina in recent
years has been due to the favourable external and domestic economic conditions
that the country has been experiencing.
Figure 5 shows that, until 1994, PNG’s real effective exchange rate (REER)
tracked the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) during the fixed exchange
rate period. Following the float of the kina in 1994, the NEER has been volatile,
particularly on the downward side, and the REER no longer tracks the NEER.
The REER has generally depreciated and is at a level lower than it was when
the kina was floated. In combination with the abolition of index-linked minimum
wage determination, this implies an increase in the international competitiveness
of the PNG economy (BPNG, 2007: 80).
Figure 4
PNG Exchange Rate against Major Currencies and the Trade
Weighted Index (TWI)
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7. PNG had a fixed exchange rate regime known as the “hard kina policy” from 1975-1994. One
of the primary purposes of the ‘hard kina’ policy that Papua New Guinea pursued from the
time of independence until the kina was floated in 1994 was to avoid imported inflation by
maintaining the value of the kina (Garnaut and Baxter 1983).233
3.5 Current Account, Foreign Exchange Reserves and Overall Balance
of Payments (US$ million)
The overall balance of payments position of the country has moved in line
with the developments in the current account. Historically, changes in the trade
account balance are dependent on international export commodity prices.
Generally, when commodity prices are high there is a high trade surplus and
when commodity prices are low the trade account tends to be low or in deficit.
However, given the high import dependency of the economy, the service account
has usually been in deficit which more than offset the trade surpluses resulting
in a current account deficit between 1985 and1992. Correspondingly, there was
a balance of payment deficit during this period. The current account balance
prior to the float was always in deficit until 1993 when it recorded a surplus of
US$474 million. This was underpinned by increased production in minerals which
was due to the commencement of production at the Porgera gold mine. Together
with an improvement in the export performance of the agriculture/forestry/
fisheries sector, the current account continued to be in surplus from 1994 to
1996. When the current account returned to surplus between 1985 and 1992,
the balance of payment also improved.
PNG’s level of foreign exchange reserves has been around US$500 million
from 1985 up until the early 1990s. Despite the healthy position of the current
account in the mid 1990s, the reserve level began to slide downwards from
Figure 5
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US$323 million in 1991 and reached a low of US$85 million in 1994, because
a large part of increased government spending was on imported goods and
services, which translated into a high usage of foreign exchange reserves under
the fixed exchange rate regime. Eventually, when the reserves were not sufficient
to support the fixed exchange rate regime, the kina was floated in October
1994. After the floating, the foreign reserve level increased under the
government’s effort to restore macroeconomic stability. In the late 1990s
excessive government spending became a feature of the economy. Combined
with the adverse effects of the El Nino drought on agricultural exports and
copper exports from Ok Tedi mine, the current account went into deficit once
again. These had the effect of reducing foreign exchange reserves and causing
the overall balance of payments to be in deficit.
After 2000, international commodity prices rose which assisted in improving
the trade and current accounts, the balance of payments and the nation’s foreign
exchange reserves position. The surpluses in the balance of payments in 2000
and 2001 were due to higher international prices for mineral exports and some
of the agricultural commodities, increased activity in the agriculture/forestry/
fisheries sectors and the depreciation of the kina. The level of international
reserves increased to a level where they were sufficient for 4 months of total
import cover and 5.4 months of non-mineral import cover.
Economic activity declined in 2002, resulting in lower exports and increased
service payments, this deteriorated the balance of payments and lowered
international reserves. In 2003, improved export activity, a lower value of exports
and prudent fiscal management by the government led to an increase in the
level of foreign exchange reserves and an improvement in the overall balance
of payments. From 2004 onwards, there has been macroeconomic stability in
the economy. High export commodity prices have led to an increase in
international reserves and a favourable balance of payments position.235
3.6 Capital Flows
Total capital flow consists of FDI, portfolio and other investments. The
value of each component at the end of a year is a net figure and therefore the
total is a net value. These can be either positive or negative. For example, in
a particular year, some capital may be coming into the country from abroad as
FDI8 while at the same time, part of the capital that came as FDI in the previous
years may be returned as earnings to foreign investors. So, the FDI figure (Dir.
Invest. in Rep. Econ9) in a given year is derived by subtracting the returned
amount in that year from the new FDI amount received that year. If the amount
of incoming new FDI is greater than the returned amount, then the FDI value
in that year will be positive. But if returned investment amount is greater than
the incoming new FDI amount, then the value would be negative.
3.6.1 Capital Inflows - Foreign Direct Investment
Most of the FDI inflows to PNG are associated with large scale mining and
petroleum projects. In 2004, of the total volume of FDI stock received by PNG,
76.3% was destined for the mineral sector, while the manufacturing and
Figure 6
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________________
8. Foreign direct investment occurs when a non-resident acquires a stake of at least 10% in a
domestic enterprise (or if he increases that stake).
9. Short for Direct Investment in Reporting Economy.236
agriculture sectors received smaller but still significant volumes of FDI inflows
(Table 1).
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Source: CSDRMS11 – Bank of Papua New Guinea
Foreign direct investment in PNG averaged around US$113 million during
the period 1985-2007. FDI has been the dominant component of total capital
inflows into PNG. On an annual basis, FDI inflows have been below US$200
million. However, this hides the volatility in capital inflows into PNG which have
been due to the volatile nature of FDI inflows into the mineral sector (Figure
7.0). As PNG receives, on average, only small volumes of FDI inflows per year,
large inflows that are used to fund large scale capital-intensive mining projects
have a large impact on the country’s capital account. The highest FDI inflow
was recorded in 1995, totalling over US$450 million, which was primarily due
to the Tolukuma and Lihir Gold mine projects. The significant FDI inflows
received in 1989 and 1990, as shown in Figure 7.0, were due to the construction
of the Porgera gold mine, while the increase in FDI inflows received in 1997
________________
10. Taken from the working paper (FDI and Economic growth in Papua New Guinea) by B. Aipi
and J. Lloyd, Research Department, Bank of Papua New Guinea.
11. Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Recording and Management System.237
were mainly destined for the construction of the Lihir gold project and the RD
Tuna canning plant in Madang. The continued inflow in FDI between 1997 and
2002 reflected the development of the Moran oil project, on-going work at Lihir
and the borrowings under the 2000 structural adjustment programme (SAP).
In the years since 2000, PNG has seen an increase in FDI inflows into both
the manufacturing and the other sectors, which includes the telecommunications
sector. In addition there were new mineral projects, such as the Ramu Nickel/
Cobalt, Hidden Valley, Wafi, Kainantu and Simberi gold projects, which attracted
a significant volume of FDI inflows.
Figure 7
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3.6.2 Portfolio12 and Other Investment13 Inflows
There has been little portfolio investments into PNG between 1985 and
2007. This reflects the small size and immaturity of the domestic security market.
________________
12. Portfolio investment includes purchases of securities and equity shareholdings. It also includes
tradable financial derivatives.
13. Other capital flows include non-tradable instruments, such as loans and deposits, trade credit
and payment of arrears on outstanding debt.238
Lack of proper management of records by the relevant agencies could have
also contributed to the state of data on this category of investment.
During the period 1985 to 2007, Papua New Guinea had other investments
from abroad which averaged around US$160 million per annum. Since 1992,
while there was net FDI inflow, there has been net outflow of other investments.
This means that there has been a greater outflow of earnings on previous
investments than inflows into the country for new other investments. The negative
other investment inflows also reflect the payment of arrears on outstanding debt.
3.6.3 FDI, Portfolio and Other Investment Outflows
Capital outflows are investments made abroad by PNG residents. These
have been low compared to the inflows since 1985. Prior to 1990, there were
some FDI outflows while portfolio and other investments were very little or
non-existent. From 1991 onwards there have been some portfolio and other
investment outflows while FDI outflows have been insignificant. During the period
1985-2007, total capital outflows averaged negative US$15 million per annum,
reflecting a reduction in investments abroad through the sale of previously held
foreign assets by residents.
Foreign direct investment remained very low and this is attributed to a number
of factors. These include a lack of capital and PNG companies not having the
competitive advantage over foreign companies.239
3.6.4 Net Capital Flows
Papua New Guinea’s net capital flow position has been volatile since 1985.
Between 1985 and 1991, PNG had successive net inflows reflecting the
developments in the mineral (including petroleum and gas) sector. From 1992
onwards, net outflows of other investments, particularly payment of arrears on
outstanding debt to international financial institutions, have resulted in total net
capital outflows. Figure 9 presents net capital flows by components and it is
clear that net FDI inflows into Papua New Guinea have been dominant whilst
portfolio and other investment flows have mostly shown net outflows.
Figure 8
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4. Capital Flows and Monetary Policy
The discussion of capital flows and monetary policy almost without doubt
starts with the well known concept of the “Impossible Trinity”, that is, the
observation that a country cannot simultaneously have open capital markets (or
free capital mobility across borders); a fixed exchange rate regime; and an
independent monetary policy (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2004).
Economists have long argued that trade in assets (or capital flows) provides
economic benefits by enabling residents of different countries to capitalise on
their differences. According to Eichen-green, et al. (1999), capital flows allow
countries to trade consumption today for consumption in the future. Capital flows
allow countries to get out of large falls in national consumption from economic
downturn or natural disaster by selling assets to and/or borrowing from overseas.
Capital flows also allow countries as a whole to borrow in order to improve
their ability to produce goods and services in the future. In more recent times,
economists have emphasised other benefits of capital flows in terms of technology
transfer that normally accompanies foreign investment, or greater competition
in the domestic markets that results from allowing firms to invest locally. However,
Figure 9
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on the other hand, the benefits from capital flows do not always come without
a price. Capital flows can complicate economic policy or even be a source of
instability themselves and therefore relevant authorities have used some form of
capital controls to mitigate the adverse impact of capital flows.
The core objective of monetary policy is to achieve and maintain price
stability. This entails low inflation and stable interest and exchange rates. The
implementation of monetary policy to achieve this objective is done through open
market operations and from time to time intervention in the foreign exchange
market.
Papua New Guinea, being a small capital-importing country with a floating
exchange rate regime, the nominal exchange is expected to appreciate in response
to capital inflows, and the opposite is expected to happen when there is capital
outflow. When the flows are such that the movements in the exchange rate
threaten price stability, the Bank of PNG intervenes in the foreign exchange
market to smooth out volatility in the exchange rate.
Figures 11and 12 show developments in short-term capital flows, foreign
exchange reserves and US$/kina exchange in recent years.
Figure 10
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As presented in Figure 7, whilst there have been negative other investment
inflows in the last five years, portfolio investments from abroad have been non-
existent. This is primarily attributed to the securities market being undeveloped
and therefore foreign investors are not able to come into the securities market.
The negative other investment inflows reflects trade credits and dividend
payments by mineral companies to foreigner shareholders.
Figure 11 shows the short-term capital flows in recent years, 2003-2007.
Whilst there have been negative short-term capital inflows due to the reasons
mentioned above, short-term capital outflows were negative between 2003 and
2005, reflecting residents bringing back their earnings from previous investments.
Short-term outflows were recorded in 2006 and 2007, where residents invested
in short-term money market instruments.
Figure 11
Capital Inflows, Foreign Exchange Reserves and US$/kina
Exchange Rate
Total capital inflows (as shown in Figure 12) in recent years have been
mostly negative, whilst the exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves have
been on an upward trend. The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and
the appreciation of the exchange rate may not necessarily be influenced by
capital inflows but by mineral tax receipts (paid through BPNG) and export
earnings.243
Monetary policy focuses on the implication of mineral tax receipts. When
the Bank gets the foreign exchange from this source it pays local currency to
the government via the banking system. This is injection of liquidity. It would
therefore respond to an increase in liquidity through its open market operations
for price stability considerations. The most popular policy response to foreign
exchange inflows into the banking system in recent years has been sterilisation.
Through sterilisation, inflationary pressures, high volatility in exchange rate
movements and changes in the money stock are mitigated. However, if there
is a perceived increase in the demand for money which the BPNG wishes to
accommodate then non-sterilised intervention may be desirable.
5. Capital Flows and Financial Stability
As stipulated in the Central Banking Act (CBA) 2000, one of the core
objectives of the Bank of Papua New Guinea is its responsibility for financial
stability. The BPNG focuses on the prevention of financial disturbances which
potentially can have adverse consequences on the economy, particularly the
financial system. The Bank applies prudential standards and guidelines through
its off-site surveillance and on-site reviews and examination to ensure soundness
and stability of financial institutions. On an on-going basis, the Bank assesses
a range of aggregate financial and economic data which help gauge the soundness
of the financial system and potential vulnerabilities.
Broadly, financial stability can be thought of in terms of the financial system’s
ability to: facilitate both an efficient allocation of economic resources and the
effectiveness of other economic processes (such as economic growth); assess,
price, allocate, and manage financial risks; and maintain its ability to perform
these key functions - even when affected by external shocks. A definition
consistent with this broad view defines a financial system as stable whenever
it is capable of facilitating (rather than impeding) the performance of an economy,
and of dissipating financial imbalances that arise as a result of significant adverse
and unanticipated events.
The impact of capital inflows on commercial bank lending is not clear as
lending has been increasing during the last five years while total capital inflows
have mostly been negative. Theoretically, we would expect lending to increase
if there are short-term capital inflows because the increase in liquidity or loanable
funds caused by the inflows would result in lower lending rates, thus encouraging
borrowing. This is not the case, as shown in Figure 7, PNG has received negative
other investment inflows and no portfolio investments. Though FDI inflows have
been positive during the last five years, this has been offset by the outflows.244
The increase in lending may not be associated with capital inflows but rather
caused by domestic factors, such as increased levels of deposits. The level of
deposits increased from US$370 million in 2003 to around US$1455 million in
2007, an increase of over 293%.
Figure 12
Capital Flows, Bank Lending and Kina Securities Share Index
The Kina Securities Share Index (KSi), launched on 29th  October 2003,
tracks the price performance of stocks listed on the Port Moresby Stock Exchange
(POMSoX). The aggregate market capitalisation of the stock exchange is now
K37.61 billion - a growth of more than 300% in less than five years. Though
still in its infancy in comparison to the other stock exchanges, the performance
of POMSoX is a testimony to the confidence and growth in the locally listed
stocks. Since 2003, there has been significant development in the PNG economy.
The upward trend of the KSi, as shown in Figure 13 (bottom right chart), reflects245
PNG’s development and recent strong performance in the mining, agriculture
and service sectors, which have led to increased investor confidence. Other
investment inflows may have found their way onto the stock market since 2003
and, with the good performances by the listed companies, dividend payments
are being repatriated abroad as shown in Figure 7.
Given the natural instability of international capital flows, any country closely
integrated into the world financial system is prone to financial crises and currency
disorder. The extent of the impact of any financial crisis depends on PNG’s
investments offshore and hence its exposure. The PNG economy appears to be
shielded from the direct effects of the current (2008) global financial market
turmoil because the banks and financial institutions are funded primarily by
domestic deposits and their liquidity are not affected by the tight conditions in
international capital markets. Also, these institutions do not have large exposures
to offshore financial and investment companies. PNG’s external indebtedness
can be affected when there are huge movements in capital given its reliance
on foreign capital.
6. Conclusion
The paper looked at the types of capital flows (particularly inflows) into the
PNG economy during the period 1985-2007. Papua New Guinea’s major policy
tool relating to capital flow management has been the Exchange Controls and
Gold Regulation enforced by Bank of PNG since monetary independence in
1976. The exchange controls aimed at controlling the amounts in foreign exchange
transactions between PNG and the rest of the world to preserve the level of
foreign exchange reserves and to protect the domestic banking and financial
sector. Reforms to the exchange control regime reflected an on-going need to
adapt to changes in economic policy environment as well as institutional and
structural changes. The easing of controls on foreign exchange transactions over
the years has been part of the overall process of liberalisation in line with the
Government’s market-orientated approach to removing impediments to investment
and economic growth.
On the whole, monetary policy does not directly influence capital flows but
is concerned about its implications on liquidity, interest rate and exchange rate.
Through its open market operations and intervention in the foreign exchange
market, the BPNG influences the movements in these variables for price stability.
With price stability and general macroeconomic stability, the BPNG can indirectly
provide an economic climate that can be conducive for capital inflows.246
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CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR CENTRAL BANK POLICIES IN
THE PHILIPPINES
by
Sittie Hannisha M. Butocan1
1. General Framework and Major Capital Flow Management Policies
1.1 Current Account and Capital Account Liberalisation
The Philippines went through a long regime of import and foreign exchange
controls in the post-World War II period.  From 1949 to early 1970, foreign
exchange policy was used to promote the development and growth of home-
grown industries, limit imports, and deployed in an attempt to change the
orientation of the Philippine economy from agricultural to agro-industrial.  The
objective was to protect local industries from foreign competition and promote
import-substituting development strategy.  A floating rate system was adopted
in 1970, but it was not until late 1984 that the central bank stopped announcing
a guiding rate and imposing a trading band.
While the controls served their purpose for a time – the import restrictions
stimulated the growth of the manufacturing sector in the early years of exchange
controls – experience showed that a perpetuation of these controls gradually
took its toll on the economy resulting in the lack of competitiveness and stunted
growth.
Thus, bold reforms to deregulate the foreign exchange system began to be
implemented in 1992. The issuance of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
Circular No. 1389 on the “Consolidated Foreign Exchange Rules and Regulations”
on 13 April 1993, marked an important achievement in the country’s efforts to
liberalise foreign exchange transactions following four decades of exchange
controls.2
________________
1. Ms. Butocan is a Bank Officer V at the Department of Economic Research of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas.
2. Specific provisions of the BSP Circular No. 1389 as well as other circulars discussed in this paper
are available in the BSP website www.bsp.gov.ph.250
The liberalisation process covered essentially the lifting of restrictions on
current account transactions and the relaxation of some capital account controls.
The major changes in the current account include the removal of the mandatory
surrender requirements on all foreign exchange receipts as well as the mandatory
inward remittance of all foreign exchange receipts from exporters and the lifting
of restrictions on the purchase and sale of foreign exchange outside the banking
system. Current account transactions were fully liberalised in 1995, the same
year that the Philippines became an Article VIII country of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Presently, the Philippines’ current account transactions, particularly on imports
and import payments and exports and export proceeds, are relatively deregulated,
except for standard documentation requirements and certain restrictions on
commodity imports and regulated exports.
The rules on foreign borrowings and foreign investments were likewise
modified to be consistent with the liberalised rules on the current account. Selected
controls in the capital account were, however, retained to limit the country’s
external vulnerability. The major provisions liberalising the capital account, under
the BSP Circular 1389, include the following:
a. Allowing the full and immediate repatriation of foreign investments, inclu-
ding profit remittances, except investments under debt-to-equity;
b. Allowing outward investments without prior BSP approval, if the foreign
exchange are not to be sourced from the banking system (for outward
investments to be sourced from the banking system a limit of US$1
million per investor per year was set); and
c. Relaxing registration requirements on foreign loans and investments such
that only those whose foreign exchange needs (for future debt servicing
and repatriation of capital and remittances of dividends and profits) are
to be sourced from the banking system need to register with the BSP.
In the succeeding years, the BSP relaxed further regulations on capital flows
taking into account the country’s absorptive capacity amid increasing integration
with global markets. Initiatives in this area included: the lifting of the restriction
on the repatriation of investments (including the remittance of dividends and
profits) under the debt-to-equity conversion programme; allowing indirect exporters
to borrow short-term foreign currency deposit unit (FCDU) loans without prior251
BSP approval to fund both foreign exchange and peso export-related costs; and
raising the limit on outward investments to be sourced from the banking system,
without prior BSP approval, to US$3 million and further to US$6 million, US$12
million, and recently to US$30 million.
1.2 Policies Implemented to Manage Capital Flows
Capital account liberalisation can have large potential economic and welfare
gains. However, the opening of the capital account also increases exposure to
external risks, which, in turn, create challenges in the conduct of domestic
macroeconomic policies, including monetary management. It is, therefore, highly
crucial for monetary authorities to identify the policy options for managing capital
flows.
In general, the policy options available to the BSP in managing capital flows
and limiting the adverse impact of either a surge in foreign inflows, or its reversal,
include: greater foreign exchange flexibility, participation in the foreign exchange
market, reserve accumulation, sterilisation policy, and financial sector reforms.
In the past two decades, the BSP employed a combination of these measures,
depending on the nature, causes and impact of these flows on the economy.
1.2.1 Period from 1992 to 1996
During the surge of capital inflows in the early to mid-1990s, there were
concerns that the appreciation of the peso might adversely affect the country’s
competitiveness. Some participation in the foreign exchange market, through
dollar purchases, was then required to increase the demand for foreign exchange.
This is to stem the rapid appreciation of the peso and avoid substantial loss in
competitiveness.  At the same time, measures were undertaken reduce the supply
of foreign exchange in the country. This was done through accelerating the
BSP’s prepayment of some of its external debt. Between 1994 and 1997, the
BSP prepaid a total of US$1.4 billion of foreign loans. The BSP also relaxed
rules on capital outflows by increasing the allowable outward investments that
can be sourced from the banking system from the initial US$1 million to US$6
million per investor per year. The restriction on the repatriation of foreign
investments made under the debt-to-equity conversion programme was also lifted.
The increased inflow of foreign capital also led to concerns on its impact
on domestic liquidity that could create inflationary pressures. However, the
monetary authorities noted that the economy was undergoing a period of financial252
deepening and that the demand for money was expanding. It was also noted
that the acceleration in the expansion of domestic liquidity, particularly in 1993-
1995, was not accompanied by a significant uptick in inflation. Thus, some
additional expansion in domestic liquidity might not be necessarily inflationary as
this was used to support the expansion of activities in the economy. Accordingly,
monetary policy partly accommodated the capital inflows and tolerated some
uptick in the growth of the money supply. The BSP built up its net foreign assets
with the impact on domestic liquidity only partially sterilised. This approach
allowed the provision of adequate liquidity to support economic growth while
ensuring that inflation objectives are achieved.
1.2.2 Period from 1997 to 2004
Confronted by large reversal of capital flows and exaggerated fluctuations
in the foreign exchange rate at the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997,
tight monetary policy was pursued to adjust to the diminished demand for domestic
assets, limit the extent of exchange rate depreciation, and contain inflationary
pressures. The BSP undertook a delicate balancing act of limiting the depreciation
of the currency and the rise in interest rates. The goal was to allow some
depreciation and accept a temporary rise in interest rates to restore stability in
the foreign exchange market, while at the same time limiting the adverse effects
of this policy choice on the balance sheets of banks and corporates.
(a) Promotion of Financial Sector Stability to Support Stable Capital
 Flows
In response to the distress experienced in the banking and corporate sectors,
the BSP embarked on an aggressive and wide-ranging reform process of the
domestic financial system. The reform process involved greater commitment to
enhancing risk management techniques, strengthening of the regulatory and
supervision frameworks, promotion of transparency and good corporate
governance, and improving financial infrastructure. One of the objectives was
to increase the resilience of the domestic financial sector to volatilities in capital
flows and enable it to allocate foreign capital more efficiently.
Providing the umbrella for this reform process was the enactment of the
General Banking Law in May 2000. This law modernised the legal framework
governing the regulation and supervision of the banking system.  At the same
time, it institutionalised a critical mass of banking reforms in the areas of risk
management, corporate governance, competition as well as microfinance.  This
ushered in the implementation of new banking rules, such as those relating to253
the adoption of a risk-based capital adequacy framework, the observance of fit
and proper rule on bank management, the acquisition of a domestic bank by
foreign banks/nationals and the granting by financial institutions of microfinance
loans.
In terms of upgrading the regulatory framework, the BSP adopted a
consolidated and risk-based approach to banking supervision to proactively
respond to the rapidly changing and highly complex financial services industry.
The risk-based capital adequacy framework was consistent with international
standard and best practice.3 Meanwhile, the consolidated approach to the
supervision of banks and their affiliates or subsidiaries began in 1998 with the
rise of financial conglomerates, which raised concerns on the effectiveness of
the traditional approach to managing risks.  With this approach, the BSP
strengthened its regulatory oversight by having a more comprehensive assessment
of the risks involved in the activities of financial groups.4
To facilitate the efforts by banks to improve the quality of their loan portfolio,
the BSP supported the passage of the Special Purpose Vehicle Act (SPVA) of
2001. The SPVA provided a legal framework for the creation of SPVs, including
the incentives for the disposal of banks’ non-performing assets (NPAs). This
approach remained a private sector-led mechanism and did not involve the use
of public funds. The SPVA, which expired in 2005, was extended for another
year to encourage banks to dispose more of their NPAs.
Support infrastructure was upgraded to make the financial system more
efficient. Along this line, the BSP initiated the upgrading of the existing payment
system into a real time gross settlement (RTGS). The Philippine RTGS, also
known as the Philippine Payment System or PhilPASS, was formally launched
in December 2002. It is expected to minimise systemic risk as real-time high
value payments between banks are made using their deposit accounts with the
BSP.
________________
3. The legal basis for risk-based capital requirement is embodied in Section 34 of the General
Banking Law of 2000. 2 Circular No. 280, dated 29 March 2001. The said Section specified
the guidelines on the risk-based capital adequacy framework which initially covered only capital
requirements for credit risks. Circular No. 360 dated 3 December 2002 specified the guidelines
to incorporate market risk in the risk capital adequacy framework for universal and commercial
banks.
4. In line with the consolidated supervision, the BSP reorganised its departments under the Supervision
and Examination Sector (SES) and a regrouping of the banks assigned to the various bank
examination departments whereby parent banks are grouped with their subsidiaries and affiliates.254
(b) Improvements in Transparency and Monitoring of Capital Flows
Measures to improve and upgrade the monitoring and transparency
mechanisms with respect to capital flows were also introduced. The provision
of timely and relevant information on capital flows can help economic authorities
anticipate possible exchange rate movements or evaluate access conditions in
international capital markets. The Philippines started subscribing to the IMF’s
Special Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS) in 1996. By January 2001, the
Philippines was in full compliance with the SDDS in the dissemination of relevant
data through the Internet in accordance with the prescribed timeliness and
frequency.
To facilitate the adoption of international norms, the Philippines has also been
participating in the formulation of Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes
(ROSCs). These reports assess the extent to which the Philippines conforms to the
various key international standards and codes that are relevant to the effective
functioning of its economic and financial systems. Resulting gains in transparency are
expected to enable market participants to formulate better analysis, forecasts and
investment decisions, thus reducing uncertainty and helping investors price risk on a
sounder basis.
To complement the activities under the ROSCs, the Philippines has also
been participating in the IMF-WB Financial Sector Assessment Programme
(FSAP) aimed at providing a comprehensive assessment of the strengths, risks
and vulnerabilities of the financial system.
(c) Development of Early Warning Systems
The magnitude and volatility of capital flows during the 1997 crisis
underscores the need for developing early warning indicators to anticipate foreign
exchange and banking crises to complement traditional macroeconomic models.
In this regard, the BSP developed Early Warning Systems (EWS) on Currency
Crises and Bank Failure. The EWS on currency crisis uses a signal approach
that compares the actual data of key indicators with the thresholds to help monitor
foreign exchange pressures and predict the occurrence of a currency crisis in
the future. Meanwhile, the Bank Failure EWS produces a one-year advance
forecast of a bank’s solvency. The adoption of this Bank Failure EWS allows
the BSP to prioritise its supervisory focus to the most vulnerable banks based
on the results, and to initiate prompt corrective measures to prevent bigger
problems down the road.255
1.2.3 Period from 2005-2007
In recent years, the Philippines experienced large inflows of foreign capital
due in part to improving market sentiment on the economy. This was driven
largely by renewed investor confidence due to a positive economic outlook
following the recent fiscal reforms and overall solid macroeconomic performance.
However, the rise in capital inflows as well as the sustained foreign exchange
inflows from overseas Filipino remittances and export receipts exerted
appreciation pressures on the peso.
(a) Reforms in the Foreign Exchange Regulatory Framework
To reduce upward pressures on the peso in the short term and allow freer
and more efficient capital flows in the long run, the BSP crafted two sets of
reforms in its foreign exchange regulatory framework. These moves are
envisaged to make the regulatory environment more responsive to the needs of
an expanding, more dynamic economy that is increasingly becoming integrated
with the global markets.
The first phase of the reforms involved changes pertaining to current and
capital account transactions as well as to prudential regulations. Specific measures
under this initiative include: (a) increasing the limit on allowable foreign exchange
purchases by residents from banks for non-trade purposes from US$5,000 to
US$10,000; (b) increased limit on allowable outward investment from US$6 million
per investor per year to US$12 million; and (c) imposition of symmetrical limit
of 20% of unimpaired capital with an absolute limit of US$50 million for both
overbought and oversold positions of the banks. This first package was contained
under Circular Nos. 561 and 565, dated 8 March and 3 May 2007, respectively.
The BSP Circular No. 561 raised the limits on foreign exchange (FX)
purchases by residents for non-trade transaction purposes and outward
investments. The relaxation of the limits was intended to facilitate: (a) the rising
demand by residents for foreign exchange to service non-trade transactions,
such as education of dependents abroad, medical care and payment of service
fees; and (b) greater integration with the international capital markets and
diversification of asset portfolios and risk exposures of institutional investors and
other corporate entities.
The adjustments were seen to support the further liberalisation of capital
flows, and in the process, help dampen the effects of strong foreign exchange
inflows on the exchange rate. They were also aimed at removing the incentive256
for residents to circumvent existing regulatory measures by encouraging
transactions within the formal banking system rather than the unsupervised
market.
The second set of reforms was approved on 20 December 2007. The second
phase focuses largely on two objectives: first, to promote greater integration
with the international capital markets and risk diversification supportive of an
expanding economy with global linkages; and second, to streamline the
documentation and reporting requirements on the sale of foreign exchange by
banks. The policy reforms under the second phase involve the following: (a)
increasing the allowed foreign exchange purchases from banks by residents for
non-trade current account transactions (without the need for supporting
documentation) to US$30,000 from US$10,000 and outward investments (also
without the need for BSP approval) to US$30 million per investor per year from
the previous US$12 million per investor per year; (b) expanding the authority of
foreign currency deposit units of thrift banks and rural/cooperative banks to
deposit and borrow; (c) expanding the use of foreign exchange swaps involving
the Philippine peso; and (d) enhancing other rules concerning both the current
and capital accounts to improve the efficiency of the foreign exchange market.
(b) Liquidity Management Measures
As large foreign exchange inflows has the potential to drive liquidity
expansion, the BSP implemented measures, effective 10 May 2007, to help prevent
inflationary pressures that could build up over the medium term, mainly as a
result of rapid money supply growth. These liquidity measures include: (a)
encouraging pension fund agencies and other government-owned and controlled
corporations to deposit funds with the BSP; (b) allowing trust entities under
BSP supervision to deposit funds with the BSP; and (c) allowing special deposit
account placements of banks to be considered as alternative compliance with
the liquidity floor requirements for government deposits.
(c) Increasing the Reserve Buffer
The importance of building up foreign exchange reserves has been
particularly highlighted during the 1997 financial crisis. The provision of adequate
level of reserves enables policymakers to counter sudden capital flow reversal,
particularly when they threaten to bring unwelcome changes in the value of the
domestic currency. It can also enhance creditworthiness as it builds the credibility
of an economy to service its foreign obligations. The increased inflow of foreign
direct and portfolio investments, together with the steady inflow of overseas257
Filipino remittances and strong export growth, provided the BSP an opportunity
to build a more comfortable international reserve cushion.
(d) Prepayment of loans
The BSP again accelerated the servicing of its external debt obligations
amidst large inflows of foreign exchange. In December 2006, the BSP prepaid
its outstanding obligations to the IMF in the amount of US$220 million, marking
its exit from the post-programme monitoring (PPM) arrangement with the Fund.
Meanwhile, in April 2007, the prepayment of the Philippine Brady Bonds freed
up collateral amounting to US$103 million including interest earned, of which,
US$85 million was credited to the BSP and the balance to the National
Government.
2. Trends in Philippine Capital Flows: 1985-2008
2.1 Key Developments in the Macroeconomy
To provide a background against which to assess trends in the Philippine
capital flows, a brief discussion of the major developments in the macroeconomy
is provided in this subsection.
The Philippines’ economic growth story over the past three decades has
been marked by cycles of economic upswings and downswings. Significant
interruptions in economic growth occurred in 1984-1985, 1991 and 1998, which
were followed by periods of relative growth (Figure 1). In recent years, however,
with the aid of key structural and policy reforms undertaken in the last two
decades, the Philippines achieved its most stable macroeconomic position.
The early 1980s had been difficult as the economy was adversely affected
by deteriorating external conditions. This was reflected mainly in poor commodity
prices, deteriorating terms of trade, and the consequently reduced trade flows.
The US dollar strengthened against virtually all world currencies. International
interest rates were at their highest levels, thus increasing the cost of servicing
the country’s external obligations, eventually leading to the country’s
announcement of a moratorium on its foreign debt. These largely uncontrollable
developments slowed down production, investments and revenues and led to
deep recession in 1984 to 1985. Real GDP fell by 7 % in both these years.
Inflation rate shot up to 50% in 1984 and 23% in 1985. Domestic interest rates
also rose dramatically during this period.258
The economic growth was revived in 1986 under a new administration, with
real GDP reaching 6.7% in 1988. Driving in part the economic expansion during
this period was the vast privatisation programme launched by the government
in 1987.  This initiative was aimed at supporting economic development through
the attraction of fresh infusions of capital to major industrial sectors needing
rejuvenation. But, beginning in 1990, the country encountered economic difficulties
once again. The growing trade and fiscal deficits were of particular concern.
This situation was exacerbated by the start of the Gulf War and, on the domestic
front, by the power crisis as well as the onslaught of severe natural disasters
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The Philippine economy gradually recovered starting in 1993 through the
introduction of broad range of economic liberalisation measures designed to spur
business expansion and foreign investment. Moreover, the initiatives to contain
the budget deficit, mainly through the introduction of build-operate-transfer
schemes and privatisation, efforts paid off. The narrowing of the budget deficit
yielded palpable results, namely, lower interest rates and moderation of inflation.
In 1998, the Philippine economy slowed down as a result of spill-over from
the Asian financial crisis. Real GDP fell to about -0.6% in 1998 from 5.2% in
1997. The Philippines quickly recovered from the crisis, posting positive growth
rates starting in 1999 on the back of a recovery in the agricultural sector and
strong government spending. There was some slowdown following the downturn
in global information technology cycle in 2001, but the economy eventually picked
up momentum from 2002 onwards.
The recovery was helped in part by supportive global economic conditions.
More importantly, the authorities continued to pursue relevant reforms in critical
areas of the economy. Since 2004, real GDP has grown steadily at over 5%
annually. This was capped by the 7.3% GDP growth in 2007, the highest in over
three decades. Growth was supported mainly by strong private consumption,
spurred in part by large inflows of overseas Filipino remittances, increased
government and private construction expenditures, and robust exports growth.
The Philippines experienced the most stable economic environment in 2005-
2007. Inflation reached a historic low of 2.8% in 2007, leading to an ideal
convergence of strong growth and low inflation during the year. The Philippines
also saw marked improvements in the financial and external sectors of the
economy.  The banking sector exhibited marked improvements, as evidenced by
near pre-crisis non-performing loan ratios, double-digit growth in assets and
profitability, and capital adequacies way above the international standards.
Meanwhile, the Philippine stock market closed 2007 as one of the top performers
in East Asia. The Philippine peso appreciated about 16% to the U.S. dollar
between end-2006 and end-2007. The country’s balance of payments was in
substantial surplus of around US$8.5 billion, more than double the level in the
preceding year, due mainly from the continued strength of the current account.
Finally, the GIR, at an all-time high of US$33.7 billion, remains adequate and
within internationally accepted benchmarks.
Since the second half of 2007, however, strains in the global economy began
to surface – the disruption in financial markets and the unprecedented surge in
food and fuel prices. Although faced with tougher economic prospects in 2008,260
compensating strengths in the economy remain. To begin with, the country enters
a slower period from a position of strong domestic demand and with more vibrant
macroeconomic fundamentals today compared to previous episodes of global
economic downturns. Other mitigating factors include the continued strong inflow
of overseas remittances and the favorable prospects of key service sectors,
particularly the business process outsourcing and tourism.
2.2 Trends in Capital Inflows (Non-resident Investment to the
Philippines)
Influenced in part by these developments in the macroeconomy, the Philippine
capital inflows showed three distinct trends in the last three decades (Figure
2).5 First, was the steady rise in capital inflows in the early 1990s that reached
its peak in 1996. A slight decline was however recorded in 1995 following the
financial strains that resulted from the Tequila crisis.  The surge in capital inflows
during this period very likely reflected the reforms undertaken to liberalise the
foreign exchange system in 1993. This was complemented by the efforts of the
National Government to attract and promote foreign investments. Major efforts
include the rationalisation of investment incentives under the Omnibus
Investments Code introduced in 1987 and the passage of the Foreign Investment
Act in 1991 (relevant legislations pertaining to foreign investment in the Philippines
are listed in Annex A). These initiatives helped facilitate further the inflow of
international capital to the Philippine shores. From the implementation of foreign
exchange liberalisation initiatives in 1993 until 1996, gross investment inflow by
non-residents grew at an annual pace of about 60%.
Figure 2
Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices of the Peso
Note: 2008 data is for Jan-Sep
________________
5. Total/gross capital inflows as discussed in this paper consist of non-residents’ (1) foreign direct
investment; (2) portfolio investment; and (3) other investment. Financial derivatives were not
included.261
The second major development in capital flows occurred in the years 1997-
2004. The upward trend in capital inflows was cut short by the Asian financial
crisis in 1997 that led to massive reversal of capital flows. During this year,
gross non-residents investments to the country dropped by 50%.
There was a slight recovery in capital inflows in 1999 due largely to a
Swiss manufacturing company’s buy-out of a local dairy firm.
The recovery in 1999 was, however, interrupted by the dotcom bubble in
early 2000s, which again affected access to international financial markets. In
2000-2001, gross capital inflows declined by 71% and 99%, respectively.
Following improvements in both the domestic and global economic environments
in 2005-2007, non-residents’ investments to the Philippines grew rapidly, almost
reaching its historic highs in the mid-1990s.
Heightened uncertainties in the global economy in 2008 led to weaker capital
inflows to the country. In particular, capital flows were adversely affected by:
(a) the continued weakening of the economies of the country’s major trading
partners; (b) heightened risk aversion of foreign investors due to a general lack
of confidence in the global financial system; and (c) the extensive de-leveraging
and financial restructuring process undertaken in the major advanced economies,
which entailed the withdrawal by these economies of their funds invested abroad,
particularly in emerging market economies. While non-residents’ direct investment
continued to post a surplus in the first three quarters of 2008, this was lower
by 45% compared to the same period in 2007. Meanwhile, non-residents’ portfolio
and other investment reversed to a deficit in the January-September 2008 period.
In terms of composition, foreign direct investments (FDI) and loan availments
comprised a significant share of foreign inflows as they accounted for an average
of about 30% and 51%, respectively, during the period 1990-1996. The share
of FDI declined significantly in 1996 to 5%, but recovered in 1998. FDI by
country of origin is dominated by the US and Japan and is channeled mainly to
the manufacturing sector. Starting in 1999, portfolio investments, particularly
investments in bonds, and direct investments have generally been the most
important sources of capital inflows.
2.3 Trends in Capital Outflows (Resident Investment Abroad)
Since the 1990s, the total capital outflows basically moved in tandem with
the capital inflows (Figure 3). This trend is consistent with the IMF’s observation
that “to a certain extent, an increase in outflows is a consequence of rising262
inflows, with some outward portfolio flows representing the onward distribution
of investment flows into the region, and other outflows representing hedging
associated with portfolio or FDI inflows.”6
Outward investment flows also registered increases in the early to mid-
1990s, most likely a result of the relaxation of rules on capital outflows as part
of the foreign exchange liberalisation measures in 1992. The Asian financial
crisis, however, dampened residents’ investments abroad. There was a short
recovery in 1998, but gross capital outflows fell further in 2000. Beginning in
2005, however, the total capital outflows reached historic highs following favorable
developments in the global economy.
Figure 3
Total Capital Outflows: Residents’ Net Investments
Note: 2008 data is for Jan-Sep
________________
6. Chapter 2: The Evolving Nature of Capital Flows in Emerging Asia, Regional Economic Outlook:
Asia and Pacific, April 2007, International Monetary Fund
In the first three quarters of 2008, residents’ investment abroad weakened
due to the persistence of negative investor sentiment in response to the global
financial crisis. Residents’ FDI investment abroad remained in surplus but was
lower by 96% compared to the same period in 2007. Meanwhile, outward portfolio
investment posted a higher deficit in the first nine months of 2008.
The other investment account comprises the major component of gross
outflows. It recorded large increases in 2005 to 2007, due primarily to prepayments
and repayments made by the National Government and the BSP of their
outstanding loan obligations amidst periods of large and growing stocks of foreign
reserves. Portfolio investment is also a major contributor to capital outflows,
with its share to total outflows averaging 20% in 1990-1999 and 38% in 2000-263
2007. While the Philippines’ direct investments abroad have remained negligible
in the past years, a substantial equity capital placement abroad following the
acquisition of shares of a foreign power company was recorded in 2007.
2.4 Net Capital Flows
Gross capital inflows largely offset the country’s gross outflows throughout
the review period, making the Philippines a net capital importer.  Net capital
flows very much mirrored the trend in gross capital inflows, also reaching its
peak in 1996 and began declining in 1997 (Figure 4). Nonetheless, as a result
of the rapid increase in gross capital outflows, particularly the significant
prepayments made in 2005 to 2007, net capital flows have been lower during
this period.
Figure 4
Net Capital Flows: Inflows Less Outflows
Note: 2008 data is for Jan-Sep
3. Key Determinants of Capital Flows
The large scale capital flows to emerging market countries in the early
1990s and in mid-2000 as well as the extent of their reversal during the 1997
crisis have stimulated an extensive literature on the determinants of such flows.
While the theoretical literature has considered a wide range of possible factors,
much of the empirical work has adopted a framework distinguishing between
the external (“push”) and internal (“pull”) determinants of capital flows (Calvo
et al (1993), Chunan et al (1998), Fernandez-Arias (1996), Montiel and Reinhart
(1999).264
Internal or “pull” factors refer to the domestic determinants of capital inflows,
such as domestic interest rates, stock market prices, macroeconomic stability,
exchange rate regime, inflation, domestic credit level, creditworthiness and
industrial production. Meanwhile, external or “push” factors include movements
in world interest rates, terms-of-trade developments, the international business
cycle and its impact on profit opportunities, and any regulatory changes that
affect the international diversification of investment portfolios at the main financial
centers.
Analysis of the relative roles of push and pull factors in driving capital
flows has an important policy implication, particularly in capital recipient countries.
If capital flows are determined by push factors, domestic policymakers will not
have much control on capital flows. On the other hand, to the extent that capital
flows are determined by pull factors, domestic policymakers will have more
power on capital flows by introducing sound macroeconomic policies.
In order to analyse the magnitude and relative impact of internal and external
factors on capital flows, the vector autoregression model can be utilised as in
other empirical studies of capital flow determinants. The use of the VAR model
is useful in generating impulse response functions (IRFs), which provide an
indication of the response of capital inflows to shocks in the exogenous variables.
In line with the “push-pull” factors approach, the estimation equation can
be specified as follows:
CF = a + biXi + diZi + u
where, CF = total capital inflows
Xi = represents the internal variables (pull factors); and
Zi = represents the external variables (push factors)
In this paper, the pull factors identified are the real GDP growth rate, real
domestic interest rate, current account balance to GDP and exchange rate
volatility, while the push factors include world real GDP growth rate and world
interest rates.
3.1 Data Description
The data employed for the estimation are quarterly data spanning the period




Before proceeding with the VAR estimation, the time-series properties of
the variables were first determined as estimations of non-stationary series are
known to be spurious. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to
check for the presence of unit roots or non-stationarity. The results of the ADF
test indicate that all the variables are non-stationary in levels, except for capital
inflows and US GDP growth (Annex B).
First-differencing was applied to remove the non-stationarity of the series.
After the variables were expressed in first difference form, the ADF test result
shows that all series are stationary at the 5% significance level. There is a
caveat though in performing this step – first differencing results in the loss of
long-run information on the data.
With the variables transformed into stationary series, the model specified
earlier is estimated using the VAR to generate the IRFs. In estimating the VAR,
all variables were first differenced for consistency.266
An important preliminary step in impulse response analysis is the selection
of the VAR lag order. In this exercise, the lag of order three was chosen for
the VAR estimation based on the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria. The
residual test shows that there is no significant serial correlation in the residuals.
It may be noted that IRF results using Cholesky decomposition could be
sensitive to the ordering of the variables in the VAR. Therefore, it is important
to decide on a proper ordering of the variables. There is, however, no unique
solution to the ordering. The Cholesky decomposition requires the variables to
be ordered in a way such that variables placed higher in the ordering have a
contemporaneous impact on all variables lower in  the ordering, but the variables
lower in the ordering do not have a contemporaneous impact on the variables
higher in the ordering. In this paper the Cholesky ordering is based on theoretical
expectations and Granger causality test (Annex C). The external factor variables
were placed before the domestic variables, consistent with a small country
assumption. CF is placed last in the ordering to allow all other system variables
to have a contemporaneous impact on it. Based on these considerations, the
Cholesky ordering was determined as follows: DUS_RGDP, DLIBOR,
DREAL_91TB, DREERMTP, DCAB_GDP, DRGDP, DLOGCF.
3.3 Estimation Results
The IRF result (Figure 5) suggests that a positive Philippine GDP growth
can lead to an increase in capital inflows, with the impact reaching its highest
magnitude in the first quarter after the shock indicating a relatively rapid effect
on capital inflows. Meanwhile, the current account balance exhibits a negative
relationship with capital inflows, which could imply significant reliance on foreign
capital in financing large and persistent current account deficits. Also, as expected,
a less volatile exchange rate environment tends to attract capital inflows. The
result also confirms the predicted inverse relationship between international
interest rates and capital inflows. That is, sustained declines in world interest
rates, particularly of the lending economies, can lead foreign investors to seek
out other markets that would generate higher returns, thus increasing capital
inflows to these markets. IRFs generated in relation to the domestic interest
rate and US GDP growth rate yielded insignificant results.
Overall, the results of the IRF analysis suggest that capital inflows to the
Philippines is influenced by both internal and external factors, specifically by the
growth of the domestic economy, the level of current account deficit, a stable
exchange rate environment and decline in world interest rates.267
Figure 5
Impact of Internal and External Variables to Capital Inflows268
4. Capital flows and Monetary Policy
Capital flows can be a powerful force towards further economic growth,
but if not managed carefully, these can disrupt the development process of a
country. Large capital flows have exposed emerging market economies to risks
in capital markets and financial sectors and increased their vulnerability to external
shocks. These risks include macroeconomic imbalances such as the rapid
appreciation of the real exchange rate, inflationary risks associated the expansion
in domestic liquidity, asset price bubbles, and destabilising effects from sudden
stops or reversal of these flows, similar to what happened during the Asian
financial crisis. These potential adverse effects of capital flows could complicate
the task of monetary as well as exchange rate management.
In the Philippines, large inflow of foreign capital, particularly of a short-
term nature in the years 2005-2007, and its subsequent weakening in light of the
global financial crisis in 2008, have affected the movements of the key economic
variables, particularly the exchange rate, international reserves, domestic liquidity,
and asset prices.
4.1 Impact of Capital Flows on Monetary and Financial Variables
4.1.1 Exchange Rate
Significant movements in capital flows exert pressure on nominal and real
exchange rates. Under a floating exchange rate regime, capital flows directly
impact on the demand for domestic currency assets, leading to an appreciation
or depreciation in the nominal exchange rate. In an environment of sticky prices,
the real exchange rate is likewise affected.
In the Philippines, the rise in capital inflows starting in 2005 as well as the
strong foreign exchange inflows from overseas Filipino remittances and export
receipts exerted upward pressures on the peso. Based on end-of-period rates,
the peso appreciated by 6.0%  in 2005, 8.0% in 2006 and by 19.7% in 2007.7
During this period, the peso exhibited relative stability with the average standard
deviation of the daily exchange rates for 2005-2007 at P0.28 (Figure 6). This
was in stark contrast to the sharp depreciation experienced in the early 2000
when peso volatility reached a peak of P1.82.
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7. Based on average monthly rates, the peso appreciated by 1.7%, 7.4% and 11.2% for 2005, 2006,
and 2007, respectively.269
In 2008, however, the weaker capital flows owing to the rising risk aversion
on concerns about a slowing global economy have put a dampening effect on
the peso. While the peso appreciated by 3.8% on average for 2008, the end-
of-period rate showed the peso depreciated by 12.8%. The depreciation of the
peso was, however, partly tempered by the continued strong dollar inflow of
overseas remittances and export earnings. Heightened market uncertainties drove
the average volatility of the peso to rise by P0.47 in 2008.
Figure 6
Pesos per US Dollar Rates and Volatility
The strength of the peso amid strong foreign exchange inflows in the years
2005-2007 also led to the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (REER)
index of the peso against the currency baskets of its major trading partners
(MTPs) as well as competitor countries. During this three-year period, the REER
of the peso gained by an average of 9.9% against the currency basket of MTPs,
and by 6.0% and 4.4% for the broad and narrow baskets of competing currencies,
respectively (Table 2).
In 2008, the peso continued to exhibit strength on a real trade-weighted
basis as the REER for the broad and narrow baskets of competing currencies
appreciated by 10.2% and 8.4%, respectively. This could be due to the greater
nominal depreciation of competitor currencies against the US dollar.270
Table 2
Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices of the Peso
In the paper by Yap (2008), it was pointed out that foreign exchange inflows
may have a less prominent role in the strengthening of Asian currencies, in
general, and the peso, in particular. Apart from maintaining a current account
surplus since 2003, the paper highlights other factors that contributed to the
appreciation of the peso, including: (a) base effect – the peso exhibited one of
the sharpest depreciations during the Asian crisis period, it was thus expected
to have a faster appreciation during the recovery phase; (b) the success of the
Philippine government’s stringent fiscal reforms implemented in 2005 helped boost
investor confidence, which contributed to the peso’s strong appreciation in 2006-
2007; and (c) the BSP, relative to other central banks in the region, did not
intervene much in the foreign exchange market resulting in a faster appreciation
of the peso compared to other Asian currencies.
4.1.2 Foreign Exchange Reserves
In so far as capital flows result in severe fluctuations in the exchange rate
and bring unwelcome changes in its value, monetary authorities intervene in the
foreign exchange market by buying foreign currency, thus increasing the foreign
reserve buffer. Given its commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime, the
BSP limits its intervention in the foreign exchange market in smoothening
exaggerated movements in the exchange rate, which can threaten the achievement
of the inflation target.271
Since 2005, the country’s gross international reserves (GIR) grew at record
highs (Figure 7). In end-December 2007, the GIR reached an all-time high of
US$33.75 billion. Reserve accumulation remained strong even with the significant
debt prepayments made by the government in recent years. GIR also remained




While large foreign exchange reserves enhance an economy’s resilience
against external vulnerabilities, its rapid accumulation can lead to strong liquidity
and credit growth. However, in the Philippines, there is still extra room to expand
bank credit to the private sector, as will be discussed in later section.
4.1.3 Domestic Liquidity
From 2002-2007, domestic liquidity registered steady increases, with its most
notable expansion posted in 2006 as it rose by 22.7% relative to the 2005 level
(Table 3). The growth in the money supply was supported mainly by the rapid
expansion in NFA. The NFA position expanded by an average of 35% in 2005-
2007 owing to higher foreign exchange inflows from foreign investments, exports
and remittances of overseas Filipinos. While both the BSP and the other depository
corporations (ODCs) exhibited significant expansions in NFA, the increase has
been particularly notable for the ODCs as it reverted to positive levels beginning
in 2005 and even posted three-digit growth rates in 2005-2006. The increased
intermediation of capital inflows by banks resulted in the expansion of the272
industry’s resources. Meanwhile, net domestic assets (NDA) posted modest
growth in recent years as the growth in net credits extended to the public and
private sectors were offset by declines in net other items account.
In 2008, the demand for money remained high due to the strong growth in
both NFA and NDA. NFA grew by 12.9% in November 2008 relative to
December 2007 due mainly to the expansion in the BSP’s foreign assets. Banks’
NFA, however, has been declining as investments in foreign securities dropped




There are three ways in which capital flows affect asset prices (Kim and
Doo, 2008). First is a direct effect through foreign investment in the stock market.
Second, capital flows indirectly result in asset price increases when there is
significant intervention in the foreign exchange market that consequently increases
liquidity flows into asset markets. Third, empirical studies suggest that capital
inflows tend to generate economic booms and, thus, lead to an increase in asset
prices.
In the Philippines, the stock market composite index (PSEi) has shown steady
increases in the years 2004-2007 (Figure 8). This was driven, in part, by a string
of positive economic developments, which included a more accommodating
external environment that led to the rise in regional equity indices, improvement
in the country’s fiscal position following the passage of government revenue-
enhancing measures, and the deceleration in inflation. These developments, in273
turn, contributed to the favorable market sentiment on the economy and attracted
foreign capital flows. A more stable political environment, solid growth in
corporate profits, and implementation of landmark financial reforms, also boosted
share prices in these years. In 2007, the end-of-period composite index surged
to 3,621.6 index points, despite the challenges that began to surface in the global
financial markets in the second half of the year.
Come 2008, however, stock prices trended downwards amid heightened
fears over the US sub-prime crisis and worries over a prolonged global slowdown.
The PSEi ended 2008 at 1,872.9 index points, registering a year-to-date decline
of 48% from end-2007.
Figure 8
Philippine Stock Market Composite Index (PSEi)
The influx of foreign capital had an important contribution to the positive
developments in the local bourse in recent years (i.e., 2005-2007). Foreign
investor participation has, in fact, outpaced local placements as it broadly
accounted for over 50%  of total market transactions since 2002 (Figure 9).
The increased interest of foreign investors was also evident in net foreign
transactions, which represent the inflow (net buying) and outflow (net selling)
of foreign funds in the local stock market. Net foreign buying has grown steadily
during 2003-2006. However, the rising investor risk aversion due to the global
financial crisis led to a decline in net buying activity in 2007, relative to 2006,
and subsequently a reversal to net foreign selling in 2008 (Figure 10).274
Figure 9
Share of Foreign Transactions to Total Value Traded in the PSE
Figure 10
Value of Foreign Transactions in the PSE
Meanwhile in the real estate market, prices started to recover in 2004
following sharp declines in the earlier years as a result of the Asian financial
crisis.8 Since 2004, prices rose steadily in line with the improving economic
environment and increasing inflows of capital in these years. Based on estimates
from Colliers International Research, land values in the fourth quarter of 2007
rose by 30% and 21% year-on-year, respectively, for the CBDs in Makati City
and Ortigas Center. The hike in demand for office space in recent years came
mainly from the growing business process outsourcing sector in the country.
________________
8. Land values in the country’s central business districts (CBDs) in Metro Manila declined by an
average of 13% in 1998-2003.275
4.2 Monetary Policy Reactions to Deal with Capital Flows in Recent
Years
Capital flows can have important implications for monetary policy formulation
by way of their effect on the inflation rate. In the Philippines, there are three
channels by which capital flows can affect inflation, namely, via the exchange
rate, interest rate and domestic liquidity. First, massive and sudden flow of foreign
capital would result in volatile exchange rates affecting import prices and,
subsequently, inflation. Second, in the case of net outflows of capital or a drop
in access to foreign financing would imply a corresponding increase in demand
for domestic financing, both from banks and non-banks. If the domestic liquidity
situation is tight, the loss of access to foreign capital may lead to an increase
in interest rates that have the tendency to have inflationary repercussions due
to higher cost of borrowing. Third, capital flows can affect the conduct of
monetary policy through their direct impact on money supply, which, in turn, can
affect future inflation outcomes.
In view of these factors, the BSP, during the surge of foreign exchange
inflows (which include foreign investment inflows, export receipts and overseas
remittances) in the years 2005-2007, employed various measures that would
mitigate the effects of such flows on inflation and inflation expectations.
A package of measures was adopted in the areas of foreign exchange
regulatory framework and liquidity management in 2007, as discussed in Section
1.2. The primary objective in implementing these reforms is to ensure that the
additional resources provided by foreign capital inflows are used to promote
growth and development, at the same time that the BSP pursues its mandate
of maintaining price stability and safeguarding the stability of the banking system.
Specific measures in these areas include the following:
4.2.1 Reform in the Foreign Exchange Regulatory Framework
a. Increase in the maximum allowable foreign exchange purchases by
residents to cover payments to foreign beneficiaries;
b. Elimination of the “no-splitting” rule within a 20-day period on foreign
exchange purchases for non-trade purposes;
c. Increase in the allowable outward investments by residents without prior
BSP approval and registration; and
d. Imposition of a symmetrical limit of 20% of unimpaired capital with an
absolute limit of US$50 million on both the overbought (OB) and oversold
(OS) positions of banks.276
4.2.2 Liquidity Management Measures
a. Encouraging government-owned and controlled corporations to deposit
funds with the BSP;
b. Allowing trust entities under BSP supervision to deposit funds with the
BSP; and
c. Allowing placements in special deposit account windows of banks to be
considered alternative compliance with the liquidity floor requirements
for government deposits.
Meanwhile, the weaker capital flows in 2008 resulting from the global financial
crisis have put a dampening effect on the peso and resulted in sharp declines
in equity prices. Nonetheless, the sustained flow of remittances of overseas
Filipinos as well as higher export services receipts continue to provide a balancing
effect on the domestic currency. The macroeconomic effects of weaker capital
flows have also been muted due to the continued resilience of domestic demand,
sustained health of the corporate sector, and the dominant domestic financing
of investments.
5. Capital Flows and Financial Stability
The steady inflow of foreign capital in recent years has helped facilitate the
development of the financial sector by allowing higher levels of investment,
promoting technology transfer, and expanding market access. However, it also
exposed financial markets to risks through increased vulnerability to external
shocks, such as what the current global financial crisis has harshly demonstrated.
Thus, to help maximise the benefits and, at the same time, effectively manage
the risks from foreign exchange flows, maintenance of the stability and promotion
of the development of the financial markets has become a priority for many
emerging market countries, including the Philippines.
5.1 Capital Flows in the Banking Sector in the Last Five Years
Figures on short-term capital inflows to the banking system in recent years
have been generally negative, specifically for the years 2000-2003 and in 2006
(Figure 11). For 2000-2002, both portfolio and other investment inflows treaded
on the negative. For portfolio investment this implies that the amount of non-
residents’ portfolio investments to the Philippine banking sector is more than
offset by the sale of non-residents of their previously held domestic portfolios.
Meanwhile, for other investment account, this means that the amount coming
from overseas as other investments to domestic banks has been smaller compared277
to that remitted abroad as payment for other investment received previously.
This development is likely explained by the widespread uncertainty in both the
global and domestic economies during this period. Portfolio investment inflows
turned positive in the succeeding years. These net inflows were, however, offset
by the large net outflow of non-residents’ other investments to the country,
particularly for the years 2003 and 2006.
Figure 11
Short-term Capital Flows to the Banking System
Short-term capital outflows to the banking system, has generally increased
between the years 2000-2007. The amount invested abroad by resident banks
as both portfolio and other investments generally offset the amount they received
from the capital they have previously invested overseas. This is particularly
evident in 2005-2006 during which resident banks, together with the National
Government and the BSP repaid and prepaid a significant amount of their external
loan obligations, taking advantage of the large stock of foreign reserves available.
5.2 Impact of Capital Flows on Credit Growth
The surge in capital inflows in recent past did not translate directly to
increased lending activities by banks. Bank lending growth has remained modest
despite ample liquidity and a generally sound financial system. Total outstanding
loans in the banking system grew at an average of 2.8% in the years 2001-2007
(Table 4).
A combination of demand and supply factors explains the relatively moderate
growth in bank lending. On the demand side, borrowers have not borrowed
heavily from banks due partly to excess capacity and highly liquid positions of278
companies. The relatively weak demand for loans may also be traced to the
changing nature of businesses. The country’s emerging growth industries, which
are mainly service-oriented, such as trading, tourism and business process
outsourcing are less capital and credit-intensive. Non-bank sources of financing
are also becoming more available to the corporate sector as the domestic financial
market broadens, therefore reducing the reliance on bank lending. On the supply
side, credit growth may have been constrained by the cautious stance of banks
following major economic and political uncertainties, and information asymmetries
brought about by the lack of extensive database and credit bureau system to aid
and facilitate loan evaluation.
Table 4
Bank Lending (Other Depository Corporations)
5.3 Central Bank Policy Reactions Related to Capital Flows and Financial
Stability in Recent Years
In recent episodes of capital flows surges, the key priority has been to
promote a well-developed financial market so as to increase the country’s capacity
to absorb such flows, that is, the ability to channel these resources to a broader
range of investment opportunities.
In an effort to broaden and deepen the Philippine financial market, the BSP
has pushed financial sector reforms in recent years aimed at (a) improving the
BSP’s supervision technology and capacity; (b) aligning prudential regulation of
the banking system with international standards and best practices; (c)
strengthening corporate governance standards and market discipline mechanisms;
and (d) stimulating the development of the domestic capital market. Relevant
measures toward this end include the following:279
• Improved financial transparency by enforcing more stringent mark-to-
market regulations; and aligning local accounting standards with
International Accounting Standards;
• Supported the passage of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) Act and
Securitisation law to help banks resolve their bad asset problem;
• Launched the Philippine Payments System or PhilPASS, a real-time pay-
ments infrastructure system;
• Provided for the recognition/de-recognition of domestic credit rating agen-
cies for bank supervisory purposes;
• Issued a directive paving the way for the creation of unit investment
trust funds (UITFs) by authorised trust entities to align the operation of
pooled funds under management by trust entities with international best
practices and enhance their credibility with retail investors;
• Formed the Financial Sector Forum (FSF) with the SEC, the IC, and the
PDIC, to provide an institutionalised framework for coordinating the
supervision and regulation of the financial system;
• Supported the private sector-led initiative to establish a Fixed Income
Exchange (FIE) to provide an electronic platform for the secondary
trading, clearing and settlement, depository, registry and custody of fixed
income securities and its derivatives;
• Approved Securities Borrowing and Lending (SBL)9 as part of the PSE’s
long-term programme to create more stock market sophistication and
liquidity;
• Pushed for the completion of the Philippine Dealing and Exchange Corpo-
ration (PDEx) interconnection for the efficient trading of government
________________
9. SBL involves the lending of securities from a lender’s portfolio on a given date to support
borrowers trading activities with the commitment by the borrower to return or deliver the same
or equivalent securities to the lender at a future date.280
securities through a “straight though processing”10 of government
securities traded at the FIE; and
• Provided guidelines for custodianship agreement between the owner/
purchaser of the security and the BSP accredited third party custodian
of his choice to promote investor protection and enhance the confidence
of investors in the government securities market.
Meanwhile, in light of the current global financial strains, the BSP has been
instituting measures to limit risks to the domestic financial system. The BSP’s
approach under the current turbulent financial conditions is to ensure that there
is no credit gridlock or a freezing-up of credit markets and at the same time
provide sufficient liquidity to fund the growth requirements of the economy. In
particular the BSP has pursued the following measures in 2008:
• Enhanced existing peso repurchase agreement (repo) facilities through
relaxed valuation and a broader list of acceptable collateral;
• Established the US dollar repo facility;
• Reduced the reserve requirement by two percentage points;
• Increased the rediscounting budget from P20 billion to P40 billion; and
• Provided directed relief to banks by allowing reclassification of financial
assets from categories measured at fair value to those measured at
amortised cost.
6. Conclusion: Policy Issues and Lessons Learned
From the time the Philippines liberalised its capital account in the early
1990s, it has experienced episodes of extreme capital flow volatility, i.e., surges
and reversals of capital flows. This highlights the fact that, while the free
movement of capital across borders has provided significant benefits to recipient
economies (e.g., it provides a means to utilise investment opportunities, allows
savers the opportunity to earn higher returns and minimise risks through
international portfolio diversification, and allows expenditure smoothening,
________________
10. In a straight through process, the buyer and seller exchange cash and securities ownership
simultaneously, which eliminates the need to encode separately instructions to the RoSS and
trade transactions.281
especially in the advent of adverse external shocks), it can also bring about
challenges in the conduct of macroeconomic policies, if not managed properly.
In general, capital flow management requires a set of consistent policies
that will help maximise the benefits and limit the risks from capital flow volatility.
Implementing the appropriate policy response depends on a clear understanding
of the causes of such volatilities, i.e., recognising the relative importance of
“push” and “pull” factors. The issue is not whether capital flows are good or
bad, the issue is determining which set of policies will ensure that the additional
resources provided by surges in foreign capital flows are maximised (i.e., used
to promote growth and development), while the risks of sudden stops and
reversals are mitigated.
For the Philippines, both internal and external factors, explain volatilities in
capital inflows. This implies that, while capital inflows are, to a certain extent,
influenced by domestic economic decisions, they will also be affected by factors
beyond the control of policymakers. Such situation requires the instituting of
safeguards against capital flow volatilities that could arise from external shocks
and, at the same time, pursuing policies aimed at effectively allocating additional
resources to more productive uses.
The policy tools available in managing capital flows can be applied to greater
effectiveness if they are supported by macroeconomic and structural reforms,
including:
6.1 Making Further Headway in Macroeconomic and Structural Reform
A key factor in facilitating the efficient use of foreign capital flows is the
maintenance of macroeconomic and financial stability. Stable interest rates,
inflation, and exchange rates project a positive outlook for long-term investment.
Investor confidence could be reinforced by reforms in the financial system that
foster greater competition and enhance integrity. More importantly, instituting
sound macroeconomic policy provides the best insurance against sudden reversals.
6.2 Greater Financial Deepening
To help maximise the benefits of foreign capital flows, it is imperative to
increase the country’s absorptive capacity, such as through greater financial
deepening. A well-developed financial market plays an important role in increasing
a country’s capacity to channel these resources to a broader range of investment
opportunities, such as in infrastructure, support industries, or in financial282
instruments. It is important to note that an economy’s capacity to absorb foreign
exchange inflows also depends on other factors, including the quality of the
labor force, the availability and quality of the infrastructure and the overall
institutional and policy environment.
6.3 Continue Improvements in the Regulatory Framework and Market
Infrastructure
More vigorous reforms in the regulatory and legal environment intended to
provide adequate investor protection and sound business practices would help
remove distortions and increase efficiency in the financial system. Moreover,
improvements in market infrastructure (e.g., the development of internationally
competitive clearing and settlement system) would promote the broadening of
the investor base and the liquidity of the bond markets.
6.4 Promoting the Development of the Domestic Capital Market
A deeper and broader domestic capital market could reduce the over-reliance
by the public on banks and equity financing. This will help mobilise the country’s
savings for investment and economic development and, at the same time, help
reduce the economy’s vulnerability from volatile capital flows and promote
financial market stability.283
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ANNEX A
Major Legislations on Foreign Investment in the Philippines
a. Executive Order No. 226 (The Omnibus Investment Code of 1997)
– provides incentives to registered enterprises in preferred areas of
investment as identified in the Investment Priorities Plan.
b. Republic Act No. 7042, as amended by Republic Act No. 8179 (The
Foreign Investment Act of 1991) – stipulates the processes and conditions
under which foreign nationals may do business in the Philippines.
c. Republic Act No. 7652 (The Investor’s Lease Act of 1993) – allows
qualifying foreign investors to lease private lands for an initial period of up
to 50 years renewable up to an additional 25 years.
d. Republic Act No. 7721 (The Foreign Banks Act of 1994) – liberalised
the entry and scope of operations of foreign banks in the Philippines.
e. Republic Act No. 7718 (The Build-Operate-Transfer Act of 1994) –
allows variations of schemes, eases restrictions on government financing
and setting of tolls and charges, and increases the opportunity for wholly
foreign-owned corporations to undertake a project.
f. Republic Act No. 7916 (The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995) –





CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL




Capital flows to Sri Lanka have been modest as compared to several
SEACEN member countries.  Though the foreign direct investment and portfolio
investment have been increasing over the years, supported by the deepening of
financial sector reforms, capital account liberalisation, privatisation and increased
corporate profitability, the debt flows to the private sector have been low due
to the prevailing exchange control regulation on private sector borrowings.
However, the government has been receiving substantial amount of foreign debt,
especially from multilateral financial institutions and bilateral donors since 1977
to finance major infrastructure projects and major institutional reforms. In the
very recent past, the government resorted to more foreign commercial borrowings
to finance major infrastructure projects as the access to concessional financing
has been declining gradually with Sri Lanka moving to middle-income country
status. During the early 1990s, inflows to the capital market increased sharply
with the relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment in the stock market,
privatisation of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and foreign loan inflows to SOEs
for restructuring purposes. During 2007 and 2008, Sri Lanka experienced a surge
in capital flows mainly due to the issuance of international sovereign bonds by
the government, approval for foreign investment in Treasury bonds and Treasury
bills, substantial increase in foreign investment in the stock market and record
high foreign direct investment. The surge in short-term capital flows in the 1990s
and during  2007 and 2008 have posed some challenges to the monetary authorities
in Sri Lanka, which were successfully managed through the adoption of
appropriate and timely policy actions.
________________
1. Deputy Director, Economic Research Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka. The author
wishes to thank Dr. D S Wijesinghe, Assistant Governor, Central Bank of Sri Lanka and Dr.
P N Weerasinghe, Chief Economist and Director of Economic Research, Central Bank of Sri
Lanka for their valuable comments and suggestions, and also Min B. Shrestha for his comments,
guidance and especially for his assistance in the empirical part of this paper. The author also
wishes to thank the fellow country researchers, Dr. John Junggun Oh and Mr. Vincent Lim for
their helpful comments at the Research workshops.288
This paper examines the policy measures implemented by the government,
trends in capital flows since 1985, determinants of capital flows to Sri Lanka
and capital management policies promulgated by the Sri Lankan authorities.
Section 1 of this paper presents a brief introduction on the topic. Section 2
outlines the general framework and major capital flow management policies in
Sri Lanka, while Section 3 presents the trends in capital flows since 1985.
Determinants of capital flows are analysed in Section 4. Issues relating to capital
flows and monetary policy are discussed in Section 5, while the issues relating
to capital flows and financial stability are discussed in Section 6.  Finally, the
conclusion of this study and the policy recommendations are presented in Section
7.
2. General Framework and Major Capital-Flow Management Polices
At the time of regaining  independence in 1948, Sri Lanka’s balance of
payments had registered a sizable current account surplus and the external
reserves were sufficient to finance about one year’s imports. However, by the
end of the 1950s, the balance of payments came under severe pressure and the
external reserves had fallen to a level sufficient to finance only four months of
imports. The depletion of external reserves prompted the abandonment of the
relatively liberal import and foreign exchange policies and the introduction of
import restriction in 1961. Attempts in the relaxation of the restrictions during
the mid-60s came to an end in 1970. The period 1971-77 witnessed the re-
emergence of a comprehensive system of quantitative restrictions, high tariffs
and foreign exchange controls. The government that came to power in 1977
introduced wide ranging economic reforms, which included removal of the import
controls, unification of the rupee’s two-tier rates, and incentives to foreign
investment to promote export-oriented industrialisation based on the successful
experience of the East Asian countries.
2.1 Current Account and Capital Account Liberalisation
The liberalisation policies introduced in November 1977 removed most of
the quantitative restrictions through the introduction of higher tariffs. During the
period from 1977-1980, import controls and quota were removed for most of the
items leaving only a few items under import control. Export licensing was limited
to only 17 items, and the Exchange controls were relaxed on several items, such
as remittances of profits and dividends to non-resident shareholders, and foreign
exchange for education overseas, etc. During the 1987-90, deregulation continued
and imports controls were removed on several items, deregulation of shipping
and air freight, and selected Exchange controls were relaxed. With the acceptance289
of the obligations under Article VIII of the IMF Articles of the Agreement by
Sri Lanka on 15th March 1994, restrictions on all current account transactions
were removed.  Accordingly, Authorised Dealers (commercial banks) were
permitted to release foreign exchange without restrictions for all current (non-
capital) account transactions.
With regard to capital account liberalisation, successive governments have
generally been following a relatively liberal regime to attract foreign investment
and provided a framework of incentives for such purpose. As far back as 1955
the government of the day issued a White paper on foreign investment, which
defined government policy on all the important issues governing foreign investment.
This included freedom for remittance of profits and repatriation of capital, foreign
participation up to 100 percent, full compensation in the event of nationalisation,
tax concessions, and employment of foreign personnel. The change of government
that followed shortly after the issue of this White Paper resulted in policies of
nationalisation and state enterprise. There were two other White Papers issued
in 1966 and 1972 to redefine government policies and encourage foreign
investment. Although the package of specific incentives offered was generous,
the foreign investors had to operate within a macroeconomic framework of state
controls and regulation. The economic liberalisation introduced in 1977 largely
changed the foreign investment climate in Sri Lanka. The unutilised Sri Lanka’s
export quota under the MFA in the garment industry attracted sizeable flow of
foreign direct investment, especially from Singapore and Hong Kong.  Aid from
donor countries came in the form of grants and concessional loans to support
the government’s structural reform measures and development activities. In 1990,
the government issued a new investment policy. It proceeded to simplify further
the rules and regulations governing foreign direct investment. This was followed
by a set of guidelines which further liberalised the procedures in regard to
remittances and capital repatriation and granted automatic approval for most
foreign investment. More recently, the government’s securities market was opened
up for foreign investment with certain upper limits on such investment.  Annexure
1 presents the chronology of capital account liberalisation.
2.2 Policies Implemented to Manage Capital Inflows
Sri Lanka’s capital market is only partially liberalised and the existing
exchange control regulations on selected foreign investment in Sri Lanka prevent
any surge in capital inflows to the country. However, with the approval for
foreign nationals to purchase 100% of the issued share capital in the listed
companies, subject to certain exclusions and limitations in 1992 and the
privatisation of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), Sri Lanka experienced a surge290
in portfolio investment during 1993-1994, as foreign nationals showed renewed
interest in stock trading and in acquiring ownership. However, this trend did not
continue as the foreign participation in the stock market declined and accounted,
on average, for around 27-30% during the last decade. Hence, such foreign
inflows did not pose any significant challenge to the management of capital
inflows. Again the country witnessed a surge in capital flows during 2007 and
2008 with the opening up of the government securities market for foreign
investment, issuance of sovereign bonds in the international markets, higher FDI
inflows and increased foreign investment in the Colombo stock market.
Until 2006, foreign investment in government securities was not permitted
and currently foreign investors could invest only up to ten percent of the
outstanding stock of Treasury bonds and Treasury bills. Private sector borrowings
other than the borrowing by financial institutions are permitted on a case-by-
case basis and foreign inflows on account of such private borrowings remain
insignificant. Foreign borrowings by financial institutions are restricted to 15%
of their capital and hence their external borrowing is very limited. The monetary
expansion resulting from the surge in capital flows during 1993-94 and 2007-
2008 were managed through monetary policy measures without introducing any
new policies as the existing Exchange Control regulations were effective in
dealing with such flows.2
________________
2. During 1993, the statutory reserve ratios (SRR) on rupee deposit as well as foreign currency
liabilities of commercial banks were raised on several occasions. Accordingly, the SRR on Rupee
deposits was raised to 14 % from 13.5%  set on January 29, 1993. In respect of foreign currency
deposits, the SRR on time and savings deposits was raised from 6 % to 8 %, while on demand
deposits was kept at 10 %.  In view of the continued credit expansion, the SRR on Rupee
deposits was raised to 15% in May, while that on foreign currency time and savings deposits
was fixed at 11 %. In June, the SRR on foreign currency deposits were unified at 12 %. In August
1993, SRR on all deposits were unified at 15 %, thus strengthening the effectiveness of the SRR
as a policy instrument. However, with a view to encouraging commercial banks to build up their
foreign currency assets, thus pressure on reserve money growth, the SRR on foreign currency
deposits placed abroad was lowered to 5 % with effect from February 18, 1994. The SRR on
foreign currency deposits was abolished in August 2000 and currently, there is no SRR on foreign
currency deposits. In addition, major thrust in managing reserve was placed on open market
operations (OMO). In the context of depleted stock of Treasury bills, the Central Bank commenced
the issue of its own securities from October 1993 with a view to containing reserve money
growth in the maturities of 3 months and 6 months.  During 1994 also the CBSL issued its
own securities with 3-6 month maturity to mop up excess liquidity. OMO was the main instrument
used during 2007 and 2008 to mop up the excess rupee liquidity created through the inflow of
foreign funds.291
2.3 Policies Implemented to Manage Capital Outflows
Under the existing exchange control regulations, Sri Lankan residents are
permitted only to undertake direct investment abroad on a case-by-case basis,
depending on the feasibility of each venture, and are not permitted to invest
abroad either in government securities or in equities/ corporate debt securities.
In view of these restrictions, no new policies were introduced to manage the
capital outflows.
3. Trends in Capital Inflows since 1985
3.1 Key Macroeconomic Indicators
The real GDP has been growing at around 5% on average in the post-
liberalisation period, except in 2001 with all the key sectors of the economy
contributing to the overall growth. In 2001, the economy recorded a negative
growth rate of 1.5% for the first time since independence largely due to both
external and internal shocks. On the external front, the terrorist attacks on Sri
Lanka’s only international airport at Katunayake in July and the subsequent
imposition of insurance surcharges on sea and air travel and political uncertainties
contributed to a negative growth. Meanwhile, the economy recorded a higher
growth rate of 7.7% in 2006 and has been growing over 6% during the last
three years. The inflation has been rising in recent years and during the last five
years it increased on average by around 11.3%.292
The interest rates on 12 months fixed deposits, which have been declining
since 1985 rose steadily from 1989 before declining again in 1993. The interest
rates remained at low levels during 2003-2005 (Table 1). However, on an average
basis, the average deposit rate, which remained around 15.65% during 1985-94
declined to 11.80% during 1995-04 and to further 11.67% during 2004-2007.
The same trend has been observed in the prime lending rate, which declined
from 17.80% during 1985-1994 to 14.63% during the 2004-2007 period.293
Table 1
Key Macroeconomic Indicators (1985-2007)
(a) All Share Price Index 1985=100
(b) Sensitive Price Index 1985= 100/ Milanka Price Index 1998 Dec=1000
Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka Colombo Stock Exchange294
Sri Lanka rupee has been depreciating, on average by around 5%, per annum
against the US dollar since moving to the managed float regime in 1977 and it
registered a highest depreciation of 17.43% in 1989. Before moving to an
independently floating exchange regime in 2001 from the managed float, the
rupee depreciated by 14.06 % in 2001. The independently floating exchange
regime has served well for Sri Lanka and during most of 2008 the exchange
rate remained stabilised despite the higher domestic inflation supported by higher
foreign inflows to both the government and the private sector. However, during
the latter part of 2008, especially with the escalation of global financial market
turbulence since September, the exchange rate came under heavy pressure to
depreciate.
The All Share Price Index and Sensitive Price Index/Milanka Price index
continued to perform strongly since 1990, except during 1995-1999 where the
indicators recorded declining movements. Higher corporate sector profitability,
increased activities of domestic retail investors and the strategic buying by the
foreign investors in certain sectors attracted foreign inflows.295
The current account deficit as a percentage of GDP, which remained at a
lower rate during 2001-2005, worsened in 2006 due to higher import expenditure
on oil and investment goods, but improved in 2007 largely offset by higher worker
remittances. The overall balance of payments (BOP) has been recording
surpluses since 2001 except in 2004, largely supported by higher foreign capital
flows to the government. Reflecting the BOP surpluses, the official foreign
reserves of the country also improved, strengthening the external sector resilience.296
3.2 Capital Inflows
3.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment, the principal source of private capital inflows,
which was virtually non-existent prior to 1977, had reached around US$ 64
million in 1982 after the initial liberalisation of the economy in 1977.  However,
this initial momentum could not be maintained and, on average, the FDI flows
during 1985-90 amounted to just around US$ 33 million. This was largely due
to the eruption of ethnic riots in 1983 and the political instability created by the
insurrection of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) during 1983-89 periods3. With
the suppression of the JVP insurrection, the implementation of the second wave
of liberalisation and structural adjustment in 1989, the relative improvement of
the macroeconomic environment  and other reforms measures introduced by the
government, including the privatisation of the SOEs,  FDI increased gradually
and remained, on average, around US$ 118 million  per annum  during 1990-
94. This increasing trend continued thereafter and FDI reached a record level
of US$ 603 million in 2007. Increased investment by companies in the
telecommunications sector through new investments and reinvestment of retained
earnings for expansion of their capacity and networks, and investment in other
services sector, contributed to higher investment in 2006 and 2007.
3.2.2 Portfolio Investment
________________
3. Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (“People’s Liberation Front”) is a nationalist Marxist political party
in Sri Lanka. The party was involved in two armed uprisings against the ruling governments
in 1971 and 1987-89,  and entered into the democratic politics by participating in the 1994
Parliamentary general election.297
The portfolio investment was virtually non-existent prior to1990, and with
approval granted for foreign investment in shares of companies incorporated in
Sri Lanka, the capital flows through portfolio investment expanded to US$ 31
million (0.3% of GDP) in 1991. Since 1991, private capital portfolio investments
tended to increase rapidly and, by 1994, they reached US$ 293 million (2.5%
of GDP). The recession and low interest rates in the industrialised countries
were the main external push factors while high domestic interest rates, further
capital account liberalisation, accelerated divestiture of state-owned enterprises,
and contemporary boom conditions in the Colombo Stock Exchange were some
of the important pull factors. The portfolio investment remained low during 1998-
2002 due to various reasons, including the low profitability of corporate sector,
political instability, loss of investor confidence and the heightened security situation.
However, with the signing of ceasefire agreement with the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE)4 in 2002, investor confidence improved and portfolio flows
surged from US$ 78 million in 2002 to US$ 145 million in 2003. With the
government mobilising funds from the international capital markets for the first
time through the issuance of dollar-denominated bonds, the portfolio investment
flows reached a peak of US$ 600 million in 2007.
3.2.3 Other Investment
Other investment inflows, consisting of private and public sectors’ foreign
borrowings and suppliers’ credits to private sector importers, have been
continuously increasing in the post-liberalisation era. The credit extended by the
foreign suppliers has been growing with the higher import expenditure. The
demand for foreign borrowing by the private sector, including public corporations,
increased during the 1990s, as there was increased access to foreign funds at
relatively low rates of interest than the domestic interest rates.
3.3 Capital Outflows
Currently, Sri Lankan residents are permitted to undertake foreign investments
abroad on a case-by-case basis and hence outflows on account of such investment
are not significant. Residents are not permitted to purchase shares or debt
securities abroad and therefore no outflows on account of portfolio investment.
Meanwhile, Sri Lankan exporters are permitted to extend credit to importers
________________
4. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, is a militant Tamil
nationalist organisation that has been waging  a secessionist campaign against the Sri Lankan
government since the 1970s in order to create a separate Tamil state in the north and east
of Sri Lanka.298
abroad and capital outflows on account of suppliers’ credit have also been
increasing with higher export growth in recent years.
3.3.1 Foreign Direct Investment
FDI outflows, which averaged around US$ 1.6 million during 1985-89, more
than doubled to US$ 4.4 million during 1990-94. During 2003-07, FDI outflows
averaged to around US$ 30 million, with more investors expanding their businesses
overseas, especially in apparel and tourism sectors.
3.3.2 Other Investment
Other investment outflows mainly consist of trade credit extended by the
Sri Lankan exporters to foreign buyers. The other investment outflows, which
were around US$ 300 million in the 1980s and 1990s have exceeded US$ 600
million in 2001. Since then capital outflows have been increasing with higher
growth in exports.
3.4 Net Capital Flows
Net capital flows to Sri Lanka have always been in the favour of inflows
although the net portfolio flows and net other investment flows have registered
capital outflows during certain years. Due to restrictions on residents’ foreign
direct investment, the net FDI flows have always been inflows to Sri Lanka.
The portfolio net inflows, which consisted of only share-related inflows until299
2006, increased substantially in 2007 due to Sri Lanka issuing debut sovereign
debt in the international markets and permitting foreign investors to invest up to
10% of the outstanding stock of rupee- denominated Treasury bonds in 2007.
With the record high FDI net inflows and higher portfolio investment, the net
capital inflows reached an unprecedented level of US$ 1.2 billion in 2007.
4. Determinants of Capital Flows
4.1 Analysis of Macroeconomic Variables of Capital Importing and
Exporting Countries
There are several factors that influence the capital flows to any country.
These include economic, social and political developments in both capital exporting
and importing countries, and could be broadly grouped into two major categories:
the push factors and pull factors. The push factors are related to the economic
cycle and other developments in the capital exporting countries and the pull
factors are related to the reforms and future economic growth prospects and
other developments, especially in the macroeconomic front, in the capital importing
countries. The push factors include changes in world interest rates, especially
US interest rates, changes in financial systems of the capital exporting countries,
world growth and corporate profitability, and demographic structure of the
industrialised countries, etc. The pull factors include increase in productivity and
growth prospects in the capital importing countries, domestic financial market
reforms, trade and capital market liberalisation and government policies on taxation300
and foreign investment, performance of the corporate sector and profitability,
flexibility of the labour market and wage structures, domestic interest rates,
especially yields on Government securities and corporate bonds, in the capital
importing countries.
4.2 Identifying Key Determinants of Capital Flows to Sri Lanka
4.2.1 The Empirical Model
In order to empirically test the determinants of capital flows, we model
capital inflows to Sri Lanka as a linear function of both the pull factors, such
as real GDP growth, real interest rate, and current account balance of Sri Lanka,
and push factors, such as real world GDP and real world interest rate.  For the
empirical test, we use the annual data for all the variables from 1977-2007.  The
rationale for selecting the data from 1977 being Sri Lanka launched its economic
liberalisation in 1977 with a prominent role for the private sector in the economy,
especially for foreign investments.
As explained in Section 4.1, both the pull factors and push factors determine
the capital flows to any country.  In equation (1), CAPIN stands for total inflows
to the country, which is a function of pull factors (internal variables) represented
by Xi and push factors (external variables) represented by Zi.. Finally, á, â and
ä are parameters and u is the error term.
CAPIN = α + βi Xi+ δI Zi + u (1)
Equation (2) is the expansion of equation (1) with four internal variables
and two external variables selected for this study.
CAPIN = α + β1RGDP + β2RINT + β3 CAGDP + β4 XRATE+
δ1RGDPW + δ2 RINTW +e (2)
where, dependent variable CAPIN represents the total capital inflows (FDI
flows, portfolio investment and other investment, such as trade credits received
from foreign suppliers) to Sri Lanka from 1977 to 2007 as a percentage of GDP.
Internal independent variables such as RGDP, RINT CAGDP, XRATE represent,
respectively, real GDP growth rate of Sri Lanka, real interest rate (proxied by
real 12 month fixed deposit rate of National Savings Bank) in Sri Lanka, external
current account as a percentage of GDP and Sri Lanka’s exchange rate expressed
in terms of number of units of US$ per unit of Sri Lankan rupee. Meanwhile,
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World Real GDP Growth Rate (proxied by real GDP growth of USA) and World
Real Interest Rate (proxied by 1-Year US $ LIBOR rate). In the equation (2),
α, βs and δs are parameters to be estimated, while e represents the error term.
The real GDP growth of Sri Lanka is expected to have a positive correlation
with the capital inflows to the country, especially FDI and portfolio investment
as higher growth in the domestic economy will create more investment
opportunities with higher return and encourage foreign investment in the real
economy and equities. The higher domestic real interest rate will have a positive
correlation with capital flows, especially in respect of investment in the
government and corporate securities. However, in the Sri Lankan case, the foreign
investment in corporate securities are not permitted, while the government
securities market was opened for foreign investment only very recently with
certain limitation on maximum permissible foreign investment (up to 10% of
outstanding Treasury bills and bonds). Current account to GDP ratio is expected
to have a positive correlation with capital flows as current account deficit attract
foreign savings to finance the deficit. The exchange rate is expected to have
a negative correlation with capital flows as the appreciation of the USD against
the rupee will reduce the volume of foreign capital required for the purchase
of domestic assets denominated in rupee. The correlation between growth in
world GDP and capital flows to the host country is ambiguous. The higher growth
in the developed countries may create new investment opportunities with higher
return in those countries, thereby encouraging domestic investors to make more
investment domestically and less investment outside the countries. On the other
hand, if high growing countries are operating at full capacity, they may encourage
domestic investors to invest outside the countries rather than investing locally.
The world real interest rate will have a negative correlation with capital flows
to the host country as higher world interest rate may reduce capital flows to the
host country, while attracting more capital flows from other countries.
4.2.2 The Empirical Results
The annual data from 1977-2007 are used to empirically test the determinants
of capital flows to Sri Lanka.  To ascertain the order of integration, augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test is applied and the results are given in Table
2. Accordingly, it was found that the variables, such as CAPIN and RINT,
appear to be integrated of order one and other variables integrated of order
zero. That is among the seven variables, CAPIN and RINTW are non stationary
at level and other five variables are stationary.302
Table 2
Unit Root Test








* Significant at 1% , ** Significant at 5%
As all the variables are not stationary, OLS cannot be performed. Similarly,
since all the variables are not non stationary, Johansen conitegration test cannot
be performed.  Therefore, the OLS- based autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)
model is adopted for cointegration analysis in this study.
The ARDL model for equation (2) is given by
∆CAPINt = α0        βi∆CAPINt-i +     γi∆RGDPt-i +     δi∆RINTt-i +    εi∆CAGDPt-i
+       ει∆XRATEt-i +     θi∆RGDPWt-i +     ϑi∆RINTWt-i + µ1∆CAPINt-1
+ µ2RGDPt-1 + µ3RINTt-1 + µ4CAGDPt-1 + µ5XRATEt-1 + µ6RGDPWt-1
+ µ7rintwt-1 + µt (3)
The test statistics of the above model selected based on Akaike Information


















ARDL (1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 0) Model Long Run Results
Dependent Variable: CAPIN
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio
CONSTANT 1.5486 2.0738       0.7467
CAGDP -0.2075 0.4570     -0.4542
RGDP 1.2267 0.4073        3.0122 ***
RINT 0.4584 0.2093     2.1902 **
RGDPW -1.5537 0.4938      -3.1467 ***
RINTW -0.5855 0.3770     -1.5529
XRATE         -54.6627 54.7136     -0.9991
*** Significant at 1percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level
The long-run results show that real GDP (RGDP) and real interest rates
(RINT) of Sri Lanka are positively associated with capital inflows (CAPIN) to
Sri Lanka, and statistically significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Accordingly, the results suggest that an increase in real GDP of Sri Lanka by
1% will increase capital inflow-GDP ratio by 1.23%, and an increase in domestic
real interest rates by 1% will increase the capital inflow-GDP ratio by around
0.46 %. While world real GDP is negatively associated with CAPIN and
statistically significant at 1 % level. This suggests that an increase in World
GDP by 1% will lead to a reduction in capital inflows to Sri Lanka by 1.55%
of GDP. This may be possibly due to the rising investment opportunities in those
high growing countries with higher returns on such investments, when their
economies grow at higher rates, thereby causing reduction in capital flows to
small developing countries like Sri Lanka. Though, RINT has a positive sign and
is significant, in the Sri Lankan case, interest-sensitive investment instruments
were not opened for foreign investment until recently. Government securities
market was opened for foreign investment in 2006 with strict limitation on
permissible investment, while the corporate securities market still remain closed
for foreign investment. Therefore, real interest was not a pull factor that
determined the capital flows until recently and, as even now, it could influence
only the capital flows in respect of Treasury bonds and Treasury bills, which is
just limited to 10% of the outstanding stock of Treasury bills and Treasury bonds.
The current account to GDP ratio, which reflects the country’s savings
investment gap, has a negative sign and is insignificant. In fact, the government’s304
project-related imports, which include materials, machinery and equipments, and
other investment goods, largely contribute to the widening current account deficits,
and are largely financed through the foreign inflows to the government.  However,
foreign inflows to the government were excluded in this study as it aims to
assess the determinants of capital flows to the private sector. In reality, the
government has been the major recipient of capital flows to Sri Lanka since the
liberalisation of the economy in 1977, as almost all the major infrastructure
projects have been financed by the government through borrowing and grants
from both bilateral and multilateral donors. Therefore, it appears that the exclusion
of inflows to the government in this study may have made the variable CAGDP
negative and insignificant.
Moreover, as stated elsewhere in this paper, the capital account has only
been partially liberalised over the years and still there are several restrictions
on foreign investment in certain sectors.5  In addition, inflows of capital were
largely influenced by other factors such as civil disturbances, which erupted in
1983 and escalated over the last two decades, especially in the North and East
of Sri Lanka, and the JVP insurrection in Southern parts of Sri Lanka during
1990s. Under the prevailing regulatory regime, it is clear that, in the case of Sri
Lanka, domestic pull factors, especially the domestic real GDP growth has been
largely determining the capital flows to the country, especially FDI, trade credits
and portfolio investment. At the same time, increasing FDI flows have been
contributing to higher GDP growth in the economy in the post-liberalisation period.
In recent years, Sri Lanka attracted substantial FDI from India and other
developing countries, such as Malaysia. Indian investors have set up their
businesses in Sri Lanka encouraged by the Free Trade Agreement with India,
where most exports from Sri Lanka to India enjoy duty free market access.
Moreover, the Board of Investment of Sri Lanka provides attractive incentives
to foreign investors such as long tax holidays, tax exemption, and duty free
imports of investment goods, such as plants, machinery and equipments and
building materials. All these factors and the developments in the political and
security fronts are not captured by this model. Hence, further research is needed
in this area to identify the determinants of capital flows to Sri Lanka to strengthen
those factors to attract the much needed capital flows to the critical sectors of
the economy.
________________
5. Foreign investment in government securities, such as Treasury bonds and Treasury bills, were
permitted, respectively, in 2006 and 2008, and such investment is permitted only up to 10%
of outstanding stock of Treasury bonds and bills.   Foreign investment in corporate bonds is
currently not permitted.305
The short-run dynamics of the model is given in Table 4. As in the long run,
RGDP of Sri Lanka is positively associated with CAPIN in the short term as
well and statistically significant at 10% level. Although the World real interest
rate (RINTW) and exchange rate (XRATE) were not statistically significant in
the long run, ∆RINTW, ∆XRATE and ∆XRATE1 are statistically significant, at
10%, 1% and 1%, respectively. That is change in capital flows to Sri Lanka is
associated with changes in World real interest rates and rupee exchange rates
in the short run.
Table 4
ARDL (1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 0) Model ECM Results
Dependent Variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆CAPIN
*** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level
However, the changes in CAGDP ratio, RINT and in the lags of CAGDP
and RINT are statistically not significant. The coefficient of ECM (-1) is -0.7350
and is statistically significant at 1% level. This suggests a rapid adjustment process,
where about 74% of shock or deviation is corrected in one year.306
Table 5
Pair-wise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1977-2007, Lags: 1
Null Hypothesis Obs F-Statistics Prob.
RIR does not Granger Cause CAPIN 30 1.03544 0.3179
CAPIN does not Granger Cause RIR 5.95251 0.0215*
RGDP does not Granger Cause CAPIN 30 0.15372 0.6981
CAPIN does not Granger Cause RGDP 0.00780 0.9303
RGDPW does not Granger Cause CAPIN 30 9.05529 0.0056*
CAPIN does not Granger Cause RGDPW 0.47760 0.4954
The Granger causality test statistics is shown in Table 5. Accordingly, the
global real GDP growth will have an impact on capital flows to Sri Lanka with
one-year lag and is significant at 1% level. Similarly, capital inflows to Sri Lanka
will have an impact on domestic real interest rates with a lag of one year and
is significant at 5% level.   However, the Granger causality test does not reveal
a relationship between Sri Lanka’s real GDP and capital flows. In fact, it has
been practically observed that increasing GDP has contributed to higher foreign
capital inflows to the country in recent years, especially FDI in industry and
services sectors and portfolio investment and such capital inflows, in turn, have
led to higher economic growth through expansion of production capacity. These
causalities are not revealed by this model. Perhaps, it may be due to limited
annual observations, and the availability of quarterly data would have been very
useful to test such causality.
5. Capital Flows and Monetary Policy
5.1 Short-term Capital Inflows and Outflows in the Last Five Years and
Possible Reason Behind the Recent Capital Flows
Short-term capital inflows, consisting of portfolio investment and private
sector debt, increased during 2003-2007, largely due to the substantial increase
in trade credits and further opening of capital account. Short-term capital inflows,
which averaged to around US$ 380 million per annum during 1998-2002, increased
sharply to US$ 1,044 million during 2003-2007. Private short-term debt, which
primarily comprised of trade credit extended by foreign exporters to Sri Lankan307
importers, accounted for over 96% of short-term flows until 2006, and then
declined to around 47% in 2007. This was mainly due to the further opening up
of the capital account by way of permission for foreign investors to invest up
to a permitted limit in rupee-denominated Treasury bonds and the issuance of
dollar-denominated sovereign bonds for the first time in the international markets
by the government to mobilise foreign funds to finance infrastructure projects.
Table 6
Short-term Capital Inflows and Outflows (US$ mn)
Inflows Outflows Net-flows
2003 759.6 739.0 20.6
2004 1041.9 1003.0 38.9
2005 833.4 756.0 77.4
2006 742.6 721.0 21.6
2007 1468.8 848.0 620.8
 Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Private short-term inflows have been rising largely in line with movements
in imports. The average private short-term inflows more than doubled to US$
824 million during 2003-2007 from US$ 395 million during 1998-2002. The main
reason for such a huge increase was the rise in the amount of suppliers’ credit
obtained by the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, the state oil company, from major
oil suppliers’ in the wake of  the sharp increase in international oil prices since
2003.  As a percentage of GDP, the private short-term inflows remained around
3.5% during 2003-2007.
Until recently, portfolio investment consisted purely of foreign investment in
equities and that composition changed in 2007 with the issuance of dollar-
denominated sovereign bonds by the government in international markets in
October and foreign investment in rupee-denominated Treasury bonds in 2007.
As a result, the portfolio inflows, comprising equities and debt securities, recorded
a sharp increase in 2007. Portfolio investment, which has been registering
outflows since 1998, turned around in 2002 and has been registering positive
inflows since then. With the signing of the ceasefire agreement with the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the UNF government in 2002, the activities
in the share market increased substantially with the improved investor confidence,308
as reflected in the share market indices and equity purchases by foreign investors.
During 2003-2007 the All Share Price Index (ASPI) rose by 139% and Milanka
Price Index (MPI) by 73%.
Table 7
Net Portfolio Inflows and Private Short-term Inflows (US$ million)
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
The average net portfolio flows increased substantially to US$ 219 million
during 2003-2007 from an average net outflow of US$ 13 million registered
during 1998-2002.  However, if the inflows on account of international sovereign
bonds and foreign investment in Treasury bonds were excluded, the average net
portfolio inflows from equity flow amounts to around US$ 45 million. The net
foreign equity investment increased from mere US$ 2 million in 2003 to US$
101 million in 2007. The foreign purchases of equities in the Colombo Stock
Exchange (CSE) increased from US$ 144 million in 2003 to US$ 430 million in
2007. A strong performance in the corporate sector, especially in firms engaged
in banking, telecommunications and insurance, attracted substantial foreign
interests in equities listed in the CSE in recent years, with some strategic foreign
buying in those companies. In 2007, the net portfolio investment increased
substantially with the issuance of US$ 500 million worth of sovereign bonds in
the international financial markets by the government and foreign investment in
rupee-denominated Treasury bonds amounting to US$ 372 million.
The short-term capital outflows comprising purely the trade credit extended
by Sri Lankan exporters to foreign buyers also continued to increase in line with
growth in exports. The average short-term capital outflows during 2003-2008
increased to US$ 813 million from US$ 370 million during 1998-2002. This
increase was attributable mainly to growth in exports, which increased to US$
7,740 million in 2007 from US$ 5,133 million in 2003.309
5.2 Impact of Capital Inflows and Outflows on Monetary and Financial
Variables
The net short-term inflows were not substantial till 2005. Net inflows rose
from just around US$ 21 million in 2003 to US$ 77 million in 2005, but decreased
to US$22 million in 2006 before reaching a peak of US$ 621 million in 2007.
Hence, they did not impact on the domestic deposit and lending rates during
these periods. At the same time, they were not significant to have impact on
the exchange rate as well. However, these inflows coupled with trade flows and
private remittances seemed to have impacted on the exchange rates in certain
years. The rupee-US dollar exchange rate appreciated by around 2.4% in 2005,
irrespective of high domestic inflation as compared to that of major trading
partners and competitors largely due to relatively higher short-term foreign inflows
and sharp rise in private remittances and aid flows received in the aftermath of
tsunami that devastated major coastal areas of Sri Lanka in December 2004.
Again in 2007, the exchange rate, which was depreciating at around 5.6% to
Rs.113.47 per US$ by the end September amidst injection of foreign currency
to the forex market by the central bank, reversed its depreciating trends in
October with the receipt of proceeds of international sovereign bonds amounting
to US$ 500 million in October. The rupee-dollar exchange rates fell to Rs.111.89
in October from Rs.113.47 in September and by end 2007 it reached Rs.108.64
per US$ thereby registering a marginal depreciation of 0.93%, irrespective of
higher domestic inflation of 17.5%.310
The official external reserves of the country were not materially impacted
by the capital flows, as the net short-term flows were not substantial until 2007.
However, these short-term flows, by lowering the market expectation of sharper
depreciation of rupee, have indirectly contributed in building up the official
reserves helping to avoid the drain of reserves, which otherwise would have
warranted the  sale of foreign currency to the market by the central bank to
avoid excessive volatility in the foreign exchange market. The reserves declined
to US$ 2,196 million in 2004 from US$ 2,329 million at end December 2003
largely due to the sale of foreign exchange amounting to US$ 515 million in
2004 to meet the excess demand resulting from the higher trade deficit. However,
the reserves increased by US$ 539 million to US$ 2,735 million in 2005 with  the
relatively low volume of sales in that year resulting from the higher purchases
of foreign exchange  by the central bank amounting to US$ 290 million as against
a purchase of US$ 27 million in the previous year. With the purchase of the
proceeds of sovereign bonds and a part of the proceeds of foreign investment
in Treasury bonds from the market, the official reserves increased by US$ 671
million to US$ 3,508 million in 2007, while the total external reserves of the
country increased by US$ 951 million to US$ 4,956 million, with the commercial
banks absorbing a part of the proceeds of foreign investment in Treasury bonds
and higher foreign equity investment in shares listed in the Colombo Stock
Exchange.311
Both the ASPI and MPI indices have been rising during the last five years
reflecting increased activities in the Colombo Stock market and higher profitability
of corporate sector. The activities of domestic retail investors in the share market
have been growing since mid-1990s, which reached as high as 87% in 2000
mainly due to the low deposit rates and higher earning potentials from the equity
trading. However, encouraged by the higher corporate earnings and increased
retail activities, the foreign participation continued to increase and reached around
45% in 2007. Both the ASPI and MPI, decreased by 6.7% and 11.3%,
respectively, in 2007, irrespective of both foreign purchases and sales recording
highest flows of US$423 million and US$ 322 million, respectively, resulting in
an unprecedented  record-high in net equity inflows of US$ 101 million in 2007.
Hence, there is no evidence to suggest the impact of foreign inflows on the
share market indices, which are largely influenced by the domestic retail activities.
5.3 Monetary Policy Reactions to Deal with Capital Inflows and Outflows
in Recent Years
As discussed above, the net short-tem flows were not significant in recent
years to pose any challenges to monetary management in Sri Lanka due to the
existing regulations and the short-term financial outflows are not permitted under
the existing exchange control regulations.6 However, the opening up of Treasury
bond market for foreign investment with limited investment and receipts of debut
international sovereign bond proceeds in 2007 posed some challenges for the
monetary management in the latter part of 2007 as market liquidity increased
with central bank purchases of such foreign proceeds. This situation was further
aggravated in 2008 following the permission for foreign investment in Treasury
bills and with foreign exchange earners also bringing in their foreign exchange
earnings from overseas bank accounts and converting their foreign exchange
earnings lying in the foreign currency deposit accounts with domestic banks, on
the expectation of further appreciation of rupee with continuous foreign inflows.
In this context, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka actively used sterilised
intervention policies without adjusting statutory reserve requirement (SRR) on
rupee deposits (no SRR on foreign currency deposits) or adjusting the policy
rates as those short-term term flows were not permanent in nature and not
substantially high. Accordingly, the central bank continued to absorb excess
________________
6. Under the existing Exchange Control Regulations, Sri Lankan residents are given case-by-case
approval to undertake only foreign direct investment abroad and are not permitted to undertake
foreign investment in government securities, stocks and corporate securities overseas.312
liquidity in the foreign exchange market by purchasing foreign exchange in the
inter-bank market, while at the same time mopping up the excess liquidity in the
banking system through the aggressive Open Market Operations (OMO), on
overnight/long-term basis.  For the OMO, the central bank mainly used the
Treasury bill holdings held by it and, in the absence of Treasury bills in the
holdings of the central bank, the bank issued its own securities called Central
Bank Securities to absorb excess liquidity from the banking system. However,
the authorities experienced some difficulties in absorbing the excess liquidity
through the issuance of Central Bank Securities due to the lesser attractiveness
of such securities, as they cannot be used by commercial banks as collateral to
obtain liquidity facility from the Central Bank’s reverse repo window.
6. Capital Flows and Financial Stability
6.1 Capital Flows in Banking Sector in the Last Five Years and Possible
Reason Behind the Recent Capital Inflows in This Sector
Commercial banks in Sri Lanka are currently permitted to borrow only up
to 15% of their capital and reserves and hence capital flows to banking sector
are limited by banking regulations.  Net inflows to the Domestic Banking Units
(DBUs) of commercial banks amounted to just US$ 13 million in 2003 and  US$
24 million in 2004, but declined to US$ 6 million in 2005 before rising to US$
31 million in 2006. During 2007, capital flows to the DBUs turned to net outflows
due to the settlement of overseas loans. However, the Off-shore Banking Units
(OBUs), which are established under the Central Bank Circular No. 380 of 2
May 1979, are permitted to borrow from and to lend to non-residents without
any restrictions. Their lending in domestic market is limited to commercial banks,
companies approved under Section 17 of the Board of Investment of Sri Lanka
(BOI) Act and other residents approved by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.313
The net capital flows to OBUs have been increasing during the last few
years due to the higher demand for foreign currency loans from the BOI
companies mainly due to the relatively higher domestic interest rates, as compared
to the interest rates on foreign currency loans and local banks raising syndicated
loans from overseas banks to on-lend to the government. The net inflows to
OBUs in 2005 and 2007 increased substantially to US$ 273 million and US$ 342
million, respectively, as compared to an inflow of US$ 115 million in  2004 mainly
due to the mobilisation of syndicated loans for the government by local banks,
as compared to an outflow of US$ 20 million in 2006.
6.2 Impact of Capital Inflows and Outflows on Financial Stability
As explained above, the capital flows to banking sector were not so large
and volatile to have any destabilising impact on the financial system stability.
The banking sector regulations impose limits on foreign borrowings, maximum
accommodation and single borrowers’ limit, and the existing exchange control
regulations impose limits on lending to resident entities in foreign currencies.
Such regulations act as safeguards in ensuring the financial sector stability.
The commercial banks’ lending to various sectors is given in Table 8.
Accordingly, the bank lending has been increasing during the last five years. A
major part of the lending has been for the financing of trading activities, followed
by the consumption and housing. On average, during the last five years the
trading sector absorbed around 27% of the total lending, while the private
consumption and housing sectors absorbed around 25% and 17%, respectively.
The lending has been growing with the relaxed monetary policy since 2002 and
increased economic activities, the result of a peaceful political environment ensuing
from the signing of a ceasefire agreement with the rebel group in 2002. However,
the growth in bank lending has been declining since 2005 with the tightening of
monetary policy and recommencement of hostilities. The lending, which grew
by over 82% in 2004 has slowed to around 5% in 2007. However, the growth
in lending was largely met by deposit mobilisation, which has been growing, on




Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
The growth in bank lending has not affected the asset quality of the banks
as the banks were more diligent in the provision of loans to their customers.
Moreover, the banks have been following better risk management techniques
and sound loan recovery procedures supported by more stringent prudential
measures. As a result, the non-performing loan ratio (NPL) for the banking
system has been improving from around 12.3% in 2003 to around 5.2% in 2007
(Chart13). The profitability of banks, as indicated by the return on assets (ROA)
ratio, also showed an improvement from 0.8% in 2003 to around 1.2% in 2007
with the higher profitability of banking system.315
The equity prices, as indicated by movements in both the ASPI and MPI,
increased substantially during the last five years, except in 2007, due to the
increased participation of domestic retail investors on the wake of low deposit
rates and low yields on Government securities. Moreover, the increasing foreign
interest in the Colombo stock market contributed to the higher equity prices, as
the Colombo stock market has been recognised as one of the best performing
market in the region. However, in 2007 the equity prices decreased even with
the record-high foreign inflows during the year. The ASPI and MPI recorded
a decline of 6.7% and 11.3%, respectively. The equity prices reached record
levels during the first two months, but moved down thereafter due to numerous
factors, such as heightened security concerns, higher yields on gild-edge
Government securities, such as Treasury bills and bonds, higher interest rates
on bank deposits and the implementation of rules on margin trading.
Table 9
Movements in Equity Prices
Equity flows ASPI % change MPI % change
2003 1.6 1062.1 30.3 1897.8 38.1
2004 10.9 1506.9 41.9 2073.7 9.3
2005 61.4 1922.2 27.6 2451.1 18.2
2006 50.6 2722.4 41.6 3711.8 51.4
2007 101.0 2541.0 -6.7 3291.9 -11.3
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Though, the government securities market was opened for foreign investment
in 2006, the inflow came only in 2007 as the rule on minimum holding period
for foreign investment was withdrawn in January 2007. The yield on Treasury
bills, which was in the region of 13% at the beginning of the year, rose sharply
during the year with the tightening of monetary policy. However, with receipt
of the proceeds of international sovereign bonds (US$500 million) in October
and inflows foreign investment in Treasury bonds amounting to US$ 372 million,
the yield rates declined during October-December to around 20% at the end of
2007. Though the inflow of foreign investment did not sharply reduce the yield
rates, it prevented the yield rates from shooting up further in 2007.316
During 2008, the inflows on account of foreign investment in Treasury bills
and bonds increased further largely due to the higher yields on these securities,
as compared to the foreign interest rates and stable rupee-US dollar exchange
rates that prevailed in 2008.  However, it is still too early to assess whether Sri
Lanka will continue to receive foreign investment on these government securities
if the yield rates decline and the exchange rate depreciates in the future.
Table 10
Treasury Bill Yield rates (%)-Primary Market
91-Day 182-Day 364-Day
2003 7.35 7.24 8.00
2004 7.25 7.65 8.90
2005 10.10 10.32 10.37
2006 12.76 12.78 12.96
2007 21.30 19.99 19.96
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka317
6.3 Central Bank Policy Reactions Related to Capital Flows and Financial
Stability in Recent Years
As explained elsewhere in the paper, the existing exchange control regulations
and banking sector regulations prevent higher foreign speculative capital inflows
or outflows.  However, the recent opening up of government securities for foreign
investment and allowing foreigners to open savings accounts, either in foreign
currencies or in local currency,  may expose the financial system to foreign
exchange risks if there is any sudden reversals of such foreign inflows.
Nevertheless, since there are restrictions on such inflows in the form of 10%
cap on foreign investment in both Treasury bills and bonds and limits on
acceptance of foreign savings by a domestic bank up to 20% of  total deposit
liabilities of the domestic banking unit, their impact on financial system stability
will be limited. Moreover, the polices implemented to improve the financial sector
stability and soundness will ensure the resilience of this sector to any shocks
that may be created by foreign capital flows.
The minimum equity capital requirement for commercial banks was raised
to Rs.2,500 million in 2005 from Rs.500 million to promote consolidation in the
banking sector. In 2006, a general provision for loans was introduced. Accordingly,
all banks were required to maintain a general provision of 1% of total performing
loans and advances and non-performing loans in the overdue category (loans
and advances in arrears for 3-6 months). Banks were directed to adopt Basel
II effective from January 2008, and this new framework is intended to improve
the safety and soundness of the banking system by aligning capital adequacy
assessment more closely with the underlying main risks in the banks.
7. Conclusion
As the capital inflows to Sri Lanka remain relatively small, they have not
posed any major difficulties for the conduct of monetary policy and monetary
management in Sri Lanka, except during 1993-1994 and 2007-2008 when there
were surges in capital flows during these periods.  Even though inward FDI,
equity investment of up to 100% by the foreigners in shares listed in the Colombo
stock exchange, and foreign investment in government securities up to 10% of
outstanding Treasury bills and bonds are freely permitted, the capital inflows to
Sri Lanka still remain relatively small, partly due to the existence of restrictions
on certain capital inflows, such as private sector external borrowing, external
borrowing by commercial banks, and foreign investment in corporate and
government securities.318
To deal with the surges in capital flows during 1993-94 and 2007- 2008, the
central bank primarily relied on monetary management.  In order to absorb the
excess liquidity in the banking system, the central bank raised the SRR on several
occasions during 1993-1994, while absorbing excess liquidity through its open
market operations through the sale of Treasury bills and central bank’s own
securities. During the latter part of 2007 and the early part of 2008, the country
experienced sudden capital inflows with the opening of Treasury bills for foreign
investment and enhancement of permissible foreign investment limit on Treasury
bonds, and the central bank used sterilised intervention to absorb the excess
forex liquidity and resultant excess rupee liquidity. Again the central bank had
to issue its own securities as it did not possess sufficient stock of Treasury bills
for the conduct of OMOs. However, foreign investment in government securities
fled with the intensification of the global financial crisis since mid-September
2008, exerting higher pressure on the exchange rates to depreciate. In this regard,
to meet the excess demand created by such sudden capital outflows, the central
bank sold foreign exchange, which created liquidity shortage in the banking system
requiring the provision of rupee liquidity by the central bank through open market
operations. This situation highlighted the risks of encouraging short-term
speculative capital flows. Therefore, Sri Lanka should focus more on attracting
long-term capital flows and discourage interest sensitive short-term speculative
flows to avoid any adverse impact on the exchange rates and the monetary
management.
Even with this high degree of capital account opening, the capital inflows
seem to be at low level though both FDI and portfolio investment increased in
recent years. This highlights the existence of some structural issues, which needs
to be addressed effectively to attain the desirable level of investment to finance
the widening savings-investment gap through long-term investment flows rather
than short-term debt flows.
7.1 Major Issues
As an emerging economy with a relatively higher savings-investment gap,
Sri Lanka needs to attract foreign capital to finance the necessary social and
economic infrastructure to promote a sustainable higher economic growth in
order to enhance the income of the people and alleviate poverty. Though Sri
Lanka was the pioneer in the South Asian region to adopt a market-oriented
economic policy and open the economy for foreign direct investment and trade,
it still lags behind other countries, who embraced the open economic policy much
latter than Sri Lanka. The main contributory factors for such lackluster319
performance were lack of better infrastructure facilities, heightened civil conflicts
since 1983 and the resultant waste of human and financial resources, and lack
of willingness to implement the necessary reforms in some key areas, including
labour laws. The bold reforms implemented by the Sri Lankan authorities over
the years in respect of several key areas, including external trade, foreign
investment, Customs, taxation and tax administration and financial sector have
yielded tangible benefits to the country. However, it is necessary to implement
reforms in areas such as labour laws, land laws, and energy sector, etc., on a
priority basis, while strengthening the reforms already instituted in other areas.
Therefore, timely policy initiatives are essential to relax the existing restrictions
and regulations that discourage capital flows to create a conducive investment
climate in the country so that foreign investment could be attracted to facilitate
the continuation of the current economic growth momentum.
Currently, the government receives higher capital flows with least flows to
the private sector as there are restrictions on the private sector borrowings and
the infrastructure projects are largely financed by the government. The
concessional financing to government from multilateral financial institutions are
gradually drying up with the country moving into a middle income status,
warranting the government to borrow from the financial markets and bilateral
sources at commercial interest rates to finance new infrastructure projects. This
raises the government debt servicing burden and, hence, the higher fiscal deficit,
which will be largely financed through bank financing if the government revenue
grows at a slower pace, leading to higher inflation and imbalance in the economy.
In several countries major infrastructure projects are implemented under private-
public partnership (PPP) arrangements with risk sharing, financing and expertise
from the private sector. Hence, both the local and foreign private sector could
be engaged in the infrastructure developments with greater access to foreign
financing for the local private sector.
The higher yield rates on government securities resulting from the higher
budgetary financing requirement may encourage speculative capital flows in the
short-term, which may reverse faster if the domestic currency depreciates rapidly
and macro imbalance emerges in the country. Such a sudden reversal of capital
flows would exert pressure on the exchange rates to depreciate further thereby
triggering outflow of other short-term capital as well. Consequently, depreciating
currency would adversely impact on government’s debt servicing, balance sheets
of the financial institutions and private sector borrowers, who have exposure to
foreign currency debt. Therefore, it would be prudent to impose an acceptable
minimum holding period on government securities and impose a tax on withdrawal320
of such short-term flows before the minimum holding period to avoid speculative
capital flows.
7.2 Policy Recommendations
The government should encourage trade-related FDI, which will not only
partly finance the savings-investment gap, but it will also bring in foreign exchange
in the future through exports revenue, thereby strengthening the debt servicing
capacity of the country.  In addition, more private companies should be encouraged
to list their shares in the stock exchange to increase foreign interest in the stock
market and to receive cheap capital for the expansion of business ventures.
Private sector enterprises, which are commercially viable and have a good track
record should be permitted to borrow freely from overseas on a medium to
long-term basis, while at the same time permitting foreigners to subscribe to
corporate bonds issued locally by the private sector. In this respect, the existing
exchange control regulations need to be gradually relaxed with sufficient
safeguards for ensuring the stability of the financial system.
However, short-term capital flows to both the private and public sectors
should be discouraged as they are likely to cause higher volatility in the foreign
exchange market and be the first to fly out of the country when macro imbalances
emerge or when the speculation builds up against the domestic currency.
Consequently, macro imbalances may intensify causing exchange rates to
depreciate rapidly affecting the balance sheets of financial institutions and private
borrowers. This would increase the external debt servicing cost of the private
sector and the government. Therefore, it is necessary for the country to maintain
a sound macroeconomic environment and adopt a more flexible exchange rate
regime to encourage long-term capital flows, such as foreign direct investment,
in order to deter speculative capital flows and, hence, their destabilising effects
on the overall economy.321
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ANNEX I







Resident Non-National Foreign Currency Account Scheme was introduced
Resident Guests were permitted by the Minister of Finance and planning to bring
in external funds for investments in the projects approved by the Greater Colombo
Economic Commission(G.C.E.C)
Authorised Dealers were permitted to open and maintain Non-Resident Foreign
Currency Accounts for nationals of Sri Lanka who are or have been employed
abroad and for non-nationals of Sri Lankan origin who are resident outside Sri
Lanka
Permission granted under sections 10, 11 and 15 of the Exchange Control Act to
approved country funds, approved regional funds and individuals resident outside
Sri Lanka to invest;
a) In a listed public company other than (b), (c ), and (d), up to 40%
of the issued capital.
b) In a company incorporated in Sri Lanka in which investment by non-
resident required the approval of the government or Foreign investment
authority.
c) In a commercial bank incorporated in Sri Lanka, up to the maximum
limit determined by the Monetary Board in terms of the Banking Act
No 30 of 1988.
d) In a company incorporated for insurance business, up to the limit
approved the government of Sri Lanka or the authorised body.
Purchase of shares in companies in Sri Lanka, by approved country funds,
approved Country funds, regional funds and individuals resident outside Sri Lanka,
up to 100% of the issued capital subject to;
(a) Foreign Investment in Money Lending, pawn broking, retail trade
with a capital of less than US$1 million, personal services other than
for export sector or tourism sector and coastal fishing shall not be
permitted
(b) Foreign investment in companies established for Banking, Finance,
Insurance, Trading services on the CSE, Air transportation, Coastal
shipping, manufacturing arms, explosives, military vehicles and
equipments, aircraft and other military hardware, manufacturing of
poisons, narcotics, alcohols and dangerous drugs, producing currency
and coins, production and distribution of energy and power,   large





shall be permitted only up to the extent approved by the respective
authority.
(c) For the following businesses up to 40% of the issued capital is
permitted. However, a higher percentage may be approved in a case-
by-case basis.
• Production of goods where Sri Lanka’s exports are subject to
internationally determined quota restrictions, Growing tea, rubber,
coconut, cocoa, rice, sugar and spices.
• Mining of no renewable national resources,  Timber-based industries
using local timber,
• Fishing, Construction of residents, Supply of water, Mass
transportation,
• Telecommunications, Mass communications, Education,  Professional
services,
• Freight forwarding and Travel/ Shipping agencies
The repatriation requirement and surrender requirement imposed on exporters in
terms of section 22 (4) and 6(2) (a) of the Exchange Control Act No.17 of 1971
were removed.  Accordingly, exporters were permitted either to repatriate export
proceeds or to retain them in foreign currency accounts in a commercial bank
abroad. Commercial banks were permitted to enter into contracts for the sale of
foreign exchange forward for a period up to 360 days.
Commercial banks were permitted to obtain foreign currency loans up to 15%
of their capital and reserves.
Commercial banks were permitted to provide foreign currency loans to Non-BOI
Exporters, from either their domestic Units or from their FCBUs subject to some
safeguards.
(a) The permission is granted for foreign investment in sectors up to percentage
of issued capital of the company subject to regulatory limits, requirements
and conditions. Permitted foreign shareholdings are Banking institutions
licensed under Banking Act (60%), Insurance (90%), Stock broking (49%
or, 100% where SEC approval is granted), Other financial services (49%).
(b) Non-resident investors were permitted to invest in Unit Trusts that contain
a trust deed with a restriction that not more than 20% of the deposited






Sri Lankan citizens living abroad were permitted to open a special bank account
titled Rupee Accounts for Non-Resident Investment (RANSI).
Non-Resident Investors were permitted to invest in US dollar Denominated
Government Bonds titled Sri Lanka Development Bonds (SLDBs)
Non-Resident Investments up to 100% of the equity capital in any rupee company
established in the areas of financial sector activities such as banking, finance,
Insurance, stock broking.  Non-Resident investments were also permitted up to
100% in activities related to infrastructure development and professional services
and setting up of branch/liaison offices of companies incorporate overseas in Sri
Lanka.
Foreign investment in Rupee Denominated Treasury Bonds (T-bonds) to a limit
up to 10% of outstanding Treasury bonds was permitted.
Dual citizenship applicants were permitted to open foreign currency fixed deposit
accounts with the commercial banks.
1. Foreign investors were allowed to invest in Treasury Bills up to 10% of
outstanding Treasury bills stocks
2. Non-Residents were permitted to open and maintain foreign currency and
Rupee Fixed Deposit with commercial banks
3. Effective from 01July2008 Sri Lankans migrating permanently will be
permitted to repatriate a higher amount of US$ 150,000, as compared to
US$ 10,000 permitted earlier. This will cover allowances and personal effects
such as jewellery and other goods exported. Any local proceeds of wealth
in excess of US 150,000 should be deposited in a blocked account carrying
interest income with a commercial bank. Of such sum, a sum of US 20,000
or its equivalent will be allowed to be remitted each year. Any balances in
blocked accounts may be utilised to meet any disbursements in Sri Lanka,
including investments permitted for non-residents.327
Chapter 11
CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS




Capital flows have significant repercussions for developing countries. In the
past decade, most of the countries in the SEACEN region received massive
capital inflows due to their rapid economic development and steady export
performance. The influx of foreign capital can supply the needed capital to support
their economic development but it can also have an adverse impact on the
economy and financial system of the recipient countries, if the capital inflows
are not properly managed. Whether huge capital inflows create asset bubbles
is another important issue for the countries to address. Section 1 of this report
highlights the pattern of the capital flows in Taiwan. It analyses the related
capital flow policies, capital flow trends in Taiwan, and identifies the possible
determinants. In Section 2, an empirical analysis of capital flows is carried out,
including the factors affecting capital flows. The consequences of capital inflows
and the implications of capital flows for central bank policies are discussed and
the conclusions are then presented.
2. General Framework and Capital Flows Management Policies in
Taiwan
The balance of payment (BOP), reflecting a country’s capital flows and
trade, consists of three parts: current account, capital account and financial
account. Current account usually reflects a country’s trade surplus or deficit
and is significantly important for small, open economies. Capital flows, on the
other hand, are generally captured under the financial accounts of BOP after
revision by the IMF, and represent the amount and direction of capital flows into
and out of a country.
________________
1. Author is the Senior Economist from Department of Foreign Exchange, Central Bank of Republic
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Taiwan is a small island country and is typical of an open economy. Its
economy is traditionally dependent on trade. Its current account was fully
liberalised  many years ago. The liberalisation of current account could be traced
back to the 1980s when Taiwan started accumulating huge foreign exchange
reserve. It was liberalised much earlier than the capital account and financial
account.
The capital account, which used to represent a country’s capital flows, plays
a very minor role after revision of the IMF BOP standard. The items left in the
capital account are capital account credit and capital account debt, which are
often relatively small in comparison to the main factors, like FDI, portfolio and
public and private loans in capital flows. Today, the focus on capital flows has
shifted from the traditional capital account to the financial account.
There are three main parts in the financial account. They are: foreign direct
Investment (FDI), portfolio investments, and public and private loans. Generally
speaking, all these three items are liberalised in Taiwan. Some minor restrictions
are imposed on them only under certain specific conditions. Capital inflows and
outflows for approved FDI are liberalised. Portfolio investments assets and
liabilities are also liberalised under the non-discretionary trust account. Other
investment assets and liabilities, including public and private loans, are liberalised
in Taiwan as well. Only certain kinds of loans which exceed one year are required
to be registered under long-term debt for record purpose. Investments in the
financial account without corresponding approval are subject to the following
restrictions:
(a)  Domestic company up to $50 million per annum
(b)  Domestic resident up to $5 million per annum
(c)  Nonresident remittance up to $100 thousand per transaction
We would like to introduce the major capital flow policies of Taiwan in the
following two ways: New Taiwan Dollar (TWD) exchange rate regime and the
capital flow deregulations.
2.1  New Taiwan Dollar (TWD) Exchange Rate Regime
Trading USD/TWD, EUR/TWD, JPY/TWD, GBP/TWD and many other
worldwide currencies in Taiwan is quite easy because the Taiwan foreign
exchange market is a highly free market. The TWD exchange rate regime
basically is a managed floating regime system. In principle, the TWD FX price
is mainly determined by market supply and demand. The Central bank will329
intervene in the foreign exchange market when two exceptions occur. One of
the exceptions is seasonal interruption and the other is the abnormal factors, i.e.,
large flows of hot money. To maintain the orders of our foreign exchange market
and reduce fluctuations of the TWD, the central bank may step in to manage
the TWD in the FX market. Under the managed floating regime system, the US
dollar/TWD is stablised in a relatively smooth pattern. Figure 1 depicts the
quarterly data of USD/TWD from 2000 Q1.
2.2  Deregulations on Capital Flow Management
Capital inflow and outflow for individuals and companies are generally very
free in Taiwan. Only few capital flow restrictions are imposed on short-term
TWD conversions and they are:
(a)  Domestic company up to $50 million per annum
(b)  Domestic resident up to $5 million per annum
(c)  Nonresident remittance up to $100 thousand per transaction
In addition to the previous few capital flow restrictions, the following major
policies enlarging the Taiwan capital market and enhancing market efficiency
are currently being implemented:
(a)  Loosen restrictions on foreign investment in domestic securities.
(b)  Promotion of the internationalisation of the domestic capital market.
(c)  Allow nonresident foreigners to take up TWD loans from local banks.
Figure 1
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(d)  Keep approving applications on overseas securities investment.
(e)  Revise regulations to enhance capital movements.
(f)  Simplify RMB exchange business. (We opened RMB exchange business
 on July 1 2008)
3. Trends in Capital Flows in Taiwan
During the past decade, the current account, capital account, and financial
account all recorded significant growth in Taiwan. We saw our current account
continually soaring, capital account running in a breakeven position and financial
account shedding. By and large, our BOP recorded large surpluses between the
years 2000 and 2003, reaching a peak in 2003 at US$37,092 million, but declined
after 2003. In 2007, the BOP of Taiwan was about – US$4,020 million. Figure
2 illustrates the trend of capital flows in the past 23 years.
Figure 2
Trend of BOP (Taiwan)
In regard of the current account, we saw steady increases in both exports
and imports. In 2007, good and service exports reached US$277,736 million
while good and service imports reached US$251,156 million. This brought to our
current account a surplus of US$32,881 million in 2007. It can be noticed in
Figure 3 that both the volume of exports and imports in value terms have doubled
over the last decade.
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The position of Taiwan’s financial account is very interesting and is totally
in the opposite direction as the current account. With the increased liberalisation
of the capital market in Taiwan, the domestic residents and companies moved
to diversify their portfolios in different countries and currencies instead of in the
traditional TWD assets. This swelled the deficit in the financial account recently,
especially after 2005. The negative figure in the financial account helped balance
the surplus in the current account to stabilise the TWD trend. We have portfolio
investment asset worth about US$44,993 million while only US$5,218 million
portfolio investment liability in 2007. The financial account deficit reached a
record high negative of US$37,100 million in 2007. Figure 4 depicts the recent
financial account trend of Taiwan.
Figure 3
Current Account Trend (Taiwan)
Figure 4
Financial Account Trend (Taiwan)
Unit: US$ million
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Further, taking a look at the three main components of financial account -
FDI, portfolio investment and public and private loans - they tell different stories
about capital flows in Taiwan. Figure 5 plots the net FDI, net portfolio investment,
as well as the net public and private loans from the period 1985 to 2007 in
Taiwan. First of all, the FDI moved in a relatively smooth path during the period.
Net FDI was typically negative in Taiwan during the past 23 years. Only in the
years 1985, 1986, 1987 and 2006 had Taiwan recorded a positive net inflow but
the magnitudes were relatively smaller. For instance, net FDI in Taiwan 2006
was +US$25 million while it was –US$2,946 million in 2007. Second, turning to
net portfolio investment assets and liabilities, the situation is a little different
from the previous net FDI. There were huge magnitudes of portfolio investment
assets and liabilities in Taiwan, especially the absolute amounts of portfolio
investment assets. However, substantial capital outflows in portfolio investment
assets appeared after 2005 due to a significant difference of interest rate between
Taiwan and abroad. This caused the negative net portfolio investments to reach
a record low of –US$39,775 million in 2007. Finally, net public and private loans
in Taiwan behaved in a very volatile manner and told a totally different story
than net portfolio investment. Before 2001, the net public and private loans
behaved in a most volatile as compared to the other two components of capital
flows; the capital inflows were positive in some years but in the other years
they were negative. The net public and private loans mounted drastically after
2002 and sustained at a high level for almost four years until 2005. This was
mainly driven by the expectation of TWD appreciation during that period. This
was also the main factor contributing to the positive capital inflows in the financial
account between 2002 and 2005. However, the financial account balance declined
dramatically after 2005 as a result of significant capital outflows in net portfolio
investments.
After comparing the trends of capital flows, Figure 6 summarises some
statistics of net FDI, net portfolio investment, and net public and private loans.
In our sample period, the mean values of the net FDI and net portfolio investment
were negative at -US$2,287.3 million and –US$3,620.3 million, respectively. On
the other hand, the net public and private loans was positive at US$2,188.7
million. Their corresponding medians are –US$1,773 million, -US$902 million
and US$285 million, respectively, and show similar signs with the mean values.
Notice that the mean value of net FDI (-US$2,287.3 million) was larger than
the mean value of net portfolio investment (-US$3,620.3 million) but their
corresponding medians (-US$1,773 million vs. –US$902 million) were in the
opposite directions. This tells us that the distributions of net portfolio investment
behaved in a much more volatile manner than net FDI. This can be verified in
Figure 5 and in the statistics of their corresponding standard deviations as well.333
To see the deviations among these three factors, both the net portfolio investment
and net public and private loans had significantly greater deviations than the net
FDI. The standard deviation and range of the net portfolio investment and net
public and private loans were multiple times greater than the standard deviation
and range of net FDI. Net portfolio investment was the most volatile factors
among the others.
Figure 5
Trends of Net FDI, Net Portfolio Investment
and Net Loans (Taiwan)
Figure 6
Statistics of net FDI, Net Portfolio Investment and Net Loans
(Taiwan)
Net FDI Net Portfolio Net Public and
Investment  Private Loans
Mean -2,287.3 -3,620.3 2,188.7
Median -1773 -902 285
S.D. 1,783.4 9,376.9 8,959.0
Range 5,610 49,111 31,489
Max 263 9,336 21,258
Min -5,347 -3,9775 -10,231
Unit: US$ million
Unit: USD million334
After comparing the trends of net FDI, net portfolio investments as well as
net public and private loans, we next compare the corresponding FDI inflow,
portfolio investment inflow and public and private loans inflow. Figure 7 plots
the trends of inflows of these three components. The trajectory of the FDI
inflow was smoothest compared to that of the other two components, and the
pattern is similar as for the net flows in Figure 5. FDI inflow surged after 2005
and reached US$8,161 million in 2007. Both the trends of portfolio investment
inflow and public and private loan inflow showed more volatility. The portfolio
investment inflow was more volatile than public and private loan inflow. Portfolio
investment peaked at US$31,045 million in 2005 but declined sharply soon after.
It reached US$5,218 million in 2007 which was the lowest among the three
components. On the other hand, the public and private loan inflow did not surge
as strongly as portfolio investment inflow after 2000 and dropped to relative low
point in 2006. However, it bounced back sharply to US$12,551 million in 2007
and was the largest contributor of capital inflows at that time.
In the same way, we also summarise the statistics of FDI inflow, portfolio
investment inflow as well as public and private inflow in Figure 8. Likewise, the
pattern of FDI inflow was the smoothest, as in Figure 7. It had the lowest
average of US$2,112.3 million and median of US$1,445 million among the three
components and also the lowest standard deviation (US$2,126.6 million) and
Figure 7
Trends of FDI, Portfolio Investment
and Loans Inflows (Taiwan)
Unit: US$ million335
range (US$7,939 million). Portfolio investment inflow had a higher average at
US$6,926 million than public and private loan inflow at US$5,513.7 million, but
a lower median at US$2,729 million than public and private loan inflow at
US$4,174 million. This shows that the distribution of portfolio investment inflow
was much more skewed than the distribution of public and private loan inflow.
In addition, the portfolio investment inflow showed the most volatility and
deviations of portfolio investment inflow were the greatest one among the three,
with the standard deviation at US$9,591 million and range at US$32,291 million.
The numbers are presented in Figure 8.
Turning to the scenario of capital outflows in Taiwan, the story is a little
different than the previous one(s). The FDI outflow, portfolio investment outflow
as well as public and private loans outflow trends are depicted in Figure 9.
Obviously, the trajectory of FDI outflow was still the smoothest among the three
and reached – US$11,107 million in 2007. Public and private loans outflow were
more volatile than FDI outflow but more stable than portfolio investment outflow
during the relevant period. The movement of portfolio investment outflow was
most volatile, after 2002, when it dropped dramatically and reached the record
low at –US$44,993 million in 2007. The factors attributed as driving the massive
portfolio investment outflow were the domestic residents’ portfolio risk
diversification and the popularity of offshore mutual funds in Taiwan.
Figure 8
Statistics of FDI, Portfolio Investment and Loans Inflows (Taiwan)
FDI inflow Portfolio Investment Public and Private
inflow  Loans inflow
Mean 2,112.3 6,926.0 5,513.7
Median 1,445 2,729 4,174
S.D. 2,126.6 9,591.0 5,474.8
Range 7,939 32,291 19,089
Max 8,161 31,045 17,520
Min 222 -1,246 -1,569
Unit: US$ million336
Figure 10 summarises some of the key statistics of FDI outflow, portfolio
investment outflow as well as public and private loan outflow. Public and private
loan outflow had the smallest absolute value of the mean at –US$3,325 million
while FDI outflow recorded a bigger average value than public and private
outflow. Again, portfolio investment outflow played the key role in the trend of
capital outflow. Besides, portfolio investment outflow had the biggest standard
deviation and range than both FDI outflow and public and private loan outflow.
This substantiates the finding that the portfolio investment outflow was the most
volatile among the three components.
Figure 9
Trends of FDI, Portfolio Investment
and Loans Outflows (Taiwan)
Figure 10
Statistics of FDI, Portfolio Investment and Loans Outflows (Taiwan)
FDI outflow Portfolio Investment Public and Private
outflow  Loans outflow
Mean -4,400 -10,546.3 -3,325
Median -4,420 -4,136 -4,615
S.D. 2,628.3 14,359.4 6,021.1
Range 11,042 44,993 27,554
Max -65 0 11,990
Min -11,107 -44,993 -15,564
Unit: US$ million
Unit: US$ million337
4. Determinants of Capital Flows in Taiwan
Although we have a moderately neutral BOP recently, it consisted of a
huge surplus in current account and a deficit in financial account, which reflected
the occurrence of massive capital inflows and outflows simultaneously. From
the group discussion at the first SEACEN capital flow workshop, we classify
the determinants of capital flow into two parts. One set are the common factors
which are at play across the different countries and the other set are the country
specific factors which are operative locally and reflect the country’s specific
situation.
The determinants are summarised in Figure 11. Among the common factors
of that determine capital flow, both inflow and outflow, we see more capital
inflow determinants than capital outflow determinants.
Figure 11
Common Factors of Capital Flow Determinants
Common Factors of Capital Flow
Inflow Outflow
– Improved investment environment
l Government policies
l Quality of infrastructure
l Political stability
– Strong economic growth
– Free trade agreement (FTA)
– Capital market development
– External factors
l US economy recession
l Global economy slowdown
l Weak US dollar
– Government policies on resident capital
outflow
– Risk diversification
– Alternative investment opportunities338
Beyond the common factors of capital flow determinants, we provide some
other essential country specific factors which also potentially influence capital
flow in Taiwan. Possible causes behind the significant capital inflow in Taiwan
include:
(1)  Increasing export
(2)  Moderate FX policies
(3)  Sound stock market
(4)  Expectation of currency appreciation
(5)  Getting better relationship with China recently
On the other hand, the huge negative numbers in the financial account
represent huge capital outflow. Possible determinants of capital outflow include:
(1)  Increasing import
(2)  Strong resident portfolio diversifications
(3)  Interest rate difference between TWD, USD and other major currencies
(4)  Popular offshore mutual funds
(5)  Political uncertainty
Besides the above plausible determinant factors influencing capital inflow
and outflow in Taiwan, a simple empirical model is introduced to investigate
whether some key factors are significant in capital flow determination. Our
empirical model is set up as follows:
CFin = α + β1GDPGR + β2IR + β3CAR + δ1WGDPGR + δ2WIR + ε (1)
Equation (1) modeled the relationship between the dependent variable capital
flow (CFin), three internal independent variables (GDPGR, IR and CAR ), two
external independent variables (WGDPGR and WIR ) as well as the intercept
item (α). The parameters β  and δ  are the corresponding coefficients of the
internal independent variables and external independent variables, respectively.
From the first SEACEN capital flow workshop, three internal independent
variables in our empirical capital flow model are domestic real GDP growth rate
(GDPGR), domestic real interest rate (IR), and current account to GDP ratio
(CAR). And the rest of the two external independent variables are world real
GDP growth rate (WGDPGR), and world real interest rate (WIR). For a tractable
model, we would like to use some proxies here: we use real 12-month time
deposit rate as proxy of domestic real interest rate; US real GDP growth rate
for world real GDP growth rate and 1-year US LIBOR rate for world interest
rate, respectively.339
Following the guidelines of the SEACEN capital flow research workshop,
we adopt quarterly data from 1985 to 2007 which include complete data of 92
quarters in capital flow, domestic real GDP growth rate, domestic real interest
rate, current account to GDP ratio, US real GDP growth rate and 1-year US
LIBOR rate.
In order to carefully build up our empirical model, we have to investigate
the stationary of every variable and to check whether some of the variables
have the unit root properties first. The augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test
(no constant approach) will be adopted. Our test results suggest that only capital
inflow data is stationary overtime while other domestic real GDP growth rate,
domestic real interest rate, current account to GDP ratio, US real GDP growth
rate and US real interest rate are non-stationary overtime. However, the five
independent variables become stationary after first order difference. The
augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test results are summarised in Figure 12.
After investigating the unit root test, we should rebuild our empirical model
to cover stationary variables instead of previous non-stationary variables. Thus,
our empirical model would become the following equation (2).
CFin = α + β1∆GDPGR + β2∆IR + β3∆CAR + δ1∆WGDPGR
        + δ2∆WIR + ε (2)
Different from previous equation (1) is that we adopt first order difference
of five independent variables instead of those independent variables themselves.
This correction is due to the fact those independent variables are non-stationary
overtime in previous unit root test. The regression empirical results of our model
are summarised in Figure 13 below. Parentheses in the Table denote the standard
deviation (S.D.) of the corresponding variables.
Figure 12
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Results
Source: Bloomberg and Aremos database.
* denotes significant at 95% confidence interval.340
According to the results of our empirical model in Figure 13, both constant
and the first independent variable, difference of domestic real GDP growth rate
are significant. The estimate of constant term is 3,714.24 with standard deviation
512.64 and t-statistic 7.25 which is significant at 95% confidence interval. Among
the three internal variables and two external variables, only difference of domestic
real GDP growth rate is significant in our empirical model. The estimate of
difference of domestic real GDP growth rate is 652.57 with standard deviation
302.85 and t-statistic 2.15. Other two internal variables, difference of domestic
real interest rate and difference of current account to GDP ratio, and two external
variables, difference of US real GDP growth rate and difference of US real
interest rate are not significant during this sample period in our empirical model.
Please note that empirical results might be different in other sample periods or
in other kinds of models.
Based on the previous capital inflow empirical model, we substitute capital
outflow data in place of original capital inflow data and repeat the empirical
model. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test shows that capital outflow data are
stationary overtime in our sample; other variables behave stationary as well
after first order difference. The statistic of capital outflow in the augmented
Dickey-fuller test is -6.80. Then we have the empirical model as following equation
(3).
CFout = α + β1∆GDPGR + β2∆IR + β3∆CAR + δ1∆WGDPG
     + δ2∆WIR + ε (3)
The results of the empirical model of capital outflow show that only the
constant item is statistically significant under 5% level. The first order difference
of domestic real GDP growth rate, domestic real interest rate, current account
Figure 13
Capital Inflow Empirical Model Results
Source: Bloomberg and Aremos database.
* denotes significant at 95% confidence interval.341
to GDP ratio, world real GDP growth rate as well as world real interest rate
are all insignificant in our sample. The summary of the capital outflow empirical
results are presented in Figure 14.
5.  Capital Flows and Monetary Policies
The recent capital flow liberalisation had significant impact on our financial
account and balance of payment. Massive capital inflows in public and private
loans brought in much capital to the Taiwan capital market while significant
capital outflows in portfolio investment contributed to much capital flowing abroad
Figure 14
Capital Outflow Empirical Model Results
Source: Bloomberg and Aremos database.
* denotes significant at 95% confidence interval.
as well. The net effect of capital inflow and capital outflow was increased
slowly and then dropped drastically during the past five years. This net effect
of financial account also dominated the development of balance of payment
which resulted in a minor negative BOP in 2007. This trend could be seen from
Figures 2 and 5.
Observing the trends of FDI inflow, portfolio investment inflow as well as
public and private loans inflow during past five years in Figure 7, it is obvious
that massive amount of capital had flowed in, especially in portfolio investment
after 2002 and in public and private loans after 2001. The huge amount of capital
inflow in the portfolio investment item was mainly attributed to the liberalisation
of restrictions on foreign institutional investors and the globalisation of Taiwan
capital market. With the  liberalisation of many restrictions on foreign investors,
most caps of Taiwan listed companies were amended to 100%, as to compared
to less than 50% previously. This policy helped attract more and more foreign
investors, including investors of institutions and natural persons, in moving capital
to invest in the Taiwan stock and bond markets in recent years. Portfolio
investment inflow reached a record high at US$31,045 million in 2005. This342
significant trend could be easily seen in Figure 7. The second largest capital
inflow in Taiwan during the past five years was public and private loans.
According to Figure 7, massive amount of capital inflow appeared in the years
of 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007. From an analysis of the public and private
loan inflow data, the reasons behind this surge of capital inflow could be attributed
to the expectations of TWD appreciation in the private sectors. Private
commercial banks would borrow first in foreign currencies and then pay back
at the end of year if they have the expectation of home currency appreciation.
They could make the profit between the periods of borrowing and repayment,
depending on the extent of the appreciation. In years of 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005
and 2007, people expected TWD to appreciate and engaged in borrowing at the
beginning of year and then paying back at the end of year. As a result, we saw
a massive surge of capital inflow in private loan. Those two factors are the
most important reasons explaining for the significant capital inflow in recent
years in Taiwan.
Based on the previous discussion and statistics, we see an increasing capital
outflow trend in the financial account in recent years. This was mainly due to
the huge amount of portfolio investment outflow. Clearly there was a significant
net outflow effect in the financial account after 2005 and this had a very important
impact on Taiwan. As discussed, the residents in Taiwan were eager to look for
alternative investment opportunities from the worldwide different asset classes
motivated by risk diversification and accelerating globalisation. Domestic portfolio
diversification and popular offshore mutual fund in Taiwan were the driving forces
behind the outflow of home capital, resulting in big deficits in net of portfolio
investment and financial account. The deficit in financial account in recent years
slowed FX reserves accumulation making the balance of payment negative in
2007. This helped moderate the huge surplus of current account and deficit of
financial account in Taiwan to keep the balance of payment neutral. It is to be
noted that Taiwan had a huge surplus in balance of payment after 2000 reaching
a peak at US$37,092 million in 2003. Although the surplus in the balance of
payment started declining after 2003, it was still positive until 2006. Then in
2007, for the first time in the past decade, the balance of payment recorded a
deficit due to the significant deficit in the financial account.
For the purpose of managing the current account and financial account,
some monetary policies may be adopted by governments to induce capital flows
to where they are required. During the past five years, Taiwan recorded significant
continuing surplus in its current account. In order to balance the huge surplus
in its current account and alleviate pressure of appreciation, facilitating capital343
outflow appropriately might be one of the solutions. To make a decision in
monetary policies is definitely very complicated and many factors have to be
taken into consideration. From the perspective of monetary policy results in
Taiwan2, a low-interest-rate environment seemed to work well and helped achieve
the goal of managing the surplus level in its current account. The high interest
rate differential between Taiwan and the other European countries and US
induced Taiwan residents to assign funds offshore. This helped facilitate a
moderate portfolio investment capital outflow and thus manage the surplus level
of the current account in the past five years.
6. Capital Flow and Financial Stability
Capital flow now in Taiwan is quite free, compared to the past. This is also
true of the banking system. During the past five years, as we have discussed
earlier, private loan inflow brought in to Taiwan massive amount of capital due
to the expectation of TWD appreciation. The private borrowing and lending
banking behaviors did not have any serious repercussions on the financial stability
in Taiwan. Our banking system and FX price did not quiver significantly because
of private loan capital inflow.
However, the liberalisation of capital flow did have some impact on Taiwan.
The most significant is its effect on the financial stability of the stock market.
Foreign investors could freely invest in most of the listed companies in Taiwan.
It is definitely beneficial for foreign institutional investors and shareholders to
invest in Taiwan’s listed companies as they may bring in sufficient capital,
technology innovation, new research of products and some other management
skills. However, in respect of the stock market, the behaviour of stocks which
attract foreign investors is usually more volatile than those which not. This is
mainly attributed to the short-term nature of foreign capital inflow. As we know,
investors often allocate portfolio funds to different categories - long-term portfolio
and short-term portfolio. Attracting long-term capital investment in Taiwanese
companies is definitely a good thing for its stock market because such capital
is not volatile, moving in and out often, be they foreign investment or home
investment. In contrast, some of the short-term foreign capital, i.e., hot money,
moved into the Taiwan stock market to invest in Taiwanese companies but they
bought and sold very often. This short-term capital usually causes wide
fluctuations in the stock price and increases the volatility of stocks. Such kind
of capital inflows will definitely destabilise our market.
________________
2. This meant that low- interest-rate environment in Taiwan is not necessary for the purpose of
balancing surplus in current account.344
In addition, the second effect of the short-term capital was its impact on
the FX market. Foreign investors buying or selling domestic stocks must first
exchange their foreign currencies for local currencies. For a long-term foreign
investor, the capital investment in stocks will stay for the long haul since the
investment goal is earning long-term dividends instead of short-term capital gains.
Such long-term foreign investors will affect the FX market very slightly due to
infrequent currency exchange transactions in the FX market. The situation is
quite different for a short-term foreign investor. The target of short-term investors
is making money from short-term capital gains, not receiving long-term dividends.
This will motivate them to trade very often causing instability to both the stock
market and FX market.
In order to reduce the impact on the stock market and FX market stemming
from the behavior of such short-term foreign investors, the central bank monitors
the capital inflows and outflows of foreign investors. The central bank encourages
foreign investors to allocate their capital in the right designated underlying assets,
i.e., Taiwan stock market.
7. Conclusion
Taiwan has liberalised its current account and financial account for many
years. The recent trend is that the surplus in its current account has been
accumulating significantly, especially after 2000.  On the other hand, Taiwan
recorded more and more capital outflow due to outflow of private loans and
portfolio investment assets in financial account. The reasons behind the capital
inflow and outflow are quite different. The two major reasons explaining capital
inflows to Taiwan are: liberalisation of restrictions on foreign investment and
expectation of TWD appreciation. This brought in significant in foreign capital
inflows into Taiwan after 2000. The expectation of TWD appreciation pushed
private banks to borrow money abroad in the years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and
2007 and brought in significant capital inflows. The major reason explaining capital
outflows from Taiwan is the motivation of its residents looking for alternative
investment opportunities and diversifying their portfolio and risks. This brought
significant capital outflow after 2002 and dominated the deficit in its financial
account recently.
In order to investigate how macroeconomic factors influence capital flow,
we built up an empirical model based on the first SEACEN workshop. The
empirical results suggest that both capital inflow and capital outflow are stationary
overtime in our sample. On the other hand, the domestic real GDP growth rate,
domestic real interest rate, current account to GDP ratio, world real GDP growth345
rate as well as world real interest rate are non-stationary overtime in our sample.
After adopting first- order difference of those independent variables, our empirical
capital inflow regression results indicate that only the constant and difference
of domestic real GDP growth rate are significant to capital inflow while other
variables are insignificant. Turning to the capital outflow model, only the constant
item is significant to our capital outflow data. Other independent variables are
all insignificant. Note that the empirical results might be different in other sample
periods or models.
Two major policy tools of the central bank are FX policy and interest rate
policy. From the perspective of balancing the BOP, theoretically, some monetary
policy might work under certain conditions. For instance, the central bank may
tend to adopt a loose monetary policy to encourage capital outflow when facing
a huge surplus in its current account, if the policy target is to balance the BOP.
On the other hand, the central bank may adopt a tight monetary policy to attract
capital inflow when facing a huge deficit in its current account. In reality,
conducting monetary policy is much more complicated than we normally think
because there are many constraints and scenarios that have to be taken into
consideration. Balancing the BOP is only one of the central banks’ main targets.
There are still lots of other proportionate targets the central bank has to deal
with.
Finally, it is essential for the central bank to maintain stable capital inflow
and outflow, but it is not an easy task. Promoting the inflow of long-term capital
inflow could help facilitate economic growth and is beneficial for the recipient
countries. Whereas, with short-term capital, the inflow can sometimes cause
damage to the capital market and aggravate the volatility of the stock market
because of the myopic pursuit of profits. How to manage such kind of short-
term capital flow is an issue and an challenge for the central bank.347
Chapter 12
CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL
BANK POLICIES IN THAILAND
by
Khatharit Sitthikul and Nasha Ananchotikul1
1. Introduction
Thailand has undergone dramatic changes over the last two decades. As
one of the most successful of the newly industrialising countries in Asia, its
economy made significant strides throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, with
an exception of the crisis years in 1997-98. Significant improvement in the
economic fundamentals together with the strengthening of the financial system,
have contributed to Thailand’s impressive economic growth in the post-crisis
years. The country’s path of economic development has been outward-oriented,
as reflected in the openness towards current and capital accounts as well as
in the government policies promoting Thai exports and inward foreign investment.
Unquestionably, greater real and financial integration with the global markets
have brought about many benefits and helped facilitate growth and development
of the Thai economy. At the same time, however, increased integration leaves
the country vulnerable to external shocks. The procyclicality and volatility of
capital flows can also create macroeconomic imbalances and, hence, pose
important challenges for policymakers in the conduct of monetary policy.
This paper aims to shed light on Thailand’s experience with capital flows
over 1985-present, with a focus on their implications on economic and monetary
variables as well as policy responses to manage these flows. We begin by
providing in Section 2 background on the evolution of Thailand’s current and
capital account liberalisation. Section 3 presents the trend of capital flows during
the 1985-2008Q3, followed by an empirical examination of their determinants in
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Section 4. Section 5 assesses the risks associated with large capital flows. Sections
6 and 7 discuss implications of large and volatile capital flows on monetary
policy and on financial stability, respectively. The conclusions and policy
recommendations are presented in Section 8.
2. General Framework and Major Capital Flows Management Policies
Thailand has long been relatively open to trade and financial flows with
current account convertibility and liberal treatment of inward foreign direct and
portfolio investments. Foreign direct investment, in particular, has played an
important role in various stages of the country’s industrialisation, especially
following the shift of Thailand’s general economic policy from import-substitution
in the 1960s to the promotion of export-oriented growth since the 1970s. Over
the period 1985-1997, foreign exchange controls on current and capital account
transactions were substantially relaxed. Inflows were further promoted through
a number of measures including tax and institutional reforms. There were times,
however, when measures to slow down excessive inflows were necessary to
maintain or restore economic and financial stability. Overall, Thailand has
continued to move towards a freer regime for capital flows, with a vision to
promote market-based mechanisms in driving sustainable economic growth.
2.1 Current Account and Capital Account Liberalisation
Thailand’s exchange control practice had been in conformity with the IMF’s
Article VIII requirements even before the acceptance of the Article. There
were no restrictions on foreign exchange involving payments for and receipts
of current account transactions. Between 1985-1990, some foreign exchange
controls were loosened, including raising the limits on the amounts of foreign
exchange that could be purchased or brought in or taken out of the country for
various purposes and permitting the uses of foreign exchange deposits for transit
passengers and non-resident baht accounts for foreign-borrowing settlements,
stock transactions, and foreign investment.
Yet, the acceptance of the Article VIII in May 1990 signified as an important
milestone by marking the beginning of systematic financial reforms and capital
flow liberalisation in Thailand. Three phases of foreign exchange control
liberalisation were implemented. The aim was to keep the foreign exchange
regime in line with the growing globalisation of economic and financial systems
and greater mobility of international capital funds. The regulatory relaxation was
to allow market force to play a more active role in the utilisation and allocation of
capital flows.349
The first phase of exchange control deregulation (May 1990) allowed
commercial banks to authorise foreign exchange transactions in trade-related
activities without prior approval from the Bank of Thailand (BOT), and further
increased the limit on foreign exchange purchase to facility transfers and traveling
expenses. The second phase (April 1991) lifted most controls related to capital
account-related inflows. Non-residents, for the first time, can open foreign-
currency accounts provided that funds originated from abroad. Foreign exchange
earners were allowed to accept payments in baht from non-resident baht
accounts without approval from the BOT and to use their foreign currency
proceeds from abroad to service external obligations. The third phase (February
1994) included raising the limit on outward transfer of direct investment by
residents, abolishing limit on traveling expenses, and permitting authorised banks
to lend to non-residents in foreign currency without limit. In essence, these
relaxations of foreign exchange controls were targeted at letting market force
to play a more active role in determining cross-border capital flows and
encouraging utilisation of baht in regional trade.
To facilitate continued economic growth and development of the financial
system, beginning from 1992, the authorities progressively deregulated financial
institutions’ operations and expanded their scope of operation. The ceilings on
all deposits and lending rates were removed by 1992. A number of reforms
were designed to support and promote the stock market. The centerpiece of the
new financial facilities was the Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF)
established in March 1993. The BIBF was meant to serve as groundwork for
international financial services and for mobilising capital from abroad to support
regional economic growth and development. Some BIBF transactions received
tax privileges, encouraging more uses of foreign capital. Following the
commencement of the BIBF, capital inflows into Thailand, especially short-term
loans, increased at an unprecedented rate (see more details in Section 2) leading
up to the financial crisis in 1997.
2.1.1 Post-crisis Liberalisation
Since the crisis, the authorities have adopted a liberalisation scheme in which
sequencing and prudential regulations are the key. On the inflow, the major change
was the relaxation of foreign ownership limit of Thai banks and finance companies
as well as certain non-bank businesses.2 This has considerably changed the
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landscape of financial institutions in the country by strengthening the system
through recapitalisation. Foreign ownership in real estate, previously severely
restricted, was also eased to allow for greater investment flexibility and to attract
a wider market. Moreover, to promote foreign investment in companies listed
in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), the Thai Non-Voting Depository
Receipt (NDVR) Company Limited was established in 2001 as a subsidiary of
the SET. Under this arrangement, the NVDR Company acts as domestic nominee
for foreign investors and is not subject to foreign ownership limit.3 This creates
more room for foreign participation in the Thai stock market, encouraging inward
portfolio investment.
Controls on capital outflows, which were liberalised only gradually throughout
the pre-crisis period, have been increasingly loosened since the second half of
2003, partly as a result of the improvement in the country’s foreign reserve
adequacy. This regulatory relaxation on outflows not only enhances greater
international diversification, but also helps create more balanced flows and correct
foreign asset-liability mismatch in the private sector’s balance sheet. Residents
are now allowed to invest abroad through mutual funds and other institutional
investors. Since July 2003, authorised institutional investors have been allowed
to invest abroad, and the asset classes and investment quota were gradually
expanded. The authorities also raised the limit on direct investments abroad by
Thai residents, with the aim of encouraging Thai companies to gain from greater
investment opportunities in the global markets.
2.2 Policies Implemented to Manage Capital Flows
In general, Thailand has been very open to foreign capital flows, with virtually
no restrictions on non-resident inflows and outflows related to genuine trade and
investment. Administrative measures might sometimes be used as anti-speculative
policy tools to manage capital flows. Direct controls would be the last resort
and would be implemented only in situations where excessive and volatile capital
flows—especially those of short-term and speculative nature—appeared to
threaten the economic and financial stability. In additional to temporary direct
controls, Thailand also retains prudential measures on residents’ short-term
external borrowing and investment abroad to limit the private sector’s foreign
short-term liabilities and foreign currency risk exposure. However, these measures,
especially on outward investments, have gradually been relaxed since 2003.
________________
3. The NVDR Company issues NVDRs to foreign investors who want to invest in underlying
stocks, warrants, and Transferable Subscription Rights (TRS). By investing in NVDRs, foreign
investors are entitled to all financial benefits (i.e. dividends, right issues or warrants, capital
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The circumstance leading up to the use of capital controls in the years
1995-97 and in the years 2006-07, as well as the specifics of these controls, are
outlined below:
2.2.1 Managing Capital Inflows and Outflows during 1995-97
The reforms to promote investments in the Thai stock markets and the
establishment of the BIBF during the first half of the 1990s, together with the
large positive interest rate differential and the fixed exchange rate regime, induced
large capital inflows to Thailand by providing attractive returns and low currency
risk. A growing proportion of net inflows were short-term in nature, reaching
60% of the total in 1995. This alarming level of short-term inflows led the Thai
authorities to start restricting short-term capital inflows in 1995 by imposing a
7% reserve requirement on banks’ non-resident baht accounts. These restrictions
were extended in 1996 to cover new foreign borrowing of less than one year
by commercial banks, BIBFs, and finance companies.
In 1997 Thailand began to experience net capital outflows due to non-
residents’ liquidation of baht-denominated assets and debt repayment induced
by lower confidence of creditors. Rising interest rates to counteract outflows
aggravated the solvency and liquidity position of many banks and finance
companies. In July 1997, faced with a currency and banking crisis, the authorities
floated the baht and a managed floating exchange rate was adopted. Baht
transfers to non-residents in all cases were temporarily restricted except for
those transactions associated with exports and imports of goods and services,
and direct and portfolio investment. In January 1998, this measure was abolished
and replaced by the 50 million baht lending limit to non-residents to prevent
internationalisation of the baht.
2.2.2 Managing Capital Inflows during 2006-08
After the crisis in 1997, there emerged a new wave of capital inflows to
the country from 2002 onward. Surging inflows both in the form of direct and
portfolio investments, accompanied by declining outflows of debt repayment,
resulted in large capital account surpluses in 2005 and 2006. This, together with
the current account surpluses due to strong exports performance, exerted
considerable upward pressure on the baht. Of the total inflows, large and
increasing sum of foreign capital flowed into short-term fixed income instruments
with the objective of gaining from attractive yields and anticipated baht
appreciation. To discourage such speculative activities, the BOT implemented a
number of anti-speculation measures, such as imposing a cap on the daily352
outstanding balance of non-resident baht account, prohibiting transactions
comparable to Thai baht lending or selling to non-residents without underlying
trade or investment in Thailand with holding period of more than three months.
However, the effectiveness of these measures combined with increased
foreign exchange intervention proved to be limited as foreign investors could
find other ways to speculate on the baht. As the baht continued to be highly
volatile and strengthened at an accelerating pace, the BOT decided to implement
the Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) measure on December 18,
2006, to serve as a price-based friction on the types of inflows that are more
likely to be used by currency speculators. These included new inward investments
in the form of foreign loans, fixed income instruments, mutual funds, property
funds, currency swaps, and non-resident baht accounts without proofs of genuine
trade and long-term investment underlying. These incoming funds were subject
to 30% withholding at the banks without interests and would get the full amount
of reserve back after one year. If the funds have remained in Thailand for at
least one year, the customer will be refunded in full the amount of the reserve
withheld. A penalty would apply to funds remaining in Thailand for less than one
year, in which case the customer will be refunded only two-thirds of the reserve
withheld. Inflows below US$20,000 as well as inflows related to trades in goods
and services, foreign direct investment, and equity investment in the stock market
were exempted from the URR measure.
The BOT gradually relaxed the URR measure over the subsequent period
by providing a full-hedging requirement as an alternative to the URR for some
types of inflows. The measure proved adequate to stabilise the baht and reduce
the size of inflows to a more manageable level. However, aware of the potential
adverse effects of the URR measure on domestic businesses and its
ineffectiveness in the long run, after a careful consideration of changes in the
environment and other relevant factors, the BOT decided to uplift the URR
measure on March 3, 2008.
3. Trends of Capital Flows in Thailand since 1985
The chronology of economic conditions and capital flows to Thailand over
the past two decades can be roughly divided into three periods: before the crisis
(1985-1996), during and after the crisis (1997-2002), and the recent years (2003-
2008Q3).353
3.1 Key Economic Indicators
3.1.1 Pre-crisis Period (1985-1996)
The Thai economy exhibited an impressive growth during the decade
beginning with the year 1985 with the average annual growth close to 9%. This
remarkable pace of economic growth was considerably influenced by waves of
financial liberalisation implemented over this period. After the abolition of interest
rate ceilings on time deposits in 1989 and all other deposits and loans in 1992,
the domestic interest rates subsequently increased—3-month deposit rate
averaged 9.4% per annum while the MLR averaged 13% per annum. The
differences between domestic and foreign interest rates were also reduced, though
still existed. Dismantlement of foreign exchange controls, competitive interest
rates, together with the pegged exchange rate regime, led to greater flows of
foreign funds into the country. The rapid economic expansion also brought about
relatively high inflation at 4.3% per annum on average.
In regard of external stability, as more and more Thai businesses financed their
investment from foreign sources instead of from domestic finances—owing to the
negative saving-investment gap, persisting current account deficits, and the promotion
of the BIBF, Thailand’s external debt became roughly doubled from $43.6 billion in
1992 to $108.7 billion in 1996, equivalent to 66% of GDP. Since these loans tended
to be denominated in foreign currency and to be on a short-term basis while the
investment horizons were long term, this created large currency and maturity
mismatches which, in turn, raised the degree of balance of payments vulnerability.
The large volume of imported capital funds also adversely contributed to stock and
property price bubbles and the country’s current account deficits during this period
(average 5.1% of GDP).
3.1.2 During and After the Crisis (1997-2002)
The crisis brought about the devaluation of the baht and the adoption of the
managed-float exchange rate regime on July 2, 1997 to replace the pegged exchange
rate regime. The baht subsequently lost more than half of its value to reach its
lowest point of 56 baht to one US dollar in January 1998. The economy contracted
markedly by 10.5% in 1998. Yet it was able to bounce back quickly and to expand
at an annual average of  4.2%  in 1999-2002, thanks to the robust growth of the
export sector (accounted for 36% of the GDP in 1997 and 55% of the GDP in 2000)
spurred by the baht depreciation. The current account recorded surpluses. This export-354
led growth was also reflected in the rise in the degree of economic openness (the
sum of export and import values to GDP) which increased from 61% of GDP
before the crisis to 93% of GDP in the post-crisis period.
As for the rate of inflation, after its peak at over 8% in 1998, it was brought
down substantially in the subsequent years in line with a low-inflation phenomenon
in the major countries and peer economies. The inflation rate in Thailand during
2000-2002 averaged at merely 1.3% per year. It should be noted that this low
inflation was concurrent with the adoption of the inflation-targeting monetary
policy framework in Thailand in May 2000.
3.1.3 The Last Five Years (2003-2007)
Upon its full recovery from the crisis, the Thai economy achieved outstanding
performance with an annual growth rate of around 7% in 2003 and 2004, the
highest level since 1995. The overall economic growth was mainly driven by
growing domestic demand and partially by booming exports benefiting from
competitive exchange rate as well as from the healthy global economy. The
overall balance of payments recorded increasing surpluses throughout this period,
exerting upward pressure on the baht, especially in 2006, when both the current
Figure 1
Key Macroeconomic Indicators
Note: For year 2008, data are from the first half of the year.
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and the capital account registered surpluses. The only year during this period
in which the current account recorded a deficit was 2005. This sudden turnaround
was caused chiefly by the Thai government’s decision to terminate the oil price
subsidy programme.4,5
Despite the overall robust export performance, during the past three years,
the economy slowed to grow at a relatively lower rate due largely to the shrinking
domestic demand. The key factors responsible for this domestic economic slack
include continued political uncertainties, which dampened investor confidence, and
higher oil prices, which lowered domestic consumption and investment and spurred
the rate of inflation. A slower growth is expected in 2008 and 2009 in the context
of extraordinarily weak outlook of the world economy caused by the on-going global
financial crisis.
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4. Thailand’s diesel subsidy since January 2004 came about after it was foreseen at the time that
the global oil price would skyrocket. While the subsidy has assisted Thai economic growth to
continue its momentum, the prolonged effect of the oil price hike has caused a growing fiscal
burden on the government budget. Having underestimated the time frame of the soaring oil price,
the oil subsidy became unsustainable. The government, led at the time by Thaksin  Shinawatra,
finally took the action to lift the cap on the diesel price. This end of the subsidy programme
edged the producers towards the real market price and allowed the producers to become more
prudent about their oil consumption.
5. Interestingly, China’s entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 contributed to
boosting, not damaging, Thailand’s export growth: Thai exports to China increased more than
five fold in value between 2000 and 2007, with exports share doubled from 4.1% of total exports
in 2000 to 9.7% in 2007. This can be explained by the triangular international trade pattern
arising from Chinese integration into the world production network: East Asian countries export
intermediate goods to China for processing, and China, in turn, exports final products to the
United States and Europe.356
3.2 Capital Flows
3.2.1 Pre-crisis Period (1985-1996)
During this period, the gross capital inflow recorded on average 7.8% of
GDP per year with its peak at 15% of GDP in 1995. The FDI inflow started
to pick up since 1985 after the Plaza Accord that resulted in a surge in the value
of yen, leading to Japanese businesses relocating and expanding their production
bases in the Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand. At the same time,
the portfolio investment inflow was steadily increasing owing to Thailand’s strong
macroeconomic performance, attractive returns on investment, and the capital
market liberalisation. This flood of inflows into the stock market drove the stock
price growth to achieve an average of 27% per annum.
Figure 2
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After 1990, the role of FDI and portfolio investments in the Thai financial
development began to subside as the “other investment” (comprised mostly of
bank loan and non-bank private loan) assumed its importance, with bank loan
alone accounted for 66% of the net capital flow. The inflow under the other
investment category reached its peak at 12% of GDP in 1995. Because of the
lower cost of financing and the lower risk of exchange rate, non-bank private
loan from abroad was on a rise since the late 1980s, while bank-related inflow
spiked up after the establishment of the BIBF in 1993. One major attraction of
BIBF loans was tax privileges—even over domestic borrowings—given to BIBF
borrowers, including those on juristic income tax, special business tax, and interest
income tax. Consequently, Thai businesses shifted from domestic loans as well
as external non-bank loans to the BIBF. Over-borrowing through the BIBF was
one of the key factors that led to the financial crisis in 1997.
3.2.2 During and After the Crisis (1997-2002)
The gross capital inflow during the five years following the onset of the crisis
registered large negative numbers—averaging at -3.8% of GDP per annum in 1997-
2002—indicating substantial capital reversal during this period. Most of the reversal
was in form of the repayment of external debts—BIBF and non-bank loans—made
during the economic boom prior to the crisis. The largest reversal at -5.6% of
GDP occurred in 1998 largely due to the gloomy economic outlook and the loss
of confidence in Thai borrowers’ ability to repay debt.
Figure 4
Composition of other investments — Inflows (% of GDP)358
FDI inflow, however, was generally not affected by the crisis. To the contrary,
large FDI flows flooded into Thailand in the aftermath of the crisis to take
advantage of the baht depreciation, which translated into cheaper assets and
production costs for foreign businesses. The increase in FDI inflows played a
key role in offsetting the severe effects of sudden stops and reversal of foreign
loans and other investments on the Thai economy.
The dramatic baht depreciation also directly caused the price of Thai stocks
to be cheaper in dollar terms, making them attractive to international portfolio
investors. The resulting large inflows in terms of portfolio investment in the third
quarter of 1997 also helped cushion the privates sector’s net outward capital
flows. However, the continued baht depreciation in 1998 brought capital loss to
the investors as well as it deteriorated investors’ confidence. This, together with
the impact of the September 11 terrorist attack in the U.S., brought about the
net withdrawal of portfolio investment in 2001-2002.
In regard to the resident outflows, after the floating of the baht, the higher
currency risk has led to higher foreign exchange hedging demand by Thai
businesses. This, in turn, resulted in an increase in cross-border bank activity,
as recorded under the “other investment” category, since banks had to square
foreign-asset position in order to meet the net foreign exchange exposure
requirement. However, the gross outflow by residents was still at a relatively
low level during this period partly due to the existing controls on outward
investments.
Figure 5
Evolution of capital outflows (% of GDP))359
3.2.3 The Last Five Years (2003-2007)
Inflows to Thailand have increasingly shifted from being dominated by bank
loans during the pre-crisis period to more from FDI and portfolio investment
over recent years. Foreign bank loans have declined significantly as both the
official and private sectors paid down the external debt and sought alternative
financing via domestic financial markets. This waning importance of bank loans
manifested in the level of external debt, which has declined substantially from
48.8% of GDP in 2002 to 29.4% in 2007.6 Moreover, of the total outstanding
external debt, the share of baht-denominated debt has continued to increase.
This, together with higher hedging ratio by Thai exporters/importers, implies a
substantial reduction of Thailand’s vulnerability to currency exposure compared
to the pre-crisis period.
FDI has become the most important component accounting around 80% of
the gross capital inflow over the last five years. This is due to a significant
shrinkage of cross-border bank loans mentioned above as well as the promising
growth prospects of the Thai economy that attracted increasing inward
investment. Portfolio investment inflow has also been on an increasing trend
owing to several factors, such as the increase of international institutional investors,
the recent lack of confidence in the U.S. economy, further financial liberalisation,
innovative trading instruments in the stock market, such as non-voting depository
receipt (NVDR) as well as the higher yields and local currency appreciation.
However, being of short-term nature, portfolio flows are highly sensitive to news
and investor sentiment and, hence, apparently unstable.
Since 2003, the Thai authorities have further relaxed restrictions on capital
outflows by residents both in forms of direct and portfolio investment. This was
aimed to promote greater acquisition of foreign assets so as to bring overall
benefits to the economy through more balanced capital flows and improved wealth
diversification.
Gross capital outflow has surged considerably from 2005 onward, reaching
6.8% of GDP in 2007. While FDI outflow has not been very responsive to the
policy stimulation, outward portfolio investment, on the other hand, has increased
quite impressively following the further liberalisation of portfolio investment through
institutional investors. The major component of the gross outflow remains in the
form of foreign currency deposits by the banking sectors as appeared under the
________________
6. The denominator here has been adjusted to be compliant with the World Bank method, i.e.,
calculated as a three-year moving average GDP.360
other investment flows. This type of outflows reflects largely the increase in
foreign asset holding by the banking sector to square their foreign asset positions
as a result of being the counterparty to the BOT’s swap agreements and clients’
foreign exchange derivative agreements. It is important to note that, rising
demand—be it from exporters, importers, or other market participants—for
foreign exchange hedging against exchange rate appreciation or depreciation
has potentially induced volatility of the net capital flow in the recent years.
Figure 6
Evolution of Net Capital Flows (% of GDP)
Note: * For the year 2008, flows are cumulated over the first nine months of the year.
To summarise, the Thai economy in the post-crisis has come to rely more on
FDI as a major source of foreign funds. Reduced reliance on foreign bank loans
helped to improve Thailand’s external balance sheet position by making it much less
sensitive to exchange rate changes and less exposed to the risk of capital reversal
compared to the past. Moreover, the adoption of a managed-float exchange rate
regime was a key to reduce vulnerability to crises as well as promote microeconomic
efficiency as businesses need to learn to price in and manage FX risks.
On the current account side, international trade has grown significantly in terms
of its importance relative to Thailand’s overall economic structure, as confirmed by
an increase in the degree of trade openness from the pre-crisis average of 61% of
GDP to 106% of GDP over the last five years. The continued robust performance
of the export sector has supported the country’s economic growth at times of falling
domestic demand. In addition, the resilience of the Thai economy to potential volatility
of capital flows and exchange rate has been further improved through more balanced
capital flows as a result of gradual liberalisation of resident outflow, as well as through
more efficient risk management practice by the private sector and the large
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves during the recent years, which will later
be discussed in this paper.361
Since gross capital flows have been increasingly large and volatile over the
years, to make the picture more complete, we shall next examine what are the
key drivers of capital flows to Thailand, so as to assess the potential risks of
a shift in these factors.
4. Determinants of Capital Flows
This section aims to identify the key determinants of capital flows in the
case of Thailand. The focus is on the “push” and the “pull” factors in influencing
different types of inflows, especially those of a short-term nature. The results
of this exercise will help us understand better the nature of capital flows and
for us to have a greater awareness of the potential vulnerability related to these
flows. The ability to identify the determinants of large flows will also help the
authorities in designing an effective capital-flow monitoring system.
4.1 Analytical Framework
The relevance of pull (internal) and push (external) factors has been at the
heart of the economic debate and empirical studies on what drives capital flows
into emerging market economies. The pull factors may include domestic variables
such as robust economic performance, financing needs, expectations of exchange
rate appreciation, high expected returns relative to the rest of the world as well
as improved governance institution, credit rating, economic and financial reforms,
and political stability. The push factors often discussed in the literature include
slow growth and lack of investment opportunities in major economies, excess
global liquidity, and international investors’ view on risk in the market, among
others.
Although in practice it is difficult to assess the relative importance of these
two sets of variables, such a judgment would help determine whether capital
inflows are likely to be permanent or temporary. For instance, if capital inflows
were motivated primarily by strong macroeconomic performance and improved
governance of the domestic economy, then such inflows would tend to be more
stable and productive. On the other hand, inflows driven by excess liquidity of
the global financial market and low-risk environment based on the market view
tend to be temporary and volatile, pouring into emerging markets to make
speculative profits from relatively more attractive yields and expected local
currency appreciation. This latter case heightens the risk of a sudden reversal
of the inflows if global liquidity dries up or there is a sudden change in investor’s
attitude towards risk.362
We consider the following pull and push factors in determining capital inflows
in Thailand during 1993Q1-2008Q37: 1) Thailand’s real GDP growth, 2) current
account balance to GDP, 3) world real GDP growth, 4) market view on risk,
5) real interest rate differential between Thailand and the major economies, 6)
growth of global liquidity, 7) exchange rate appreciation, and 8) stock return
differential.8  Figure 7 introduces the short-hand notations and provides a
description of the variables.
Based on economic reasoning, the prospect of economic prosperity should
be a positive factor that draws foreign capital into the host country. Current
account balance measures the extent to which the country needs to finance
current account deficits: in a relatively flexible exchange rate regime, current
account deficits should, in principle, coincide with capital account surpluses. The
slower growth of the advance economies as well as the low-risk investment
environment causes investors based in these countries to look overseas in the
search for better yields elsewhere, especially in emerging markets. Along the
same line, the relatively high interest rates, strong stock market performance as
well as expectations of local currency appreciation in emerging markets make
investments in those economies appealing. Lastly, the high growth of global liquidity
means international capital is more abundant, readily available for investing where
expected returns are above average.
The graphic illustration of the relationships between aggregate capital inflows
and the above potential factors are shown in Figure 8 below. We can make an
observation by eye-balling these time series plots that Thailand’s economic growth
seems to predict capital flows quite well before and during the crisis, but not
in the subsequent period. Current account balance is more or less a mirror image
of capital inflows around the zero line, but this relationship seems to break since
early 2006. Most strikingly in this graphic analysis is the relationship of investors’
view on risk and the inflows: the (inverse of) VIX index closely synchronises
with the dynamics of capital inflows in Thailand throughout the whole sample
period. A similar pattern is observed for the global liquidity factor. However, the
relationship evidently breaks down at the end of the sample period, coinciding
with the onset of the global financial crisis of 2008. This may be caused by the
________________
7. Thailand began to record quarterly GDP data from 1993Q1 onwards. Observations in the regression
models include quarterly data in 1993 regardless of the year-on-year growth variables that require
1992 data. The quarterly 1992 data are approximated by the method of extrapolation using
annual 1992 figure and average quarterly distribution during 1993-1995.
8. Although political instability in Thailand during the recent years is likely an important factor
that discourages part of the capital inflows, it is not included in the regression model due to
the lack of a quantitative indicator of political conditions.363
way the global liquidity index is constructed—as a growth of U.S. monetary
base plus reserves held at the Federal Reserves in custody for foreign central
banks. The fact that the U.S. government unconventionally made several rounds
of rate cuts and extensive liquidity injections in attempt to prevent a crisis could
have caused the U.S. money base to expand substantially, inflating the measure
of “global liquidity” under this definition. Notwithstanding these apparent bivariate
relationships, in the next subsection, we conduct a formal econometric test in
order to reach empirically sound conclusions.
Figure 7
Description of Variables
Note: * G3 = The U.S., Japan, and the euro area.
________________
9. VIX is a symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index which is a measure
of implied volatility of S&P500 index options. This index is often viewed as a proxy for market
view on risk and uncertainty. The higher the VIX index, the riskier is the investment environment
perceived by investors. It is sometimes referred to as a fear index.364
Figure 8
Capital Inflows and Potential Determinants
4.2 Econometric Investigation
Based on the discussion of the potential determinants of capital flows above,
we employ econometric methods to test the importance of each factor in
influencing capital inflows to Thailand. A basic regression model would be
specified as:365
CF = α + βX + δZ + ε (1)
where CF is one of the capital flow variables specified in Figure 7; X is
a vector of the pull factors, Z push factors; α denotes a constant term; â and
ä are a vector of coefficients on X and Z, respectively; finally, ε represents a
disturbance term.
The time-series variables used in all regression models in this paper are
quarterly data running from 1993Q1 to 2008Q3. Since most time-series economic
variables tend to establish strong trends and thus are non-stationary, running
simple OLS regressions on these variables can give rise to misleading or spurious
values of R2 and t-statistics. Therefore, we will first test for non-stationarity due
to the presence of a unit root for each variable in the model, before proceeding
with an appropriate estimation model based on the test results.
4.2.1 Unit Root Tests
We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to determine whether the
variables in question contain a unit root. For a sequence t y , the test is carried out
in the context of the model:
∆yt = µ + γyt-1 +   φi∆yt-i + νt (2)
The parameter of interest is γ. Under the null hypothesis of a unit root, γ
= 0, i.e., the yt contains a unit root. The test-statistic is compared with the
critical values in the Dickey-Fuller table. The optimal number of lags is determined
using the Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). The results of the
unit root tests on the levels and the first differences of the variables are




Based on the test results, all the variables can be treated as non-stationary
and integrated of order I(1), except for the exchange rate appreciation and stock
return differential which appear to be stationary.
4.2.2 Cointegration Tests
To test for cointegration of the I(1) variables, we employ the Johansen (1995)
maximum likelihood method. Since, in order to employ the Johansen’s method, all
the included variables must be integrated of the same order, we have to leave out
the exchange rate appreciation and stock return differential from the regression
model. Moreover, when we investigate the correlations among the independent
variables, it appears that the VIX index and the global liquidity measure are strongly
and significantly correlated (correlation = -0.598, prob. = 0.001), thus, we also drop
the latter from the model to avoid multicolinearity problem.
Under this approach, all the variables in the model are viewed as endogenous,
with each expressed as a linear function of lagged values of itself and all other
variables. This set of equations can be represented in the form of a vector
autoregressive equation, a VAR. Manipulation of this vector equation produces
a vector error correction model (VECM) of which the parameters are then
estimated simultaneously via maximum likelihood. This VECM takes into account




The first step of the Johansen method is to determine the number of cointegrating
vectors in this system, which is equal to the rank of the matrix of coefficients
associated with the variables in the VECM equation. The test results for the case
of total capital inflows are shown in Figure 10.  (The rank test results for the case
of individual components of inflows are omitted here.)
Figure 10
Cointegration Rank Test
The rank test based on trace statistics indicates that 3 cointegrating equations
at the 5% level for the case of total capital inflow. The test for each of the
three components of capital flows consistently rejects the null hypothesis of no
cointegration, but the results are omitted here to save space.
4.2.3 VECM Estimation
We now estimate the parameters of multivariate cointegrating VECM under
the Johansen (1995) procedure with the number of cointegrating equations
suggested by the rank test above. The lag length of the variables is selected by
SBIC. By normalising the co-integrating vector with respect to the capital flow
variable, the model estimation can be expressed in a single equation, which
represents a long-run relationship between the capital flow variable and the other
variables, as follows:
(3)
Note: * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level368
The short-run dynamics of the long-run equation above can be expressed in the
form of error correction representation as:
(4)
where ECM represents the error correction term:
(5)
The short-run dynamics (Equation 4) describe the way in which the system
adjusts or corrects back to the long-run equilibrium, where the point at which
ECMt = 0 can be thought of as an equilibrium of the system. The coefficient
on the ECMt-1 in Equation 4,, is the speed of adjustment. Figure 11 presents the
estimated coefficients of the long-run relationship between capital flows and the
other variables as in Equation 3, and the estimates for in Equation 4.
4.2.4 Discussion of Results
Based on the estimated results for the whole sample period (Columns 1-
4), domestic economic growth appears to be one of the important drivers of
overall capital flows to Thailand. The results suggest that a 1 percentage point
increase in Thai GDP growth leads to a 1.9% increase in FDI inflow and a
7.3% increase in other investment inflow. But it causes the portfolio inflow to
decrease by 0.9%. However, when we consider the results over the more recent
period, that is, 2000 onwards (Column 7), the portfolio inflow is also positively
determined by the growth in domestic GDP. Overall, the results strongly suggest
procyclicality of capital flows to Thailand.
As expected, the current account balance relative to GDP has a negative
relationship with capital inflow. When the CA/GDP ratio is 1 percentage point
lower, total capital inflow tends to increase by 4.9% (Column 1). This is consistent
with the balance of payments concept for a relatively flexible exchange rate
regime in which capital inflows are needed to finance current account deficits.
Interestingly, however, for the latter half of the sample period, FDI inflow seems
to be positively associated with current account surplus (Column 6). A plausible
explanation is that strong current account performance coincides with robust
economic growth during this period, which, in turn, leads to expansion of foreign
direct investments either in terms of new investments or increases in direct
loans from parent to subsidiary companies.369
The world real GDP growth also establishes interesting results. The impact
of world economic growth on FDI is positive and significant both for the whole
sample period (Column 2) and for the recent period. On the contrary, its effects
on portfolio and other investment inflows are statistically significant only for the
latter period and signify negative relations (Columns 7-8). In light of these results,
FDI expansion to emerging markets appear to be driven by healthy economic
growth of the countries of the parent companies, while lack of investment
opportunities in mature economies due to their slow growth seems to be a stronger
motivation for portfolio and other investment flows.10
The interest rate differential factor produces mixed results on different forms
of inflows. The estimates suggest that an increase in the real interest rate
differential between domestic interest rate and the world interest rate induces
portfolio investment inflow, but this is offset by its effect on FDI and other
investment inflows in the opposite direction.
What is worth highlighting is the importance of the measure of market view
on risk as a determinant of capital inflows. Focusing on the latter period, this
measure is significantly and negatively correlated with inflows across all types.
A 10% decrease in the VIX index causes FDI, portfolio investment, and other
investment inflows to rise by 3.9%, 3.2%, and 13.9%, respectively. Moreover,
based on Granger causality tests (Figure 12), while causality is not detected
between most of the other potential determinants and capital flow variables, the
test results support the causation from the VIX index to portfolio and other
investment flows, albeit not to FDI flow. Similarly, when this measure is replaced
by the global liquidity index, the main results remain unchanged, implying that
global liquidity is another important capital flow determinant. Interestingly, when
the VIX index and the global liquidity index are both present in the model, the
global liquidity becomes insignificant, suggesting relative less relevance of the
global liquidity index than the VIX.
As for the speed of adjustment, which is captured by the alpha coefficient,
short-term inflows appear to have strong negative feedback in the short-run dynamic,
possibly reflecting the volatile nature of this type of flows. On the other hand, the
________________
10. The results from this exercise with regard to FDI should be taken with caution. This is because
other, more conventional, determinants of FDI are not included in this model. For example,
according to the Eclectic (OLI) Paradigm by John Dunning, FDI is motivated by ownership
advantages (firm-specific advantages), location advantages (country-specific advantages), and
internationalisation advantages. Absence of these factors as explanatory variables could be a
reason for the low R2 of the FDI regressions.370
system of FDI inflows produces an alpha coefficient that is small (Column 2) or is
not statistically different from zero (Column 6), which is consistent with the fact that
FDI flows are generally regarded as a persistent type of flows that tend not to
fluctuate in the short-run. All the above results stress the need to distinguish among
different types of investment when analysing capital flows as they are driven by
different factors, possess different characteristics, and evolve differently through
time.
In sum, the surge of short-term capital flows to Thailand in the recent years
has been both pulled by domestic economic performance and pushed by external
factors, including global liquidity, investors’ view on risk, and economic conditions
of major economies, with the external factors appear to play relatively more
important role. How development of capital flows has complicated the conduct




 Vector Error Correction Estimates
Dependent Variables: Log of capital inflow372
5. Capital Flows and Associated Risks
This section assesses the potential vulnerability of Thailand to risks associated
with large capital flow movements in recent years, including macroeconomic
risks, financial stability risks, and risk of sudden capital reversal. Overall, large
macroeconomic imbalances, such as asset price bubbles and financial mismatches,
have not been observed in Thailand. It also appears that Thailand has established
relatively strong resiliency to various types of risks potentially caused by capital
movements.
5.1 Macroeconomic Risks
5.1.1 Domestic Credit Growth
The impact of capital inflows on credit growth would depend on the extent
to which these inflows go into financing domestic credit, which, in turn, depends
on the cost of funding of foreign relative to the domestic market. During the last
five years, the interest rates in Thailand have not been substantially higher than
the world interest rates or interest rates in the region. This is partly due to the
existence of ample liquidity in the banking sector as a result of the softening
demand for investment and capital market development. The cost of domestic
funding is thus not too high to drive Thai businesses to seek foreign funding. As
aforementioned, after the crisis Thai banks and business turned to favour domestic
borrowing to limit their FX and external exposure. Therefore, capital inflows
Figure 12
Granger Causality Tests
Note: F-statistics and probability (in parentheses)  are shown in the table.
Significant at 5% level highlighted in bold face.373
and domestic credit have not been closely correlated in Thailand in recent years.
Moreover, since the crisis Thai commercial banks have moved away from
collateral-based lending to a risk-based approach as well as improved credit
analysis, risk management and good corporate governance, all of which help
harness excessive domestic credit growth and limiting credit risks in the banking
system.
Figure 13
Loan Growth and Components of Loans
5.1.2 Exchange Rate Appreciation
As shown in Figure 14, the baht began to strengthen gradually starting from
2001. At the beginning, this was largely due to the current account surplus which
was to some extent offset by the capital account deficits as a result of debt
repayments made by both the public and the private sectors. After 2005, however,
the upward pressure on the baht intensified owing to the surpluses in both of
the current account and the capital account. On the current account, while exports
continued to expand satisfactorily, imports growth declined sharply, following the
abolishment of the government’s oil price subsidy programme as well as softened
domestic demand due mainly to rising concerns over political uncertainties. Yet,
most of the upward pressure on the baht in 2006 came from the capital account.11
________________
11. It is worth noting that the outflows in the banking sector mainly reflected the increase in
banks’ holding of foreign currency deposits or short term instruments to square their foreign
exchange position as a result of being the counterparty to the BOT’s swap agreements, which
is one of the channels the BOT uses to sterilise its FX intervention. Therefore, the overall
capital account position will underestimate the upward pressure on the baht in this case. If
the outflows associated with the swap agreements between the BOT and the banking sector
were taken out, the adjusted figure for the capital account in 2006 would be much higher,
comparable to the figure in 2005.374
The sharp increase in the balance of payments surpluses from $ 5.4 billion in
2005 to $12.7 billion in 2006, with most of the surpluses coming from the capital
account, led to a rapid baht appreciation of more than 16% against the US
dollar, making the baht one of the world’s most rapidly appreciating currency in
2006. The real effective exchange rate (REER) also established the same rapid
appreciating trend during this period, implying deteriorating export competitiveness
which could damage the overall economic growth, if left unchecked. The URR
was thus carried out to suppress this threat to the economy.12
Figure 14
Nominal Exchange Rate, NEER, and REER
5.1.3 Inflation
Large capital inflows may create important pressure on domestic prices,
but this has not been the case for Thailand. This is because softened domestic
demand and exchange rate adjustments during the time of large inflows, together
with a credible inflation-targeting monetary policy regime, have contributed to
anchoring price stability to a large extent. As discussed in Section 3, the rate
of inflation in the recent years has been driven largely by increases in the oil
price that pass-through to production costs. Recently, however, since the oil
price has continued to fall dramatically after peaking in July of 2008, the rate
of inflation has also eased off.
________________
12. However, in the third quarter of 2007, the baht turned around and depreciated moderately due
mainly to capital outflow by non-residents at the first signs of the U.S. subprime problem,
before starting to appreciate again until the first quarter of 2008. The depreciation resumed
in March 2008 and continued thereafter as the U.S. credit market turmoil turned out to be
a worldwide financial crisis.375
5.1.4 Volatility of Capital Flows
As discussed in Section 3, capital inflows have picked up sharply during the
last five years. FDI, which is often perceived as long-term, stable foreign
investments, has become the most important source of foreign financing for
Thailand (Figure 16), while reliance on cross-border bank loans has declined
substantially compared to the pre-crisis period.
Figure 15
Headline and Core Inflation
Figure 16
Private Non-bank Capital Flows
(Million USD) Average Average
1993-1996 2004-2007
Non-resident net flows (Inflow) 7,549 11,195
Foreign direct investment 1,833 7,235
Portfolio investment 3,224 2.706
Other investments 2,492 1,253
Resident net flows (Outflow) -636 -4,861
Thai direct investment -592 -557
Portfolio investment -6 -3,073
Other investments -38 -1,232376
This should not be a cause for complacency, however. Although the country
may have less exposure to a sudden stop or reversal of short-term foreign
borrowings (more details below), other forms of risks may arise as a result of
increasing financial integration. First, portfolio investments, another type of short-
term capital flows, have been even more volatile during the recent years (Figure
17). Increases in portfolio investment flows likely reflect the movement of funds
away from developed countries to seek higher potential yields in emerging
markets, including Thailand, to speculate in the local equity and bond markets
as well as on the local currency. Our empirical investigation also finds that
supportive global conditions, such as excess liquidity, economic growth slowdown
in the U.S. economy, and investors’ view on risk, are also responsible for the
recent surge in short-term capital inflows. Since these investments have no long-
term commitment, they are ready to flow out anytime when the opportunity for
making profits or global liquidity begins to dry up and investors perceive higher
risk. Figure 18 shows that foreign participation, measured by the buy-sell volume,
in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) has increased substantially from 2003-
2007.
Second, while somewhat more stable, the volatility of FDI flows has also
increased. This could reflect large but sporadic flows of FDI in terms of equity
investment, direct loans, and recapitalisation between parent and subsidiary
companies in a more recent period. Third, other forms of long-term capital inflows
may no longer be considered stable balance of payments items. In this changing
world, trading of innovative financial instruments that are derived upon long-
term contracts effectively add volatility to the overall capital flows. For example,
creditors or debtors can change their FX hedging ratio on long-term loans,
depending on the direction of exchange rate changes. Furthermore, long-term
liability holders themselves rarely remain passive when balance of payments
problems arise. They can quickly build up hedges which, in effect, result in
immediate cross-border capital movements in the banking sector as well as
pressure on the local currency. (Further discussion on hedging-related flows is
in Section 5).377
5.2 Financial Stability Risks
5.2.1 Maturity and Currency Mismatches
The substantial reduction in inflows in terms of banks loans is reflected in
the external debt profile of Thailand at end-2007, compared to end-1996. Not
only that the overall external debts declined markedly from 60% of GDP at end-
2006 to stand at 24% of GDP at end-2007 (Figure 19), but also the proportion
of short-term to the overall external debt outstanding also decreased especially
in the banking sector. Moreover, the increasing proportion of the new foreign
borrowings is denominated in Thai baht, which curtails currency mismatches in
Thailand’s asset-liability position. (Baht-denominated external debt accounted for
15% of total external debt in the public sector and 27% in the private sector
at end-2008Q1.) These could imply that the country’s vulnerability to currency
and maturity mismatches of the 1997 crisis nature has been considerably reduced.
Moreover, the composition of short-term external debt has also increasingly shifted
to trade credits (Figure 20)—reflecting increasing imports—which are considered
relatively less sensitive to a shift in investor confidence at times of a crisis.
Figure 17
Volatility of Capital Flows
Volatility of non-resident flows 1993-1999 2000-2007
Direct investment Inward 0.46 2.12
Outward 0.50 3.50
Net 0.63 1.93
Portfolio investment Inward 0.73 6.44
Outward 0.77 7.24
Net 1.37 1.42
Other investment Inward 0.25 0.67
Outward 0.19 0.72
Net 2.91 8.26
Note: Volatility is measured by the coefficient of variation of monthly capital flow data. Other
investment includes bank loans, trade credits, currency and deposits, and others.378
5.2.2 Asset Prices
Given the relatively large share of foreign ownership in the Stock Exchange
of Thailand (SET) compared to other domestic asset markets, inflows and net
buy/sell position of foreign investors over a short-time span have been very
influential in the movement of equity prices, both through direct impact and through




Composition of Private Short-term External Debt: By Instrument379
foreign investors’ decisions. As of the end of 2007, the foreign ownership share
of the total market capitalisation in the SET was around 35%. The share of
transactions attributed to foreign investors is similarly high. In fact, overall the
past years, the investment decisions by foreign investors - especially those in
response to the URR announcements in Thailand and the concerns over the
subprime crisis in the global market -have been particularly important in explaining
the volatility of equity prices in Thailand.
Figure 20
Portfolio Equity Inflow and Stock Performance
Figure 21
Net Foreign Buy-sell and the SET Index380
As for the bond market, since the share of foreign holdings of Thailand’s public
bonds are relatively small, foreign investors’ influence on the price of bond has not
been as significant compared to their role in the stock market. Moreover, the share
of foreign ownership has continued to decline since the implementation of the capital
control in December 2006 despite the introduction of a full hedge requirement as
an alternative to the URR.
Figure 22
Portfolio Debt Inflow and Bond Performance
The property prices in Thailand have risen steadily since 2002 in line with
the pick up of activities in the property sector. However, this is not necessarily
indicative of house price bubbles since most part of the rise in prices was
accounted by the increase in costs of construction materials. Moreover, as the
experience from the last crisis remains vivid, all the stakeholders are more
cautious about their strategies and decisions regarding housing businesses: banks
become more prudent in making mortgage and land development loans; land
developers become aware that good reputation is the most important selling
factor in a competitive housing market; customers become more selective and
tend to buy houses that are built before sale. Foreign investors, however, do
play a significant role in the relatively rapid price increases of luxury condominium
in the central business district as well as of the housing projects in many popular
report towns, such as Phuket and Samui.13 But the overall pace of price increases
________________
13. Foreigners are not allowed to purchase land, except when they invest at least 40 million baht
in a Board of Investment (BOI)-approved project. The BOT also prohibits mortgage lending
to foreigners. They are, however, allowed to buy condominium units provided that they do
not make up more than 40% of the condominium’s unit-owners. In addition, under the law
on property leasing, foreigners doing business in Thailand were allowed to lease real property
primarily for commercial or industrial purposes as well as to lease land for at least 30 years
but not exceeding 50 years, renewable for another 50 years.381
has been moderate. A recent study also finds that there is no obvious housing
price bubble in most East Asian countries, including Thailand.14 However, the
Thai authorities continue to keep close monitoring on this sector for imbalances.
Figure 23
Property Price Indicators
Note: SDH Price = Single, detached house price; TH Price = Townhouse price
5.2.3 Quality of Loans
A widely used indicator of loan quality is the ratio of non-performing loan
(NPL) to total loans in the system. After the crisis, NPLs peaked at $73.7
billion or 48 % of total loans in May 1999 as a result of severe economic
contraction, while also reflecting low quality of the loans made during the pre-
crisis period, largely due to easy bank access to relatively cheap foreign loans
through BIBFs. Although several measures had been implemented to resolve
the NPL problem, the NPL was still considered high in the post-crisis period.
As a result, the Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) was established
with the objective to resolve the NPL problem in financial institutions by
transferring part of NPLs from state-owned financial institutions and asset
management companies. Since then, the financial sector has continued to
strengthen its risk management and loan provisioning framework. Consequently, NPLs
declined substantially to stand at $12.7 billion or equivalent to 6 % of total loans as
of the third quarter of 2008.
________________
14. Glindro, et al (2008).382
5.3 Risk of a Sudden Reversal
The risk of sudden reversal of financial flows can be measured by the size
of mobile capital relative international foreign reserve. This “vulnerability
indicator” is calculated as the sum of short-term foreign currency debts and
foreign holdings of local equities and debt securities, divided by the existing
stock of foreign exchange reserves (Sim, 2008).
According to an analysis by Sim (2008), Thailand’s vulnerability indicator
appears considerably low (54% of international foreign reserves) compared to
its peer group (for example, Indonesia 230%, Korea 208%). This indicates
Thailand’s relatively strong resilience to the risk of capital fight.
Figure 24
Total Loans and NPLs383
6. Capital Flows and Monetary Policy
As it is well-known by the theory of “trilemma,” under a floating exchange-
rate regime, capital mobility complicates the conduct of monetary policies by
affecting monetary variables, such as exchange rate and domestic liquidity, and
by creating a tradeoff between internal and external imbalances. The fact that
capital flows these days are so large, so rapid, and so volatile, tends to add to
the perception of policy complexity. In the wake of the crisis in 1997, policymakers
have grown wary of international capital flows and tend to take preemptive
measures to correct the imbalances brought about by large inflows to reduce
the possibility of a sudden reversal. Available policy tools to manage capital
flows include greater exchange rate flexibility, FX intervention, interest rate policy,
fiscal policy, capital outflow relaxation, and capital controls.
In the case of Thailand, under the managed float regime, the BOT has
largely allowed the overall direction of the baht to adjust to changes flexibly to
changes in market fundamentals. This helps facilitate macroeconomic real
adjustment as well as promote microeconomic efficiency and risk management.
Over the recent years, however, the BOT had to implement a series of measures
to slowdown the pace of exchange rate appreciation since massive capital
inflows, especially those of short-term and speculative nature, led the baht to




the export sector has been the major economic growth engine for Thailand
(accounting for 56% of GDP in 2006) especially at the times when domestic
demand were weakened due to political uncertainties, prompt policy reactions
to the surge in capital inflows were warranted before it would lead to a significant
slowdown in the overall economic growth through excessive exchange rate
appreciation. The measures employed by the BOT included FX interventions,
capital outflow liberalisation, anti-speculative measures, and capital controls. (As
an inflation targeting central bank, the BOT has chosen to reserve interest rate
policy for dealing primarily with inflation and domestic economic growth, not to
use it as a main policy tool to manage capital flows.)
In response to the strong and persistent baht appreciation in 2006, the BOT
stepped up the conduct of FX purchase operations, which resulted in a marked
increase of net reserves (gross reverses plus net forward positions) of roughly US$41
billion from the end of 2005 through the end of 2007, or equivalent to 35% average
annual growth. This rapid accumulation of reserves, though helpful in strengthening
the economy’s resiliency to external shocks, does complicate the operation of monetary
policy.15
Figure 26
Thailand’s Foreign Exchange Reserves, 1993-2008Q3
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15. Coinciding with the recent baht depreciation as a result of the global financial crisis, foreign
exchange reserves has been depleting since the second quarter of 2008 after peaking at $131
billion in March. Thanks to the earlier accumulation of reserves, the high level of foreign
exchange reserves provides sufficient cushion for a potential sudden stop or reversal caused
by the global financial meltdown.385
As mentioned earlier, FX interventions to reduce the speed of baht
appreciation resulted in the rapid accumulation of FX reserves. It also
simultaneously caused a rise in domestic liquidity which poses an additional policy
challenge in terms of liquidity management. The BOT normally sterilises the
monetary impact of intervention in order to avoid inflationary effects as well as
to maintain the policy rate at the level set by the monetary policy committee.
However, in theory, sterilisation can entail substantial costs. First, sterilisation
that is designed to prevent a decline in domestic interest rates at the same time
maintains the incentives for continuing capital inflows, thus perpetuating the
problem. Moreover, sterilisation often implies quasi-fiscal costs because it generally
involves the central bank exchanging high-yield domestic assets for low-yield
reserves. The BOT has mainly sought to sterilise excess liquidity through issuing
BOT bonds, for its relative efficiency in absorbing liquidity on a large scale and
with longer maturities. However, the direct cost arising from interest rate
differentials on assets and liability of the BOT’s balance sheet has not been a
big concern so far, since Thai domestic interest rates are on average comparable
to foreign interest rates. But indirect costs, including the cost arising from FX
revaluation loss on the BOT’s balance sheet and the impact of large bond
issuances on the yield curve, would prove continuation of FX interventions to
be too costly to carry out if capital inflows were to persist.
The BOT also adopted a series of measures aimed at discouraging short-
term speculative capital inflows, such as posing quantitative restrictions on short-
term borrowing (maturity not over three months) of Thai baht from non-residents,
and limiting the daily outstanding balance of non-resident baht account (NRBA)
to the maximum amount of 300 million baht per non-resident. On December 4,
2006, as the baht continued to appreciate rapidly, the BOT required non-residents
to hold securities for longer than three months and allowed domestic financial
institutions to borrow baht from non-residents without underlying trades or
investments in Thailand only for a maturity of longer than six months.
As described in Section 2, regulatory restrictions on outward investments
by Thai residents have been relaxed substantially, which could potentially help
mitigate the upward pressure on the baht—a side benefit in addition to the benefits
of better investment diversification, more balanced capital flows, and greater
investment opportunities for Thai investors.
Nevertheless, these measures combined with increased FX interventions
proved to have limited effectiveness partly because foreign investors can find
other alternative instruments to speculate on the baht. The baht continued to be
highly volatile and strengthened with an accelerating pace. On December 18,386
2006, the BOT announced the implementation of the 30% URR measure on
short-term capital inflows which required them to be deposited with the central
bank for one year with no interest. Capital flows of amounts below US$ 20,000
and those related to trade in goods and services, foreign direct investments, and
foreign investments in the stock market were exempted from such measure. To
alleviate the burden of the URR measure on the business sector, the BOT has
gradually relaxed the measure over the subsequent period by providing a full
hedging requirement as an alternative to the URR for selected types of inflows
and exempting loans with an amount not exceeding US$ 1 million and with
maturity over one year from both the URR and the full hedge requirement.
Businesses having a natural hedge may be considered for an exemption from
both measures on a case-by-case basis.
The URR measure proved to break the momentum of the baht appreciation
and was crucial in ensuring the baht stability. However, aware of the adverse
effects of the capital control on domestic market development, investor
confidence, as well as its ineffectiveness in the long run, the BOT intended to
use this measure only temporarily. After careful consideration of changes in the
environment and factors on February 29, 2008, the BOT announced the lifting
of the URR measure. To facilitate the adjustment process after the lifting of the
URR, the Thai authorities continued to relax capital outflow regulations as well
as supported the SME businesses by announcing a soft loan programme for
SMEs through the financial institutions for a period of three years and a facility
to purchase foreign currency that SMEs sold forward to financial institutions for
a period of six months.
7. Capital Flows and Financial Stability
During the 1997 crisis, Thailand had experienced sudden and massive reversal
of foreign capital mostly in the form of debt callback and sudden stop of short-
term loans in the banking sector (mainly through BIBFs) and withdrawal of
portfolio investments in the capital markets. The occurrence and consequences
of the crisis have shown that international capital flows, when they support the
buildup of imbalances and disequilibrium in economic and financial sectors, can
greatly destabilise the economy once growing financial weaknesses cause external
as well as domestic investors to reassess their willingness to finance a country.
This section focuses on the evolution of capital flows in the banking sector and
policy implemented to deal with the potential risks to financial stability.387
7.1 Capital Flows in Banking Sector in the Last Five Years
Capital flows in the banking sector can be less comprehensible than capital
flows in the other sectors because they sometimes involve unobvious capital
movements. They reflect the change in the external position on banks’ balance
sheet: inflow (outflow) to the banking sector is captured by a decrease (increase)
in banks’ foreign asset or an increase (decrease) in banks’ foreign liability. We
divide our analysis of bank flows according to their maturity, i.e., short-term and
long-term flows.
Figure 27
Capital Flows in Banking Sector
Figure 28
Composition of Short-term Banking Flow388
7.1.1 Long-term Bank Flows
As illustrated in Figure 28, long-term capital flows have played a relatively
insignificant role in the Thai banking sector throughout the financial history of
Thailand. The jump during 1998-99 was due to FDI into the banking sector in
the form of recapitalisation and mergers and acquisitions of several domestic
banks in the aftermath of the crisis. The 49% foreign ownership limit was relaxed
for banks and domestic banks were encouraged to find foreign strategic partners
to help improve productivity, capital base, and overall financial strength. As a
result, four domestic banks have become majority-owned by foreign banks.16
An additional four Thai banks were merged with foreign partners during 2006-
07 to strengthen their strategic and financial positions in the domestic market.17
7.1.2 Short-term Bank Flows
The overall movement of bank flows has been dominated almost exclusively
by the short-term component. In the pre-crisis period, most of the short-term
bank flows were channeled through the BIBFs and commercial banks. These
foreign-currency-denominated funds, by way of rolling over the short-term loans,
were then used to finance long-term domestic projects that yielded long-term
baht returns. The implied stability of the exchange rate promised by the peg
exchange rate regime made FX hedging deem unnecessary. This created both
currency and maturity mismatches that on both the banks’ and Thai corporations’
balance sheets. As the imbalances became more obvious, foreign investors started
to doubt the sustainability of the fixed exchange rate and the ability of Thai
borrowers to continue servicing external debts. Short-term bank flows stopped
to flow in and existing foreign loans were called back. Unlike portfolio flows,
for debt flows there was no price mechanism—i.e., that prices drop as large
sum of money exits the security exchanges and hence make the securities
attractive as expected returns become higher–that would otherwise have
counteracted the disincentive of remaining in the country.
________________
16. These included Ratanasin Bank acquired by United Overseas Bank (Singapore), Nakonthon
Bank by Standard Chartered Bank (United Kingdom), Bank of Asia by ABN Amro (Netherlands),
and Thai-Danu Bank by DBS Bank (Singapore).
17. They were Bank of Ayudhaya partnered with GE Capital International Holdings Corporation
(United Sates), Bank Thai with Newbridge (Netherlands), Thai Military Bank with ING Bank
(United States), and Thanachart Bank with Bank of Novascotia (Netherlands).389
The expensive lessons learned from the crisis have led Thai banks and
businesses to be wary of relying heavily on external debt. Most of them have
switched to domestic sources for financing. Foreign creditors have also become
more prudent in making loans. These resulted in substantially reduced inflows
in form of foreign debt. Moreover, at the beginning of 2004, the BOT developed
the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) in order to carry out a major reform
of the Thai financial system. The FSMP eliminated the tax distortion and regulatory
arbitrage problems of the BIBFs, which partly contributed to the diminishing
role of short-term external loans in the bank flow in Thailand.
7.1.3 Residents Hedging
During the last five years, deposits in bank abroad (Nostro accounts) by
Thai banks have become the most important component of Thai bank flow. An
increase (decrease) in banks’ deposit in Nostro accounts are recorded as bank
outflow (inflow) from the perspective of Thailand. A Thai domestic bank
increases or decreases its deposits abroad mainly to manage their FX position,
inclusive of all foreign currencies, to remain below 20% of the bank’ capital to
comply with the prudential regulation under the BOT’s risk-based supervisory
framework. Under this FX position limit, if customers buy or sell FX derivatives
with a bank, the bank almost always squares its net FX position by increasing
or decreasing its deposit abroad at the end of the day regardless of the maturity
of the derivatives.18 As a result, capital flows occur almost immediately in the
banking sector even though there has not been any delivery of the foreign
exchange between banks and customers.
________________
18. Even though the bank’s net FX position is much below 20% of capital, the bank usually squares
its additional FX exposure imposed by FX derivative transactions with exporters/importers.
This is because what banks expect to gain from agreeing to be the counterparty of FX transactions
is mainly from transaction fees and not so much from FX speculation be leaving their FX
positions open.390
A sharp increase in demand of Thai exporters for FX hedging, by selling
outright forwards on their future export receipts, was one of the factors driving
capital inflows to Thailand in the past years through the banking sector, from
the fact that Thai banks have to decrease their foreign asset holdings abroad
to square their net FX positions in response to increased FX forward obligations.
However, beginning from the second half of 2007, after further regulatory
relaxation on outward investments, investment hedging has been another important
component in Thai bank flow. Nonetheless, investment hedges do not have
significant effect on the exchange rate since most of the FX hedges by institutional
investors are in the form of swap contracts, which involve buy or sell FX today
with an agreement to reverse the transaction with an equal amount on a specified
future date, hence leaving the bank’s net FX position unaffected. Since banks
do not need to adjust their FX position in this case, this does not generate either
capital inflow or outflow via banks.
Figure 29
Residence Hedge-related Bank Flows (% of GDP)391
7.2 Central Bank Policy Related to Capital Flows and Financial Stability
in Recent Years
A root cause of the banking crisis was also poor corporate governance and
risk management in financial institutions. Lending practices with collateral-based
lending did not involve proper credit assessment. Collateral-based lending was
also highly risky given the asset price bubble leading up to the crisis, particularly
in the property markets. Moreover, the financial liberalisation allowed domestic
corporations greater access to external funding through the banking sector,
particularly in the form of shorter-term loans without exchange rate hedge. The
crisis provided important lessons which led to a concerted effort on the part of
banks and regulators to improve corporate governance and risk management.
The BOT implemented two major policy approaches to improve financial stability:
the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) and the risk-based supervision with
international standards.
7.2.1 Risk-based Supervision
Thailand’s supervisory system is moving towards risk-based supervision
which covers three key areas: capital adequacy, risk management and good
corporate governance. The BOT places great emphasis on the management’s
roles and responsibilities in providing a robust risk management system that
corresponds to their business operations and strategies and is in line with
international standards. Proper risk management must include using the
appropriate tools to manage five key risks, namely, strategic risk, credit risk,
market risk, liquidity risk and operational risk.
At present, the BOT is in the course of moving from the capital adequacy
framework under Basel I to the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), applicable
to all financial institutions in 2008. The new guideline for regulatory capital will
not only cover all the major risks faced by financial institutions, but will also be
more responsive to the increasing risks of financial institutions and the more
complex financial market conditions.
7.2.2 Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP)
In order to further address structural weaknesses and develop a stable and
efficient financial sector, the BOT developed the Financial Sector Master Plan
(FSMP) as the medium-term (5-10 years) development plan for the Thai financial
sector. The master plan seeks to ensure a financial landscape which is sound
and free from such structural weakness, while providing a transition path to392
strengthen the financial institutions, via merger and upgrading or orderly exit.
The key measures to increase efficiency in the financial sector, by reducing the
number of small players and eliminating regulatory arbitrage, are the licensing
rationalisation scheme and the “one presence” policy.19 Under the new licensing
scheme, by reducing the number of licenses and allowing commercial banks to
better take advantage of the economy of scope and scale, the authorities have
removed the overlapping scopes of business that posed regulatory arbitrage
problems among the financial institutions. This effort is reinforced by the “one
presence” policy which requires financial conglomerates with more than one
type of deposit-taking financial institution within their group to merge their
holdings, further reducing regulatory arbitrage in the system.
The FSMP began to be implemented at the beginning of 2004. Following
the merging and upgrading of the finance companies and credit fonciers to
commercial or retail bank status, discontinuation of IBFs and consolidation under
the “one presence” policy, the number of financial institutions under the supervision
of the BOT is expected to decline from 83 to about 37.
7.2.3 Deposit Insurance System
The Deposit Insurance Act has been passed by the Legislature on 19
December 2007 and announced in the Government Gazette on February 13,
2008. This move will pave the way for the removal of a blanket deposit guarantee,
a legacy of the crisis. It is aimed to address moral hazard and promote risk
management in the financial sector. The Act allows for a one million baht per
person per bank guarantee limit. The guarantee is expected to cover 98% of
depositors. However, the implementation of the Act has been delayed due to the
global financial crisis, as the Thai authorities deem the postponement necessary
to safeguard confidence in the Thai banking sector amid the global turmoil.
8. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Financial liberalisation and a consequent growing integration into the global
markets have spurred the growth as well as the volatility of gross capital flows
in Thailand during the past two decades. Thailand experienced strong increases
________________
19. Licensing rationalisation created a new deposit-taking regime occupied by only four types of
financial institutions, namely commercial banks, retail banks, foreign bank branches and
subsidiaries of foreign banks. Licenses for International Banking Facilities (IBFs) have been
discontinued to eliminate tax distortion. Qualified finance companies, credit fonciers, and
stand-alone IBFs are allowed to be upgraded to either commercial or retail banks.393
in gross inflows in the early 1990s and in mid-2000s. What is special about the
more recent wave of inflows to Thailand, compared to the previous one, is that
it was taking place against the background of much stronger external currency
account positions and a substantial acceleration in foreign exchange reserves
accumulation. In addition, the composition of the capital inflows has also altered—
from being dominated by bank loans to having FDI as a major component, while
portfolio inflows also increased considerably. Although Thailand’s vulnerability
to the old types of capital flow-related risks has been much reduced, this should
not be a cause for complacency to the Thai authorities since new form of risks
may be underway, especially those stemming from the (mis)use of increasingly
more complex financial instruments.
Based on our empirical investigation, the pick-up in capital flows to Thailand
in 2005-2006 reflected, for the most part, the country’s improved macroeconomic
fundamentals as well as external investment environment, particularly the weak
outlook on economic growth of the major economies, ample global liquidity and
international investors’ perception of market risk. The facts that (1) capital flows
are procyclical and (2) the external determinants are beyond the control of
domestic policy, forewarn policy makers of plausible channels of risks through
imbalances and external financial linkages. This may call for counter-cyclical
policy to correct any economic imbalance before it evolves into a catastrophe,
as well as proactive safeguards against the volatility and the risk of a sudden
reversal that could arise from external shocks.
In Thailand, the risk to financial stability in terms of overheating, asset price
bubbles, and rapid credit growth were limited, thanks to the developments in the
domestic capital markets and improvement in prudential measures. Albeit, there
were two key macroeconomic challenges faced by the Thai policymakers in the
recent years—namely, the rapid real exchange rate appreciation and domestic
liquidity management. Sterilised FX interventions and temporary capital controls
were used to manage the excessive capital inflows and their impact. However,
these policy measures do not come without a cost and could be ineffective,
especially when the inflows persist for a long time.
A long-run approach to managing capital flows would be to create economic
and investment environment conducive to more long-term and productive types
of capital flows and to increase the economy’s capacity to absorb foreign
investments through improvements in market infrastructure, structural reforms,
labor productivity, and product competitiveness. Other policy tools such as financial
supervision and regulation to reduce the risk inherent with large capital flows—
including their role in accentuating business cycles, their destabilising impact on394
financial prices, and the upshot of a sudden stop—should also be strengthened
to prevent a potential crisis caused by a shift in capital flows. The fact that, so
far, Thailand has proved quite resilient to the current global financial crisis that
has greatly decelerated capital inflows into the country should not be a cause
for complacency. As long as the country is still part of this financially integrated
world, consistent and properly-designed policies to manage capital flows aimed
at promoting long-term stability and economic growth are a must, while potential
vulnerabilities need to be closely monitored.
Regarding capital outflows, the remaining regulations on capital outflows by
residents should be relaxed gradually to bring more balance to the net flows and
to encourage international risk sharing. The gradual approach towards outflow
liberalisation should be emphasised, especially in light of the current global crisis
in the major economies. The spillovers from the turmoil in the U.S. and European
credit markets have so far been limited in Thailand due to the low exposure of
domestic investors to these markets, thanks partly to some limitations on residents’
outward investment and the conservative investment strategy and risk
management of Thai banks and institutional investors. Going forward, a stepped
liberalisation towards a free capital flow regime should be taken cautiously, and
concurrently with continued improvement in financial literacy and risk
management in all economic sectors, including the non-financial businesses and
households.395
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Chapter 13
CAPITAL FLOWS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL
BANK POLICIES IN VIETNAM
by
Ngo Thi Thu Tra1
1. General Framework and Major Capital Flows Management Policies
1.1 Current Account and Trade Liberalisation.
In December 30, 2005, Vietnam was recognised by the IMF as completing
its member obligation to fully liberalise its current account in compliance with
the Fund’s Article VIII (compared with 1968 for Malaysia, 1990 for Thailand
and 1996 for Mongolia). Payments and transfers for current account transactions
can now be freely made through the commercial banks. The requirement for
the economic institutions to surrender their foreign exchange was gradually
reduced from 80% (1998) of their foreign currency revenues to 50% (1999),
40% (2001), 30% (2002), and finally abolished in April 2003.
Besides, the Vietnamese Government is continually adjusting its policies to
encourage remittance from overseas. Fee on remittance receipt was lifted in
1982 and income tax on remittance receipt was exempted in 1999. The local
beneficiaries are allowed to withdraw or hold remittance in foreign currencies
since 1999. At the same time, many institutions were licensed to carry out
remittance transfer service. As a result, remittances into Vietnam increased
dramatically from US$0.95 billion (1998), $2.6 billion (2003), over $3 billion (2004),
$4.1 billion (2005), $4.1 billion (2006), and to $6.4 billion in 2007.
With its open and liberalised trade policies, Vietnam is well integrated into
the world economy. As a member of the AFTA, APEC and, most recently, the
WTO, together with the associated advantages, Vietnam has emerged as one
of the most attractive destinations for global investors, especially in the period
of 2006-2007.
________________
1. Economic Expert, Foreign Exchange Department, State Bank of Vietnam398
Being an official member of the WTO, however, also means that Vietnam
is obliged to cut tariffs, remove domestic protection and further open the door
to fierce competition, allowing foreign investors entry into its commercial and
financial markets. This has brought about many challenges as well as opportunities
to Vietnam’s economy and its policy development and management.
1.2 Capital Account Liberalisation
Together with a fully liberalised current account, Vietnam has removed many
restrictions on its capital account, taking significant steps towards a fully liberalised
capital account. Since its issuance of the first Law on Foreign Investment in
1988, Vietnam has continually amended as well as issued many new and relevant
laws and legal provisions to create a transparent and favorable legal framework
to encourage foreign investment, especially FDI into the country.
1.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Policy
In 2001, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), the central bank, removed the
requirement of foreign currency self-balancing applied to FDI enterprises. FDI
enterprises can buy foreign currencies from commercial banks for their legal
needs. The government even guaranteed to sell foreign currencies to some
important FDI projects. The door to FDI inflows has been cast open wider and
wider with each passing year. The compulsory requirement on export ratio or
limitation on the ratio of capital contribution made by technology transfer, and
employment in FDI projects, were removed. The withholding tax on profit
remittance of FDI projects was lowered and subsequently abolished. The limitation
of 30% for foreign ownership in FDI enterprises was abolished, with some
exceptions. As a result, Vietnam has witnessed a sharp and continuous increase
of FDI inflows since 1988.
1.2.2 Portfolio Investment: Foreign Indirect Investment (FII) Policy
Vietnam’s stock market initially came into play in July 2000 with few listed
companies. In order to encourage foreign portfolio investment (FII) as an
important drive towards domestic capital market growth, the Vietnamese
Government issued a regulation in 2003 on capital contribution and share holding
by foreign investors in Vietnamese enterprises. Under this regulation, foreign
investors can contribute capital or buy shares up to a maximum equivalent of
30% of Vietnamese enterprises’ legal capital. Individual investors are tax-
exempted for their income from capital contribution or share purchase in
Vietnamese enterprises.399
For further FII encouragement, on 12 December 2004, the SBV removed
the requirement of FII to remain at least one year in the country before it can
be repatriated. Foreign investors are allowed to buy foreign currencies to transfer
their invested capital and profit out of the country freely at any time after
fulfillment of tax and other obligations. Therefore, there is currently no regulation
restricting the withdrawal of foreign investment out of the country. However,
foreign capital on arrival is required to be converted into the local currency and
held in a specialised account with a commercial bank to realise the investment
in Vietnam.
The permitted room for foreign participation was increased from 30% in
2003 for both listed and unlisted companies to 49% in 2005 for listed companies,
except banks.
Foreign holdings of valuable papers issued by financial institutions are limited
up to 50% while there is no restriction on foreign holdings of listed bonds in
Vietnamese stock market.
1.2.3 Outward Investment Policy
Besides stimulative policies to attract foreign investment, the government
also gradually liberalised its external investment policy. Before 2005, domestic
enterprises could use only foreign currencies from their current account revenue
for investment abroad. Since 2005, they can also use foreign currencies bought
or borrowed from eligible banks for overseas investment.
1.2.4 External Borrowing Policy
Vietnam also adopted relatively open external borrowing policies. Enterprises
are allowed to borrow overseas to fund their permitted, registered business
activities and are self-responsible for repayment as contracted. Loan registration
after contracting and periodical reports of loan disbursement to SBV are required
only for medium-term and long-term loans. Disbursement of such loans can only
be made after duly complying with the requirement of loan registration with the
SBV. External borrowing by public sector should meet SBV’s relevant
requirements and be subject to the nation’s annual total commercial credit ceiling.
Individuals can borrow overseas as long as they meet the conditions set by the
SBV.400
1.2.5 Overseas Lending Policy
In terms of external lending policy, the financial institutions can extend
financial and commercial credit overseas. Registration and periodical reporting
to SBV are required after entering the contract. Economic institutions can lend
overseas only with approval of the Prime Minister and registration with SBV.
Individuals are not permitted to lend overseas.
1.3 Other Relevant Policies
1.3.1 Monetary and Fiscal Policies
During a long period from 1999-2006, Vietnam adopted accommodative
monetary and fiscal policies in order to boost local investment and consumption
for economic growth and  cope with the potential threat of deflation under the
impact of the Asian financial crisis. The SBV gradually liberalised its interest
rate policy, shifting from direct to indirect management. Deposit and lending
interest rates of both local and foreign currencies were fully liberalised in June
2002. At the same time, the SBV continues to announce the SBV’s directive
interest rate (so-called base rate) as a reference for the market. However, it
is stipulated under the Civil Law of Vietnam that the local currency interest
rates should not exceed 150% of the SBV’s base rate with a view to avoiding
extremely high rate loans. The amendment of the Civil Law regarding this issue
is proposed.
1.3.2 Exchange Rate Management Policy
In 1991, the SBV reformed its exchange rate management mechanism from
multi-exchange rate system into a unified one. The SBV announced the daily
official rate of USD/VND as the central rate for commercial banks to determine
their trading exchange rates within a certain band set, and adjusted when
necessary by the SBV’s Governor for each particular period. Vietnam’s exchange
rate regime at that time was classified by the IMF as conventional peg.
In February 1999, the SBV abolished the announcement of official rate,
shifting into calculating and announcing the daily inter-bank weighted average
exchange rate as the reference for commercial banks’ trading exchange rate
determination within a certain band. This was a significant change in Vietnam’s
exchange rate policy as it moved from subjective management mechanism into
market-oriented one. As a result, the exchange rate mechanism of Vietnam was
classified as managed floating by the IMF in 1999.401
Table 1
Exchange Rate Developments of VND 1997-2007
In parallel with the SBV’s frequent intervention in the domestic foreign
exchange market to prevent it from excessive or unreasonable fluctuations, the
allowed trading band of commercial banks was gradually widened from  ± 0,1%
(2/1999) to ± 0,25 % (7/2002), ± 0,5% (12/2006) ; ± 0,75% (12/2007); ± 1%
(3/2008) and ± 2% (6/2008), ± 3 % (12/2008).
Vietnam’s capital account has been liberalised and quite open. Apart from
some regulations limiting the maximum level of participation that can be made
by foreign investors in Vietnam’s companies or in some special areas, Vietnam’s
Government does not impose any restrictions on capital inflows and withdrawals.
On the one hand, this liberal policy framework has created strong incentives for
the stimulation of foreign investment, resulting in great opportunities for economic
development. On the other hand, it has led to increasing dramatic fluctuations
of capital flows into and out from the country, creating series of unpredictable
mini-shocks in foreign exchange market. Vietnam’s macroeconomic policy
framework is  complicated by the dilemma of the “Impossible Trinity.”
By the Theory of the Impossible Trinity, a country cannot simultaneously
achieve the three main goals of macroeconomic policies: flexible capital flows,
stable exchange rate, and monetary autonomy. As a result, every country that
liberalises its capital account should adopt a flexible exchange rate policy if it
aims to maintain monetary autonomy. However, a relatively stable exchange402
rate is viewed by the Vietnamese Government as a key factor to the country’s
economic development. Therefore, increasing the flexibility of capital flows into
the country posed great challenges to Vietnam in its efforts to maintain its
exchange rate management policy.
2. Trend of Capital Flows in Vietnam since 1985
Along with its course of economic reforms and global integration, Vietnam
attracted an increasingly significant amount of foreign investment in contributing
to its economic development. Since 1995 until now, the surplus in its capital
account has been rising (except 2000).
2.1 Inflows
2.1.1 FDI Inflows
FDI contributed the highest proportion in Vietnam’s capital inflows. Since
1998 with the enforcement of its Law on Foreign Investment up to December
2007, Vietnam attracted $99.6 billion of registered FDI capital, of which US$45.5
billion had been realised.
As can be seen from Figure 1 below, FDI inflows in Vietnam recorded the
first peak in 1996 and then cut into half in 1997-1998 under the impact of the
Asian financial crisis. FDI inflows in Vietnam recovered in 2000 and have since
increased dramatically from Vietnam’s accession to WTO.
Figure 1
FDI into Vietnam 1988-2007403
The registered amount of FDI recorded at US$21.3 billion in 2007, exceeding
the total registered amount of US$20.8 billion for the whole period of 2001-
2005. It continued to reach US$64 billion in 2008, equal to three times the
registered amount of the previous year. The disbursement was US$11.5 billion
in 2008, increasing by 43.2% against 2007.
2.1.2 FII Inflows
Until 2004, foreign portfolio capital (FII) inflows into Vietnam were
insignificant given its infant stock market and poorly developed money market.
However, Vietnam witnessed an amazing surge of foreign portfolio inflows, which
rose from nearly zero in 2004 to the record of US$6.2 billion in 2007 amidst the
boom of Vietnam’s stock market and the perceived attractiveness of Vietnamese
economy after its WTO entry.
Besides its positive effects on the local capital market development, the
sudden surge of foreign portfolio inflows had posed many challenges to Vietnam’s
nascent financial  and money market. However, there has been a declining trend
in net portfolio inflows into Vietnam since the second quarter of 2008 as the
inflows dropped and the withdrawal amount plummeted. The net portfolio inflows
to Vietnam were just US$1.8 billion for the first half of 2008, just equal to
27.7% of the total FII inflows of Vietnam in the last year.
Figure 2
Net Portfolio Inflows in Vietnam404
2.1.3 External Debt
Vietnam’s net external debt only made a positive contribution to its capital
account since 2003. By the end of 2007, the total outstanding external debt of
the country was US$23.2 billion, of which, short-term debt incurred by private
sector was only US$0.2 billion, accounting for 0.9% of total external debt.
Approximately 97-98% of Vietnam’s external debt consists of medium and long-
term loans under the form of ODA or commercial loans incurred by enterprises
for machines and equipment purchase. Its total short-term external debt was
equal to 1/95 of its foreign exchange reserve by the end of 2007, far below the
alarming limit of ½ specified by the IMF. The ratio of Vietnam’s external debt/
exports has gradually decreased from 82% in 1997 to 37.8% in 2007, far below
the maximum permitted level of 200% specified by the IMF. As a result, there
is not much risk of sudden capital flight for its external debt.
Figure 3
Vietnam’s Net External Debt (End Year)
According to the IMF and WB ratings, Vietnam is not included in the list
of High Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). All the external debt sustainability
indicators of Vietnam have always been well below the IMF or WB’s applicable
debt thresholds, reflecting Vietnam’s mostly concessional and long-term structure
of external debt, as well as its dynamic export sector.  The annual debt service
of Vietnam has been always in the range of 7.3-13.9% of its exports of goods
and services, which is lower than the highest border of the permitted safety
range.405
2.1.4 Structure of Net Capital Inflows
As far as the capital structure is concerned, FDI has always contributed
the biggest proportion in Vietnam’s total net inflows (except the year 2003).
This is a good reflection of a healthy capital structure, facilitating sustainable
development of Vietnam’s economy in the long term. However, the sudden
increase of portfolio investment into Vietnam since 2005 is noteworthy and
necessitated an appropriate response as it raised the proportion of short-term
and volatile capital in Vietnam’s capital structure.
Table 2




Because of the limited financial capability of Vietnamese enterprises and
great demand of capital for domestic economic development, the outward flow
of investment and lending during the past years was insubstantial. There were
just 280 FDI projects abroad with a registered capital of US$1.26 billion made
by Vietnam during the period of 1989- 2007, of which only approximately 17%
has been realised. No portfolio investment and almost no overseas lending was
registered during the same period.
A significant and most volatile part of Vietnam’s capital outflows is its banking
system’s investments abroad in the placement of deposits with foreign banks.
The volume of this part of capital outflows is primarily subject to the interest
rate developments in the world market. In the years 2000 and 2001 when the
world’s interest rates went up, with the FED fund rate climbing to the highest
level over 40 years, Vietnam witnessed huge capital outflows (US$2.1bn in 2000
and US$1.2 billion in 2001), being the domestic banks’ overseas investments
from their huge amount of domestic deposits in foreign currencies.  This was
one of the main reasons for Vietnam’s capital account deficit in the year 2000.
3. Determinants of Capital Flows in Vietnam
3.1 Possible Causes behind Surge in Capital Inflows into Vietnam
3.1.1 External Factors
The sharp depreciation of the US dollar in the international markets since
2002, together with the economic recession starting in the US since 2001, induced
global investors to seek for investment opportunities outside the US and in US
currency-denominated assets. The economic conditions in many other regions
were also not good for new and high-return-oriented investors. Many big countries
started to cut down interest rates to cope with the threat of economic recession
and weakening financial systems, therefore undermining the attractiveness of
their local currency-denominated assets.
On the other hand, it comes out obviously that, the more integrated and
globalised the world’s market, the more diversified the outreach of global portfolio
investors  looking for investment. In such a context, Asia has emerged as the
most attractive destination for global investors thanks to its continual high
economic growth, cheap labor, and large emerging market, which promises high
returns from high-yielding assets.407
3.1.2 Internal Factors
Vietnam’s outstanding economic achievement and its advantages as a newly
emerging market are the main driving forces behind the strong capital inflows
into the country in recent years, especially in the context of the current global
economic recession.
(i) Fast Growing Economy
Over the last 13 years from 1995-2007, Vietnam achieved great success in
economic development, attaining on average a growth rate of 7.58% annually,
much higher than the average rate of 6.5% of the whole region. With GDP
growth rate of 8.5%, Vietnam was the second fastest growing economy in Asia
after China in 2007. Characterised by a stable political environment, Vietnam is
viewed to have great potential for strong economic growth, thanks to its
comparative advantages, such as cheap labor force, newly established and cheap
stock and real estate market, newly established financial and foreign exchange
markets.
(ii) High Demand
As a developing country with a widening savings-investment gap, there is
high demand in Vietnam for foreign capital for economic development. On the
other hand, as a newly emerging market with numerous under-capacity industries
and huge demand for equitisation, Vietnam offers tremendous opportunities for
foreign investment.
Figure 5
Vietnam’s Economic Growth Rate (2000-2007)408
(iii) Easy Access
With its fully liberalised current account, open-trade policy and quite liberalised
capital account accompanied by foreign investment incentives and stable
exchange rate regime, Vietnam offers to be an attractive and easily accessible
destination for foreign investments, especially after its WTO’s membership.
(iv) Great Interest Rate Differential
The expectation of stable exchange rates of VND makes the great interest
rate differential between local and international monetary markets (8% in 2007
and 12% in early 2008) even more attractive for foreign portfolio investment.
3.2 Possible Causes behind a Decline in Capital Inflows since Quarter
II of 2008
Since the second quarter of 2008, Vietnam has witnessed a declining trend
of net capital inflows as less portfolio capital inflows are pouring into the economy
and more portfolio capital withdrawn out of the country both due to external and
internal reasons. However, committed FDI continued to soar and recorded
US$31.6 billion in the first half of the year, equal to 3.7 times the total of 2007’s
committed FDI, which exceeded the total registered amount of FDI for the
whole period of 2001-2005.
Table 3
Vietnam’s Selected Macroeconomic Indicators (1995-2008)409
3.2.1 External Factors
Erupting in the United States in August 2007, the sub-prime credit crisis has
spread quickly worldwide and swelled out into the largest-ever global financial
crisis since the Great Depression of 1929-1933. The crisis triggered huge losses
and massive collapse of major global financial and banking institutions, badly
shaking all the major financial markets throughout the world. It also led to a
credit crunch and liquidity tightening in the world inter-bank market, inducing
capital withdrawals of foreign institutional and individual investors out of
developing countries, including Vietnam, due to the need of liquidity support for
their parent companies and their increasing risk adverse appetite.
The worsening global economic recession is a main cause contributing to
a decline in capital inflows into Vietnam in recent months.
3.2.2 Internal Factors
Performing on the back of the external economic situation and sharp price
movements in the world market, the Vietnamese economy experienced
overheated growth during the past one year and seemingly went into an
adjustment period accompanied by some macroeconomic uncertainties.
(i) Double-digit Inflation and Economic Slowdown
After many good years of control over inflation, Vietnam’s CPI index climbed
to double-digit level at 12.6% in 2007 and continued to mount up to 21.87% just
in first nine months of 2008, nearly doubling the total CPI index increase of the
Figure 6
World’s Economic Growth (2003-2008)410
previous year. The monthly increase of CPI index recorded the highest level in
the past 16 years at 5.3%/month in May 2008. High inflation turned the domestic
real interest rate into negative, triggering a strong reduction in consumption spending
and a slowdown of the whole economy. Vietnam’s economic growth rate
decreased from 8.4% in 2007 to 6.23% in 2008.
Figure 7
Vietnam’s Monthly CPI Index in 2007
%
Figure 8
Vietnam’s First 6-month Economic Growth (2003-2008)
%/year
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(ii) Huge Trade Deficit
On the one hand, the growth of foreign trade activities as a result of open
trade policy and current account liberalisation, created various export opportunities
for Vietnamese enterprises. On the other hand, it contributed to push up the
country imports. Import tariff reduction under commitments to WTO also
encouraged the country’s imports to meet its accelerating aggregate demand.
Additionally, the dramatic increase of FDI inflows themselves contributed a main
drive for the country’s increasing imports of machines, equipment and input
materials. Consequently, Vietnam’s trade deficit has quickly widened from US$5.1
billion in 2006 to $14.1 billion in 2007 (equivalent to -11.9% of GDP) and continued
escalating to reach the record level of US$14.8 billion just in the first half of
2008.
Figure 9
Vietnam’s Trade Deficit (2000-2007)
US $ billion
(iii) Widening Budget Deficit
As a result of an expanding fiscal policy implemented by the Vietnamese
Government since 1999 to facilitate economic growth and living quality
improvement, the state budget deficit widened to -5.9 % of GDP in 2007.
(iv) Strong Adjustment in Stock and Real Estate Markets
After the boom in late 2007 and early 2008, both the real estate market and
stock market experienced a strong adjustment reflected in a freezing real estate
market and a drop of almost 70% of VN Index just in six months.412
(v) Credit Rating Downgrade
Given some signs of domestic macroeconomic imbalances and concern
among foreign investors about the resilience of the Vietnamese economy and
the banking system to the worsening global financial market, Moody and Standard
& Poors lowered Vietnam’s credit rating from “stable” or “positive” to
“negative”. However, this agency still maintains a positive assessment with regard
to the long-term outlook and prospects of Vietnam’s economic growth.
Table 4
Credit Rating Outlook of some Asian Countries Rated by S&P
(May 2008)






Vietnam’s huge trade deficit together with its widening budget deficit raised
concern among investors about the sustainability of Vietnam’s balance of payment,
especially in the context of flexible capital flows and deepening global financial
crisis. In addition, the on-going increase of domestic inflation rates and signs of
liquidity tightening in the banking system added more anxiety to foreign and
even local investors regarding the country’s economic prospects and the potential
devaluation of the Vietnamese Dong. This  badly affected the confidence of
foreign investors over Vietnam’s short-term economic prospects and triggered
a partial withdrawal of foreign short-term investment out of the country in the
middle of 2008.
4. Implications of Capital Flows for Central Banks Policies and Its
Response
Alongside great opportunities for economic growth and market development
that can be reaped from capital inflows, the increasing volatility of capital flows
in and out of the country pose tough challenges to the SBV. The greatest413
challenge may be the problem of the impossible trinity, which is manifested in
the tremendous difficulties of SBV in maintaining a stable VND exchange rate
and independent monetary policies under the impact of strong fluctuations in
capital flows in recent times.
4.1.Implications of Rocketing Capital Inflows for Central Bank Policies
and Its Response
4.1.1 Exchange Rate Management Policies
(i) Implications
A surge in capital inflows into Vietnam, especially since late 2006, significantly
changed the balance between demand and supply in the local foreign exchange
market. In the past, the demand for foreign currencies was always greater than
the supply, the VND was hence always under the pressure of depreciation.
Dramatic increase of capital inflows, especially portfolio capital pushed up the
supply of foreign currencies in domestic foreign exchange market to outweigh
the market demand, thus creating the first-ever upward pressure on VND. Instead
of always quoting their trading exchange rates at the ceiling of the controlling
band as in the past, all banks then traded at floor rates. The black market
witnessed for the first time in its history the drop of US dollar/VND exchange
rate to a level far below trading rates in the official markets.
The situation became more serious in the first quarter of 2008 when the
supply of foreign currencies from capital inflows continued to increase to over-
exceed the market demand, putting the local currency under strong pressure of
appreciation. The wide expectation of further VND appreciation due to the
forecast of continuously increasing capital flows into the economy induced market
participants to flee or stay away from US dollar or US dollar-denominated assets.
Local people and companies rushed to convert their foreign currency holdings
into Vietnamese dong to avoid further depreciation of US dollar and to make
benefit from high VND interest rates. Banks did not want to be long in foreign
currencies as the market demand for foreign currencies declined sharply while
the exchange rate of US dollar/VND dropped day by day both in the official
and black markets. At the same time, the local inter-bank market started to face
tightening liquidity of VND. As a result, the SBV was facing tremendous challenge
in maintaining its primary objective to keep exchange rate stable and competitive
for export promotion.414
(ii) Central Bank’s Response
a. Exchange Rate Adjustment
Instead of trying to keep the reference rate under as little change as in the
past, the SBV proactively adjusted the reference exchange rates towards gradual
appreciation of VND to keep pace with market movements. The exchange rate
trading band was widened two times from + 0.25% applied since 2002 to ±0,5%
and then  ±0,75 in 2007 and another time to ±1% on March 2008 (see Table
8). Consequently, the VND appreciated 1.12% in the official market and 1.4%
in the black market in the first quarter of 2008 for the first time ever.
b. Foreign Exchange Intervention and Sterilisation
In parallel with the reference rate adjustment, the SBV also intervened to
stabilise the domestic foreign exchange market by purchasing foreign currencies
from commercial banks to prevent local currency from too much appreciation.
By doing so, the SBV, on the one hand,  helped reduce foreign currency over-
supply, easing upward pressure on VND. On the other hand, it consolidated its
foreign exchange reserve, which climbed from US$10.4 billion from late 2006
to US$19.6 billion by the end of 2007.
However, this inevitably led to the increase of local currency in circulation,
pushing up inflation, thus badly affecting the VND Real Effective Exchange
Rate and the economy’s external competitiveness, creating difficulties in monetary
policy formulation. Great efforts were made by the SBV to neutralise these
adverse effects through intensive open market operations and other creative
measures in money market (see in 4.1.2).
c. Other Relevant Policies
In order to help ease upward pressure on VND due to over-supply of foreign
currencies, the SBV encouraged prepayment of external debt by enterprises





As Vietnam is a dollarised economy, the mounting supply of foreign currencies
resulted from high capital inflows since late 2006 had not only exacerbated
dollarisation in the economy but also increased the total broad money in circulation,
leading to inflation hike, making central bank’s monetary policies more
complicated. The central bank’s efforts of forex intervention to relieve upward
pressure on the local currency also played a part in raising the money supply
in the economy, thus pushing up the inflationary pressure.
b. Overheated Credit Growth and Volatile Inter-bank Market
As a result of the strong surge in capital inflows, followed by great investment
opportunities and greater local currency supply under a loosened monetary policy
to neutralise abundant foreign currencies in the forex market, the growth rate
of the Vietnamese banking system quickly mounted up from 25% in 2006 to
53% in 2007, and with domestic credit equaled to 98.3% GDP in 2007, instead
of 40-75% of GDP as in the last period.
Table 5
Vietnam’s Selected Monetary Indicators (2000-2007)416
In addition, the scarcity of VND in the banking system induced a fierce
competition of interest rates, which then almost became a race among commercial
banks, creating disorders in the banking system, segmenting the inter-bank market
and worsening the partial liquidity problems.
c. Boom and Price Bubble in Real Estate and Stock Market
The surge of capital inflows in 2006 and 2007 was seen as one of the main
sources of the price bubble in the real estate market and the boom of the stock
market in Vietnam in the same period. The VN Index increased nearly six times
and the daily trading volume in Vietnam’s stock market grew up more than 10
times just within one year. The fast growth of these markets in 2006 and 2007
fuelled inflationary pressure and induced the growing demand for risky investment
into these markets, risking social and economic consequences should the bubble
collapse.
Figure 10
Vietnam’s Booming Stock Market
(ii) Central Bank’s Response
In order to contain inflation, the SBV started tightening its monetary policies
by sharply increasing its directive interest rates, restricting credit expansion and
raising reserve requirements. SBV’s base interest rate was raised from 8.25%/
annum in 2007 to 8.75%/annum in early 2008 and then quickly was lifted to
12%/annum in May 2008 and continuously to 14% one month later. SBV’s
financing rate and discount rate were also adjusted upward in accordance with
movements in the base interest rate.417
The reserve requirement was raised from 5% to 10% as applied to local
currency and up from 8% to 10% as applied to foreign currencies in June 2007.
Both reserve requirement ratios were increased by an additional 1% in February
2008. The scope of reserve requirement was expanded to include deposits of
all maturities.
In order to help stop the interest rate race among commercial banks that
emerged in February 2008, the SBV temporarily required all commercial banks
to maintain deposit interest rates not exceeding 12%/annum to regain the stability
of money flows in the inter-bank market. Accordingly, the interest rate race
quickly ended, depositors had no demand for shifting their deposits among banks
and SBV’s interest rate ceiling was rescinded immediately. The SBV then
coordinated with the Vietnam Association of Banks for commercial banks to
hold dialogue and reach consensus on maximum rates for deposit mobilisation
so as to stabilise the inter-bank monetary market.
Besides, the SBV tried to sterilise the adverse impact of its forex intervention
on inflation pressure through many ways, such as open market operations,
increase of commercial banks’ required reserve ratio, sale of central bank bills
to commercial banks with diversified maturities from 14 days to 364 days in
order to draw money back from circulation.
In February 2008, the SBV issued and required commercial banks to buy
central bills with the total value of VND 20,300 billion (equivalent to approximately
US$1.28 billion). Banks had over one month for fund resource preparation. They
could even borrow money from SBV to buy adequate central bank’s bills as
required. Banks operating at rural areas or owing small amount of own capital
(less than VND 1000 billion) were not required to buy central bank’s bills.
In order to calm down the overheated credit growth and consolidate the
soundness of the financial system, the SBV issued comprehensive instructions
Table 6
SBV’s Directive Interest Rate Adjustment (2006-2008)
2006 2007 2/2008 19/5/2008 11/6/2008
Base Rate (%) 8.25 8.25 8.75 12 14
Refinancing Rate (%) 6.5 6.5 7.5 13 15
Discount Rate (%) 4.5 4.5 6 11 13418
and implemented specific measures to monitor and control the scale, quality of
banking credit, especially bank lending for high risks areas, such as stock
investment and stock trading. Commercial banks were advised to keep credit
growth below 30% for the whole year 2008. Under the directive of the central
bank issued in July 2007, commercial banks’ total outstanding loans for stock
investment and stock trading and loans guaranteed by stocks were restricted
below 3% of their total outstanding loans. Since February 2008, the banks’ total
outstanding loans and commercial papers discounted for the purpose of stock
investment are not to exceed 20% of their legal capital. Intensive inspection
were carried out by the central bank to scrutinise the commercial banks’ risky
lending activities for consumption, stock, real estate investment and trading or
credit guaranteed by stocks, with the purpose to ensure the safety of the banking
system in the context of a booming market.
Concurrently while tightening monetary policy to curb inflation, the SBV
increased its short-term liquidity support to the banking system through open
market operations and other channel of capital funding. Funds were assigned
with first priority for development of business, export activities, major national
projects and for rural and agricultural development. Money was injected by the
SBV on a timely basis into some small banks to help them overcome temporary
liquidity difficulties and ensure the stability of the whole system.
4.1.3 Balance of Payment Sustainability
The dramatic increase of capital inflows into the economy accumulated a
high capital account surplus for Vietnam, which was the crucial offsetting resource
for its huge current account deficit. It helped to improve its overall balance of
payment. However, the country’s consumption of increasing capital inflows,
particularly portfolio investment, also entailed a greater accumulation of its future
external debt obligation, putting the economy under more volatile foreign currency
positions.
The consumption of greater capital inflows not only pumped more foreign
currencies into the economy but also pushed up the aggregate demand of the
economy, especially for importing of machines, equipments, raw materials and
luxury goods, thus contributing significantly to the country’s widened trade deficit
and deteriorated Vietnam’s balance of payment sustainability. Vietnam’s trade
deficit suddenly climbed up to US$14.1 billion for the year 2007, nearly tripling
the amount of 2006, and reached the equivalent of 25.7% of its export revenues419
for the same period, and continued to swell out to US$14.8 billion just in the first
half of 2008.
Table 7
Vietnam Balance of Payment (2000-2008)
(i) Central Bank’s Response
The SBV proactively cooperated with other relevant ministries to seek
solutions to curb the import increase and encourage exports. On the other hand,
the SBV closely monitored developments of capital flows in and out of the
country in order to predict fluctuations in the balance of payment. The SBV
also actively intervened in the foreign exchange market to buy foreign currencies
for building up its international reserve while easing upward pressure on its local
currency at the same time.420
(ii) Policies Effects
Due to SBV’s flexible exchange rate and monetary management, Vietnam’s
monetary and forex markets as well as exchange rate and interest rate
developments were gradually stabilised. The liquidity of the banking system was
improved. The inter-bank market overnight lending rate quickly went up.
However, these positive developments may coincide with a start of a declining
trend in net capital inflows as a consequence of the worsening situation in the
global economy and financial markets.
4.2 Implications of a Declining Trend in Capital Inflows for Central Bank
Policies and Its Response
4.2.1 Exchange Rate Management Policy
(i) Implications
a. Pressure of Depreciation on Local Currency
Since the second quarter of 2008, Vietnam  witnessed a sign of decline in
net capital inflows into the economy, mainly in net portfolio inflows. This led to
a decreasing supply of foreign currencies available in the economy. Meanwhile,
the demand for foreign currencies continued to increase as the trade deficit
kept widening until the middle of the year. The VND was facing serious
downward pressure in both the official and black markets.
Turning from negative foreign currency positions maintained in the previous
period, when the local foreign exchange market was flooded by foreign
currencies, the domestic banks were not well prepared for the sudden decline
in net portfolio inflows, especially for the demand of short-term capital withdrawal
out of the country. Hence, banks encountered a shortage of foreign currencies
to meet the demand of importers and short-term foreign investors who wanted
to convert their funds into foreign currencies to transfer home. The local currency
was, therefore, under depreciation pressure.
Consequently, the exchange rate escalated to exceed 19.000 VND/US dollar
in the black market while the SBV’s reference rate was still at 16.500 VND/
US dollar, followed by the quoted trading exchange rate of commercial banks
to be kept at around 16.800 VND/US dollar as bounded by the controlled trading
band of 1%. Meanwhile, the 1-year forward exchange rate of US dollar/VND
in VND’s overseas NDF market mounted up to 23.000 VND/US dollar.421
Most of the economy’s important demand of foreign currencies relied on
the supply of the central bank. Trading volumes in foreign exchange market
dropped dramatically both in inter-bank and retail market.
The SBV was once again facing serious difficulties in maintaining the stability
in the foreign exchange market, but this time to protect the local currency from
strong depreciation while preserving their foreign exchange reserve. This situation
was not only the result of net portfolio investment decline but also of speculative
activities in the foreign exchange market.
(ii) Response
The SBV continued implementing flexible exchange rate policies through
flexible adjustment of exchange rate levels and trading bands as well as intensive
foreign exchange intervention.
a. Exchange Rate Downward Adjustment
In parallel with selling US dollar into the market to improve its foreign
exchange liquidity, the SBV proactively adjusted its reference exchange rate
upward gradually in alignment with market developments. Specifically, the SBV’s
reference rate were strongly adjusted upward twice by 2% and 3%,  respectively,
in June and in December 2008 in order to better reflect the balance between
demand and supply in inter-bank foreign exchange market. Around the same
time, the controlled trading band was also widened from + 1% to + 2% to give
more room for commercial banks to adjust their trading rates in accordance
with market fluctuations. Besides, the depreciation of VND was also aimed at
export promotion in the context of the global economic recession.
After each adjustment, the SBV’s reference exchange rate was maintained
relatively stable to signal the market about a period of stabilisation. On the other
hand, the central bank tightened its supervision to request commercial banks to
comply with the official trading band, fix the cross-exchange rate with the third
currencies based on the US dollar/VND exchange rate, and not to add fee to
raise the actual traded exchange rates.422
b. Intensive Foreign Exchange Intervention
The SBV aggressively intervened to stabilise the domestic foreign exchange
market and defended its exchange rate regime by selling foreign currencies to
commercial banks, thus reducing the imbalance between the demand and supply
of foreign currencies and improving the market’s foreign currency liquidity.
Besides, the SBV continued to closely monitor commercial banks’ daily net open
position and used it as a basis for intervention consideration.
4.2.2 Monetary Management Policy
(i) Implications
The decline of net portfolio capital inflows into Vietnam impacted on the
Vietnamese stock and real estate markets in two significant ways. Firstly, it led
directly to a decrease in the total trading volume of the stock market, which
used to rely considerably on the purchasing power of foreign investors. Secondly,
it badly affected the sentiment of local investors in the stock and real estate
markets.
The sharp fall of stock and real estate prices created great difficulties both
for sectors in raising funds for their business operations and for the Government
Table 8
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11/6/2008 + 1 %; increase IWAER by 2% (322 d/USD) for one time
from 16139 -> 16461
27/6/2008 + 2%
07/11/2008 + 3%
24/12/2008 + 3% and increase IWAER by 3% from 16494 -> 16989423
in implementation of its schedule for state-owned enterprise equitisation. It
exacerbated the adverse impact of the on-going tightening monetary policy on
economic growth.
The massive sale of government bonds by foreign investors, on the one
hand, created some disorder in the domestic monetary market and created
pressure on the local currency in the foreign exchange market. On the other
hand, it brought about opportunities for the local banks to buy government bonds
at a low price, improving their balance sheets, increasing instruments for them
to participate in open market operations with the central bank.
(ii) Response
In order to cope with the potential threats and adverse impact arising from
uncertainties in the global financial market, recession in the world’s economy
and the threat of capital flight, the SBV proactively implemented comprehensive
measures to consolidate the banking system, facilitate major economic activities
and promote exporting industries. It adopted flexible but prudent monetary policy
to maintain its primary objective of inflation control. Besides, the SBV proactively
took prudent measures for controlling the pace and  quality of credit growth as
well as in tightening the prudential regulations for banks.
Since the fourth quarter of 2008 when the monthly CPI index showed signs
of declining, the SBV started to gradually loosen its monetary policy to promote
lending activities to stimulate economic growth in the context of global economic
recession and drastic fluctuations in the world’s capital market.
Within a period of three months from late October 2008 to January 2009,
the SBV cut its target interest rates six times from 14% to 7% as applied to
the base rate, from 13% to 6% as applied to the discounting rate, and from 15%
to 8% as applied to the refinancing rate.
The reserve requirement ratio was lowered and lowered while the interest
rate paid on the mandatory local currency reserve of commercial banks
maintained with the central bank was raised from 1.2% to 3.6% (29/8/2008),
5% (24/9/2008), and then to 10% recently. The SBV also hiked the interest
rates paid to the central bank’s obligatory bills held by commercial banks to
encourage commercial banks to lower their lending rates. The SBV also allowed
commercial banks to use their holding of central bank’s obligatory bills to
participate in transactions of refinancing or clearing before expiration.424
All these measures of the SBV were aimed at stimulating improvement in
the capability of the banking system in capital mobilisation and credit extension,
thus increasing liquidity, maintaining the sustainability of the system and
contributing to domestic investment and economic growth stimulation.
Furthermore, the Vietnamese Government and SBV resolved to apply a special
policy of interest rate subsidy to facilitate individuals and institutions in maintaining
and developing their production and business activities in the context of the global
economic recession.
Additionally, a new set of policies were adopted to counteract the recession
of the stock market and encourage the resilience of domestic investors in order
to reduce the impact of foreign capital in the development of this important
capital market.
4.2.3 Balance of Payment Sustainability
(i) Implications
The sudden decline in net portfolio inflows necessitated strong intervention
by the SBV to stabilise the domestic foreign exchange market and protect the
value of its local currency. The decline in net capital portfolio inflows directly
impacted in lowering Vietnam’s capital account surplus, contributing to a sharp
deterioration in its overall balance of payment from a high surplus of US$10.2
billion in 2007 down to $0.5 billion in the first half of 2008.
(ii) Response
In order to maintain the soundness of Vietnam’s balance of payment, the
SBV actively cooperated with the other relevant ministries to implement
comprehensive measures to curb inflation, promote exports and preserve its
international reserve. The SBV established a new, fast daily reporting system
through the commercial banks to monitor the movement of foreign portfolio
investment.
Besides, various steps were taken by the SBV to improve its communication
to the public. Foreign exchange reserves and monetary data was published and
updated frequently on mass media. Weekly statements on monetary and banking
operations were posted on SBV’s Vietnamese and newly launched English-
language websites. Regular press conferences and interviews were held by the
central bank leaders to communicate the central bank’s stance and new policy
decisions regarding monetary and exchange rate policy. These moves of the425
SBV has helped to bolster the confidence not only of the local people but also
of foreign investors on the transparency, consistency of central bank policies
and the stability of the banking system. The timely release of international reserve
data, published the time first-ever, helped to allay the ungrounded concern of a
sharp fall in Vietnam’s international reserves that might lead to a potential crisis
in its balance of payment.
4.3 Implications of Capital Flows Fluctuations for Central Bank Policies
and Its Response
(i) Implications
The flexible movement of capital flows, especially portfolio investment, has
increased the volatility of the forex market and the vulnerability of the financial
and banking system.
As portfolio investment is usually of a short-term and volatile nature, it is
also called hot money. It can flow in and out of the country very rapidly in
response to changing conditions in the global and domestic economies and in the
financial market. The flexible movement of short-term capital flows subjected
the forex market to many unpredictable mini-shocks, continuously generating
short-term shortage of demand or supply of foreign currencies and segmenting
the forex market, thus creating difficulties for exchange rate and monetary policies
and threatening the sustainability of domestic banking system.
(ii) Response
In order to protect the domestic economy and financial market from the
adverse effects of the increasing flexible capital flows, the SBV enhanced its
supervision and inspection over the money market and set up a fast reporting
system to provide for appropriate market assessment and timely intervention. It
gradually overhauled its banking supervision approach and reformed the structure
and institutional framework of financial supervision. A specialised and dedicated
Banking Supervision Agency and National Committee of Finance Supervision
were established.
Additionally, the SBV took comprehensive measures to improve the liquidity
of commercial banks both in VND and in foreign currency, and strengthened
the resilience of the banking system to withstand the increasing fluctuation of
international capital flows. The measures include:426
- Enhancing controls for credit risk, especially credit extension for investment
in securities and real estate.
- Promoting privatisation of state-owned commercial banks with a view to
strengthening their financial capacity and improving their banking management
capability.
- Modifying the regulations on the issuance of licenses for the establishment
and operation of joint-stock commercial banks and foreign banks.
- Modifying the principles of loan classifications and setting detailed limitations
on financial investment by credit institutions: Under the requirement of the
SBV, by the year 2008, commercial banks were required to build internal
credit-rating systems to facilitate their loan classification and credit quality
management.
- Strengthening the financial capability of the banking system by setting out
and implementing the following agenda of increasing the regulatory capital
applicable for banks in accordance with the directive of the Prime Minister:
Table 9
Regulatory Capital Applicable for Various Types of Banks in Vietnam
No. Type of credit institutions 2008 2010
1. State-owned commercial banks VND 3000 billion VND 3000 billion
2. Joint stock commercial banks VND 1000 billion VND 3000 billion
3. Joint-venture banks VND 1000 billion VND 3000 billion
4. 100% foreign-owned banks VND 1000 billion VND 3000 billion
5. Foreign bank branches $ 15 million $ 15 million
6. Investment Banks VND 3.000 billion VND 3000 billion
7. Development Banks VND 5.000 billion VND 5000 billion
8. Cooperative Banks VND 1.000 billion VND 3000 billion
9. Finance Companies VND 300 billion VND  500 billion
10 Finance Leasing Companies VND 100 billion VND 150 billion
(Reference Exchange Rate: 1 US$ =  VND 16.900)427
(iii) Policy Effects
Thanks to the appropriately flexible and prudent management of exchange
rate, monetary policies and banking supervision enhancement made by the SBV,
the Vietnamese economy quickly overcame the macroeconomic uncertainties.
Despite the adverse impact of the global economic recession and financial
crisis and of the domestic macroeconomic uncertainties, Vietnam achieved a
GDP growth rate of 7.4% in the first quarter of 2008. It recorded GDP growth
of 6.3% for the whole year of 2008, a growth rate though lower than the previous
year but still higher than that of many countries in the region and in the world.
The SBV was successful in controlling inflation. The monthly CPI index
was lowered to below 2% since July 2008, and turned marginally negative in
October 2008. Inflation rate was 19.89% for the whole year 2008 in comparison
with 2007.
The trade deficit was gradually reduced and maintained under control. It
remained below US$1 billion since June 2008, and totalled US$17.5 billion for
the whole year of 2008. The overall balance of payment was slightly positive.
Figure 11
Vietnam’s Monthly CPI index in 2008428
FDI inflows still increased to a record level attaining the registered amount
of US$59.36 billion in the ten months of 2008, of which US$9.1 billion was
realised . FDI inflows increased 38.3% against the same period of the previous
year. This is evidence to show that foreign investors are still confident in the
medium and long-term prospects of the Vietnamese economy.
Figure 12
Vietnam’s Monthly Trade Deficit in 2008
US $ billion
Figure 13
Disbursement of FDI in Vietnam in 2008
US billion429
The financial and banking system quickly consolidated both in scale and in
depth, liquidity and solvency were maintained during the most volatile periods of
capital flows fluctuations. Despite the fact that the international banking system
is still struggling with liquidity problem, the Vietnam banking system was kept
stable and safe without any bankruptcy or bank failures. The NLP ratio was
about 3% of outstanding loans; the capital adequacy ratio was better than the
previous year and nearly 10%. Money was injected by the SBV into some small
banks which faced a liquidity shortage to restore their liquidity. The deposit and
lending interest rate were quickly reduced both in wholesale and retail markets.
The commercial banks consolidated their internal inspection and audit control
systems, enhancing internal monitoring. They adopted more prudent procedures
in regard of loan evaluation and assessment. Credit quality as well as banks’
corporate governance and management capability improved significantly.
The local foreign exchange market was quickly stabilised after each mini-
shock in the supply or demand of foreign currencies due to capital inflow
fluctuations. The exchange rate of US dollar/VND became quite stable around
17000 both in the official and parallel market. The differential between the
exchange rate in the official and parallel market was insignificant.
ith a fluctuation of over 9% of VND exchange rate in both ways
(appreciating and depreciating) for the whole year of 2008, Vietnam’s exchange
rate policy was progressively more flexible but still under management. The
SBV was quite successful in its innovative forex intervention strategy to stabilise
the exchange rate and foreign exchange market. Though the intervention volumes
were great during the years of 2007 and 2008, they   did not deteriorate the
national foreign exchange reserve, thanks to the SBV’s appropriate management
of reserve, buying in when market was over-supplied with foreign currencies
and selling out when market was in shortage of foreign currencies. Confidence
in the value of the VND and Vietnam’s economic prospects was restored and
strengthened.
5. Conclusion
Together with a fully liberalised current account, Vietnam removed many
restrictions on its capital account, taking significant steps towards a liberalised
capital account. Since its issuance of the first Law on Foreign Investment in
1988, Vietnam  continuously amended and issued many relevant legal documents
to create a transparent and favorable legal framework to encourage foreign
investment, especially FDI into the country. Apart from some regulations limiting430
the maximum level of participation of foreign investors in Vietnam’s companies
or in some special areas, Vietnam’s Government does not impose any restrictions
on capital inflows or withdrawals.
With its liberalised trade policies and a quite open capital account, Vietnam
is well integrated into the world economy. Being a member of the AFTA, APEC
and, most recently, the WTO, Vietnam has emerged as an attractive destination
for global investors, especially in the period of 2006-2007, attracting an increasingly
significant amount of foreign investment contributing to its economic development.
Since 1995 until now, Vietnam’s capital account surplus has been rising
(except 2000), of which, FDI is always the main part (except the year 2003).
This is the advantage of Vietnam in maintaining a healthy capital structure,
facilitating its sustainable economic development. However, the sudden surge of
portfolio investment inflows into Vietnam since 2005 and their fluctuations trending
downwards during 2008 are noteworthy and necessitated an appropriate policy
response as it raised the proportion of short-term and volatile capital in Vietnam’s
capital structure.
Alongside the great opportunities for economic growth and market
development that can be reaped from strong capital inflows, the increasing
flexibility of capital flows in and out of the country posed tough challenges to
the SBV. The greatest challenge may be the problem of the ‘impossible trinity”,
which was clearly manifested in the difficulties of the SBV in maintaining the
desired exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy under the impact of
strong fluctuations in capital flows.
The mounting supply of foreign currencies that resulted from high capital
inflows not only exacerbated the dollarisation in the economy, but also increased
the total broad money, leading to inflation hike, overheated credit growth, price
bubble in real estate and stock markets, making central bank’s tasks in managing
monetary policies more complicated.
The volatility of capital flows, especially portfolio investment, created instability
in the domestic forex market by causing continuous shifts between short-term
surplus and shortage of foreign currency supply and exerting upward and
downward pressure on the local currency exchange rate. This not only made
things more complicated for the central bank in the formulation and management
of its monetary and exchange rate policies, but it also increased the volatility of
the forex market and tested the soundness of the domestic financial and banking
system.431
The strong capital inflows, on the one hand, built up a high surplus in Vietnam’s
capital account, thereby serving as a crucial resource for its balance of payment
improvement and facilitating its international reserve consolidation. On the other
hand, they pushed up the demand for imports, thus deteriorating its trade balance.
In order to cope with the side-effects of the increasingly volatile capital
flows, the SBV adopted flexible exchange rate policies, tightened monetary
policies for inflation control and initiated comprehensive measures to improve
the liquidity of commercial banks and enhance the central bank’s supervision
over the money market and banking system. Developments of capital flows in
and out the country are subject to close surveillance by the SBV to prepare for
any fluctuations in the balance of payment.
Due to the appropriate and timely response of the SBV, the Vietnamese
economy rapidly surmounted the macroeconomic uncertainties. The economy
grew by 6.3% in 2008 in spite of the adverse impact of the world’s economic
recession and the global financial crisis. Inflation was successfully controlled
and the trade deficit was narrowed. FDI inflows still increased to reach a record
level with the registered amount of US$ 59.36 billion in the first ten months of
2008.
The financial and banking system consolidated rapidly both in scale and in
depth, and liquidity and solvency were maintained during the most volatile periods
of capital flow fluctuations. The commercial banks raised their working capital,
consolidated their internal inspection and audit control systems, enhancing internal
monitoring. They adopted prudential procedures in respect of loan evaluation
and assessment. As a result, credit quality as well as the banks’ corporate
governance improved significantly. The local foreign exchange market stabilised
quickly after each mini-shock in supply or demand of foreign currencies.
Confidence in the value of VND and in the outlook of Vietnam’s economic
prospects was restored and strengthened.
Since the last quarter of 2008, Vietnam’s economy was starting to be
affected by the worsening global economic and financial situation. In this context,
the SBV, once again, showed its promptness and flexibility when it proactively
made a big policy shift from a tightened to a prudently loosened monetary policy
and implemented comprehensive measures to stimulate demand and facilitate
economic growth. Appropriate and massive measures were taken in a timely
manner to mitigate the adverse effects of the external environment on the
domestic economy.432
The lesson of experience of Vietnam teaches us that the capital account
liberalisation should be conducted in a gradual and orderly manner in alignment
with a strengthened banking system and a flexible exchange rate mechanism.
The macroeconomic policy adjustments should be carried out in a consistent and
timely manner to help strengthen the sustainability of the financial system and
promote confidence in the local currency, and to act as a cushion for unpredictable
fluctuations in capital flows. The banking supervision and internal controls need
to be further strengthened to prevent banks from taking risky or volatile positions.
The quality and timeliness of the banks’ reporting systems should be enhanced
and the early warning system, both at the macro and microeconomic levels,
should be quickly established to trace and prepare for any signals of instability.
While further efforts should be made to improve the trade balance so as
to minimise the vulnerability of overall balance of payment to capital flight, a set
of technical measures may be established to exercise indirect and effective control
on hot money flows. Additionally, an effective and intensive public communication
strategy can make a significant contribution to bolster public and investor
confidence. The central bank’s stance on monetary and exchange rate policy
should be made more transparent to the public, which will help to protect the
markets from psychological shocks. The public is to be made aware about the
objectives and implications of macroeconomic policy adjustments to create
consistent incentives for economic development.
According to the assessment of the world’s leading financial institutions,
such as the World Bank, the IMF, etc., in spite of the inevitable adverse impact
of the global economic recession, Vietnam’s economic prospects shine bright in
the medium-term. Vietnam remains an attractive destination for global investors.
Effective capital flow management is a tough, but critical task for Vietnam. It
is a vital challenge for the country to meet, now and in the near future, if it is
to get the most benefit from further integration and from globalisation of the
international capital market, while minimising the side-effects.433
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